Rajiv Sharma, J.;- At the outset, Sri Apoorva Tewari, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that he may be permitted to implead Incharge District Judge, Lucknow and Prescribed Authority, Lucknow Development Authority, Lucknow, as respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in the array of the respondents. 2. Let him do so during the course of the day. 3. Heard Sri Apoorva Tewari, learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State and Sri Manish Kumar, learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 4. Through the instant writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 4.6.2011 passed by the Incharge District Judge, Lucknow, whereby the application of the petitioner for urgent hearing of the appeal filed under Section 9 of the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1972 during summer vacations was rejected and fixed the appeal for hearing on admission on 1.7.2011 on the grounds that the order, which has been challenged in appeal, was passed by the Prescribed authority, Lucknow Development Authority, Lucknow, in the year 1989 and it is not possible to accept the plea of the Counsel for the appellant that he has no knowledge of the order dated 21.7.1989 and further the matter would require notice to the respondent and as such, the matter cannot be treated as urgent. 5. Sri Apoorva Tewari, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that order dated 21.7.1989 passed by the Prescribed Authority, Lucknow Development Authority, Lucknow, has come to the knowledge of the appellant only on 28.5.2011 and that too through the news item published in 'Hindustan Times' of even date and as such, he has filed an appeal along with an application for urgent hearing in the vacations together with an application under Section 9 (3) of the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1972 for condonation of delay in filing appeal and an application for interim relief. He submits that a specific plea taken by the petitioner in paras-2 and 3 of the affidavit in support of the application for urgent hearing during the vacations, was that vide orders dated 21.7.1989 passed by Shambhoo Singh Yadav, alleged Prescribed Authority, whereby the appellant's eviction was ordered, is being given effect to, which in fact has come to the knowledge of the appellant on 28.5.2011 only and on the strength of the aforesaid impugned order, the appellant is sought to be evicted from the property in question. However, inspite of said fact the In-charge District Judge, Lucknow has not entertained the appeal during summer vacations. He submits that petitioner has apprehensions that during summer vacations, petitioner (Oudh Gymkhana Club), which is quite old and within the heart of District Lucknow, is going to be demolished pursuant to the order dated 21.7.1989 passed by the Prescribed Authority. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the property in question was allotted to the petitioner's society, namely, Oudh Gymkhana Club by the order of District Magistrate, Lucknow, in the year 1933. As lease deed of the property in question had expired on 1.1.1973 and as such, the petitioner's society moved an application for renewal of lease, stating therein that the property in question is in their possession and they want that lease deed may further be extended but no decision with regards to extension of lease deed was communicated to the petitioner though lease rent was paid by the petitioner's society at the rate fixed upto the year 1983. Thereafter, Lucknow Development Authority refused to accept the rent on the ground that the same shall be accepted only when the issue of renewal of the lease is being decided. Thereafter petitioner's society preferred several representations and request for renewal of the lease deed to the competent authority but on 6.11.1987, the Prescribed Authority, Lucknow Development Authority, in exercise of power under Act No. 22 of 1972 issued a show cause notice to the petitioner's society under Section 4 of the Act, requiring to show cause as to why an order under Section 5 and 7 of the Act be not passed. According to the petitioner, said notice did not contain any grounds but was issued on the basis of the reprot of the Nazul Officer, to which reply was tendered by the petitioner's society, intimating that the case for renewal of lease deed is pending before the State Government and they have also annexed letters dated 1.11.1987 and 10.11.1987 and further vide letter dated 15.12.1987 informed the State Government for entering into an agreement of lease for a period of 90 years on the premium, which was proposed to be charged. On the proposed premium to be charged, Government of U.P., vide letter dated 14.7.1988, asked the Vice-Chairman, Lucknow Development Authority to submit all the documents for renewal of the lease to the Government of U.P., which was submitted on 31.8.1988. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that as the matter has already engaging attention of the State Government for renewal of the lease deed, but on the notice, which was issued under Act No. 22 of 1972, as stated hereinabove, the Prescribed Authority did not fix any date, after the reply so tendered by the petitioner's society and instead passed an ex parte order dated 21.7.1989. He submits that the petitioner has no knowledge about the ex parte order dated 21.7.1989 as the same has not been intimated in any manner whatsoever nor any publication was made. The petitioner only came to know about the ex parte order dated 21.7.1989 of the Prescribed Authority through news item published in Hindustan Times, as stated hereinabove. 8. Having considered the materials place on record and the submissions advanced by the Counsel for the parties, I am of the considered opinion that there has been extreme urgency in the matter as there was imminent apprehension of the petitioner's eviction from the premises. The Incharge District Judge committed an error in not considering the attending circumstances and wrongly decline the hearing on the appeal in summer vacations. He also fell to consider that by listing the matter on 1.7.2011, the very purpose of filing appeal is frustrated if the petitioner's apprehension becomes true. 9. In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, the impugned order dated 4.6.2001 is not maintainable and as such it is hereby set-aside. He also fell to consider that by listing the matter on 1.7.2011, the very purpose of filing appeal is frustrated if the petitioner's apprehension becomes true. 9. In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, the impugned order dated 4.6.2001 is not maintainable and as such it is hereby set-aside. The In-charge District Judge, Lucknow, is directed to prepone the hearing of the appeal, which has been directed to be listed on 1.7.2011 and fix the same on 10.6.2011 for hearing on admission. 10. Since this order has been passed in the presence of the parties, as such, parties are directed to appear before the appellate Court on 10.6.2011. 11. However, keeping in view the attending circumstances, prima facie, as the balance of convenience is in favour of the petitioner at this stage insofar as the petitioner is in possession over the property in question since 1933 and even after the order dated 21.7.1989, it is hereby directed that parties shall maintain status quo with regards to the possession of property in question, till disposal of the interim relief application filed along with the memo of appeal. 12. The writ petition is disposed of finally in above terms.