JUDGMENT 1. THE Mutawalliship and Enrolment Committee (hereafter the Committee) of the Board of Wakfs, West Bengal (hereafter the Board) adopted a resolution on June 29, 2011 appointing a Committee Mutawalli of 11 (eleven) members to administer the affairs of Hazi Rousan Ali Wakf Estate (hereafter the said estate) for a period of 5 (five) years in terms of provisions contained in Section 63 read with Section 3(i) of the Wakf Act, 1995 (hereafter the Act). The resolution was confirmed by the Board in its meeting held on July 13, 2011. 2. THE petitioner challenged appointment of the Committee Mutawalli in respect of the said estate by presenting an application under Section 83(2) of the Act before the Tribunal constituted in terms of Section 83(1) thereof. In connection with such application, the petitioner had applied for stay of the resolution under challenge. The Presiding Officer of the Tribunal by order dated July 27, 2011 declined stay on the ground that the provisions of the Act do not empower him to stay the operation of the resolution under challenge during pendency of the application under Section 83(2) thereof. The order dated July 27, 2011 is the subject matter of challenge in this revisional application. 3. MR. Munshi, learned advocate for the petitioner refers to a judgment dated August 12, 2011 passed by this Court while disposing of C.O. 2519 of 2011 (Manjur Rahaman Khan v. The Board of Wakfs, West Bengal and ors.). It was held therein, on consideration of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2010 (12) SCALE 323 = (2011) 1 WBLR (SC) 308 (Board of Wakf, West Bengal v. Anis Fatma Begum and anr.), that the Tribunal does enjoy the power to stay operation of the resolution under challenge before it in view of the provisions contained in Section 83(5) of the Act. He, accordingly, prayed for an order to set aside the order impugned and for a direction on the Tribunal to consider his prayer for stay. 4. MR. Roy, learned advocate for the opposite parties 2 to 4 opposed the application. He contended that the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal was right in passing the impugned order since the provisions of the Act do not empower him to grant interim stay pending decision on an application filed under Section 83(2) of the Act. It is the specific contention of Mr. He contended that the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal was right in passing the impugned order since the provisions of the Act do not empower him to grant interim stay pending decision on an application filed under Section 83(2) of the Act. It is the specific contention of Mr. Roy that in terms of Section 83(5) of the Act, the Tribunal would be deemed to be a Civil Court and entitled to exercise such powers that are available to be exercised by the Civil Courts in terms of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter the Code) only if the Tribunal is in seisin of a suit instituted before it and not otherwise. In support of his submission, Mr. Roy placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2010 (2) CLJ (SC) 233 (Syed Mohideen and anr. v. Ramanathanpura Peria Mogallam Jamath and ors.). It was further contended that the decision in Syed Mohideen (supra) was not noticed either by the Supreme Court in Anis Fatma Begum (supra) or by this Court while deciding Manjur Rahaman Khan (supra) and that the former decision having correctly interpreted Section 83(5) of the Act, the order of the Presiding Officer impugned herein does not warrant interference and ought to be upheld based thereon. 5. THE decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1992 SC 1 (Mohan Kumar Singhania and ors. v. Union of India and ors.) was referred to by Mr. Roy to contend that when the language of the statute is clear and explicit, the words have to be construed in the ordinary sense. 6. MR. Roy next placed reliance on the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court reported in 1991 (2) CHN 131 (In re : State Transport Authority and anr.), wherein it was held that a District Forum or the State Commission has not been vested with any power under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to grant and/or pass any ad-interim order and since those tribunals are not Civil Courts and do not have the necessary trappings of a Civil Court so as to be deemed as such, it does not enjoy inherent powers as embodied in the Code. Reference was made by him to the decision reported in AIR 2001 Madras 431 (A.M. Ali Akbar and anr. Reference was made by him to the decision reported in AIR 2001 Madras 431 (A.M. Ali Akbar and anr. v. Keelakarai South Street Jamath Masjeed Paripalana Committee and ors.), wherein it was held, relying on the decision in State Transport Authority (supra), that petitions for permanent and temporary injunction would not be entertainable by the Tribunal constituted under the Act. 7. FINALLY, reliance was placed on the decision of a learned Judge of this Court reported in 2005 (1) CLJ (Cal) 467 (Abdur Rahim Dewan v. State of West Bengal and ors.), wherein it was held that the Tribunal constituted in terms of Section 83(1) of the Act and functioning as an appellate authority, is not entitled to receive additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code since such power has not been conferred on it by the Act. 8. MR. Yusuf, learned advocate representing the opposite party no.1 i.e. the Board, adopted MR. Roys submission and echoed that the application merits dismissal. This Court has heard learned advocates for the parties and considered the materials on record. Before proceeding to decide whether the impugned order warrants interference or not based on the decision in Manjur Rahaman Sarkar (supra), it would be profitable to read few of the provisions contained in the Act. 9. ON reading the provisions of the Act, it appears that the Tribunal constituted thereunder may be approached either by instituting a suit [Sections 6(1) and 54(4)], by presenting an appeal [Sections 33(4), 38(7), 52(4) and 64(4)] and by preferring an application [Section 83(2)]. The powers and functions of the Tribunal are embodied in Section 83 of the Act and the rules framed under the Act. In terms of its rule making power conferred by Section 195 of the Act, the Governor of the State of West Bengal has been pleased to make the West Bengal Wakf Rules, 2001 (hereafter the said Rules). Rule 27 of the Rules provide for the additional procedure that the Tribunal may follow in the conduct of its business. 10. THE Act does not say that while acting as an appellate authority, the Tribunal in no case would enjoy the power to grant stay. Rule 27 of the Rules provide for the additional procedure that the Tribunal may follow in the conduct of its business. 10. THE Act does not say that while acting as an appellate authority, the Tribunal in no case would enjoy the power to grant stay. It is settled law that when appellate jurisdiction is conferred, unless there is a specific provision to the contrary, the jurisdiction of the appellate authority would be of widest amplitude and in proper cases such authority may have jurisdiction to grant interim relief (see AIR 2001 SC 3025 : Punjab State Electricity Board v. National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd.). Considering that power to grant stay is not expressly barred and there are certain provisions in the Act [Sections 33(4) and 69(3)] specifying the situations where the Tribunal exercising appellate powers shall not grant stay, it would be acting within legal parameters if in a given situation, not attracting Sections 33(4) and 69(3) of the Act, it considers necessary to grant stay in the interest of justice in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The situation would not exactly be the same when the Tribunal is considering an original application. Since the provisions of the Act do not expressly or by necessary implication include the power to grant interim stay insofar as an application which is preferred before it is concerned, interim stay cannot be granted by it. 11. HOWEVER, the Tribunal while trying a suit instituted before it would, in terms of provisions contained in Section 83(5) of the Act, be deemed to be a Civil Court and all powers that are available to a Civil Court in terms of the provisions contained in the Code for granting injunction and to execute such order would be available to it for exercise. This is what has been laid down in the decision in Syed Mohideen (supra). The relevant portion reads as under: We, however, may make it clear that in terms of Section 83(5) of the Wakf Act, 1995 the Wakf Tribunal is deemed to be a Civil Court and has the same powers as are exercised by Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit or executing a decree or order. The Civil Courts are in turn competent to issue injunctions in terms of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 and Section 151 C.P.C. Similar orders can, therefore, be passed by the Wakf Tribunal also in suits that are legally triable by it if a case for grant of such injunction or direction is made out by the party concerned. 12. WITHOUT noticing the aforesaid interpretation of Section 83(5) of the Act, the Supreme Court in its subsequent decision in Anis Fatma Begum (supra) ruled as follows: Under Section 83(5) of the Wakf Act, 1995 the Tribunal has all powers of the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, and hence it has also powers under Order 39 Rules 1, 2, and 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure to grant temporary injunctions and enforce such injunctions. Hence, a full-fledged remedy is available to any party if there is any dispute, question or other matter relating to a Wakf or Wakf property. While the former decision interprets Section 83(5) of the Act to restrict the power of the Tribunal to grant stay only in respect of suits triable by it, the latter decision evidently does not by interpretation impose any such restriction and tends to suggest that in respect of any dispute, question or matter relating to a wakf or a wakf property, which is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, can be decided by it and in so deciding, it would have all powers of a Civil Court under the Code and hence powers under Order 39 Rules 1, 2 and 2A thereof to grant temporary injunctions and to enforce such injunctions can be exercised by it. 13. RELYING on the law laid down in Anis Fatma Begum (supra), this Court proceeded to hold in Manjur Rahaman Khan (supra) that the Tribunal has the power to grant stay even on an application preferred under Section 83(2) of the Act. But now, on re-reading Section 83(5) of the Act, it appears to this Court to be clear that the power of the Tribunal to exercise powers that are available to a Civil Court under the Code is only in respect of suits and not in respect of an original application. But now, on re-reading Section 83(5) of the Act, it appears to this Court to be clear that the power of the Tribunal to exercise powers that are available to a Civil Court under the Code is only in respect of suits and not in respect of an original application. Use of the punctuation, before and after the words while trying a suit is significant for the words while trying a suit refers to the lis before the Tribunal and not a Civil Court. There has been a misreading of Section 83(5) of the Act in Manjur Rahaman Khan (supra) and this Court does not, therefore, hesitate to record that Manjur Rahaman Khan (supra) has not been correctly decided. 14. IN view of the divergence of opinion, let this revisional application be now placed before the Honble the Chief Justice for constitution of an appropriate Bench to resolve the issue as to whether or not the Tribunal constituted under the Act has the power, after receiving an application under Section 83(2) of the Act, to grant interim relief in any form or interim stay of the order under challenge passed by the Board to be operative till such time the application is finally decided. The revisional application may be placed for decision after the issue is resolved. Photostat certified copy of this order may be furnished to the applicant at an early date.