JUDGMENT Mr. M.M. Kumar, J.: - The unsuccessful petitioner-appellant has filed the instant appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent against the judgment dated 25.11.2010 rendered by the learned Single Judge upholding the order, dated 7.9.2006 (P-6), dismissing the appellant from service after holding a departmental inquiry against him. He has been found guilty of the misconduct for accepting bribe for sanctioning of loan to farmers. The appeal filed by the appellant was also rejected vide order dated 19.12.2006 (P-3) and further appeal before the Review Committee also met the same fate, vide order dated 6.10.2009 (P-6). 2. Before the learned Single Judge primarily two grounds were urged. Firstly, it was contended that during regular inquiry the petitioner cross-examined the complainant and the witnesses. The Enquiry Officer accepted the testimony of the witnesses and held the petitioner-appellant guilty. However, during the pendency of appeal he got affidavits from the said witnesses wherein they have resiled from the earlier statement given before the Enquiry Officer. As per the petitioner-appellant, the whole inquiry is vitiated. Secondly, it was submitted before the learned Single Judge that the complainant was a disgruntled customer of the bank whom the petitioner-appellant had forced to pay the outstanding loan. To prove this fact, the petitioner wanted to examine the witnesses but was not allowed by the Enquiry Officer. Both these arguments have been repelled by the learned Single Judge by observing as under: “ Both the arguments are misconceived. A subsequent affidavit may or may not have the probative value of testimony which is given in person and which has been tested by cross-examination. As regards the second argument, even if it is accepted that the complainant was a disgruntled customer, yet it would not detract from the merit or otherwise of the complaint. What the learned counsel is arguing, in reality is reappreciation of the evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in The Managing Director State Bank of Hyderabad and another vs. P. Kata Rao, 2008 (3) SCT 153 has held clearly that superior Courts exercise a limited jurisdiction in interfering with findings of fact arrived at by the inquiry officer. This would apply with even more vigour when the said findings of fact have been affirmed in appeal and further proceedings. Learned counsel has not been able to persuade me that the departmental proceedings were so vitiated as to render them nonest.” 3. This would apply with even more vigour when the said findings of fact have been affirmed in appeal and further proceedings. Learned counsel has not been able to persuade me that the departmental proceedings were so vitiated as to render them nonest.” 3. In the instant appeal the petitioner-appellant has averred that the learned Single Judge has not considered the issue of quantum of punishment. It has been submitted that the respondents have inflicted upon him extreme penalty of removal from service merely on account of some lapses/irregularities without taking into consideration about 23 years of service rendered by him. According to the petitioner-appellant the Courts are empowered to alter or interfere with the penalty. In that regard reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Ramanuj Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2009) 7 SCC 248. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and perusing the paper book we are of the considered view that the instant appeal is devoid of merit and does not warrant admission. The petitioner-appellant has not been able to point out any material irregularity in holding of the departmental inquiry against him. It is well settled that the Courts are not a Court of Appeal over and above the Inquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate/Revisional Authority. As a concept of law the Courts cannot re-appreciate evidence to reach a conclusion different than the one recorded by the Inquiry Officer merely because another view is possible. In that regard reliance may be placed on the observations made by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde, (2006) 7 SCC 212. Learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant has not been able to point out either any violation of the principles of natural justice nor any statutory rules warranting a conclusion that he has not been treated fairly. Once the findings of fact are well based and the procedural requirements contemplated by the Rules have been complied with then the quantum of punishment cannot be interfered with. It is equally well settled that if the Inquiry Officer, Punishing Authority or the Appellate Authority has proceeded on the basis of wholly irrelevant material or wholly irrelevant consideration or in violation of principles of natural justice only then the Courts are empowered to interfere with the quantum of punishment. It is equally well settled that if the Inquiry Officer, Punishing Authority or the Appellate Authority has proceeded on the basis of wholly irrelevant material or wholly irrelevant consideration or in violation of principles of natural justice only then the Courts are empowered to interfere with the quantum of punishment. In that regard reliance may be placed on the Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Gurdev Singh v. State of Haryana, [2006(4) Law Herald (P&H) (DB) 3216] : 2007 (1) RSJ 45. In that case a Division Bench of this Court (of which one of us, M.M. Kumar, J. was a member) has considered the application of Wednesbury Principles by referring to para 242 of a Constitution Bench judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v. Union of India, (2006) (2) SCC 1. The aforesaid para 242 reads as under:- “242. The Wednesbury principle is often misunderstood to mean that any administrative decision which is regarded by the Court to be unreasonable must be struck down. The correct understanding of the Wednesbury principle is that a decision will be said to be unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense if (i) it is based on wholly irrelevant material or wholly irrelevant consideration, (ii) it has ignored a very relevant material which it should have taken into consideration, or (iii) it is so absurd that no sensible person could ever have reached it.” (Emphasis added) 5. Hon’ble the Supreme Court has also referred the “Wednesbury Principles” in the case of Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386. The views of Lord Greene in the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1947) 2 All England Reports 680, have been relied upon by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in para No. 26 and the conclusion has been recorded in para 71. The aforementioned paras read as under:- “ 26. Lord Greene said in 1948 in the Wednesbury case, (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA), that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. The aforementioned paras read as under:- “ 26. Lord Greene said in 1948 in the Wednesbury case, (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA), that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. He said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors were considered; or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken. These principles were consistently followed in the UK and in India to judge the validity of administrative action. It is equally well known that in 1983, Lord Diplock in Council for Civil Services Union v. Minister of Civil Service, (1983) 1 AC 768, (called the GCHQ case) summarised the principles of judicial review of administrative action as based upon one or other of the following viz., illegality, procedural irregularity and irrationality. He, however, opined that “proportionality” was a “future possibility”. XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 71. Thus, from the above principles and decided cases, it must be held that where an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned as “arbitrary” under Article 14, the court is confined to Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing authority. The court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Article 14 applies in such a context. The court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in rare cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the courts, and such extreme or rare cases can the court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment.” 6. A Constitution Bench had another opportunity to succinctly state these principles in the case of Rameshwar Prasad (VI) (supra). In para 242, their Lordships’ have issued the guidelines for correct understanding of Wednesbury Principles, which have already been extracted above. 7. A Constitution Bench had another opportunity to succinctly state these principles in the case of Rameshwar Prasad (VI) (supra). In para 242, their Lordships’ have issued the guidelines for correct understanding of Wednesbury Principles, which have already been extracted above. 7. When the principles laid down in the aforementioned judgments are applied to the facts of the present case, we find that the Wednesbury principles, as per the guidelines given in Rameshwar Prasad’s case (supra) would not be attracted because principles of natural justice have been religiously complied with. Therefore, the impugned orders passed by the punishing, appellate and revisional authorities would not require any intervention. 8. The judgment in Ramanuj Pandey’s case (supra) would also not come to the rescue of the petitioner-appellant because after noticing the observation made in the earlier judgments rendered in the cases of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 and Commissioner of Police v. Syed Hussain, (2006) 3 SCC 173, in para 9 of the judgment it has been specifically observed that it is for the disciplinary authority or the administrative authority to decide the quantum of punishment in a case of misconduct and the role of the Court is only secondary. In B.C. Chaturvedi’s case (supra) it has been held that the High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. When the above principle is applied to the present case we find no ground which may shock the conscience of even a common man. The charges levelled against the petitioner-appellant were serious in nature and stood proved. He has been found accepting bribe for sanctioning of loan to poor farmers. Therefore, we have no hesitation to reject the argument raised by the petitioner-appellant. 9. For the reasons aforementioned, we find no merit in the instant appeal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. --------------