Hon'ble MISHRA, CJ.—Heard on the question of admission. 2. In the writ petition, petitioner has prayed for declaring Section 42(b) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 as ultra vires of the Constitution of India. Prayer has been made to set aside the order dated 2.2.2011. Consequential relief of mutation of the name of the petitioner in the revenue record has also been made. 3. Section 42(b) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act prohibits sale, gift or bequest by khatedar tenant member of Scheduled Caste in favour of a person who is not a member of the Scheduled Caste, or by a member of Scheduled tribe in favour of a person who is not a member of the Scheduled Tribe. Such a transaction is declared to be void. It is averred on the petition that petitioner is a private limited company. It is involved in the generation of any kind of energy like solar energy and to set up power plants and other facilities for generation of power from solar energy. 4. The petitioner intended to participate in the proposed scheme to be floated by NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Ltd. (NVVN) under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission. Requisite permission has been obtained. However, bidders need to provide evidence within six months of signing PPA with NVVN that the required land for project development was under possession of the successful bidders. The petitioner started purchasing land at Phalodi so as to acquire ownership and possession of a requisite large piece of land. Land in dispute was required to be purchased by the petitioners. Petitioner purchased around 150 bighas land from Bhera Ram S/o Budha Ram Bavari recorded as such as khatedar tenant vide sale-deed dated 4.1.2011. Petitioner thereafter applied for changes in revenue record. Tehsildar came to the conclusion that sale is against he provision of Section 42(b) of the Act of 1955. Sellers belong to a scheduled caste, therefore transaction is void. The respondents are likely to proceed under Section 175 of the Act of 1955 to take over the land in dispute. 5. It is submitted by the petitioner that initially the scheme of Section 42 was not to make such transaction as void ab initio. Sellers belong to a scheduled caste, therefore transaction is void. The respondents are likely to proceed under Section 175 of the Act of 1955 to take over the land in dispute. 5. It is submitted by the petitioner that initially the scheme of Section 42 was not to make such transaction as void ab initio. Though Act of 1955 has been placed in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution of India for protection against challenge to its validity on the anvil of Part-III of the Constitution as provided in Article 31-B of the Constitution of India, as such this Court can examine the vires of Section 42(b) of the Act of 1955. Petitioner has also submitted that State of Rajasthan has come out with a comprehensive policy to promote power generation from solar energy in name of Rajasthan Solar Energy Policy, 2011. In order to carry out the objective of the State policy, land has been purchased. 6. Mr. Manish Shishodia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised the submission that Section 42(b) of the Act be declared to be illegal and ultra vires as it imposes unreasonable restriction upon the petitioners to carry out project of solar energy which is in public interest. Since operation of the provision has become unreasonable, Court can have a re-look on such a provision after lapse of reasonable time. 7. Section 42 of the Act of 1955 is quoted below : "Section 42.—General restrictions on sale, gift and bequest.—The sale, gift or bequest by a khatedar tenant of his interest in the whole or part of his holding shall be void, if– (a) Deleted w.e.f. 11.11.1992 (b) Such sale, gift or bequest is by a member of Scheduled Caste in favour of a person who is not a member of Scheduled Caste, or by a member of Scheduled Tribe in favour of a person who is not a member of Scheduled Tribe; [(bb)] Such sale, gift or bequest, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (b), if by a member of Saharia Schedule Tribe in favour of a person who is not a member of the said Saharia Tribe] (c) "Omitted". 8. 8. The aforesaid Section 42(b) declares any transaction by khatedar tenant of his interest in the whole or part of his holding, to be void in case such sale, gift or bequest by a member of Scheduled Caste in favour of a person who is not a member of Scheduled Caste, or by a member of Scheduled Tribe in favour of a person who is not a member of Scheduled Tribe. The aforesaid provision has been included in the Act of 1955 with a view to protect the tenants belonging to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe from social injustice and all forms of exploitation and i.e. for fulfillment of directive principles enshrined under Article 46 of the Constitution. Enactment has been enlisted under Schedule IXth having protective umbrella of Article 31-B of the Constitution. Other provisions made in Section 46-A, 49 for also protection of such classes. The objective is that sources of such weaker sections remains within such community and it does not go out of them. 9. The Apex Court in Manchegowda and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. ( (1984) 3 SCC 301 ) has laid down in the context of Sections 4 and 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 containing prohibition of transfers of granted lands and resumption thereof, that the Legislature is competent to declare transfer of lands in contravention of the prohibition as void and effect the resumption, having regard to the legislative policy and object. The Legislature is also competent to nullify the prohibited transfers effected even prior to commencement of the Act as the transferees acquired only defeasible title. The Apex Court laid down thus : "12. In pursuance of this policy, the Legislature is undoubtedly competent to pass an enactment providing that transfers of such granted lands will be void and not merely voidable for property safeguarding and protecting the interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for whose benefit only these lands had been granted. Even in the absence of any such statutory provisions, the transfer of granted lands in contravention of the terms of the grant or in breach of any law, rule or regulation covering such grant will clearly be voidable and the resumption of such granted lands after avoiding the voidable transfers in accordance with law will be permitted. Even in the absence of any such statutory provisions, the transfer of granted lands in contravention of the terms of the grant or in breach of any law, rule or regulation covering such grant will clearly be voidable and the resumption of such granted lands after avoiding the voidable transfers in accordance with law will be permitted. Avoidance of such voidable transfers and resumption of the granted lands through process of law is bound to take time. Any negligence and delay on the part of the authorities entitled to take action to avoid such transfers through appropriate legal process of resumption of such grant may be further impediments in the matter of avoiding such transfers and resumption of possession of the granted lands. Prolonged legal proceedings will undoubtedly be prejudicial to the interests of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for whose benefit the granted lands are intended to be resumed. As transfers of granted lands in contravention of the terms of the grant or any law, regulation or rule governing such grants can be legally avoided and possession of such lands can be recovered through process of law, it must be held that the Legislature for the purpose of avoiding delay and harassment of protracted litigation and in furthering its object of speedy restoration of these granted lands to the members of the weaker communities is perfectly competent to make suitable provision for resumption of such granted lands by stipulating in the enactment that transfers of such lands in contravention of the terms of the grant or any regulation, rule or law regulating such grant will be void and providing a suitable procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice for achieving this purpose without recourse to prolonged litigation in Court in the larger interests of benefiting the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 15. Any person who acquires such granted land by transfer from the original grantee in breach of the condition relating to prohibition on such transfer must necessarily be presumed to be aware of the prohibition imposed on the transfer of such granted land. Anybody who acquires such granted land in contravention of the prohibition relating to transfer of such granted land cannot be considered to be a bonafide purchaser for value; and every such transferees acquires to his knowledge only a voidable title to the granted land. Anybody who acquires such granted land in contravention of the prohibition relating to transfer of such granted land cannot be considered to be a bonafide purchaser for value; and every such transferees acquires to his knowledge only a voidable title to the granted land. The title acquired by such transfer is defeasible and is liable to be defeated by an appropriate action taken in this regard. If the Legislature under such circumstances seek to intervene in the interests of these weaker sections of the community and choose to substitute a speedier and cheaper method of recovery of these granted lands which were otherwise liable to be resumed through legal process, it cannot, in our opinion, be said that any vested rights of the transferees are affected. Transferees of granted lands with full knowledge of the legal position that the transfers made in their favour in contravention of the terms of grant or any law, rule or regulation governing such grant are liable to be defeated in law, cannot and do not have in law or equity, a genuine or legal grievance that their defeasible title in such granted lands so transferred is, in fact, being defeated and they are being dispossessed of such lands from which they were in law liable to be dispossessed by process of law. The position will, however, be somewhat different where the transferees have acquired such granted lands not in violation of any term of the grant or any law regulating such grant as also where any transferee who may have acquired a defeasible title in such granted lands by the transfer thereof in contravention of the terms of the grant or any law regulating such grant has perfected his title by prescription of time or otherwise. We shall consider such cases later on. But where the transferee acquires only a defeasible title liable to be defeated in accordance with law, avoidance of such defeasible title which still remains liable to be defeated in accordance with law at the date of commencement of the Act and recovery of possession of such granted land on the basis of the provisions contained in Section 4 and Section 5 of the Act cannot be said to be constitutionally invalid and such a provision cannot be termed as unconscionable, unjust and arbitrary. The first two contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are, therefore, overruled. 17. The first two contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are, therefore, overruled. 17. Granted lands were intended for the benefit and enjoyment of the original grantees who happen to belong to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, At the time of the grant, a condition had been imposed for protecting the interests of the original grantees in the granted lands by restricting the transfer of the same. The condition regarding the prohibition on transfer of such granted lands for a specified period, was imposed by virtue of the specific term in the grant itself or by reason of any law, rule or regulation governing such grant. It was undoubtedly open to the grantor at the time of granting lands to the original grantees to stipulate such a condition the condition being a term of the grant itself, and the condition of the condition being a term of the grant itself, and the condition was imposed in the interests of the grantee. Except on the basis of such a condition the grantor might not have made any such grant at all. The condition imposed against the transfer for a particular period of such granted lands which were granted essentially for the benefit of the grantees cannot be said to constitute any unreasonable restriction. The granted lands were not in the nature of properties acquired and held by the grantees in the sense of acquisition, or holding of property within the meaning of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. It was a case of a grant by the owner of the land to the grantee for the possession and enjoyment of the granted lands by the grantees and the prohibition on transfer of such granted lands for the specific period was an essential term of condition on the basis of which the grant was made. It has to be pointed out that the prohibition on transfer was not for an indefinite period or perpetual. It was only for a particular period, the object being that the grantees should enjoy the granted lands themselves at least for the period during which the prohibition was to remain operative. It has to be pointed out that the prohibition on transfer was not for an indefinite period or perpetual. It was only for a particular period, the object being that the grantees should enjoy the granted lands themselves at least for the period during which the prohibition was to remain operative. Experience had shown that persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled tribes to whom the lands were granted were, because of their poverty, lack of education and general backwardness, exploited by various persons who could and would take advantage of the sad plight of these poor persons for depriving them of their lands. The imposition of the condition of prohibition on transfer for a particular period could not, therefore, be considered to constitute any unreasonable restriction on the right of the grantees to dispose of the granted lands. The imposition of such a condition on prohibition in the very nature of the grant was perfectly valid and legal." 10. With respect to the land of non-tribal, the Apex Court in Lincai Gamango and Ors. vs. Dayanidhi Jena and Ors. ( AIR 2004 SC 3457 ) has laid down that non-tribal cannot claim to have acquired right or title over such land held by tribal by adverse possession, in view of Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (By Scheduled Tribes) Regulatiosn (2 of 1956) - Sections 3 and 7D. 11. The Apex Court in Amrendra Pratap Singh vs. Tej Bahadur Prajapati and Ors. ( AIR 2004 SC 3782 ) has held that acquisition of title in favour of a non-tribal by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession over the immovable property belonging to a tribal, is prohibited by law. The object sought to be achieved by the Orissa Merged State's Laws Act, 1950 and the Orissa Schedu-led Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (by Scheduled Tribes) Regulations (2 of 1956) is to see that a member of an aboriginal tribe indefeatably continues to own the property which he acquires and every process known to law by which title in immovable property is extinguished in one person to vest in another person, should remain so confined in its operation in relation to tribals that the immovable property of one tribal may come to vest in another tribal but the title in immovable property vesting in any tribal must not come to vest in a non-tribal. This is to see and ensure that non-tribals do not succeed in making inroads amongst the tribals by acquiring property and developing roots in eh habitat of tribals. Tribal areas have their own problems. Tribals are historically weaker sections of the society. They need the protection of the laws as they are gullible and fall prey to the tactics of unscrupulous people and are susceptible to exploitation on account of their innocence, poverty and backwardness extending over centuries. The Constitution of India and the laws made thereunder treat tribals and tribal areas separately wherever needed. The tribals need to be settled, need to be taken care of by the protective arm of the law and be saved from falling prey to unscrupulous device so that they may prosper and by an evolutionary process join the mainstream of the society. Therefore, the expression 'transfer of immovable property' as defined in clause (f) of para 2 of 1956 Regulations has to be assigned a very wide meaning. Any transaction or dealing with immovable property which would have the effect of extinguishing title, possession or right to possess such property in a tribal and vesting the same in a non-tribal would be included within the meaning of 'transfer of immovable property'. 12. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Babu Lal and Ors. ( (1977) 2 SCC 435 ), the Apex Court laid down that bhumiswamy right of scheduled tribe person is not transferable to a non-scheduled tribe person without following the provisions of law as provided under Section 165(6) of M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. 13. The submission raised by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that since the sale was in favour of the company, the bar of the provision of Section 42(b) is not attractive. Merely by the fact that company is a juristic person, provision of Section 42(b) shall not be applicable, cannot be accepted. The word 'person' includes such juristic person if the submission is accepted, it would frustrate the basic purpose of the provision imposing restriction under Section 42(b). Even if transfer is to such a juristic person, in our opinion, bar of Section 42(b) is clearly attracted. The protection of interest of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe is equally important as that of development and solar energy. Interest of such down-trodden people cannot be ignored and overlooked. Even if transfer is to such a juristic person, in our opinion, bar of Section 42(b) is clearly attracted. The protection of interest of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe is equally important as that of development and solar energy. Interest of such down-trodden people cannot be ignored and overlooked. Our view is fortified by the decision of Full Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Uka & Ors., D.B. Civil Special Appeal (W) No. 158/2004 along with other appeals decided on 10.5.2010 = 2010(3) RLW 2636 in which the correctness of the decision in Asuram vs. Tehsildar, Sanchore (AIR 2000 Rajasthan 345) has been upheld. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that Section 42(b) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 cannot be said to be ultra vires the Constitution of India. No other questions was raised. The writ petition being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed.