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2011 DIGILAW 1462 (CAL)

Swadesh Ghosh v. CESC Limited

2011-12-01

J.N.PATEL, SAMBUDDHA CHAKRABARTI

body2011
Judgment :- J.N. Patel, CJ. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 16.2.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.1508 of 2008 and thereby dismissing the writ petition wherein the petitioner sought for quashing of the direction of the respondents to deposit 50% of the assessed amount as precondition and for filing of fresh appeal as envisaged under Section 127 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and for other ancillary reliefs. It is the case of the petitioner that he is engaged in the business of manufacturing rubber goods from the factory premises 9/H/1, Abinash Chowdhury Lane, Kolkata700046, in partnership with Sri Shambu Ghosh, under the name and style of Ever Shine Rubber Industries and was supplied with electricity by the respondents as a licencee under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (for short the Old Act) by installing a meter bearing No.2350145K, in the factory premises, in the name of the petitioner bearing consumer No.29189041004. Similarly, a separate supply of electricity was given to his partner namely Shambu Ghosh in the said premises under consumer No.291890440007 and meter No.2350222. The petitioner had declared a lock out in his factory due to labour problem. During the said period, the respondents continued raising average monthly bills without noting and reading of the recording in the meters, and disconnected the supply line to the petitioner’s meter and also disconnected the supply line to the meter of the petitioner’s partner. Therefore, the petitioner and his partner were constrained to move an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the said writ petition was registered as W.P. No. 622 of 2002. By an interim order dated 4.4.2002, the officials of CESC Ltd. were directed to inspect the premises and on inspection, everything was found to be satisfactory and no pilferage was observed. Local enquiry revealed that the factory was closed due to labour problem. As a consequence the respondent CESC raised a revised bill and upon payment of the same the supply lines of the petitioner and his partner were restored. It is the case of the petitioner that as there was a possibility of settlement and lifting of closure of the factory the petitioner requested to change the old meters with new meters of higher load. It is the case of the petitioner that as there was a possibility of settlement and lifting of closure of the factory the petitioner requested to change the old meters with new meters of higher load. The officers and agent of CESC Limited visited the factory premises and by false representation to the security personnel posted in the closed factory, entered the factory premises under lock out, disconnected the supply line by giving out that the supply would be restored on installation of new meter with higher load and capacity. The petitioner and his partner who are running the said factory were involved in allegations of pilfering of electricity supplied, on the basis of tampering of meter hologram seals. Seal on terminal plate was found tampered and seal on meter body was also found tampered. The petitioner by a letter dated 28.8.2003 was informed of the alleged findings and inspection and provisionally assessed to pay a sum of Rs.2,27,527/-. The petitioner on 2.9.2003 received the said provisional order of assessment dated 28.8.2003 and through his learned Advocate he filed a written objection dated 20.10.2003 denying the charges and findings of pilferage and demanded strict proof of the alleged charges and findings. Similar steps were taken by the petitioner’s partner who was also served with the order of provisional assessment on the alleged charge and finding of pilferage in respect of his meter. It is the case of the petitioner that without considering the objection and according any hearing to the petitioner the respondents passed final order of assessment dated 2.10.2003 which ex parte confirmed the purported order of provisional assessment and so was the case in respect of his partner. It is contended that the case of the petitioner and his partner was identical as they were doing business under the name and style of Ever Shine Industries save and except the difference in reference number, consumer number and meter number. Aggrieved by the ex parte order of Final Order of Assessment dated 2.10.2003 and 8.11.2003 the petitioner preferred an appeal under clause 30(a) of the Conditions of Supply as required. The petitioner’s partner also challenged the Final Order of Assessment dated 29.10.2003 by preferring an appeal under Clause 30(a) of the Conditions of Supply which came to be accepted by the respondents to be in order in accordance with the Rules. The petitioner’s partner also challenged the Final Order of Assessment dated 29.10.2003 by preferring an appeal under Clause 30(a) of the Conditions of Supply which came to be accepted by the respondents to be in order in accordance with the Rules. By a letter dated 12.12.2003 issued by respondent No.5 the petitioner was informed that the date for further hearing of appeal was fixed 23.12.2003. On 23.12.2003 the petitioner appeared and filed a written submission before the appellate authority for hearing the appeal. The same was accepted. However, despite completion of hearing and submission of written argument, no or order was passed for several months as the respondent appellate authority failed to take any decision in the matter despite completion of hearing and filing of written submission. The petitioner filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which was registered as W.P. 1580 of 2005. The said writ petition came to be disposed of by directing the appellate authority appointed in terms of Section 127 of The Electricity Act, 2003 (for short the New Act) to give a final decision by passing a reasoned order within three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order and that the appeal should be decided by the appellate authority appointed in terms of Section 127 of the Act of 2003 and according to the provision of Rules. It is the case of the petitioner that the partner of the petitioner was also required to file a writ petition being W.P. No.998 of 2005 for the same reason and finally, the appellate authority after a long spell fixed and heard the appeal on 29.5.2007 and by order dated 16.6.2007 modified the purported final order of assessment by a reasoned order by reducing the amount on account of pilferage from Rs. 2,27,527 to RS. 44,515/-. The case of his partner being identical, the petitioner claims that the said order is squarely applicable and binding on the authorities in respect of the petitioner’s appeal inasmuch as the said order will also dispose of the appeal preferred by the petitioner. On the other hand, when the petitioner communicated the order dated 3.8.2005 passed by this Court in his W.P. No.1508 of 2005, and met the Deputy General Manager, Loss Control Cell. On the other hand, when the petitioner communicated the order dated 3.8.2005 passed by this Court in his W.P. No.1508 of 2005, and met the Deputy General Manager, Loss Control Cell. He was shocked by his misinterpretation of the order dated 3.8.2005 passed by the Court to the extent that the said order had directed to file a fresh appeal under Section 127 of the new Act which stipulates payment of 50% of the assessed amount as condition precedent for filing of an appeal and disposal of the same by the appellate authority in terms of Section 127 of the new Act, in spite of the fact that the said appellate authority had entertained, accepted and heard the appeal of the petitioner filed under Clause 30(a) of the Condition of Supply as was applicable at the relevant time. Objecting to such malafide and misconstruction of the order dated 3.8.2005 the petitioner by a letter of Advocate dated 29.11.2005 represented and objected against malafide intent of respondents in misinterpretation of the order of this Court in not giving a decision in the appeal, even after concluding the hearing and demanding payment of 50% of the assessed amount as precondition for entertaining appeal under Section 127 of the new Act which led to filing of the said petition. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent appellate authority having disposed of the appeal of the partner of the petitioner and having kept the appeal of the petitioner pending and after the petitioner filed a writ petition and the Court directed the respondents to hear out his appeal the act of the appellate authority in misinterpreting the order of Court and insisting on the pre-deposit of 50% of the assessed amount in the final order of assessment, is arbitrary, malafide, in violation of Articles 14 and 19(g) of the Constitution of India and therefore the said order passed by the appellate authority deserves to be quashed and set aside. But the learned Judge failed to appreciate the true scope and meaning of the judgment and order dated 3.8.2005 passed in W.P. No.1580 of 2005 and erred in law in holding that the assessment was made under Section 126 of the said Act when the final order of assessment clearly without any ambiguity states that the assessment was made by the Authority entrusted to carry out the functions provided under clause 31 of the Conditions of Supply approved by the appropriate government under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 which has statutory force and continue to operate during the transitional period under Section 172 of the Indian Electricity Act and, therefore, the impugned order suffers from error of law and fact and is illegal and liable to be set aside. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has taken the following exceptions to the impugned order. He has contended that the final order of assessment being passed under Section 126 of the new Act, 2003 read with Clause 29(c) of the Conditions of Supply as stated in the final order of assessment. It cannot be held that the final order of assessment was made under Section 126 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and, therefore, there is no condition in preferring an appeal under Clause 29(c) of the Conditions of supply under the Old Act as it does not stipulate any pre-deposit as provided in subsection (2) of Section 127 of the new Act. It is submitted that Section 172 of the new Act which is a transitional clause, rather saves Clause 31 of the Conditions of Supply approved by the appropriate government under Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and would continue to have statutory force and operate at the time when the appeal was filed by the appellant/petitioner under Clause 30 of the terms and conditions of supply, which was received and heard in part; therefore, the petitioner cannot be called upon to file a fresh appeal under Section 127 of the new Act by making a predeposit of 50% of the assessed amount in deciding the pending appeal filed during the operation of Clause 30 having statutory force during the transitional period. It is submitted that the appeal filed against the final order of assessment under Clause 30 of conditions of supply having statutory operational force during the transitional period as provided in Section 172 of the new Act is deemed to be an appeal filed under corresponding provision of Section 127 of the Act for decision and that the pre-deposit of 50% of the assessed amount in preferring an appeal under Section 127(2) of the new Act is not applicable by virtue of repeal and saving clause in Section 185 of the new Act. It is tried to be canvassed before us that the purport and scope of Section 185 of the new Act provides for the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1987 with regard to the effect of repeals. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Judge suffers from material irregularity and wrong understanding of the provision of Section 127 of the new Act in respect of pending appeals filed during the operation of transition period when the provisions of preferring appeal under Clause 30 of the Old Act was having statutory operational force and, therefore, the appeal preferred by the petitioner under Clause 30 of the condition of supply having statutory force against the final order of assessment made under Section 126 of the new Act read with Clause 29(c) of the condition of supply during the transitional statutory period as provided under Section 172 of the new Act and the impugned order directing the petitioner to deposit of 50% of the assessed amount for decision in the pending Appeal filed under Clause 30 of the Condition of Supply during the transitional period cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. vs. The State of M.P. & ors. (AIR 1953 Supreme Court 221) and Glaxo Smith Kline Plc. & ors. vs. Controller of Patents and Designs & ors. (AIR 2009 Supreme Court 1147). On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that upon promulgation of the Electricity Act, 2003 on and from 10th June, 2003, Section of the said Act also came into force. (AIR 1953 Supreme Court 221) and Glaxo Smith Kline Plc. & ors. vs. Controller of Patents and Designs & ors. (AIR 2009 Supreme Court 1147). On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that upon promulgation of the Electricity Act, 2003 on and from 10th June, 2003, Section of the said Act also came into force. Section 127 (1) of the Electricity Act, 2003 provides for an appeal against the final order of assessment made under Section 126 of the said Act. Section 127(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 provides that no appeal against an order of assessment shall be entertained unless an amount peal equal to 1/3rd of the assessed amount is deposited. Subsequently, by the amendment Act of 2007, “1/3rd of the assessed amount” has been substituted for “half of the assessed amount”. The order of Final Assessment was passed by the Assessing Officer on 29th October, 2003 after coming into force of the said Act and the said Final Order of Assessment was passed in terms of Section 126 of the Electricity Act, 2003. Therefore, the said Final Order of Assessment was clearly appealable under Section 127 of the Electricity Act, 2003. Under the old Act i.e. Indian Electricity Act, 1910, there was no provision for assessment of electricity charges for unauthorized use of electricity on the part of any person or consumer. The Conditions of Supply framed by CESC Limited, while the old Act was prevailing, was sanctioned by the State Government under Sub-Section 2 of Section 21 of the said Old Act, i.e. Indian Electricity Act, 1910 vide Notification No.149-Power/III dated 15th May, 2000. Sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 provided that any licensee may, with the previous sanction of the State Government, after consulting the State Electricity Board and also the local authority, where the licensee is not the local authority, make conditions not inconsistent with this Act or with his licence or with any Rules made under this Act to regulate his relations with persons who are or intended to become consumers. Section 172 of the Electricity Act, 2003 provides for, notwithstanding anything to the contract contained in this Act, for continuance to operate all licences, authorization approval, clearance and permissions granted under the provisions of the repealed laws for a period not exceeding one year from the appointed date as if the repealed laws were in force with respect to such licences, authorization approval, clearance and permissions shall be deemed to be licences, authorization approval, clearance and permissions. Section 185(2)(a) of the Electricity Act, 2003 provides that notwithstanding repeal of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, any Rule, Notification, Inspection, order or notice made or issued or any appointment, confirmation or declaration made or any license, permission, authorization or exemption granted or any document or instrument executed or any direction given under the repealed laws shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act. Admittedly, the new Act i.e. the Electricity Act, 2003 has made an express provision for appeal against the Final Order of Assessment for unauthorized use of electricity whereas the Conditions of Supply, as referred to by the appellant/writ petitioner, was framed under the repealed Act i.e. the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and therefore, even assuming continuance of operation of the Conditions of Supply under the transitory provisions of the new Act, the Conditions of Supply cannot prevail over the central piece of legislation. Moreover, the provisions in Clause 30(a) of the Conditions of supply, is clearly contrary to and inconsistent with the provisions of Section 127(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 in so far as it relates to entertainability of appeal only upon payment of 1/3rd of the assessed amount (subsequently, by way of amendment Act of 2007, made half of the assessed amount), and therefore, in view of the provisions of Section 185(2)(a) of the Electricity Act, 2003, the provision of Section 127 of the Electricity Act, 2003 is squarely applicable in the present case of the appellant/writ petitioner to govern his appeal. The only point which arises for determination in this appeal is whether the remedy by way of an appeal is available to the appellant/petitioner under the Conditions of Supply of CESC Limited framed as required under sub-section 2 of Section 21 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (IX of 1910) or will be governed by the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003. The premise on which the appellant/petitioner claims that his remedy to prefer an appeal against the order of provisional assessment would lie under the Clause 30(a) of the Conditions of Supply as the appeal preferred by the appellant/petitioner on 8.11.2003 under the said clause was admitted and entertained by the appellate authority and so was the case relating to his partner and having admitted the appeal under the said clause of the Conditions of Supply the appellate authority was estopped from passing the impugned order directing him to file a fresh appeal under the provision of Section 127 of the new Act. The appellant/writ petitioner in support of his contention has placed reliance on Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897) which provides as follows : “6. Effect of repeal.— Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not— (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.” The Electricity Act, 2003 received the assent of the President on 25th May, 2003. Sections 1 to 122 and Sections 122-185 came into force on 10th June, 2003 vide S.O. 669(E), dated 10th June, 2003, published in the Gazette of India, Extra., Pt.II, Sec. 3(ii), dated 10th June, 2003. Part XII of the new Act which relates to investigation and enforcement and provides for appeal to appellate authority under Section 127 of the said Act does not expressly or by necessary implication make the relevant provisions retrospective in character. Therefore, we find that the remedy available to the petitioner stands well crystallized and does not call for any determination as to whether the provisions relating to appeal provided under the Old Act coupled with the Conditions of Supply or the new Act would apply. The very initiation of action against the appellant/petitioner took place on 28.8.2003 when the officials of CESC Limited inspected the establishment of the appellant/petitioner and detected unauthorized use of electricity as a result supply of electricity came to be disconnected. The order of provisional assessment was passed by the Assessing Officer adjudging the liability for unauthorized use of electricity to the tune of Rs. 2,27,034/-. Therefore, after commencement of the new Act the whole exercise could be undertaken only under Section 126 of the Electricity Act, 2003 which empowers the Assessing Officer to inspect any place or premises and having done so when the officer comes to the conclusion that such person is indulging in unauthorized use of electricity, he shall provisionally assess to the best of his judgment the electricity charges payable by such person or by any other person benefited by such use. It is the petitioner’s own case that by a letter dated 28.8.2003 the petitioner was informed of the alleged finding and inspection and was provisionally assessed to pay a sum of Rs. 2,27,527/-. Therefore, this all happened after the new act came into force. Maybe, the officials of the CESC Limited in their correspondence referred to the powers vested in them under the Old Act and the Conditions of Supply which provided for such inspection and provisional assessment of malpractices of pilferage of electricity. Therefore, the reliance placed by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant/petitioner in the case of M/s. Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. vs. The State of M.P. & ors. (AIR 1953 Supreme Court 221) in no way comes to the rescue of the appellant/petitioner. Therefore, the reliance placed by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant/petitioner in the case of M/s. Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. vs. The State of M.P. & ors. (AIR 1953 Supreme Court 221) in no way comes to the rescue of the appellant/petitioner. In M/s. Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court dealt with the provisions of Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act (21 of 1947 and particularly the Proviso to Section 22(1) and the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the amendment of the Proviso by Act 17 of 1949 would apply to the proceedings before the amendment. The Supreme Court held as follows : “a right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure. It is a matter of substantive right. This right of appeal from the decision of an inferior tribunal to a superior tribunal becomes vested in a party when proceedings are first initiated in and before a decision is given by, the inferior Court. Such a vested right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment. An intention to interfere with or to impair or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or necessary implication. The amendment of S. 32 proviso has placed a substantial restriction on the assessee’s right of appeal, for the amended section requires the payment of the entire assessed amount as a condition precedent to the admission of its appeal. The imposition of such a restriction by amendment of the section cannot affect the assessee’s right of appeal from a decision in proceedings which commenced prior to such amendment and which right of appeal was free from such restriction under the section as it stood at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. The fact that the pre-existing right of appeal continues to exist must, in its turn, necessarily imply that the old law which created that right of appeal must also exist to support the continuation of that right. As the old law continues to exist for the purpose of supporting the pre-existing right of appeal that old law must govern the exercise and enforcement of that right of appeal and there can then be no question of the amended provision preventing the exercise of that right. As the old law continues to exist for the purpose of supporting the pre-existing right of appeal that old law must govern the exercise and enforcement of that right of appeal and there can then be no question of the amended provision preventing the exercise of that right. The argument that the authority has no option or jurisdiction to admit the appeal unless it be accompanied by the deposit of the assessed tax as required by the amended proviso to S. 22(1) of the Act overlooks the fact of existence of the old law for the purpose of supporting the pre-existing right and really amounts to begging the question. The new proviso is wholly inapplicable in such a situation and the jurisdiction of the authority has to be exercised under the old law which so continues to exist”. Another decision on which reliance was placed by the appellant/petitioner is in the case of Glaxo Smith Kline Plc. & ors. vs. Controller of Patents and Designs & ors. ( AIR 2009 SC 1147 ) which referred to the decision in M/s. Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. (supra) and held : 7. As was observed by this Court in Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of M.P.1 when a pre-existing right of appeal continues to exist, by necessary implication the old law which created the right of appeal also exists to support the continuation of that right and hence the old right must govern the exercise and enforcement of that right. In the absence of contrary intention in repealing the enactment, rights under the old statute are not destroyed. In Gurcharan Singh Baldev Singh v. Yashwant Singh it was observed that right to proper consideration of an application by statutory authority remains alive even after repeal of the enactment under which the consideration had been sought. A five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Garikapati Veeraya vs. Subbiah Chowdhary & ors. (AIR 1957 Supreme Court 540), after considering a catena of decision on the issue that the vested right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedural law but is a substantive right and whether it can be altered to the disadvantage of the litigant, laid down the following principles: “23. (AIR 1957 Supreme Court 540), after considering a catena of decision on the issue that the vested right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedural law but is a substantive right and whether it can be altered to the disadvantage of the litigant, laid down the following principles: “23. From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge: (i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. It can, therefore, be seen that the law is well settled that the right of appeal is a matter of substantive right and once it is vested in a litigant, he cannot be deprived of the remedy unless it is taken away by a subsequent enactment. In the case of the petitioner it so happened that as the appellate authority failed to take a decision in the matter of appeal preferred by him the appellant/petitioner was required to approach this Court by filing W.P. 1580 OF 2005 which came to be disposed of by directing the appellate authority appointed in terms of Section 127 of the Electricity Act to give a final decision by passing a reasoned order within three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The Writ Court has given a specific direction that the appeal should be decided by the appellate authority appointed in terms of Section 127 of the Act of 2003 and according to the provisions of Rules. In so far as the direction of the Court that the appeal be decided by the appellate authority appointed in terms of Section 127 clearly indicates that in the facts of the case of the appellant/petitioner the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 i.e. the new Act would be applicable and not the Indian Electricity Act of 1910 and the Conditions of Supply governing the appeal prior to the amendment of the said Act. The contention of the appellant/petitioner that he has preferred an appeal under Clause 30(a) of the Conditions of Supply and which was entertained by the appellate authority and not only this, a similar appeal preferred by his partner was entertained and disposed of by the appellate authority, in our opinion does not accrue any vested right in the appellant/petitioner to get his appeal decided under the provisions which were provided in the Conditions of Supply under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 i.e. old Act. Although the petitioner was a consumer of electricity prior to the coming of the new Act but his right to prefer an appeal would be governed by the lis in the matter which was initiated much after the commencement of the Electricity Act, 2003 i.e. the new Act which came into force on 10th June, 2003 i.e. when the final order of assessment was passed by the Assessing Officer pursuant to Section 126 of the Act of 2003 on 29th October, 2003 and, therefore, when the appellant/petitioner was called upon to make predeposit of an amount equal to 1/3rd of the assessed amount with the licencee in order to entertain his appeal as required under sub-section (2) of Section 127 of the Electricity Act there was nothing wrong or contrary to the law to which the appellant/petitioner could have objected. On the other hand rather than complying with the requirements the appellant/petitioner rushed to the Court by preferring another writ petition alleging that he was shocked by the misinterpretation of the order dated 3.8.2005 passed by the Court in W.P. 1508 of 2005. On the other hand rather than complying with the requirements the appellant/petitioner rushed to the Court by preferring another writ petition alleging that he was shocked by the misinterpretation of the order dated 3.8.2005 passed by the Court in W.P. 1508 of 2005. We find that the learned Judge has not committed any error or illegality in dismissing the petition and directing appellant/petitioner to comply with the requirement of Section 127 of the new Act. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed with costs.