Judgment :- Prasenjit Mandal, J. These two applications are at the instance of the two applicants against the Order No.323 dated March 18, 2006 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 9th Court, Alipore in Title Execution Case No.15 of 1982 thereby rejecting two applications filed by the two applicants. The C.O. No.1692 of 2006 has been filed by Mr. Amarnath Shroff against the order of rejection of the prayer for leave to sue against the judgment debtors and the learned Receiver appointed by the learned Executing Court in Title Execution Case No.15 of 1982 and the C.O. No.2354 of 2006 has been filed against the order of rejection of the prayer for assignment of a decree in favour of the applicant, M/s. Devine Mercantiles Pvt. Ltd. Instead of narrating the entire facts leading to the filing of the two applications, it will be convenient to state the facts not in dispute first and then to state other facts. The following facts are in dispute:- (a) The plaintiff-Bank / decree-holder / opposite party no.1 herein instituted a suit being Title Suit No.1942 of 1976 for recovery of money advanced under the heading ‘Credit Facility’ to M/s. Sur & Company against the defendants / judgment debtors /opposite parties herein. (b) The suit was decreed in final form on compromise in July 1981. The plaintiff-Bank got a decree for recovery of Rs.8,60,696.86 with interest @ 16% per annuam from the date of institution of the suit along with other reliefs. (c) The plaintiff-Bank filed a title execution case being Title Execution Case No.15 of 1982 for realisation of the decretal dues against the judgment debtors / opposite parties herein. (d) The judgment debtors took several adjournments to make payments, but, ultimately did not make any payment and as such, the Executing Court was about to sell the premises no.47, Cristopher Road, Kolkata-700046 by auction (one of the four mortgaged premises of the judgment debtors on consent). (e) A Receiver was appointed by the learned Executing Court over the mortgaged properties of the judgment debtors. (f) Mr. Amarnath Shroff (applicant of the C.O.1692 of 2006) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (henceforth in short “MoU”) dated September 6, 2004 with some of the judgment debtors to the effect, inter alia, that the mortgaged premises no.s 41, 43, 45 & 47, Cristopher Road, Kolkata-700046 would be sold to Mr. (f) Mr. Amarnath Shroff (applicant of the C.O.1692 of 2006) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (henceforth in short “MoU”) dated September 6, 2004 with some of the judgment debtors to the effect, inter alia, that the mortgaged premises no.s 41, 43, 45 & 47, Cristopher Road, Kolkata-700046 would be sold to Mr. Amarnath Shroff for consideration of Rs.5.8 crores and that out of the sale proceeds Rs.45 lakhs would be paid to the decree-holder for liquidation. Mr. Shroff also undertook the responsibility to make payment to the Ex-workers and also to pay their terminal benefits to the tune of Rs.25 lakhs and 10 lakhs. The parties to the agreement agreed to co-operate with Mr. Shroff by signing papers which might be lawfully required for the abovementioned purpose. (g) M/s. Devine Mercantiles Pvt. Ltd. (applicant of the C.O. No.2354 of 2006) of which Mr. Amarnath Shroff is a Director wrote a letter dated January 1, 2005 to the decree-holder praying for assignment of the decree in its favour upon payment of the decretal dues. (h) Mr. Amarnath Shroff filed an application dated March 7, 2005 before the learned Executing Court, Alipore praying for, inter alia, to allow him to file a suit for specific performance of agreement dated September 6, 2004. (i) M/s. Devine Mercantiles Pvt. Ltd. also filed an application praying for assignment of the decree in its favour and discharge of the Receiver in March 2005. (j) By the letter dated March 18, 2005, the plaintiff-bank /decree-holder expressed its willingness to assign the decree in favour of M/s. Devine Mercantiles Pvt. Ltd. and to deliver the title deeds of the property to the company on payment of entire dues. (k) Upon hearing both the sides and on consideration of the applications and their objections and the reply, the learned Executing Court rejected both the applications filed by the Mr. Amarnath Shroff and M/s. Devine Mercantiles Pvt. Ltd. by the impugned order dated March 18, 2006. Being aggrieved, the two applicants have preferred the two revisional applications. (l) Shree Ganga Construction Company Ltd. (of which Mr. Amarnath is a Director) deposited a sum of Rs.61 lakhs as fixed deposit with the plaintiff-Bank to show bona fide attitude of purchasing the premises in suit in 2005. Being aggrieved, the two applicants have preferred the two revisional applications. (l) Shree Ganga Construction Company Ltd. (of which Mr. Amarnath is a Director) deposited a sum of Rs.61 lakhs as fixed deposit with the plaintiff-Bank to show bona fide attitude of purchasing the premises in suit in 2005. (m) On February 14, 2007, a sum of Rs.70 lakhs was deposited with the Allahabad Bank by way of a fixed deposit in the name of Christopher Housing Developers Pvt. Ltd., and n) On August 25, 2010, an affidavit was filed by Ranjit Sur and Sanjit Sur thereby denying that any MoU had been executed between them and Mr. Shroff and further stating that Allahabad Bank had no claim against the Surs as the matter had been fully and finally settled between the parties. Now, the question is whether the learned Executing Court was justified in rejecting the aforesaid two applications of the two applicants by the impugned order. Upon hearing the learned Counsel of both the parties and on perusal on materials on record, I am of the view that the C.O. No.2354 of 2006, that is, the prayer for assignment of the decree in favour of M/s. Devine Mercantiles Pvt. Ltd. should be considered first. C.O. No.2354 of 2006:- The basis of the claim of the applicant (M/s. Devine Mercantiles Pvt. Ltd.) is that Mr. Amarnath Shroff entered into a MoU dated September 6, 2004, as per materials on record. The applicant itself (M/s. Devine Mercantiles Pvt. Ltd.) did not enter into any agreement with all the judgment debtors / opposite parties herein. Mr. Amarnath Shroff, one of the Directors of the applicant entered into an agreement dated September 6, 2004 with some of the judgment debtors and not all the judgment debtors. Thus, this Bench finds that the applicant itself who has a separate entity did not enter into any agreement with all the judgment debtors. An assignment of a decree is not unknown to the law of the land. For convenience, the relevant Rule 16 of Order 21 of the C.P.C. is quoted below:- Order 21 Rule 16:- 16. Thus, this Bench finds that the applicant itself who has a separate entity did not enter into any agreement with all the judgment debtors. An assignment of a decree is not unknown to the law of the land. For convenience, the relevant Rule 16 of Order 21 of the C.P.C. is quoted below:- Order 21 Rule 16:- 16. Application for executionby transferee of decree.- Where a decree or, if a decree has been passed jointly in favour of two or more persons, the interest of any decreeholder in the decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it; and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by such decree-holder: Provided that where the decree, or such interest as aforesaid, has been transferred by assignment, notice of such application shall be given to the transferor and the judgment-debtor, and the decree shall not be executed until the Court has heard their objections (if any) to its execution: Provided also that, where a decree for the payment of money against two or more persons has been transferred to one of them, it shall not be executed against the others. [Explanation.- Nothing in this rule shall affect the provisions of section 146, and a transferee of rights in the property, which is the subject-matter of the suit, may apply for execution of the decree without a separate assignment of the decree as required by this rule.] Thus, this Bench finds that in order to seek permission for assignment of a decree, the essential ingredient is that the interest of the decree-holder in the decree has been transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law and the transferee has applied for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it. In the instant case, no transfer took place by operation of law. So far as, assignment in writing is concerned, this Bench finds that a MoU had been entered into between one, Mr. Amarnath Shroff (not the applicant) and the eight judgment debtors out of the sixteen judgment debtors on a plain paper only. Out of such sixteen judgment debtors, two have declared subsequently that no such MoU had been executed by them (as referred to earlier). Amarnath Shroff (not the applicant) and the eight judgment debtors out of the sixteen judgment debtors on a plain paper only. Out of such sixteen judgment debtors, two have declared subsequently that no such MoU had been executed by them (as referred to earlier). According to Clause 8 of the MoU appearing at page 35 of the C.O. No.1692 of 2006, the parties agree to corporate with Mr. Shroff by signing papers which may be lawfully required for the abovementioned purpose including signing a formal agreement for sale. It may be mentioned herein that the property referred to in the said MoU, remained mortgaged with the plaintiff-Bank and unless and until, those were released upon due payment, the question of signing the documents for assignment did not arise when the applicant (M/s. Devine Mercantiles Pvt. Ltd.) approached the plaintiff-Bank. The Bank informed the applicant that it had no objection for assignment, if its dues were cleared. In order to test the bona fide intention of the applicant, the bank asked to deposit a certain sum of Rs.61 lakhs and according to the applicant, the said amount was deposited with the plaintiff-Bank by a sister concern of the applicant. But, such amount was withdrawn and subsequently, another alleged sister concern of the applicant, namely, Christopher Housing Developers Pvt. Ltd. made a fixed deposit of Rs.70 lakhs with the plaintiff-Bank. From such conduct, it could be understood at best that the bona fide attitude of the applicant was merely tested by making fixed deposits referred to above. The MoU was not signed as yet by all the parties concerned. Even, the decree-holder / Bank was quite in dark about the execution of such MoU. The Bank is concerned with the realisation of its dues and an assignment is one of the modes of realisation of such dues and as such, the bank informed the applicant that it had no objection in the matter of assignment of the decree in favour of the applicant if the entire dues were paid. Mr. Roychowdhury, Senior Advocate appearing for the applicant has submitted that since the fixed deposit had been made pursuant to the correspondence between the applicant and the plaintiff-Bank and most of the owners of the premises in suit agreed to such transfer, there was no bar to assign the property in favour of the petitioner. Mr. Mr. Roychowdhury, Senior Advocate appearing for the applicant has submitted that since the fixed deposit had been made pursuant to the correspondence between the applicant and the plaintiff-Bank and most of the owners of the premises in suit agreed to such transfer, there was no bar to assign the property in favour of the petitioner. Mr. Partha Bhattacharya, learned Advocate for the plaintiff-Bank has submitted that the plaintiff-Bank has filed an affidavit before this Hon’ble Court contending, inter alia, that after passing of the impugned order, it had assigned the property under mortgage to a different person, namely, M/s. ASREC (India) Ltd. The bank has filed the necessary papers in support of its claim of assignment in favour of the other party by way of an affidavit. The plaintiff-Bank has no claim against the judgment debtors in the matter. So, the plaintiff-Bank has prayed for disposal of the execution application after release of the Receiver. In this regard, Mr. Roychowdhury has contended that such subsequent transfer is bound by the provisions ‘lis pendens’ and as per order dated May 16, 2006 passed by Hon’ble Justice Subhro Kamal Mukherjee in C.O. No.1692 of 2006, stay of all further proceedings in Title Execution Case No.15 of 1982 had been granted till the disposal of the revisional application and as such, the subsequent transfer will govern by the provisions of the theory ‘lis pendens’. So far as the application of ‘lis pendens’ is concerned, this Bench agrees with Mr. Roychowdhury. Appropriate steps may be taken in the application for execution accordingly. But, this is a separate chapter to be dealt with subsequently by the learned Executing Court. At present, this Bench is concerned with the C.O. No.2354 of 2006. All the learned Advocates appearing for the opposite parties have made their submissions independently and at the same time, they have also adopted the submission of Mr. Bimal Chatterjee, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the opposite party no.s 12 to 15 and 17. Mr. Chatterjee has submitted that the so-called MoU was executed by some of the owners of the premises in suit, that is, the judgment debtors in respect of the four premises, but no agreement for assignment between the plaintiff-Bank / decreeholder and the petitioner has yet been executed. Since, there is no agreement at all, the question of assignment did not arise at all. Since, there is no agreement at all, the question of assignment did not arise at all. He has also submitted that if for argument’s sake, it is presumed that the bank has no objection in the matter of assignment as noted in its letter, the appropriate remedy for the applicant, if any, is to sue the bank for specific performance of contract and no permission for assignment is required from the Court. Mr. Chatterjee has also pointed out that the deposit of money in favour of the bank is not clear. The MoU was held between some of the judgment debtors and one Mr. Amarnath Shroff. But, at the time of deposit of money of Rs.61 lakhs, the same was not made by Mr. Shroff in his personal capacity, but in the name of another concern which has been described as Shree Ganga Construction Company. The said amount was withdrawn by the concern on the ground of financial crunch and another concern, namely, Christopher Housing Developers Pvt. Ltd. deposited Rs.70 lakhs as fixed deposit with the decree-holder / Bank, but such deposit was not made by Mr. Amarnath Shroff who initiated negotiation with the judgment debtors for the first time. Therefore, such deposits cannot be considered as deposits of money on behalf of Mr. Shroff who negotiated the matter. Mr. Chatterjee has also contended that if the relief as sought for assignment is perused, it would reveal that the petitioner has not only prayed for assignment but also prayed for giving directions which could be passed only if any decree for specific performance on contract is granted. To make it clear, the prayer as made in the application for assignment is quoted below:- (a) That permission be granted by Your honour for assignment of the said decree by the Allahabad bank in favour of your petitioner after discharge of the said Receiver and delivery of possession of the said premises No.47, Christopher Road to your petitioner along with document of title and other papers and documents lying deposited with the Allahabad Bank, to enable your petitioner to make payment of the said sum of Rs.61,27,419.86/= to Allahabad Bank. …………………………….………………… **********……………………………………………. Thus, Mr. Chatterjee contends that the applicant has not only prayed for assignment but also prayed for giving directions which could be passed only in a decree of specific performance of contract. …………………………….………………… **********……………………………………………. Thus, Mr. Chatterjee contends that the applicant has not only prayed for assignment but also prayed for giving directions which could be passed only in a decree of specific performance of contract. There is no proof of any agreement between the applicant and the bank that an agreement was really executed in writing stating assignment. So, in the absence of any agreement between the bank and the applicant, namely, M/s. Devine Mercantiles Pvt. Ltd., the prayer for assignment cannot be considered. Since, there is no agreement between the assignor and the assignee, the question of handing over possession did not arise at and the learned Trial Judge has rightly rejected the application for assignment. This submission of Mr. Chatterjee, this Bench holds, is convincing. Thus, by referring to the provisions of Order 21 Rule 16 of the C.P.C., Mr. Chatterjee has submitted that unless the assignment was done in writing or by operation of law, the question of permission for assignment did not arise at all. He submits that since, there is no assignment in writing from the Bank to the applicant, the prayer for assignment has been rightly rejected. Mr. Chatterjee has also contended that according to the letter of the Bank, Annexure-B at page 29 of the application, the Bank has intimated that it has no objection to assign, if its dues are cleared by the applicant. Mr. Chatterjee has also contended that if Shree Ganga Construction Company is a sister concern of M/s. Devine Mercantiles Pvt. Ltd. and Mr. Amarnath Shroff is a Director in respect of all the concerns, Shree Ganga Construction Company would have transferred the said amount in the name of Mr. Amarnath Shroff, the applicant and in that case, Mr. Shroff or the applicant could deposit the decretal dues in his name. He has also pointed out that Shree Ganga had withdrawn the amount prematurely and another company deposited the money. Anyway, the company which deposited the money as fixed deposit is quite different from the applicant or Mr. Amarnath Shroff and as such, the said security cannot be taken into consideration. Lastly, Mr. He has also pointed out that Shree Ganga had withdrawn the amount prematurely and another company deposited the money. Anyway, the company which deposited the money as fixed deposit is quite different from the applicant or Mr. Amarnath Shroff and as such, the said security cannot be taken into consideration. Lastly, Mr. Chatterjee has referred to the affidavits sworn by the Bank contending that the liability of the Bank had been satisfied by ASREC (India) Ltd. Thus, he has submitted that assignment had already been made by the Bank in favour of the ASREC (India) Ltd. Under the circumstances, the Bank has filed an application for dismissal of the execution case for nonprosecution and that application may be considered by this Court. He has also submitted that the ASREC (India) Ltd. has also filed an application to the similar effect for assignment in its favour and as per agreement between the Bank and the said trustee, the execution application is liable to be dismissed for nonprosecution on full satisfaction of the decretal dues. Thus, Mr. Chatterjee submits that in no way the prayer for assignment in favour of the petitioner can be considered. Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhatterjee appearing on behalf of the opposite party no.11 submits that in exercising the revisional jurisdiction, this Hon’ble Court need not intervene the matter, if there is no irregularity in the impugned order. He has contended that since there is no contract between the bank and the applicant seeking for assignment, the learned Trial Judge has rightly rejected the application for assignment by giving reasons. So, there is no scope of interference with the impugned order. Mr. Gopal Ghosh, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party no.s 4 & 5 has also referred to the provision of MoU particularly the Clause 8 and thus, he submits that the petitioner did not comply with the agreement at all. Even, it did not make any payment for discharge of its liabilities towards the employees as per clause 4 of the MoU appearing at page no.36 of the C.O. No.1692 of 2006. He has contended that under the changed circumstances, an assignment in favour of the ASREC (India) Ltd. has taken place. As such, the question of assignment in favour of the applicant or the leave to sue does not arise at all. He has contended that under the changed circumstances, an assignment in favour of the ASREC (India) Ltd. has taken place. As such, the question of assignment in favour of the applicant or the leave to sue does not arise at all. Thus, the learned Counsel on behalf of the opposite parties have submitted that the learned Trial Judge was perfectly justified in rejecting the application for assignment. Upon due consideration of the materials on record and the submissions of the learned Counsel of both the parties referred to earlier, this Bench is convinced that although the bank expressed its willingness for assignment, if its dues were satisfied, yet, in fact, no assignment in writing had taken place at all between the plaintiff-Bank and the applicant. Some preliminary measures were taken for assignment but the assignment had not been materialised at all in writing. Beside the heirs of Nani Gopal Sur, there are other partners from the family of the Surs in the M/s. Sur & Company. By filing an affidavit-in-opposition, the judgment debtors have also contended that no assignment had taken place at all in writing. Even the preliminary condition as appearing from Clause 4 of the MoU that the benefits should be given to the employees of M/s. Surs & Company before assignment have not been paid by the applicant as yet, though, the MoU was signed in the year 2004. Moreover, the other prayers relating to assignment as noted in the prayer of the application, cannot be granted at all, unless there is an actual assignment in writing. Under the circumstances, this Bench is of the view that since the provisions of Order 21 Rule 16 of the C.P.C. have not been complied with, the prayer of the applicant for assignment cannot be granted. The learned Trial Judge has, therefore, rightly rejected the application for assignment. In that view of the matter, there is no scope of interference with the impugned order relating to assignment. Accordingly, the revisional application fails to succeed. It is, therefore, dismissed. Considering the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. C.O. No.1692 of 2006:- Mr. The learned Trial Judge has, therefore, rightly rejected the application for assignment. In that view of the matter, there is no scope of interference with the impugned order relating to assignment. Accordingly, the revisional application fails to succeed. It is, therefore, dismissed. Considering the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. C.O. No.1692 of 2006:- Mr. Amarnath Shroff has sought for leave to file a suit for specific performance of the agreement dated September 6, 2004 against the learned Receiver and the defendants / judgment debtors / opposite parties and that application was rejected by the learned Trial Judge by the same order dated March 18, 2006 in Title Execution Case No.15 of 1982. While disposing of the said application, the learned Trial Judge has observed that Mr. Amarnath Shroff has not shown and highlighted any justified reason for granting permission to him to institute a suit against the legal heirs and heiresses of Late Nani Gopal Sur and the Receiver. He has also observed that if the petitioner has any interest in the suit premises, he can file a suit in his own capacity and for that reason, there is no need for taking permission of the Court. Thus, he has concluded that the application for leave to file a suit is liable to be rejected and thus, he has rejected the said application. Beside the reasons stated earlier in C.O. No.2354 of 2006, this Bench also observes that there are other grounds mentioned afterwards for which the said prayer for leave should have been allowed so far as the learned Receiver is concerned. It is true that the petitioner is a third party in respect to the execution proceeding and he has not acquired any interest in the suit premises. A Receiver had been appointed by the Executing Court and the learned Receiver is performing his duties as per writ issued to her in respect of the premises in suit. Therefore, virtually, the Receiver is an officer appointed by the Executing Court in respect of the suit premises and she has to discharge his duties as per writ issued to her. Therefore, virtually, the Receiver is an officer appointed by the Executing Court in respect of the suit premises and she has to discharge his duties as per writ issued to her. Since, a Receiver had already been appointed by the Executing Court in respect of the suit premises over which the petitioner claims for relief for specific performance of agreement, certainly, the learned Receiver, prima facie, appears to be a necessary party in the suit to be filed for specific performance of agreement dated September 6, 2004. The learned Receiver is an officer appointed by the Court and so, in fact, the suit premises lie in the custody of the learned Receiver. Mr. Roychowdhury appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the learned Receiver is nothing but an agent of the Court and for that reason, in fact, the property lies in the custody of the Court. He relies on the decisions of Banwarilal Agarwalla v. Sudhamoi Basu reported in 1959 C.W.N. 481 and Everest Coal Company Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar & ors. reported in AIR 1977 SC 2304 and thus, he submits the observations made therein that when the Court appoints a Receiver over a particular property, it is the Court which really takes charge of the same. It is only proper, therefore-and indeed, it is imperative for the maintenance of the dignity of the Courts and respect for the judiciary, so essential for the stable administration,-that the property or any rights therein should not be allowed to be affected or interfered with, without the leave of the appointing Court and the persons desiring to take any step which might affect the said property or any rights therein, should obtain that Court’s leave in that behalf. It seems, therefore, that, on principle, the Rule should have a wide application and as a proceeding for standardisation of rent in respect of a premises may well affect the income or the payment to be made for the use and occupation of a disputed property and may thus conceivably affect the said property or to be more precise, the rights and liabilities of the parties in respect thereof in the matter of rent, the rule should also be applicable to such a proceeding. On principle and also as a matter of law, the rule will equally apply to proceedings before judicial and quasi judicial tribunals having some, though not all, the trappings of a Court of law strictly so called. The decision of Everest Coal Company Pvt. Ltd. (supra) also lays down the same principle with the observations that in the case where the property is under possession of a Receiver, grant of leave is the rule and refusal is the exception. Any litigative disturbance of the court’s possession without its permission amounts to contempt of its authority; and the wages of contempt of court in this jurisdiction may well be voidability of the whole proceeding. Equally clearly, prior permission of the court appointing the Receiver is not a condition precedent to the enforcement of the cause of action. Nor is it so grave a vice that later leave sought and got before the decree has been passed will not purge it. Therefore, permission is essential either before the institution of the suit or after filing of the suit, without which the petitioner may have to fact the contempt proceedings. The submission of Mr. Roychowdhury based on the abovementioned two decisions, this Bench holds, should be accepted. During argument, Mr. Bimal Chatterjee, learned Senior Advocate has submitted that so far as the heirs and heiresses of Late Nani Gopal Sur are concerned, no leave is required. The petitioner may file a suit against them, if he wishes to do so. So far as, the learned Receiver is concerned, he need not take any leave earlier. But, leave may be taken afterwards after filing of the said suit, if such leave is required at all. For that reason, leave of the Court is not required at this stage. Mr. Chatterjee has also submitted that since, the decretal dues of the decreeholder / Bank has been satisfied out of the sale of the suit premises to a third party, the learned Receiver stands discharged automatically with the sale of the suit premises to a third party (ASREC) and as such, no leave is required at all to file a suit against the learned Receiver. Controverting such submission, Mr. Roychowdhury has replied that leave to file a suit, prior to the institution of the said suit, is not sine quo non and such leave may be sought for after filing of the suit. Controverting such submission, Mr. Roychowdhury has replied that leave to file a suit, prior to the institution of the said suit, is not sine quo non and such leave may be sought for after filing of the suit. But, before filing of the suit, the petitioner is required to expend money for the purpose of preparation of the plaint, issuance of notice, Court fees, etc. and if ultimately, the learned Trial Judge rejects the plaint on the ground that no leave was sought for earlier and if it is ordered that the suit is dismissed with liberty to file a fresh suit after obtaining leave from the Executing Court, in that case, the petitioner will be seriously prejudiced. Pointing out the observations made by the learned Executing Court in the impugned order, Mr. Chatterjee submits that in fact, there is no cause of action to institute a suit and as such, no permission is required. Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharjee appearing on behalf of the opposite party no.11 has also submitted that in order to file a suit against the learned Receiver, certain actions on the part of the Receiver which is irregular or without jurisdiction, must be shown. But, in the instant case, there are no circumstances that the learned Receiver has violated any terms of her appointment or that she has exceeded her jurisdiction for which the Court can grant permission. He also submits that the learned Trial Judge has rightly rejected the application for leave to sue the learned Receiver and the Surs. He has also contended as noted earlier that in exercising the revisional jurisdiction, this Court need not come into the matters in details. There is a clear finding in the impugned order on the basis of the materials and so, this is enough for rejection of the prayer for leave. In order to appreciate whether the leave is required or not, the relevant paragraph in the application for leave is quoted below:- It appears that the present judgment debtors and/or the legal heirs and heiresses of late Nani Gopal Sur are now trying to liquidate the dues of the bank by borrowing money from outsider and thereafter by dishonoring the agreement entered in between Shri Amarnath Shroff and them and it may so happen that they may transfer and/or sell the said property without honouring the agreement entered earlier. A copy of the Memorandum of Understanding entered in between Amarnath Shroff and the legal heirs and heiresses of Late Nani Gopal Sur is annexed hereto as Annexure “A” and same may be treated as part of this petition. The Petitioner/Applicant also wrote a letter to the said legal heirs of Nani Gopal Sur gratifying the Memorandum of Understanding vide writing dated 24th December, 2004. A copy of the said letter addressed to the said legal heirs of Nani Gopal Sur dated 24th December, 2004 by Amarnath Shrof is annexed hereto as Annexure and marked with letter “B”. This Bench agrees with the submission of the learned Counsel for the opposite parties to the effect that no leave is required to institute a suit against the heirs and heiresses of late Nani Gopal Sur for the reliefs as stated in the application. But, prima facie, the petitioner has shown grounds to institute a suit against them. As observed earlier, the suit premises had already been assigned to ASREC (India) Ltd. In order to enter into an agreement dated September 6, 2004, the petitioner might have to expend money and it does not appear that the said agreement had been cancelled. The discharge of the learned Receiver from the execution case is not automatic. An appropriate order is to be passed to that effect and then and there the learned Receiver may be discharged. Otherwise, she will be deemed to be in the custody of the property, although, it is stated by the bank that the property had been assigned to the ASREC (India) Ltd. As per observations made earlier and the decisions referred to earlier, under the above circumstances, the leave of the Executing Court to sue the learned Receiver is a must. The observations of the learned Executing Court contrary to the above cannot be supported. In consideration of the exigency of the situation as discussed earlier, the prior permission, this Bench considers, would prevail. The observations of the learned Executing Court as to whether the learned Receiver is aware about the MoU or not is not a matter of consideration at present. But, it reveals from the materials on record that as observed earlier, the MoU was signed by some of the heirs and heiresses of Late Nani Gopal Sur and the petitioner. The observations of the learned Executing Court as to whether the learned Receiver is aware about the MoU or not is not a matter of consideration at present. But, it reveals from the materials on record that as observed earlier, the MoU was signed by some of the heirs and heiresses of Late Nani Gopal Sur and the petitioner. So, if the terms of the MoU are violated by some of the judgment debtors, the petitioner is at liberty to take suitable action against them and for that reason, the learned Receiver also becomes a necessary party in the suit to be filed by the petitioner for the reliefs as stated in the application. Accordingly, the impugned order relating to the rejection of the prayer for leave to sue against the learned Receiver passed by the learned Executing Court cannot be supported. In that view of the matter, the learned Executing Court has committed errors of law in rejecting the application for leave to sue for specific performance of agreement against the learned Receiver particularly when the learned Receiver is in possession of the suit premises. The impugned order cannot be sustained accordingly. The revisional application succeeds in part. It is, therefore allowed in part. The impugned order is hereby set aside. The application dated March 16, 2005 filed by the petitioner appearing as Annexure-B at page no.30 stands allowed in part. The prayer for leave to file a suit against the learned Receiver for declaration, injunction, enforcement of the MoU dated September 6, 2004 before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 4th Court, Alipore is granted. It is also recorded that no leave of the Executing Court is required to file a suit against the heirs and heiresses of late Nani Gopal Sur for the selfsame reliefs. So this prayer for leave is hereby refused. Considering the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.