Hon'ble Dr. KOTHARI, J.—These two appeals have been filed by the appellant-Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Limited, Udaipur (hereinafter referred to as the RSMML or the appellant Company) under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 against the judgment/order dated 6.12.2010 passed by the learned Distt. Judge, Merta on reference under Section 18 of the Act with respect to award of Land Acquisition Officer (SDO, Nagaur) dt. 19.9.2000. 2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal, shorn of unnecessary details, are as under. 3. On 7.11.1997, the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was issued by the State Government seeking to acquired in all 7400 bighas of agricultural land of village Matasukh, Tehsil Jayal, Distt. Nagaur out of which 98 bighas and 11 biswas of land was of Khatedar Bala Ram, the respondent herein. The notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 16.10.1998 as also the notification under Section 17(1) of the Act was issued on 16.10.1998. The said land was acquired for the appellant RSMML, a Government of Rajasthan undertaking for mining of lignite which was mineral found under the surface of said land in a survey conducted by the Central Government and the State Government around the year 1995. The total land acquired was around 7400 bighas of land comprised in villages Kasnau, Igyar and Matasukh of Distt. Nagaur. The Land Acquisition Officer-SDO, Nagaur passed the award on 19.9.2000 and on the basis of DLC rates supplied to him by the Sub-Registrar of Jayal vide letter dated 24.12.1998 and letter dtd. 17.8.2000, he passed the award on 19.9.2000 determining the compensation of the said land of various land holders. The DLS rates communicated to him for village Mata Sukh were Rs. 12,000/- per bigha for irrigated land away from road/abadi area and Rs. 13,200/- per bigha of irrigated land near road/abadi area. Similarly, for unirrigated land, the said rates were notified to be 7,370/- per bigha for land situated away from road/abadi area and Rs. 7,920/- per bigha near the road/abadi. For small plots/Baras, the rate of DLC communicated was Rs. 55 per sq. yard. Including therein the rate for trees on said land or well if existing on said land, the rate determined by the Land Acquisition Officer in the award was worked out at Rs. 12,500/- per bigha for the irrigated land and Rs. For small plots/Baras, the rate of DLC communicated was Rs. 55 per sq. yard. Including therein the rate for trees on said land or well if existing on said land, the rate determined by the Land Acquisition Officer in the award was worked out at Rs. 12,500/- per bigha for the irrigated land and Rs. 7,500/- for unirrigated land for the land in the said village Matasukh. Being dissatisfied with the same, certain reference applications were filed under Section 18 of the Act seeking enhancement of compensation and by the impugned judgment and order dated 6.12.2010, the learned Court below of Distt. Judge, Merta City (Sh. Surendra Moham Sharma, RHJS) enhanced the rate per bigha uniformally for both irrigated and unirrigated land and further directed that such enhanced rate of compensation be paid with interest @ 12% from 7.11.1997, date of notification under Section 4 of the Act till the date of passing of award or taking of possession whichever is earlier, after adjustment of compensation already received by the land-owners in pursuance of the award. Solatium @ 30% was also directed to be paid. 4. Being aggrieved by the said order of reference under Section 18 of the Act, the appellant RSMML has approached this Court by way of present appeals, which were heard finally at admission stage since a caveat was entered on behalf of respondent-landowner by Mr. L.R. Mehta, Advocate and both the learned counsels prayed for final hearing of the case at this stage. 5. The primary and foremost contention raised by Mr. M.R. Singhvi, Sr. Advocate, learned counsel appearing for appellant RSMML was that the Reference Court under Section 18 of the Act has abnormally raised the amount of compensation to Rs. 50,000/- per bigha for the land in question more than four times as against Rs. 7,500/- and 12,500/- per bigha in case of irrigated land awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. Advocate, learned counsel appearing for appellant RSMML was that the Reference Court under Section 18 of the Act has abnormally raised the amount of compensation to Rs. 50,000/- per bigha for the land in question more than four times as against Rs. 7,500/- and 12,500/- per bigha in case of irrigated land awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. He submitted that the evidence adduced by the respondents-land holders in the form of sale-deeds also did not disclose such high rate of agricultural land and therefore, the market value of the land which is required to be determined as per Section 23 of the Act as on the date of publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act and further Section 24 of the Act especially negatives taking into account any increase in the market value of land acquired, which is likely to accrue from the use to which it will be put when acquired. In other words, he submitted that merely because lignite coal was to be mined from the said acquired land at a later point of time and also same was valuable mineral fetching high value in market and such lignite was to be used for power generation, such consideration could not be taken into account for determining the higher market value. He submitted that the Land Acquisition Officer himself had enhanced the rate from DLC rates made available to him by concerned Revenue Authorities to Rs. 7,500/- per bigha for unirrigated land and Rs. 12,500/- per bigha for irrigated land in the award dtd. 19.9.2000. 6. Mr. Singhvi also vehemently assailed the basis for enhancement of rate to Rs. 50,000/- per bigha by reference Court on the basis of another acquisition of land made by the State Government for the appellant-Company in Barmer of about 17592 bighas of land of Kapurdi Lignite Project in which an award on mutual agreement of State Government and Land-holders were passed under Section 11(2) of the Act on 14.9.2009 after about 9 years and the notification for such acquisition of land in Barmer for Kapurdi Lignite Project was issued on 13.7.2007 after about 10 years of notification under Section 4 of the Act involved in the present case, which was issued on 7.11.1997. 7. 7. Drawing the attention of the Court towards Section 11(2) and sub-section (3), the learned counsel for the appellant-RSMML urged that award under Section 11(2), which is prefaced with non-obstante clause clearly stipulates that notwisthanding contained in sub-section (1) if at any stage of proceedings, the Collector is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land who appeared before him have agreed in writing on the matters to be included in the award of the Collector in the form prescribed by rules made by the appropriate Government, he may, without making further enquiry, make an award according to the terms of such agreement. Thus, it is the award on mutual settlement between the parties as to the rate of compensation, measurement of land etc. He further submitted that sub-section (3) of Section 11 clearly stipulates that the determined of compensation for any land under sub-section (2) shall not, in any way affect the determination of compensation in respect of other lands in the same locality or elsewhere in accordance with the other provisions of this Act. Thus, he submitted that the award made for Kapurdi Lignite Project in Barmer after about 10 years on mutual settlement under Section 11(2) of the Act in which State Government agreed to pay Rs. 50,000/- per bigha of irrigated land could not form the basis for the enhancement of rate in the present case of acquisition in Nagaur in an award, which was made not by mutual settlement but on the basis of market value determined under Section 23 of the Act in terms of Section 11(1) of the Act. 8. Mr. Singhvi, therefore, prayed that in that in fact devoid of any other evidence on record, the learned Reference Court in the present case, has abnormally raised the compensation to Rs. 50,000/- per bigha which was not the market value for land in question as on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act merely on the basis of Barmer Kapurdi Lignite Project award dtd. 14.9.2009 which was not only a different land situated far away from the land in question situated in District Nagaur, but at a much later point of time also and that too upon a mutual settlement between the State Government and the land holders. He, therefore, prayed for quashing of the impugned order and restoring the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. He, therefore, prayed for quashing of the impugned order and restoring the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his contentions: (1) AIR 2010 SC 170 - Lal Chand vs. Union of India & Anr. (2) (1994) 4 SCC 595 - Jawajee Nagnatham vs. Revenue Divisional Officer. (3) AIR 1992 SC 974 - Ashwini Kumar Dhingra vs. State of Punjab. (4) (1995) 1 SCC 717 - Land Acquisition Officer vs. Jasti Rohiti. 9. On the other hand, Mr. L.R. Mehta learned counsel appearing for the respondents-landowners stoutly supported the impugned order and relying upon the various decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, he urged that the amount of compensation awarded by the Reference Court in just and proper and is fair determination of the market value in terms of Sec. 23 of the Act and therefore the same deserves to be maintained. He also urged that in fact, the respondent-land owners were never given proper oppor-tunity to make their claims for compensation as even the notices under Sec. 9 of the Act were not served on the respondents and the rate of Rs. 50,000/- determined by the Reference Court was not only based on evidence in the form of sale-deeds of land situated in nearby area, but also the award of Kapurdi Lignite Project of Barmer could also be relied upon and has rightly been relied upon by the Reference Court for enhancing the reate of compensation to Rs. 50,000/- per bigha besides interest and solatium. 10. Elaborating further, Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-land-owners further submitted that the evidence of sale-deeds vide Ex. 2, 3 and 4 produced before the Reference Court also supported such enhancement in rates. Ex. 2 is the sale-deed of agricultural land measuring 15 bighas of land in village Arwar of one Rajendra Singh to Laxmi Devi on 31.1.1997 at the rate of Rs. 40,000/- per bigha. Ex. 3 is the sale-deed for 16 bighas and 17 biswas of land sold by Radha Devi to Rameshwar Prasad on 13.8.1997 at Rs. 11,000/- per bigha. Ex. 4 is another sale-deed dated 27.12.1990 by which on Basti Ram sold 7 bighs and 4 biswas of land to one Idana Ram in village Matasukh for Rs. 50,000/-. 11. The learned counsel Mr. 11,000/- per bigha. Ex. 4 is another sale-deed dated 27.12.1990 by which on Basti Ram sold 7 bighs and 4 biswas of land to one Idana Ram in village Matasukh for Rs. 50,000/-. 11. The learned counsel Mr. L.R. Mehta for the respondents-landowners also submitted that the legal representatives of respondents-landowners Teja Ram S/o Bala Ram has also filed his detailed affidavit before the learned Reference Court in his Reference Case No. 35/2003 in which he stated that even prior to 1996, the land near said village Matasukh was being sold around Rs. 70,000/- per bigha. In his affidavit dated 9.4.2010 in para 35 of the said affidavit, he has also stated that his father Bala Ram had spent about Rs. 4,50,000/- in the year 1984 to 1986 towards manure of gypsum etc. and had also raised temporary mud boundary of about 5 to 6 ft. height around his land of 98 bighas and for levelling of land which was uneven earlier. He also stated that quality of soil of said land was very good in village Matasukh and therefore, in comparison to land sold in nearby villages, the land of the respondent-landowners in village Mata Sukh was required to be valued at higher price. The said deponent was also cross-examined by the learned counsel for RSMML before the Reference Court and in the additional affidavit filed by said Teja Ram on 18.10.2010, he has also produced the award under Section 11(2) of the Act by the Land Acquisition Officer of Barmer regarding Kapurdi Lignite Project and therefore, the same has rightly been relied upon by the Reference Court and in the said award, rate of Rs. 1,50,000/- per bighas was given as compensation inclusive of solatium, interest and cost of trees etc. and out of said sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-, Rs. 50,000/- per bigha was determined as market value for land in question. Mr. L.R. Mehta learned counsel for the land owners relied upon the following judgments in support of his contention: (1) AIR 2010 SC 984 - Sagunthala vs. Special Tehsildar. (2) (2010) 9SCC 118 - A. Natesam Pillai vs. Special Tehsildar (3) (2011) 6 SCC 47 - Trishala Jain & Anr. vs. State of Uttaranchal & Anr. 12. I have heard the learned counsels at lenght and given my thoughtful consideration to the impugned order, relevant statutes and the judgments cited at the bar. 13. (2) (2010) 9SCC 118 - A. Natesam Pillai vs. Special Tehsildar (3) (2011) 6 SCC 47 - Trishala Jain & Anr. vs. State of Uttaranchal & Anr. 12. I have heard the learned counsels at lenght and given my thoughtful consideration to the impugned order, relevant statutes and the judgments cited at the bar. 13. At the outset, it may be stated here that the cross-objections filed by the land-owners seeking further enhancement of compensation were dismissed as not pressed on 13.7.2011 on account of non-payment of Court fee by the land-holders which was paid only of Rs. 10/- fixed fee as against the ad-voleram Court fee. Though the learned counsel for the land-holders Mr. L.R. Mehta initially relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Diwan Brothers vs. Central Bank of India, Bombay & Ors. reported in AIR 1976 SC 1503 , however, in view of later decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority vs. Tarak Singh & Ors. reported in AIR 1995 SC 1828 and the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Prayag Chand vs. Land Acquisition Officer & Anr., reported in 2005(2) RLW 1234 following the said view, in which it has been held that ad-voleram Court fee has to be paid on such cross-objections and cross-appeals as has been paid by the appellant-RSMML in the present appeals, the learned counsel for the land-holders Mr. L.R. Mehta did not press such cross-objections. With the dismissal of the cross-objections, this Court is seized only to decide the present two appeals of the appellant RSMML and to decide whether compensation awarded by the Reference Court by the impugned judgment under Section 18 of the Act @ Rs. 50,000/- per bigha of land is justified or not. 14. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sagunthala vs. Special Tehsildar (L.A.) reported in AIR 2010 SC 984 , heavily relied upon by the learned Court Mr. L.R. Mehta, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that for determination of market value of land, the purpose for which the land was acquired is a relevant factor. In the said case, the agricultural land was acquired to build quarters of workers of the Company and the acquired land was also potential house sites being adjacent to residential colonies. In the said case, the agricultural land was acquired to build quarters of workers of the Company and the acquired land was also potential house sites being adjacent to residential colonies. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that fixation of amount of compensation @ Rs. 1,75,000/- per acre by the Reference Court under Section 18 was proper even though the claimants had claimed lesser compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- per acre, but the Apex Court held, that it was not material and setting aside the judgment of the High Court restored the market value as determined by the Reference Court at Rs. 1,75,000/- per acre. In paras 24 to 26, the Apex Court held as under: "24. In the light of the above material facts this Court feels that the presence of number of buildings on the lands acquired and the said lands being occupied by the buildings are to be treated as house sites. The basic purpose that has been traced out in the evidence and as admitted by the RWs that the lands were acquired for the purpose of putting up residential quarters. As a portion of the land is being considered as house site, the adjoining lands have the potential of being put in better use as house sites in the near future. 25. The other important factor is the proximity of the plots to two residential colonies i.e. Anna Nagar and Gandhi Nagar. As it has come on record that the Anna Nagar Colony has about 50-60 houses and Gandhi Nagar Colony has about 150 hourses, as such it is reasonable and proper to conclude that the present lands under dispute were near the residential colonies. 26. It should also be taken into consideration that the disputed lands were situated near the factory premises and further were adjoining the main road which connects the Tanmag Road. As such the aforesaid lands are potential house sites." While holding that the reference proceedings under Section 18 has to be treated as original proceedings and the claimants are in a position of plaintiffs who have to show the price offered for their land in award is inadequate, the Court held in para 37 that the purpose for which the acquisition is being made is an important factors. Quoting from the decision of Atma Singh vs. State of Haryana reported in (2008) 2 SCC 568 , the Court held in para 34 that the market value is the price that a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller for the property having due regard to its existing condition with all its existing advantages and its potential possibilities. The Apex Court held in para 34 as under: "34. In Atma Singh (Dead) through Lrs. and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2008) 2 SCC 568 : AIR 2008 SC 709 : 2007 AIR SCW 7835, it was observed that the expression "market value" has been the subject-matter of consideration by this Court in several cases. The market value is the price that a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller for the property having due regard to its existing condition with all its existing advantages and its potential possibilities when let out in most advantageous manner excluding any advantage due to carrying out of the scheme for which the property is compulsorily acquired. In considering market value disinclination of the vendor to part with his land and the urgent necessity of the purchaser to buy should be disregarded. The guiding principle would be the conduct of hypothetical willing vendor who would offer the land and that of a purchaser who, in normal human conduct, would be willing to buy as a prudent man in normal market conditions but not of an anxious purchaser dealing at arm's length nor a fictitious sale brought about in quick succession or otherwise to inflate the market value. The determination of market value is the prediction of an economic event viz. a price outcome of hypothetical sale expressed in terms of probabilities." 15. The determination of market value is the prediction of an economic event viz. a price outcome of hypothetical sale expressed in terms of probabilities." 15. In a recent decision in the case of Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority vs. Devendar Kumar & Ors., Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 16366/2011 -decided on 6.7.2011, the same bench of Apex Court while quashing the land acquisition proceedings itself as colourable exercise of powers by U.P. State Government observed the following while emphasizing the agricultures whose only source of livelihood i.e. agricultural land is acquired and which land is like mother to those people: "Before concluding, we consider it necessary to reiterate that the acquisition of land is a serious matter and before initiating the proceedings under the 1894 Act and other similar legislations, the concerned Govt. must seriously ponder over the consequences of depriving the tenure holder of his property. It must be remembered that the land is just like mother of the people living in the rural areas of the country. It is the only source of sustenance and livelihood for the landowner and his family. If he land is acquired, not only the present but the future generations of the landowner are deprived of their livelihood and the only social security. They are made landless and are forced to live in slums in the urban areas because there is no mechanism for ensuring alternative source of livelihood to them. Mindless acquisition of fertile and cutlivable land may also lead to serious food crisis in the country. In the result, the special leave petitions are dismissed. The Greater Noida Development Authority is saddled with cost of Rs. 10 lakhs for undertaking an exercise of allotment of land to the builders in complete violation of the purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired and even before approval by the State Government for the change of land use. The Greater Noida Development Authority is saddled with cost of Rs. 10 lakhs for undertaking an exercise of allotment of land to the builders in complete violation of the purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired and even before approval by the State Government for the change of land use. The amount of cost shall be deposited in the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within a period of three months from today." While holding it to be colorable exercise of powers, the Hon'ble Supreme Court replying upon their earlier decision of Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471 and quoted the following from the said judgment while quashing the acquisition on the ground of mala fide exercise of powers: "This was nothing but a colourable exercise of power by the State Government under the 1894 Act and in our considered view, the High Court did not commit any error by recording a conclusion to that effect. In this context, it will be useful to notice the observations made in State of Punjab vs. Gurdail Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471 . In that case, while pronouncing upon the correctness of the order passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court which had quashed the acquisition of the respondents land on the ground of mala fide exercise of power, this Court observed: "Legal maliace is gibberish unless juristic clarity keeps it separate from the popular concept of personal vice. Pithily put, bad faith which invalidates the exercise of power- sometimes called colourable exercise or fraud on power and oftentimes overlaps motives, passions and satisfactions -is the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or pretension of gaining a legitimate goal. If the use of the power is for the fulfillment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malic is not regicidal. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the entrustment. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of which the power is vested the Court calls it a colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of which the power is vested the Court calls it a colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion. In a broad, blurred sense, Benjamin Disraeli was not off the mark even in law when he stated : "I repeat...that all power is a trust- that we are accountable for its exercise- that from the people, and for the people, all springs, and all must exist." Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end designed. Fraud in this context is not equal to moral turpitude and embraces all cases in which the action impugned is to effect some object which is beyond the purpose and intent of the power, whether this be malice-laden or even benign. If the purpose is corrupt the resultant act is bad. If considerations, foreign to the scope of the power of extraneous to the statute, enter the verdict or impel the action, mala fides or fraud on power, vitiates the acquisition or other official act." 16. In the case of Lal Chand vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in AIR 2010 SC 170 however, the Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned the lower Courts against adding some fancied percentage to the value shown by sale-deeds to arrive at what they considered to be "realistic market value" pre-suming that sale deeds disclosed depressed market value instead of read value. In paras 30 and 31, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: "When the respondents reply upon certain sale deeds to justify the value determined by the Land Acquisition Collector or to show that the market value was less than what is claimed by the claimants, and if the claimants produced satisfactory evidence (which may be either with reference to contemporaneous sale deeds or award made in respect of acquisition of comparable land or by other acceptable evidence) to show that the market value was much higher, the sale deed relied upon by the respondents showing a lesser value may be inferred to be undervalued, or not showing the true value. Such deed have to be excluded from consideration as being unreliable evidence. A document which is found to be undervalued cannot be used as evidence. Such deed have to be excluded from consideration as being unreliable evidence. A document which is found to be undervalued cannot be used as evidence. (Para 30) But we have noticed a disturbing trend in some recent cases, where a Court accepts the sale deed exhibited by the claimants as the basis for ascertaining the market value. But then, it also accepts a contention of the claimants that the general tendency of members of public is not to show the real value, but show a lesser value to avoid tax/stamp duty and therefore, the sale deeds produced and relied on by them, should be assumed to be under valued. On such assumption, some Courts have been adding some fancied percentage to the value shown by the sale deeds to arrive at what they consider to be `realistic market value.' The addition so made may vary from 10% to 100% depending upon the whims, fancies, and the perception of the learned Judge as to what is the general extent of suppression of the price is sale deeds. Such increase, in the market value disclosed by the sale deeds, on the assumption that all sale deeds show a `depressed' market value instead of the real value, is impermissible. The Court can either accept the document as showing the prevailing market value, in which event it has to be acted upon. Or the Court may find a document to be undervalued in which it should be rejected straightaway as not reliable. There is no third way of accepting a document, by adding to the market value disclosed by the document, some percentage to off-set the under valuation. There is no legal basis to proceed on a general assumption that parties, without exception, fail to reflect the true consideration in the sale deeds, that there is always undervaluation or suppression of the true price and that consequently, all sale deeds reflect a depressed value and not the real market value and therefore, some percentage should be added to arrive at the real value. Such a course also amounts to branding all vendors and purchasers and dishonest person without any evidence and without hearing them. It ignores the fact that Government has fixed minimum guideline values and whenever a registering authority is of the view that a sale deed is undervalued, proceeding are initiated for determination of the true market value. Such a course also amounts to branding all vendors and purchasers and dishonest person without any evidence and without hearing them. It ignores the fact that Government has fixed minimum guideline values and whenever a registering authority is of the view that a sale deed is undervalued, proceeding are initiated for determination of the true market value. It also ignores the fact that a large number of sale deeds are accepted by the registering authorities as disclosing the current market value. (Paras 31)" 17. In earlier decision in the case of P. Ram Reddy & Ors. vs. Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad reported in (1995) 2 SCC 305 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that market value of acquired land with building potentiality is required to be determined with reference to the material to be placed on record or made available in that regard by the parties concerned and not solely on surmises conjectures or pure guess. In paras 10 and 12, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "The market value of the acquired land with building potentiality, is also required to be determined with reference to the material to be placed on record or made available in that regard by the parties concerned and not solely on surmises, conjectures or pure guess. (Paras 12) Market value of the acquired land with building potentiality comprises of the market value of the land having regard to the use to which it was put on the relevant date envisaged under Section 4(1) of the LA Act plus the increase in that market value because of the possibility of the acquired land being used for putting up buildings, in the immediate or near future. If there is any other land with building potentiality similar to the acquired land which had been sold for a price obtained by a willing seller from a willing purchaser, such price could be taken to be the market value of the acquired land, in that, it would have comprised of the market value of the land as was being actually used plus increase in price attributable to its building potentiality. If the prices fetched by sale of similar land with building potentiality in the neighbourhood or vicinity of the acquired lands with building potentiality, as on the relevant date envisaged under Section 4(1) of the LA Act, are unavailable, it becomes necessary to find out whether any building plots laid out in a land similar to the acquired land had been sold by a willing seller to a willing buyer on or near about the relevant date under Section 4(1) when the acquired land had been proposed for acquisition and when to find out what would be the price which the acquired land would have fetched if had been sold by making it into building plots similar to those sold. In other words, an hypothetical lay out of building plots in the acquired and similar to that of the layout of building plots actually made in the other similar land, has to be prepared, and the price fetched by sale of building plots in the lay-out actually made should form the basis for fixing the total price of the acquired land with building potentiality, to be got if plots similar to other plots had been made in the latter land and sold by taking into account plus factors and minus factors involved in the process." 18. Upholding the discretion to apply guesstimate, when no evidence is led by either of the parties for determining the market value and how such fair discretion should be applied was recently determined by the Apex Court in the case of Trishala Jain & Anr. vs. State of Uttaranchal & Anr. reported in (2011) 6 SCC 47 . The relevant gist of judgment from the head-note of SCC is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: "More often than not, it is not possible to fix the compensation with exactitude or arithmetic accuracy. Depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court may have to take recourse to some guesswork while determining the fair market value of the land and the consequential amount of compensation that is required to be paid to the person interest in the acquire land. (Para 56) The concept of 'guesswork' is not unknown to various fields of law. It is has been applied in cases relating to insurance, taxation, compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act as well as under the Labour Laws. (Para 56) The concept of 'guesswork' is not unknown to various fields of law. It is has been applied in cases relating to insurance, taxation, compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act as well as under the Labour Laws. Where the parties have not brought on record any evidence, then the Court will not be in a position to award compensation merely on the basis of imagination, conjecture etc. There are different methods of computation of compensation payable to the claimants, for example it can be based upon compareable sale instances, awards and judgements relating to the similar or comparable lands, method of averages, yearly yields with reference to the revenue earned by the land etc. Whatever method of determining the compensation is applied by the Court, its result should always be reasonable, just and fair as that is the purpose sought to be achieved under the scheme of the Act.(Paras 63) The Court may apply some guesswork before it could arrive at a final determination, which is in consonance with the statutory law as well as the principles stated in the judicial pronouncements. This principle is only intended to bridge the gap between the calculated compensation and the actual compensation that the claimants may be entitled to receive as per the facts of a given case to meet the ends of justice. Principles controlling the application of "guesstimate" are: (a) Whatever the evidence produced by the parties is not sufficient to determine the compensation with exactitude, this principle can be resorted to. (b) Discretion of the Court in applying guesswork to the facts of a given case is not unfettered but has to be reasonable and should have a connection to the date on record produced by the parties by way of evidence. Further, this entire exercise has to be within the limitations specified under Sections 23 and 24 of the Act and cannot be made in detriment thereto. (Para 65)." 19. In the case of A. Natesam Pillai vs. Special Tehsildar reported in (2010) 9 SCC 118 , the Apex Court held that deduction in valuation of large tracts of land where exemplar land is a small plot is permissible. Applying the principles of potentiality of acquired land, the Apex Court held that High Court was not justified in reducing compensation from Rs. 11 per sq. ft.to Rs. 9 per sq. ft. Applying the principles of potentiality of acquired land, the Apex Court held that High Court was not justified in reducing compensation from Rs. 11 per sq. ft.to Rs. 9 per sq. ft. In Paras 22 to 27 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "22. Therefore, it is clear from the aforementioned decisions of this Court that the potentiality of the acquired land, in so far as it relates to the use to which it is reasonable capable of being put in the immediate or near future, must be given due consideration. 23. The present acquired land has all the potentiality to be used as building sites, even in the immediate future, as it is located at a placed in and around which building activity has already started. The evidence on record also clearly indicate that acquired land is abutting the main road. The acquired land is also surrounded by schools, Panchayat Union Office, shops and residential building in all three sides. The High Court also found, as a matter of fact, that the area where the acquired land is situated is fit for construction of houses. On an overall consideration and appreciation of the records, we feel that the deduction due to the small size of the exemplar land can easily be set aside with the corresponding increase in price of the acquired land when compared with the land in Ex. A.3 from the point of view of potential value. 24. Although it is true that the land covered by Ex. A3 is a small tract of land and therefore cannot be compared in size with the large area of land acquired under the present notification, it is to be concluded that the land in question would definitely fetch a higher price than what is fixed the High Court. A prospective purchaser would only be too willing to pay for the acquired land having immediate potentiality of being used as a residential site in a prime locale at almost the same, if not, higher price than the land covered by Ex. A3 which is located outside the Municipality area. 25. We are in agreement with the conclusion of the High Court that the acquisition of a large tract of land merits a discount in compensation. A3 which is located outside the Municipality area. 25. We are in agreement with the conclusion of the High Court that the acquisition of a large tract of land merits a discount in compensation. However, in the present circumstances, it is significant to note that the compensation granted by the High Court does not match the potentiality of the land, even after the discount has been taken into consideration. Even on giving a discount in respect of the acquired land being a large tract as compared to the small portion of land sold under Ex. A3, according to us, the rate of Rs. 11/- would be adequate and just compensation for the same. 26. In our considered opinion, by scaling down the rate of compensation to Rs. 9/- from Rs. 11/- per sq. ft., the High Court denied just and reasonable compensation to appellant, thereby resulting in a miscarriage of justice. 27. We, therefore, hold that the appellant shall be entitled to compensation at Rs. 11/- per sq. ft. for the acquired land which we consider to be just and fair. Needless to say that the State shall also be liable to pay additional compensation and solatium on the amount enhanced and fixed in terms of this order including payment of interest in terms of the rate of interest awarded by the Reference Court. The appeal stands allowed to the aforesaid extent without any costs." 20. In light of the aforesaid judgments, it is clear that the market value has to be determined with reference to the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, which in the present case was 7.11.1997 and the market value should be based on the evidence led by the parties in the reference proceedings, which has to be treated as original jurisdiction proceedings and some amount of guess work can be made by the Court by fair use of discretion, but no surmises or will guess work can be applied to arrive at so called "realistic market value". While potentiality of the land acquired can be taken into consideration also and is relevant factor, it is nonetheless burden of the claimant to prove such potentiality before the Reference Court. 21. Viewed from this angle, jacking up of the rate of compensation by the Reference Court from Rs. 7,500/- per bigha for unirrigated land and Rs. While potentiality of the land acquired can be taken into consideration also and is relevant factor, it is nonetheless burden of the claimant to prove such potentiality before the Reference Court. 21. Viewed from this angle, jacking up of the rate of compensation by the Reference Court from Rs. 7,500/- per bigha for unirrigated land and Rs. 12,500/- per bigha for irrigated land straightway to Rs. 50,000/- per bigha at four times is rather a wild guess work. The said judgment of the learned Distt. Judge under Section 18 of the Act is only based on the award made after 10 years in respect of Kapurdi Power Project in Barmer on mutual agreement between the landholders and the State Government on 14.9.2009 under Section 11(2) of the Act, which determined such compensation with respect to notification under Section 4 dated 13.7.2007, whereas in the present case, for village Matasukh in Distt. Nagaur, the notification under Section 4 was issued on 7.11.1997. Not applying any discounting factor for a period of 10 years by the learned Reference Court on the rate of Rs. 50,000/- per bigha even assuming for the argument's sake that subsequent award could be taken into consideration as relevant evidence, was not at all justified. Comparison of Rs. 50,000/- applied in the present case by the learned Distt. Judge in the impugned order dated 19.9.2000 with total compensation including interest, solatium and compensation for damages @ Rs. 1,50,000/- per bigha in the case of Kapurdi Lignite Project should not mislead any one because the rate per bigha for the agricultural land was Rs. 50,000/- only on mututal agreement award under Section 11(2) of the Act with the reference to the date of notification dated 13.7.2007 in respect to Kapurdi Lignite Project, Barmer. The same rate of Rs. 50,000/- per bigha could not be taken as market value of the land acquired in the present case in District Nagaur 10 years back. The deduction of 40% to 50% from the market value would have been quite appropriate and justified even if such evidence in the form of award under Section 11(2) of the Act could be taken into consideration notwithstanding a bar under Section 11(3) of the Act. The other evidence of sale-deeds produced before the Reference Court also did not disclose such higher rate of Rs. 50,000/- per bigha. The evidence in the form of Exs. The other evidence of sale-deeds produced before the Reference Court also did not disclose such higher rate of Rs. 50,000/- per bigha. The evidence in the form of Exs. 2, 3 and 4 discussed above, as produced by the landholders also discloses the per bigha rate of Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 40,000/- during that period. Therefore, even if such rates for small plots were to be applied, the same could be applied with appropriate discounting factor because a huge chunk of land of 7,400/- bighas has been acquired. The rate could not be jacked up to as high as Rs. 50,000/- per bigha. At the same time, this Court is of the opinion that the rates determined by the Land Acquisition Officer at the rate of Rs. 7,500/- per bigha for unirrigated land and Rs. 12,500/- per bigha for unirrigated land in the present case is also extremely conservative and does not take into account the possible increase in the market value keeping in view of potentiality of the land to be used and also the fact that the agriculturists have been deprived of only source of their livelihood permanently. The DLC rates also cannot be taken as sole basis for determining the market value under Section 23 of the Act. Thus, a balance has to be struck between the two rival claims between the parties. This Court is of the opinion that upon fair and reasonable estimation of market, value on the basis of material on record, the market value of Rs. 25,000/- per bigha for the agricultural land can be applied uniformly irrespective of the land in question being irrigated or unirrigated because just after its acquisition, the said difference would not matter as the land in question is not intended to be put to use for the agricultural purposes, but lignite has to be mined therefrom by the appellant RSMML for power generating projects. The huge length of period which has passed untill now from the date of Notification under Section dated 7.11.1997 and land price have gone up in the meanwhile considerably is another reason to justify the increase from the rates of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. 22. Accordingly, these two appeals are partly allowed and the order of Reference Court dated 19.9.2000 is modified to the extent of rate of compensation being reduced from Rs. 50,000/- to Rs. 22. Accordingly, these two appeals are partly allowed and the order of Reference Court dated 19.9.2000 is modified to the extent of rate of compensation being reduced from Rs. 50,000/- to Rs. 25,000/- per bigha as on 7.11.1997. The interest under Sec. 34 of the Act @ 9% per annum from the date of possession till the date of payment and solatium shall be computed accordingly. However the other parts of compensation for trees, damages for dislocation etc. is maintained as held by the Reference Court. The amount of compensation so determined may be paid accordingly to the landholders within a period of three months from today. No order as to costs.