Judgment :- (V. Periya Karuppiah.,J) 1. O.S.A.No.285 of 2010 is directed against the order passed in A.No.605 of 2009 dated 25.6.2009 in dismissing the claim of the appellant to condone the delay of 82 days in filing the application to set aside the judgment and decree dated 27.6.2008 made in A.No.112 of 2007 in E.P.No.202 of 2000 passed by the learned Master. 2. O.S.A.No.286 of 2010 is directed against the order passed in A.No.606 of 2009 dated 25.6.2009 in dismissing the claim of the appellant to condone the delay of 82 days in filing the application to set aside the judgment and decree dated 27.6.2008 made in A.No.114 of 2007 in E.P.No.203 of 2000 passed by the learned Master. 3. The short facts necessary for the disposal of these appeals are as follows: i) The respondents herein filed E.P.No.202 and 203 of 2000 respectively before this Court against M/s. Feena Petro Products Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as Company) for execution of the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal on 11.03.2000 directing the Company to pay the arrears of rent, amounting to Rs.10,76,389/- together with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of award till the date of realization. The Arbitral Tribunal also directed the company to deliver the leased 6425 LPG cylinders to the respondents failing which, directed to pay the cost of Rs.50,11,500/- towards the cylinders and also a sum of Rs.1,45,200/- towards costs. Since it failed to remit the lease rentals in terms of the award, the above E.P.Nos.202 and 203 of 2000 were filed. In the said Execution Petitions, the appellant was impleaded as a party respondent by order dated 13.3.2006. Subsequently, the respondents filed Application Nos. 112 and 114 of 2007 in E.P.Nos. 202 and 203 of 2000 respectively to direct the appellant Corporation to deliver 6425 LPG cylinders leased to the Company or in the alternative, direct the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs.50,11,500/- being the cost of the leased cylinders. ii) The Company had availed first Hire Purchase Term Loan of Rs.90.00 lakhs on 20.8.1995 and the second Hire Purchase Term Loan of Rs.150.00 lakhs on 30.01.1996 from the appellant Corporation for the purchase of LPG cylinder and valves. ii) The Company had availed first Hire Purchase Term Loan of Rs.90.00 lakhs on 20.8.1995 and the second Hire Purchase Term Loan of Rs.150.00 lakhs on 30.01.1996 from the appellant Corporation for the purchase of LPG cylinder and valves. Since the Company failed to repay the amount borrowed, the appellant Corporation foreclosed the loan amount on 16.10.1997 and took possession of Unit I and II and also the collateral security on 31.08.1996 Aggrieved by the same, the Company filed W.P.No.7209 of 1998 before this Court and this Court suspended the proceedings dated 16.10.1997and 06.05.1998 on condition that the Company shall pay a sum of Rs.74.00 lakhs on or before 15.7.1998 and another sum of Rs.8.00 lakhs to be paid before March 1999. Since the company failed to comply with the conditional order, the appellant took possession of the collateral security belonging to the company and brought the same for public auction. The Company again filed W.P.No.9843 of 1998 on the ground that it has moved BIFR for rehabilitation of the industry in Case Nos.123 of 1999 and obtained interim stay. Subsequently, by the order dated 9.9.1998, W.P.No.9843 of 1998 was disposed of directing the BIFR to dispose of the case No.123 of 1999 pending before it . Until final order is passed by BIFR, the Appellant Corporation was directed to hand over the possession back to the company. W.P.No.7402 of 1998 was kept pending. By order dated 15.11.1999, the BIFR dismissed the petition filed by the Company. Thereafter, this Court gave a finding in W.P.7209 of 1998 that the appellant Corporation is entitled to take possession of the Unit and to realize the amount due. While the appellant took possession of the land building and machineries of the Company, there was only 847 cylinders available in the premises and not 6425 cylinders as claimed by the respondents and the employee of the Company also refused to sign the mahazar. Subsequently, the Company filed application before the BIFR for reference under Section 15(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies Act 1985. Since none represented on behalf of the Company, the BIFR directed issuance of show cause notice in two newspapers mentioning that the company’s reference would be liable for dismissal. In response to the said show cause notice, M/s. TVS finance & Services Ltd., filed application dated 26.05.2003 requesting the BIFR for removal of the cylinders against its dues by the Company. In response to the said show cause notice, M/s. TVS finance & Services Ltd., filed application dated 26.05.2003 requesting the BIFR for removal of the cylinders against its dues by the Company. By order dated 05.04.2004, the BIFR dismissed the reference of the company. The respondent had in fact attended the hearing on 05.04.2004 before the BIFR but omitted to bring it to the notice of this Court what transpired at the meeting held on 05.04.2004 and has vaguely stated that the reference was dismissed. It was within the knowledge of the respondent about the request made by Ms. TVS finance & Services Ltd., for removal of cylinders against its dues. The appellant was impleaded as a party respondent in E.P.Nos. 203 and 204 of 2000 respectively and Application Nos. 112 and 114 of 2007 were filed by the respondents to direct the appellant to deliver 6425 LPG cylinders leased to the Company or in the alternative pay a sum of Rs.50,11,500/-, being the cost of the leased cylinders and the respondent further sought for direction to direct the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs.50,51,500/-being the cost of leased cylinders. Both the Application Nos. 112 and 114 of 2007 were allowed. The appellant preferred applications i.e., Application Nos. 605 and 606 of 2009 to condone the delay of 82 days in preferring the applications against the order of the learned Master but the applications were dismissed by this Court. Hence, these appeals. 4. Heard Mr.Jayesh B.Dolia, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr.Sathish Parasaran learned counsel for the respondents. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit in his arguments that the explanation offered by the appellant for the delay of 82 days in preferring the applications was not condoned by the learned Single Judge despite the reasons given for such delay which was purely due to the collection of documents for the purpose of preferring the appeals. He would further submit in his argument that the reason for condonation of delay was towards collection of documents but however, the learned Single Judge has mentioned that there was no reason assigned by the applicant which is not correct. He would also submit in his arguments that the appellant has lost their valuable rights of contesting the case on merits merely on the dismissal of the applications filed by him. He would also submit in his arguments that the appellant has lost their valuable rights of contesting the case on merits merely on the dismissal of the applications filed by him. He would further submit that the condonation of delay was purely an administrative delay in collecting the documents and the appellant/applicant is a Government Agency and it cannot be treated equivalent to an individual person for condoning the delay. He would rely upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2008(14) SCC 582 (State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Ahmed Jaan) in support of this argument. He would therefore, request the Court that the condonation of delay caused in filing the applications against the order passed by the learned Master have to be set aside. He would further submit that the learned Master has passed the order which is against law as well as against all principles and therefore, it has to be adjudicated before the learned Single Judge by filing the applications. Therefore, he would request the Court to set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the applications filed by the appellants for condoning the delay of 82 days in preferring the application before the learned Single Judge. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents would submit in his argument that the applicant has not explained the delay as required in law. He would further submit that the applicant had the knowledge of the proceeding pending from the year 2006 and therefore, it cannot be construed that the delay was only 82 days and it is more than four years. He would also submit that the applicant has no merits in his case before lower Court and on considering all these circumstances, the learned single Judge had dismissed the claim of the applicant before the lower Court. He would also submit that the reasons submitted by the applicant before the lower Court would depict nothing and it is not sufficient for condoning the delay of 82 days. He would also draw the attention of the Court to a judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in 2010(5) SCC 459 (State of A.P. vs. McDowell & Co.) for the principle that the same yardstick to be applied for deciding the application of private individual and State. However, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible with regard to the State. However, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible with regard to the State. He would also submit that the appellant/applicant has not even explained the delay for collection of the documents. Therefore, he would request the Court that the learned Single Judge was right in dismissing the claim of the appellant and therefore, both the appeals may be dismissed. 7. We have given anxious consideration to the arguments advanced on either side. The appeals have arisen against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the condonation applications filed by the appellant in both the cases for filing applications questioning the order passed by the learned Master. The further submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the learned Master has passed the order in E.P.Nos. 202 and 203 of 2010 on 27.06.2008. The orders passed by the learned Master would direct the appellants who were the respondents therein to deliver 6425 numbers of LPG cylinders to M/s. Feena Petro Products Limited or in the alternative to pay a sum of Rs.50,11,500/- being the cost of 6425 numbers of LPG cylinders to the applicant in the said E.P. Similar order was passed by the learned Master in Application Nos.112 and 114 of 2007. Aggrieved by the said orders, the appellant herein had preferred applications before the learned Single Judge and in preferring such applications, delay of 82 days have been caused. 8. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents would be that it is not 82 days but the delay would be more than four years. According to him, the appellants have knowledge of the proceedings from the date of their impleadment in the said execution proceedings as garnishee. However, it is not disputed that the order of the learned Master was passed only on 27.6.2008. According to Order XIV Rule 12 of the Original Side Rules, the appeal has to be preferred within eight days from the date of the order. Since the applications have not been filed within eight days, the delay of 82 days have been caused. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that the delay has to be calculated from the date of knowledge in participating the proceedings is not at all sustainable. 9. Since the applications have not been filed within eight days, the delay of 82 days have been caused. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that the delay has to be calculated from the date of knowledge in participating the proceedings is not at all sustainable. 9. In the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondents reported in 2010(5) SCC 459 (Oriental aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another) it has been categorically laid down that the delay cannot be condoned since it was for an inordinate period of more than four years. The relevant passage would run as follows: “16. In dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities this Court has; while emphasizing that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the State, observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case because the state represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table consumes considerable time causing delay – G.Ramegowda v. Land acquisition Officer, state of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, state of U.P. v. Harish Chandra, State of Bihar v. Ratan Lal Sahu, State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan. 17. In the light of the above, it is to be seen whether the respondents had offered any plausible/tangible explanation for the long delay of more than four years in filing of appeal and the High Court was justified in condoning the delay.” 10. In the aforesaid judgment it has been discussed that in a case where the delay is inordinate the yardstick applied for the individual need not be observed to certain amount of latitude even for the State. Anyhow, as already found, the delay is only 82 days which is not inordinate. 11. In the aforesaid judgment it has been discussed that in a case where the delay is inordinate the yardstick applied for the individual need not be observed to certain amount of latitude even for the State. Anyhow, as already found, the delay is only 82 days which is not inordinate. 11. The judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in 2008(14) SCC 582 (State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Ahmed Jaan) would lay down the principle as follows: “The expression ‘sufficient cause’ is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice – that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression ‘every day’s delay must be explained’ does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense, pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the state as a litigant are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an evenhanded manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned. 13. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the state as a litigant are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an evenhanded manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned. 13. Experience shows that on account of impersonal machinery (no one is charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal.” 12. The Larger Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in A.I.R. 1996 Supreme Court 1623 (State of A.P. vs. McDowell & Co.) has also approved the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court which runs as follows: "When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the =buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officer/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay – intentional or otherwise – is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the state are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression " sufficient cause" should , therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. If the appeals brought by the state are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression " sufficient cause" should , therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process." 13. On a careful perusal of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, we could see that the delay caused in preferring the applications questioning the order of the learned Master should have been approached with pragmatism and justice oriented approach considering the public interest. The delay caused in preferring the applications are not so inordinate. The delay was only 82 days and it is not four years as contended by the learned counsel for the respondents. In the said circumstances when we approach the merits of the case, the appellant was only stated to be a garnishee who is to deal with the cylinders as a custodian on behalf of the parties. The said right and liability over the cylinders concerned have to be decided only in the applications preferred by the appellant herein. In the said circumstances, we cannot rule out that there is no merit in the case of the appellant. If for any reason, the delay caused in preferring the applications are not condoned, the public interest would be affected. Therefore, the appellant has to be given an opportunity to state their case. The said circumstances were not considered by the learned Single Judge and the condonation of delay of 82 days in preferring the applications were not allowed. The reasons stated by the appellant in the applications for condonation of delay that the delay in not filing the applications was due to searching the documents, is acceptable. 14. The said circumstances were not considered by the learned Single Judge and the condonation of delay of 82 days in preferring the applications were not allowed. The reasons stated by the appellant in the applications for condonation of delay that the delay in not filing the applications was due to searching the documents, is acceptable. 14. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge in A.Nos.605 & 606 of 2009, refusing to condone the delay of 82 days in preferring the applications before the said Court against the order passed by the learned Master in A.Nos.112 and 114 of 2007 are not correct and therefore, they are liable to be set aside and the appellant has to be given opportunity to present their case in the applications. In order to give such an opportunity, both the appeals are liable to be allowed. 15. With the said reasons, we set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge made in A.Nos. 605 & 606 of 2009 dated 25.06.2009. Accordingly, both the appeals are allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.