Judgment : 1. By this application, revision petitioner (husband) challenged legality, propriety and correctness of the impugned order passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Amravati on 23.1.2004 in Criminal Revision No. 10 of 2003 whereby the revision application was allowed and the respondent-wife was granted monthly maintenance of Rs. 750/from the date of application plus costs of Rs. 250/for the proceedings. Earlier, learned trial Magistrate who heard an application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Misc. Criminal Application No. 231 of 2002, claim of respondent-wife for maintenance for herself was rejected. However, claim for maintenance for child was granted in the sum of Rs. 350/per month from the date of application plus Rs. 1500/towards costs of the proceedings. Aggrieved by refusal to grant maintenance to wife, wife had challenged refusal to grant maintenance in Criminal Revision No. 10 of 2003 which was decided by the impugned judgment and order. 2. It is the grievance of the revision applicant that the applicant had pronounced Talaq (divorce) in accordance with Muslim Law and, therefore, after divorce, his wife was not entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr. P. C. It is further submitted that ruling cited in DagduChotu Pathan v. Rahimbi Dagdu Pathan reported in 2002 (3) Mh. L. J. 602 is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case on the ground that Talaq was pronounced as per command of Quaran and, therefore, decision of the Full Bench was not applicable. It is further submitted that learned Additional Sessions Judge wrongly observed regarding postal endorsement and communication sent under postal certificate. According to learned counsel for revision applicant, the presumption of communication of Talaq ought to have been drawn considering the refusal to accept notice sent from the husband. It is, therefore, contended that the impugned judgment and order is improper, unjust and incorrect. 3. Learned counsel for respondent-wife submitted that apart from the Full Bench Judgment referred to in the impugned judgment and order in DagduPathan’s case (supra), Bombay High Court in the ruling of DilshadBegaum Ahmadkhan Pathan v. Ahmadkhan Hanifkhan & anr reported in II (2007) DMC 738 held that valid and legal Talaq ought to be proved by a factum of pronouncement of Talaq. It is necessary that pronouncement of Talaq must be proved by sufficient evidence to be considered in the light of Full Bench decision in DagduPathan’s case (supra). In other words, requirement of law must be met by evidence led on the part of husband regarding preconditions of arbitration for reconcilliation and communication of reasons for Talaq. The husband is required to convey reasons for divorce, appoint arbitrator who resort to conciliation proceedings so as to bring reconciliation between the parties and failure of such reconciliation to establish a situation where it was impossible for the marriage to continue. This is required to be proved as condition precedent for the husband’s right to give Talaq to his wife in accordance with Muslim Law. The requirements of law are to be satisfied particularly when wife disputes the factum of Talaq or the effectiveness of Talaq or legality of Talaq in a competent court of law. In other words, therefore, mere statement made in writing before the Court or in oral depositions regarding the Talaq having been pronounced sometimes in the past is not sufficient to hold that the husband has divorced his wife and such a divorce is in keeping with the dictates of Islam. 4. In the present case, it is contended that one witness by name Mohammad Faruq was examined in order to establish that he had been to the house of Samsher Khan (father of respondent-wife) for to fetch her on 4/5 occasions. He also stated that he had no concern with divorce, but in the same breath, turned around to say that he is eye witness to the divorce. Apart from this shaky evidence with least credibility, no oral evidence is led of any independent witness after husband Alhaj Ezaj examined himself to contest the claim for maintenance. 5. Be that as it may, in DagduChotu Pathan’s case (supra), it is held by the Full Bench of this Court that mere statement made in writing before the Court or in oral depositions regarding the Talaq having been pronounced sometimes in the past is not sufficient enough to conclude that the husband has divorced his wife by pronouncing Talaq and further that such a divorce was in keeping with the dictates of Islam. Furthermore, witness who is examined by applicant-husband is not reliable as he has tendency to change his version in the same breath, first saying that he had no concern with the divorce and then turning around to state self-contradicting that he had been eye witness to the divorce. 6. Reference is made to one more ruling in ShabanaBano v. Imran Khan reported in (2010) 1 SCC 666 regarding object of grant of maintenance under Section 125 Cr. P. C. in order to submit that wife would be entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr. P. C. until she remarries. In other words, claim for maintenance is not restricted to Iddatperiod only. Thus, on behalf of the respondent-wife, it is contended that even a divorced muslim woman would be entitled to claim maintenance till she does not remarry. This is so, considering the fact that Section 125 Cr. P. C. is a beneficial piece of Legislation and benefit must be accorded to divorced Muslim woman even assuming that divorce is proved. 7. To counter this submission, learned counsel for the applicant-husband cited ruling in KamlaPal and ors v. Samlaprasad reported in 2005 All MR (Cri) 1958 to contend that wife must prove refusal and neglect on the part of her husband to claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr. P. C. 8. After going through the rulings cited by respective counsel and considering the facts and circumstances appearing from the record, it does appear that revision applicant in this case pleaded divorce as a ground for avoiding to pay maintenance. He also chose to avoid liability for maintenance pleading that his wife has independent source of income from tailoring job and also disputing his ability to earn and pay maintenance. Looking into all these circumstances, I think, ratio in the ruling in DagduPathan’s case (supra) was attracted and it was rightly applied by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Amravati so as to grant maintenance allowance. 9. Learned counsel for the revision applicant then argued that quantum of maintenance is on higher side since applicant-husband is unable to pay maintenance as per the impugned judgment and order. He also submitted that amount of interim maintenance is deposited by husband in the trial Court, but it was not withdrawn by the wife. 9. Learned counsel for the revision applicant then argued that quantum of maintenance is on higher side since applicant-husband is unable to pay maintenance as per the impugned judgment and order. He also submitted that amount of interim maintenance is deposited by husband in the trial Court, but it was not withdrawn by the wife. According to learned counsel for respondent-wife, deposit of interim maintenance was directed by this Court in order to test bonafides of the husband and due to oral direction from this Court, wife had not applied for withdrawal of the amount deposited. 10. Bethat as it may, considering that husband is always at liberty to bring to the notice of trial Court change in the circumstances, if any, for to claim alteration in the quantum of maintenance allowance as stated under the provisions of Section 127 Cr. P. C. Hence, quantum of maintenance allowance awarded by the impugned judgment and order needs no interference. 11. For all these circumstances, I do not find any valid ground for interference in the impugned judgment and order. Revision application is accordingly dismissed.