Shri Narayan Shukla, J.;- Heard Mr.Kunwar Mridul Rakesh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr.Rajesh Chandra Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr.Sajjad Husain, learned counsel for the respondent No.2 as well as Mr.Rajendra Kumar Dwivedi, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State. 2. The petitioners have challenged the proceeding of Criminal Case No.392 of 2010, pending before the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (C.B.I.), Ayodhya Prakran, Lucknow as well as the charge sheet filed therein and also the summoning order issued by the court concerned. 3. The petitioners case is that one Ahetsham Ali, who was Zamindar of Saleh Nagar, Pargana Bijnore, Tehsil and District Lucknow granted patta in faovur of late Smt. Bhagwati Devi Saxena, on 12th of March, 1947. The petitioners are sons of Smt. Bhagwati Devi Saxena. Since she was living in her in-laws house in Madhya Pradesh, when on 25th of January, 1996 she came and inspected the revenue record, she found that her name was not recorded in the revenue record. Then she filed a regular suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for declaring her as a tenure holder of the land in dispute. Two witnesses, namely, Jamuna Prasad and Tribhuwan Nath Shukla through their statement supported her case, but the suit was dismissed on the point of maintainability. She filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner. The Additional Commissioner allowed her appeal by means of order dated 17th of May, 1997 and ordered for recording her name in the revenue record, pursuant to which her name was incorporated in Khatauni of 1402-07 Fasali and Kisan Bahi was also prepared in her name. Whereas one Mr.Ramesh Chandra Chhokra filed an application for restoration of case on 10th of February, 1999, on the ground that his father late Bhagwan Das was the owner of the disputed land prior to the abolition of Zamindari, who died in 1977. After his death being his sole son he became entitled to inherit the property. The land in question was also recorded in 1389 Fasali, but subsequently it was recorded as 'Banjar'. The Additional Commissioner allowed the application and recalled the order dated 17th of May, 1997 and restored the appeal to its original number. After his death being his sole son he became entitled to inherit the property. The land in question was also recorded in 1389 Fasali, but subsequently it was recorded as 'Banjar'. The Additional Commissioner allowed the application and recalled the order dated 17th of May, 1997 and restored the appeal to its original number. Earlier the appeal was dismissed in default, but at the stage of Board of Revenue, it was remanded by restoring the appeal to decide it on merit. 4. On 25th of January, 2004, Smt. Bhagwati Devi Saxena died and in her place her three sons, namely, Ram Mohan Saxena, Krishna Murari Saxena and Vikas Mohan Saxena were substituted and Supervisor Kanoongo entered their names in PA Ka-11 document in place of Smt. Saxena and also recorded in Khatauni. However, by means of order dated 27th of April, 2007, passed by the Board of Revenue, the position of documents prior to 4th of November, 1999 was maintained. By means of order dated 27th of November, 2006 the Board of Revenue allowed the application for mutation in favour of her three sons and their names were mutated. Ultimately the Additional Commissioner dismissed the appeal and set aside the order dated 17th of May, 1997, which was challenged by the petitioners through the second appeal filed before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue dismissed the same in limine on 10th of September, 2008. The Review Petition filed therein was also dismissed. Then Mr.Vikas Mohan Saxena challenging the said orders filed a writ petition being writ petition No.1546 (MS) of 2009. This court by means of order dated 23rd of April, 2010 remanded the matter to the Divisional Commissioner, Lucknow to decide the appeal on merit with the direction that till disposal of appeal the status quo in respect of land in dispute shall be maintained and entry in revenue records shall be corrected in pursuance of the order dated 17th of May, 1997, passed by the Additional Commissioner, Lucknow in appeal No.230/96-97. This court further directed that the petitioner shall continue to hold the possession over the land in dispute. Pursuant to which the petitioners' names have been incorporated in the revenue records. 5. This court further directed that the petitioner shall continue to hold the possession over the land in dispute. Pursuant to which the petitioners' names have been incorporated in the revenue records. 5. On the back ground of the aforesaid facts the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the allegation of preparation of forged lease deed in the name of petitioners' mother in 1994 is absolutely false as the same has been adjudicated upon by the courts at various stages and thus he submits that their right has become confirmed over the land in dispute on the basis of said lease deed, therefore, it is not open for the complainant to challenge the veracity of the same at this stage by lodging the First Information Report. 6. On the other hand the respondent No.2 has contested the matter by filing the counter affidavit and submitted that the land in dispute was never allotted to the petitioners' mother Smt. Saxena on 23rd of December, 1947. The respondent No.2 has brought on record the documents of said lease and disputed the authenticity of the same on several grounds. It is further stated that the witnesses of that very lease deed, namely Jamuna Prasad and Tribhuwan Nath Shukla have stated that this lease deed was executed in favour of Smt. Bhagwati Devi Saxena in 1994, whereas the petitioners claim the date of execution of patta as 12th of March, 1947. The date of birth of Jamunal Prasad is 1st of November, 1949, which establishes that on the date of alleged sale deed i.e. 12th of March, 1947 he was not born. The deed writer through the affidavit submitted before the Pargana Adhikari on 23rd of April, 1994, has narrated the story of fabrication of that very deed. The respondent has disputed the existence of Smt. Bhagwati Devi Saxena also with the averments that through her affidavit dated 3rd of August, 1994 she has shown her age as 60 years, whereas in another affidavit sworn on 2nd of February, 1993 she has shown her age as 55 years. It is stated that she had filed the suit for declaration of her right on the basis of wrong facts. Ultimately which was dismissed on 13th of March, 1997. 7. It is stated that she had filed the suit for declaration of her right on the basis of wrong facts. Ultimately which was dismissed on 13th of March, 1997. 7. It is stated that in the writ petition No.1546 (MS) of 2009, though the father of respondent No.2 was made as the opposite party No.4, but no notice was served upon him, on account of which he could not contest the case before this court. It is further stated that the petitioners and their brothers have executed two registered sale deeds in favour of different persons due to ulterior motive. Since it is a case of grabbing of land on the basis of forged lease deed, the petitioners who are the beneficiary of the said lease deed, are liable to be prosecuted for their criminal act. Respondent No.2 has also disputed the age of other witness, namely, Tribhuwan Nath Shukla, keeping in view his age as 72 years mentioned in his affidavit dated 10th of April, 2009 before this court. The respondent No.2 has also raised the question on the functioning of the Revenue Authorities at the behest of petitioners as well as the charge of bribery to pass the order in their favour. 8. The learned counsel for the respective parties have cited some cases in their support, which are referred hereunder:- 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners cited a case i.e. State of Haryana and others versus Bhajan Lal and others, reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has described the nature of cases wherein the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be exercised. The relevant paragraph 102 of which is reproduced hereunder:- "102. The relevant paragraph 102 of which is reproduced hereunder:- "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised: (1) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code; (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code; (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (6) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 10. The petitioners claim to be covered their case under the aforesaid clause (4) and submitted that since the offences are non cognizable offences, therefore, keeping in view other facts, this court can interfere in the proceedings of the court below. 11. He cited another case i.e. Indra Mohan Goswami and another versus State of Uttaranchal and others reported in (2007) 12 SCC, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the scope of powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the reference of the Bhajan Lal's case (Supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also dealt with the powers of interference by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. where the criminal case is based upon the civil dispute. The relevant paragraph 46 is reproduced hereunder:- "46.The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the stature itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained." 12. The petitioner has further cited the case of Kishan Singh (D) through Lrs vs. Gurpal Singh and others, reported in AIR 2010 (SC) 3624 . The relevant paragraphs 24 and 25 are reproduced hereunder:- "24. It is to be noted that the appellants' father Kishan Singh lodged FIR No.144/02 on 23.7.2002 through his attorney Jaswant Singh Mann under Sections 240/323/467/468/471/120B IPC, against the respondents. The allegations made in the FIR were substantially similar to the allegations made by the appellants in Civil Suit No.1075/96, which had been decided against them. It is evident that the aforesaid FIR was filed with inordinate delay and there has been no plausible explanation for the same. The appellants lodged the aforesaid FIR only after meeting their waterloo in the Civil Court. Thus, it is evident that the FIR was lodged with the sole intention of harassing the respondents and enmeshing them in log and arduous criminal proceedings. The appellants lodged the aforesaid FIR only after meeting their waterloo in the Civil Court. Thus, it is evident that the FIR was lodged with the sole intention of harassing the respondents and enmeshing them in log and arduous criminal proceedings. We are of the view that such an action on the part of the appellants' father would not be bana fide, and the criminal proceedings initiated by him against the respondents amount to an abuse of the process of law. 25. In view of the above, and to do substantial justice, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings against the respondents in spite of the fact that the impugned judgment dated 13.2.2009 passed in Criminal Misc. No.4136 of 2003 is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 13. On the other hand the learned counsel for the opposite parties cited so many cases on the same point, whereas I hereby refer only those cases, which are most relevant for the present case. It is stated that since the preparation of documents i.e. lease deed is based on fraudulent action of the petitioners, the opinion of this court, given for the documents is concerned, which are based on fraud, may not be given weightage as the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A.V. Papayya Sastry and others versus Govt.of A.P.and others reported in (2007) 4 SCC 221 has held that it is well settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal. It is further stated that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of law. Such a judgment, decree or order by the first court or by the final court has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. 14. It is further stated that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of law. Such a judgment, decree or order by the first court or by the final court has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. 14. The learned counsel for the respondents further stated that since the petitioners have not come with clean hands before this court they are not entitled to any relief, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Oswal Fats and Oils Limited versus Additional Commissioner (Administration), Bareilly Division, Bareilly and others, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 728, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if a person who approaches the court for grant of relief, equitable or otherwise, is under a solemn obligation to candidly dispose all the material/important facts which have bearing on the adjudication of the issues raised in the case. 15. On the point whether during the pendency of civil proceeding, criminal proceeding is permitted, the respondents' counsel cited several judgments, which are discussed as under:- 16. In Kamaladevi Agarwal versus State of W.B.and others, reported in (2002) 1 SCC 555 , in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the nature and scope of civil and criminal proceedings and the standard of proof required in both matters is different and distinct. Whereas in civil proceedings the matter can be decided on the basis of probabilities, the criminal case has to be decided by adopting the standard of proof of "beyond reasonable doubt" and where civil and criminal cases are pending, precedence shall be given to criminal proceedings as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.S.Sheriff versus State of Madras, reported in AIR 1954 SC 397 . 17. In Lalmuni Devi (Smt.) versus State of Bihar and others reorted in (2001) 2 SCC 17 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the facts may give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence. Merely because a civil claim is maintainable does not mean that the criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 18. 17. In Lalmuni Devi (Smt.) versus State of Bihar and others reorted in (2001) 2 SCC 17 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the facts may give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence. Merely because a civil claim is maintainable does not mean that the criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 18. I had an occasion to go through a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, rendered in the case of Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam and another versus State (Delhi Administration) and another, reported in (2009) 5 SCC 528 , in which the point of continuation of criminal proceeding during the pendency of civil proceedings on the same subject matter has been dealt with. The relevant paragraphs 22 and 23 are reproduced hereunder:- "22.It is, however, now well settled that ordinarily a criminal proceeding will have primacy over the civil proceeding. Precedence to a criminal proceeding is given having regard to the fact that disposal of a civil proceeding ordinarily takes a long time and in the interest of justice the former should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. The law in this behalf has been laid down in a larger number of decisions. We may notice a few of them. 23.In M.S.Sheriff v. State of Madaras, reported in AIR 1954 SC 397 a Constitution Bench of this Court was seized of a question as to whether a civil suit or a criminal case should be stayed in the event both are pending; it was opined that the criminal matter should be given precedence. In regard to the possibility of conflict in decisions, it was held that the law envisaged such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. It was held that the only relevant consideration was the likelihood of embarrassment. 19. In light of the aforesaid settled view of the Hon'be Supreme Court, when I go through the facts of the present case, I find that it is a case of preparation of forged lease deed on the basis of which the petitioners have tried to perfect their right over the land in dispute. 19. In light of the aforesaid settled view of the Hon'be Supreme Court, when I go through the facts of the present case, I find that it is a case of preparation of forged lease deed on the basis of which the petitioners have tried to perfect their right over the land in dispute. Their right based on the said lease deed is to be determined by the revenue court, as has been asked by this court, but the manner of preparation/fabrication of the said lease deed can be examined by deep observation of the trial court, on the basis of evidence adduced therein. The respondents have raised question, inter alia, on the existence of witnesses on the date of lease deed, therefore, I am of the view that the pendency of civil case before the revenue court, cannot hamper the proceeding of a criminal case, therefore, no interference in the trial in question is warranted. 20. The petition is dismissed.