Judgment Nisar Ahmad Kakru, CJ. 1. Being aggrieved of auction, held by the Court in Execution Petition No. 3 of 2004, arising out of Original Suit No. 268 of 2001, on the file of the XI Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, therefore this writ petition, by the petitioner, claiming to be owner of the subject matter of the suit and to the exclusion of the judgment debtors – respondents 6 and 7. Thus a dispute of title between the writ petitioner – appellant and the judgment debtors – respondents 6 and 7, but instead of approaching the competent civil court of jurisdiction, the writ petitioner is seeking redressal by medium of a writ petition and in support of its maintainability, reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the judicial pronouncement handed down in SMT. G.K. AND ORS v. MUNI. COM., BHATINDA 1969 (3) SCC 769 which has dealt with a question, whether there was due publication of the notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. He has also referred to C.M and MANU CO. LTD., v. THE U. MUNI. COUNCIL 1970 (1) SCC 582 which refers to the impact of levy of octroi duty. COM., BHATINDA 1969 (3) SCC 769 which has dealt with a question, whether there was due publication of the notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. He has also referred to C.M and MANU CO. LTD., v. THE U. MUNI. COUNCIL 1970 (1) SCC 582 which refers to the impact of levy of octroi duty. Law being settled that a judicial decision has to apply provided facts are similar, therefore, a glance on the facts of the case is called for so as to appreciate similarity of facts or otherwise and to begin with, let us notice the relief sought for by the petitioner in this writ petition; “……..Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue an order, direction or writ more in the nature of WRIT OF CERTIORARI calling for records in E.P. No.3 of 2004 in O.S.No.268 of 2001 on the file of the court of the 1st respondent and quash the proceedings in E.P No. 3 of 2004 in O.S.No.268 of 2001 including auction proceedings for the sale of H.No. 3-6-182/1&2 situate in Hyderguda, Himayatnagar, Hyderabad made by the 1st respondent in favour of respondents 2 to 5 as void-ab-initio, manifest error apparent on the face of record resulting in miscarriage of justice, opposed to principles of natural justice, violative of Article 300-A of Constitution of India and to declare the auction sale certificate No. 4293 of 2005 on the file of the Joint-Sub Registrar-II, Hyderabad, and subsequent alienation made by the respondents 2 to 5 vide document No.3131 of 2006 on the file of the Joint Sub-Registrar-II, Hyderabad, made in favour of respondent No.8 and the lease deed document No.550 of 2007 on the file of the Joint Sub-Registrar-II, Hyderabad in favour of respondent No.9 as bad, illegal, arbitrary and to declare them as void consequently directing respondents 8 & 9 to deliver the vacant possession of the H.No. 3-6-182/1&2 to the petitioner.” 2. The relief clause reproduced unveils that the petitioner seeks a declaration of her title over the subject matter of the writ petition which was put to auction by the Court in an execution petition, primarily on the ground that the respondents 6 and 7 have no title to the said property and the claim so advanced is refuted by the other side. Hence a dispute of title and what is questioned in the judgments supra is the validity of notification issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and levy of octroi duty. More so, the facts of this case have given rise to a variety of complex questions of fact, determination whereof is not possible without production of oral evidence besides documentary, therefore, we are of the view that the dispute cannot be appropriately tried in a writ petition. In taking the view, we are fortified by the judgments supra relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, a few paragraphs whereof may be noticed. To begin with paragraph 14 of SMT. G.K. AND ORS v. MUNI. COM., BHATINDA (1 supra)is extracted; “When the petition raises question of fact of a complex nature, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute may not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition.” Paragraph 8 ofC.M and MANU CO. LTD., v. THE U. MUNI. COUNCIL (2 supra); “The High Court may, in exercise of its discretion, decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. But the discretion is judicial if the petition makes a claim which is frivolous, vexatious, or prima facie unjust, or may not appropriately be tried in a petition invoking extraordinary jurisdiction, the Court may decline to entertain the petition. (Emphasis supplied)” 3. Reverting to the facts of the case the following questions arise ; (i) Whether petitioner can maintain writ petition questioning Court auction, which involves disputed questions of title? (ii) Whether a writ of certiorari can be sought for against a judicial order passed by a competent civil Court? 4. Question No. 1 need not detain us because answer is readily available from the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to hereinafter. In SOHAN LAL v. UNION OF INDIA AIR 1957 SC 529 following extract would be relevant; “3………………There was, a serious dispute on questions of fact between the parties and also whether Jagan Nath, had acquired in law any title to the property in dispute. In SOHAN LAL v. UNION OF INDIA AIR 1957 SC 529 following extract would be relevant; “3………………There was, a serious dispute on questions of fact between the parties and also whether Jagan Nath, had acquired in law any title to the property in dispute. Proceedings by way of a writ were not appropriate in a case where the decision of the Court would amount to a decree declaring Jagan Nath’s title and ordering restoration of possession. The proper remedy open to Jagan Nath was to get his title declared in the ordinary way in a Civil Court……….. 4…… 5 We do not propose to enquire into the merits of the rival claims of title to the property in dispute set up by the appellant and Jagan Nath. If we were to do so, we would be entering into a field of investigation which is more appropriate for a Civil Court in a properly constituted suit to do rather than for a Court exercising the prerogative of issuing writs. These are questions of fact and law which are in dispute requiring determination before the respective claims of the parties to this appeal can be decided. Before the property in dispute can be restored to Jagan Nath it will be necessary to declare that he had title in that property and was entitled to recover possession of it. This would in effect amount to passing a decree in his favour. In the circumstances to be mentioned hereafter, it is a matter for serious consideration whether in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution such a declaration ought to be made and restoration of the property to Jagan Nath be ordered.” In THANSINGH v. SUPDT. OF TAXES AIR 1964 SC 1419 following extract from para 7 would be relevant; “………The jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Art. 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Art. 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.” In Ghan Shyam Das Gupta v. Anant Kumar Sinha AIR 1991 SC 2251 it was held as under; “7……….It was, therefore, necessary to adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties and record a finding on the character of possession of the writ petitioners, before proceeding to consider whether the decree is executable or not against them; and having not done so, the High Court has seriously erred in law in allowing the writ petition by the impugned judgment. The decision on the disputed issue was dependent on the consideration of the evidence to be led by the parties, and while exercising the writ jurisdiction the High Court was not expected to go into that question. In the circumstances, the Court ought to have refused to dispose of the writ petition on merits, leaving the writ petitioners to avail of the remedy before the Civil Court. 8. In the circumstances, the Court ought to have refused to dispose of the writ petition on merits, leaving the writ petitioners to avail of the remedy before the Civil Court. 8. The principle as to when the High Court should exercise its special jurisdiction under Art. 226 and when to refuse to do so on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy has been settled by a long line of cases. The remedy provided under Art. 226 is not intended to supersede the modes of obtaining relief before a Civil Court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions. As was observed in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1976) I SCR 521: ( AIR 1975 SC 2151 ) the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is supervisory in nature and is not meant for correcting errors like an appellate Court. In Thansingh Nathmal v. A. Mazid, (1964) 6 SCR 654 : ( AIR 1964 SC 1419 ) a case dealing with liability to pay sales tax, the appellants without following the statutory remedy under the Sales Tax Act, moved the High Court under Art. 226 on the ground that the Act was ultra vires. The challenge was rejected. Another contention, namely, that the finding of the Commissioner that the goods were actually within the State at the time of the contract was based on no evidence and was purely speculative, was also raised. This ground also failed before the High Court and the writ petition was dismissed. Approving the decision, this Court observed that if the appellants had pursued the statutory remedy under the Act and the question had been referred to the High Court, the Court could have appropriately advised the Commissioner, but not having done so, the High Court could not be asked to assume the role of an appellate Court over the decision of the Commissioner either on a question of fact or even of law. Again when a learned single Judge of the High Court and on appeal a Division Bench proceeded to examine the correctness of an order in relation to grant of a permit to ply a vehicle under the Motor Vehicles Act, it was observed by this Court in M. Naina Mohammed v. K.A. Natarajan, (1976) 1 SCR 102 : ( AIR 1975 SC 1867 ), that the power under Art. 226 is supervisory in nature and the Judges at both the tiers had unwittingly slipped into the subtle but, fatal, error of exercising a king of appellate review. So far the question of executability of a decree is concerned, the Civil Procedure Code contains elaborate and exhaustive provisions for dealing with it in all its aspects. The numerous rules of O. XXI of the Code take care of different situations, providing effective remedies not only to judgment-debtors and decree-holders but also to claimant objectors as the case may be. In an exceptional case, where provisions are rendered incapable of giving relief to an aggrieved party in adequate measure and appropriate time, the answer is a regular suit in the Civil Court. The remedy under the Civil Procedure Code is of superior judicial quality than what is generally available under other statutes, and the Judge being entrusted exclusively with administration of justice, is expected to do better. It will be, therefore, difficult to find a case where interference in writ jurisdiction for granting (relief) to a judgment-debtor or a claimant-objector can be justified. The Rr. 97, to 106 of O. XXI envisage questions as in the present appeal to be determined on the basis of evidence to be led by the parties and after the 1976 Amendment, the decision has been made appealable like a decree. The High Court, in the present case, therefore, ought not to have embarked upon a decision of the writ petition on merits, and should have refused to exercise its special jurisdiction on the ground of alternative remedy before the Civil Court.” 5. The auction sale which is questioned by medium of this writ petition is questionable under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) or even otherwise by an appropriate suit for declaration of title. The auction sale which is questioned by medium of this writ petition is questionable under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) or even otherwise by an appropriate suit for declaration of title. The remedy prescribed under CPC being undoubtedly efficacious one, it would therefore be impermissible by application of judicial pronouncements handed down by the apex Court to allow the petitioner to invoke extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India bypassing an alternative and efficacious remedy. 6. Question No.2. While deliberating upon the question, it needs to be borne in mind that the petitioner has called in question the proceedings of a competent Executing Court and challenge thrown has inter alia given rise to disputed questions of fact as indicated above. Even if it is assumed that the petitioner had title to the property in question, yet, writ of certiorari against the judicial order passed by a competent Court of jurisdiction is not maintainable in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Naresh v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1 . It was a case where a judicial order passed by the High Court on the original side was called in question by invocation of jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. While dealing with the question, the legal position was illustrated by the Court in the following extracts; “38……Whether the findings of fact recorded by the Judge are right or wrong, and whether the conclusion of law drawn by him suffers from any infirmity, can be considered and decided if the party aggrieved by the decision of the Judge takes the matter up before the appellate Court. But it is singularly inappropriate to assume that a judicial decision pronounced by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him for adjudication can affect the fundamental rights of the citizens under Art. 19 (1). What the judicial decision purports to do is to decide the controversy between the parties brought before the Court and nothing more. What the judicial decision purports to do is to decide the controversy between the parties brought before the Court and nothing more. If this basic and essential aspect of the judicial process is borne in mind, it would be plain that the judicial verdict pronounced by Court in or in relation to a matter brought before it for its decision cannot be said to affect the fundamental rights of citizens under Art. 19 (1). 63. Whilst we are dealing with this aspect of the matter, we may incidentally refer to the relevant observations made by Halsbury on this point. “In case of judgments of inferior Courts of civil jurisdiction” says Halsbury in the footnote, “it has been suggested that certiorari might be granted to quash them for want of jurisdiction [Kemp v. Balne (1844), I Dow. & L. 885, at p. 887], inasmuch as an error did not lie upon that ground. But there appears to be no reported case in which the judgment of an inferior Court of civil jurisdiction has been quashed on certiorari, either for want of jurisdiction or on any other ground.” The ultimate proposition is set out in the terms: “Certiorari does not lie to quash the judgments of inferior Courts of civil jurisdiction”. These observations would indicate that in England the judicial orders passed by civil Courts of plenary jurisdiction in or in relation to matters brought before them are not held to be amenable to the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari. 65. We are, therefore, satisfied that so far as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writs of certiorari is concerned, it is impossible to accept the argument of the petitioners that judicial orders passed by High Courts in or in relation to proceedings pending before them, are amenable to be corrected by exercise of the said jurisdiction. We have no doubt that it would be unreasonable to attempt to rationalise the assumption of jurisdiction by this Court under Article 32 to correct such judicial orders on the fanciful hypothesis that High Courts may pass extravagant orders in or in relation to matters pending before them and that a remedy by way of a writ of certiorari should, therefore, be sought for and be deemed to be included within the scope of Art 32. The words used in Art. 32 are no doubt wide; but having regard to the considerations which we have set out in the course of this judgment, we are satisfied that the impugned order cannot be brought within the scope of this Court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Art. 32; to hold otherwise would be repugnant to the well-recognised limitations within which the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari can be exercised and inconsistent with the uniform trend of this Court’s decision in relation to the said point.” 7. The aforesaid view is reiterated by the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam and Anr. Vs. Chhabi Nath and Ors (2009) 5 SCC 616 . In the said decision, the Supreme Court noticed a discordant note in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Ors AIR 2003 SC 3044 and the said decision was found contrary to the Constitution Bench judgment in Naresh (6 supra) and accordingly, the matter was referred to larger bench. Except the decision in Surya Dev Rai (8 supra), the Supreme Court has consistently held that a writ of certiorari does not lie to quash judgments of subordinate Courts of civil jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was further held in Radhey Shyam (7 supra) that “under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not issue a writ of certiorari. The said power under Article 227 is very sparingly exercised to keep the tribunals and Courts within the bounds of their authority”. 8. Apart from that, it is not a case where petitioner is remediless and fact of the matter is that she is fully alive to the civil remedies, those are available to her which she has identified herself, very specifically at paragraph 14 at page 13 of her affidavit. 9. In the aforementioned backdrop, indulgence is declined. Dismissed along with miscellaneous petitions.