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2011 DIGILAW 1478 (CAL)

Samir Chatterjee v. Pratima Sanyal

2011-12-02

DIPANKAR DATTA

body2011
JUDGMENT: DIPANKAR DATTA, J. 1. THE petitioner instituted a suit, in the Court of the learned District Judge at Barasat, 24 Parganas (N), praying for a decree declaring the marriage between him and the defendant (opposite party herein) as nullity under Section 24 read with Section 4(a) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (hereafter the SM Act). It was registered as Matrimonial Suit No. 1807 of 2006 and is pending for decision now before the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Barrackpore, 24 Parganas (N). 2. IT is the plaint case that marriage of the petitioner with the opposite party was registered under the provisions of the SM Act on August 11, 1995 and that prior thereto, the opposite party while representing to the petitioner that she is virgin/unmarried suppressed the fact of her subsisting marriage with one Ranjit Roy (hereafter Ranjit). The petitioner claimed that her marriage with the opposite party is void ab initio since she had a spouse living on the date of registration of marriage and, accordingly, prayed for relief as noted above. The opposite party has been contesting the suit by filing a written statement. Perusal thereof reveals that the opposite party, after her father died in the year 1991, had approached the petitioner, a bank staff, who was looking after fixed deposits/savings account/locker etc. standing in the name of her deceased father, for effecting necessary changes so that she, along with her mother, could operate the same. The opposite party was married to Ranjit and a son was born in their wedlock but her conjugal life was full of disturbances and not a happy one. The petitioner, being fully aware of such marriage and the fact that the opposite party had a son, started expressing a strong desire to marry her, which she rejected forthwith because of her subsisting marriage. Two letters written by the petitioner to the opposite party were annexed to the written statement for the purpose of establishing her plea that it was the petitioner who made approaches towards her. However, while the opposite party stood by her firm decision not to give indulgence to the petitioner, he started paying regular visits and took more and more progressive view and gradually won her heart. However, while the opposite party stood by her firm decision not to give indulgence to the petitioner, he started paying regular visits and took more and more progressive view and gradually won her heart. According to her, the petitioner knowingly married her despite subsistence of her earlier marriage and assured her that there would be no -obstruction stands- (sic -objection from his side- ?) in this regard. The petitioner purchased a flat after registration of marriage and there they started living as husband and wife. However gradually, over a period of time, the petitioner developed a sort of animosity towards her and started treating her brutally, including beating her mercilessly. Ultimately, the petitioner left the said flat on October 24, 2005 leaving the opposite party to stay thereat all alone and has been threatening her to deliver quiet and vacant possession thereof failing which dire consequences would follow. It is alleged therein that the petitioner allured the opposite party to marry him despite being aware of her antecedents to rob her of her accumulated fortune and taking advantage of her simplicity committed acts of violence leaving an indelible scar on the most cherished possession of a woman, her chastity, thereby jeopardizing her reputation and lowering her esteem. 3. IN connection with the suit, the opposite party filed an application for alimony pendente lite under Section 36 of the Act. The petitioner contested the application by filing a written objection. He pleaded therein that the marriage between the opposite party and Ranjit was dissolved on August 31, 2001 and that since the marriage between the parties is void, she is not entitled to alimony pendente lite. 4. THE learned judge heard the parties. By order dated August 7, 2010, he allowed the application under Section 36 of the Act. According to him, whether or not the marriage of the opposite party with Ranjit was subsisting at the time marriage between the petitioner and the opposite party was registered is a question touching the merits of the matter and keeping in mind the settled law that issues which touch the merit of the suit should be avoided while dealing with an interlocutory matter, it was held that the point raised by the petitioner could not be decided at that stage and ought to be reserved for a decision at the stage of trial. A finding was also recorded that the opposite party has no source of earning and that marriage between the petitioner and the opposite party being an admitted fact, she was entitled to alimony pendente lite. THE petitioner was, accordingly, directed to pay Rs.5,000/- per month from the date of filing of the suit, month by month, and December 8, 2010 was fixed for peremptory hearing. This order is the subject matter of the challenge in the present revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution. Mr. Maity, learned advocate for the petitioner contended that since the marriage between the parties is admittedly void, the learned judge acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction in directing payment of alimony pendente lite based on his finding that -from the attending facts and circumstances of the case and pleading of the parties it is admitted that respondent is the legally married wife of the petitioner and the said marriage is still subsisting-. It was contended that the learned judge approached the problem from a wrong angle and failed to pose the correct question for answer. According to him, -wife- referred to in Section 36 of the SM Act refers to a woman who is legally married in terms of the extant marriage laws of the country to a man; it does not include a woman whose marriage has been solemnized in contravention of such marriage laws and is, therefore, void. The marriage between the parties being void, he urged that there is no question of the Court awarding alimony pendente lite and the order of the learned judge being infected with jurisdictional error is liable to be set aside. 5. MR. Maity also referred to an order dated November 16, 2010 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 2nd Court, Barrackpore on an application under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code (hereafter the Cr.P.C.) filed by the opposite party claiming maintenance. The learned magistrate upon noticing that the opposite party had been married to Ranjit and the said marriage was subsisting on the date the parties had their marriage registered, refused interim maintenance by the said order. The contention urged is that the application filed by the opposite party for alimony pendente lite ought to have met the same fate. 6. IN support of his submission, Mr. The contention urged is that the application filed by the opposite party for alimony pendente lite ought to have met the same fate. 6. IN support of his submission, Mr. Maity relied on the following decisions: i) AIR 2006 SC 80 : M.M. Malhotra v. Union of INdia and others; ii) (2005) 1 C Cr LR (SC) 609 : Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat and ors.; iii) AIR 1988 SC 644 : Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav and another;, iv) (2008) 1 C Cr LR (Cal) 559 : Aloke Kumar Biswas v. The State of West Bengal and anr.; v) II (1990) DMC 447 : Manjeet Singh v. Parson Kaur; vi) AIR 2007 Punjab and Haryana 8 : Satyavir Vashist v. Smt. Asha Gambhir; and vii) AIR 2010 Chattisgarh 25 : Megh Prasad v. Bhagwantin Bai; Opposing the revisional application, Mr. Ray, learned senior advocate representing the opposite party contended that the order impugned does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference of this Court. According to him, the question as to whether the marriage between the parties is void or not would come up for decision at the final hearing of the suit and during the time the suit pends in the trial Court, the opposite party cannot be made to starve and thereby allow the petitioner a virtual walkover. The learned judge, he further contended, did not commit any jurisdictional error and rightly allowed the application for maintenance. 7. RELIANCE was placed by Mr. Ray on the decisions reported in AIR 1991 Madhya Pradesh 47 : Laxmibai v. Ayodhya Prasad alias Ramadhar and AIR 2005 SC 422 : Ramesh Chandra Rampratapji Daga v. Rameshwari Ramesh Chandra Daga in support of his contention that even though prima facie the marriage between the parties may appear to be void, the opposite party is entitled to alimony pendente lite. 8. I have heard learned advocates for the parties. For facility of reference, Section 36 of the SM Act is quoted below: -36. 8. I have heard learned advocates for the parties. For facility of reference, Section 36 of the SM Act is quoted below: -36. Alimony pendente lite.-Where in any proceeding under Chapter V or Chapter VI it appears to the district court that the wife has no independent income sufficient for her support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife, order the husband to pay to her the expenses of the proceeding, and weekly or monthly during the proceeding such sum as, having regard to the husband's income, it may seem to the court to be reasonable: Provided that the application for the payment of the expenses of the proceeding and such weekly or monthly sum during the proceeding under Chapter V or Chapter VI shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of service of notice on the husband.- 9. THE legal question that calls for an answer is whether in order to be entitled to payment of alimony pendente lite in terms of Section 36 of the SM Act, the term -wife- referred to therein is to be given a strict literal meaning and, therefore, a woman would be considered to be a -wife- within its meaning only if she has been legally married to a man in accordance with all the provisions of the SM Act, or may even include a woman who claims to be the wife of a man, her husband, although it may appear that her marriage, so called, with such man is void for one reason or the other as specified in the SM Act. 10. FOR an appropriate decision, I consider it necessary to read the decisions that have been cited at the bar to find its relevance to the question at hand. The decision in Manjeet Singh (supra) rendered by a learned Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court does support the contention raised by Mr. Maity. Paragraph 11 of the decision being relevant, is quoted hereunder: -I am of the considered view that, on the admitted facts that at the time of the alleged marriage of the applicant-respondent with the appellant, the appellant was already legally married and was having a living spouse, her marriage with the appellant was in violation of Section 5 of the Act and was a void marriage. Thus, in the eye of law the applicant-respondent never attained the status of a wife, which has a definite connotation as observed above and as understood by the society. Section 24 of the Act statutorily confers a right of maintenance on a spouse during the pendency of the proceedings under the Act but when the marriage itself is void and none of the spouse enjoys the status of husband/wife, neither of the spouse can stake claim for maintenance during the pendency of the proceedings. In view of this, I find no force in the application and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs. However, the views expressed here will not be taken note of at the time of deciding the appeal on merits.- 11. IN M.M. Malhotra (supra), an order of compulsory retirement from service was under challenge in a writ petition. The petitioner was a member of the INdian Air Force. Two of the charges levelled in the show-cause notice against him on the basis of which proposed disciplinary action was contemplated were that he was maintaining illicit relation with a lady while his marriage with the complainant, his wife, was subsisting, and that he had contracted -plural marriage- with such lady, which is an act contrary to paragraph 578 of the Regulations for the Air Force (Revised Edition) 1964, resulting in birth of a child in such illegal wedlock. While dealing with the question as to whether there was a plural marriage, the Court had to deal with provisions contained in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereafter the HM Act). IN paragraph 11, it was observed as follows: -11. For appreciating the status of a Hindu woman marrying a Hindu male with a living spouse some of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Marriage Act') have to be examined. Section 11 of the Marriage Act declares such a marriage as null and void in the following terms : -11. For appreciating the status of a Hindu woman marrying a Hindu male with a living spouse some of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Marriage Act') have to be examined. Section 11 of the Marriage Act declares such a marriage as null and void in the following terms : -11. Void marriage - Any marriage solemnized after the commencement of this Act shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto against the other party, be so declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes any one of the conditions specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5.- Clause (i) of Section 5 lays down, for a lawful marriage, the necessary condition that neither party should have a spouse living at the time of the marriage. A marriage in contravention of this condition, therefore, is null and void. By reason of the overriding effect of the Marriage Act as mentioned in section 4, no aid can be taken of the earlier Hindu law or any custom or usage as a part of that law inconsistent with any provision of the Act. So far as Section 12 is concerned, it is confined to other categories of marriages and is not applicable to one solemnised in violation of Section 5(i) of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 puts further restrictions on such a right. The cases covered by this section are not void ab initio, and unless all the conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled and the aggrieved party exercises the right to avoid it, the same continues to be effective. The marriages covered by Section 11 are void ipso jure, that is, void from the very inception, and have to be ignored as not existing in law at all if and when such a question arises. Although the section permits a formal declaration to be made on the presentation of a petition, it is not essential to obtain in advance such a formal declaration from a court in a proceeding specifically commenced for the purpose. The provisions of Section 16, which is quoted below, also throw light on this aspect : -16. Although the section permits a formal declaration to be made on the presentation of a petition, it is not essential to obtain in advance such a formal declaration from a court in a proceeding specifically commenced for the purpose. The provisions of Section 16, which is quoted below, also throw light on this aspect : -16. Legitimacy of children of void and voidable marriages :- (1) Notwithstanding that a marriage is null and void under Section 11, any child of such marriage who would have been legitimate if the marriage had been valid, shall be legitimate, whether such child is born before or after the commencement of Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976), and whether or not a decree of nullity is granted in respect of that marriage under this Act and whether or not the marriage is held to be void otherwise than on a petition under this Act. (2) Where a decree of nullity is granted in respect of a voidable marriage under Section 12, any child begotten or conceived before the decree is made, who would have been the legitimate child of the parties to the marriage if at the date of the decree it had been dissolved instead of being annulled, shall be deemed to be their legitimate child notwithstanding the decree of nullity. (3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be construed as conferring upon any child of a marriage which is null and void or which is annulled by a decree of nullity under Section 12, any rights in or to the property of any person, other than the parents, in any case where, but for the passing of this Act, such child would have been incapable of possessing or acquiring any such rights any reason of his not being the legitimate child of his parents. Sub-section (1), by using the words underlined above clearly implies that a void marriage can be held to be so without a prior formal declaration by a court in a proceeding. While dealing with cases covered by Section 12, sub-section (2) refers to a decree of nullity as an essential condition and sub-section (3) prominently brings out the basic difference in the character of void and voidable marriages as covered respectively by Sections 11 and 12. While dealing with cases covered by Section 12, sub-section (2) refers to a decree of nullity as an essential condition and sub-section (3) prominently brings out the basic difference in the character of void and voidable marriages as covered respectively by Sections 11 and 12. It is also to be seen that while the legislature has considered it advisable to uphold the legitimacy of the paternity of a child born out of a void marriage, it has not extended a similar protection in respect of the mother of the child. The marriage of the appellant/ must, therefore, be treated as null and void from its very inception.- (emphasis in original) 12. THE law laid down in the aforesaid decision to the effect that marriages covered by Section 11 of the HM Act are void from the very inception admits of no doubt. THEre can also be no quarrel with the proposition that the effect of a marriage between a man and a woman, either of who has a spouse living, is that the marriage does not exist in law at all, if and when such a question arises. However, based on this authority, it cannot be ruled that the question involved herein is no longer res integra. The decisions in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya (supra), Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav (supra) and Aloke Kumar Biswas (supra) were rendered while dealing with applications for maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. It has been held in the first two decisions by the Supreme Court that -wife- in Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. means legally married wife and a woman who marries a man already having a living spouse is not entitled to maintenance thereunder since such a marriage, according to Hindu rites, is complete nullity. In the former decision it has also been observed that although the law operates harshly against the woman who unwittingly gets into relationship with a married man and is deprived of the protection that Section 125 envisages, that is an inadequacy in the law which only the legislature can undo. Without even referring to the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, the learned Judge of this Court has observed in the same tune in Aloke Kumar Biswas (supra). 13. Without even referring to the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, the learned Judge of this Court has observed in the same tune in Aloke Kumar Biswas (supra). 13. IN Satyavir Vashist (supra), the learned Judge exercising revisional jurisdiction was called upon to decide the propriety of an order of the trial Court granting an application under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereafter the HAandM Act). The order under challenge was interfered with for the reason mentioned in paragraph 9, reading as follows: -9. Thus it is clear that law is settled that ad interim maintenance can be granted where the status of the parties is not in dispute. However, it is not open to the Court to grant maintenance ad interim under Section 18 of the Act in case there is a serious dispute regarding relationship between the parties. IN the present case, the petitioner disputed the relationship of husband and wife and it is yet to be established by way of evidence as to whether there exists the relationship of husband and wife between the parties so as to entitle the respondent to claim maintenance from the petitioner.- 14. THE learned Judge in T.P. Sharma (supra) was faced with a similar situation. It was also ruled that the words -Hindu wife- used in Section 18 of the HAandM Act only includes lawful wife or legally wedded wife and does not include wife of second marriage during subsistence of the first marriage. The effect of the aforesaid decisions on construction of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 18 of the HAandM Act shall be discussed at a later part of this judgement. 15. THE legal question that arose in Laxmibai (supra) was whether the applicant, claiming to be the wife of the non-applicant, could be denied maintenance pendente lite under Section 24 of the HM Act only on the ground that her marriage with her husband is the second marriage during subsistence of her first marriage and, therefore, void under Section 11 read with Section 5(i) thereof. After examining various provisions of the HM Act, it was observed in paragraphs 8 and 9 as follows: -8. After examining various provisions of the HM Act, it was observed in paragraphs 8 and 9 as follows: -8. From the entire scheme of the Act, as examined by me, from the provisions mentioned above, I find that it is a piece of social welfare legislation regulating the marital relations of Hindu consistently with their customary law i.e. Hindu law. THE object behind S. 24 of the Act providing for maintenance pendente lite to a party in matrimonial proceedings is obviously to provide financial assistance to the indigent spouse to maintain herself or himself during the pendency of the proceedings and also to have sufficient funds to carry on the litigation so that the spouse does not unduly suffer in the conduct of the case for want of funds. THE expressions 'husband and wife' used in S. 24 of the Act have, therefore, to be construed in the context in which that expression is used for granting and fixing maintenance pendente lite and keeping in view the aims and object of the case. It may be seen from the above provisions of the Act that even in a case of bigamous marriage one of the parties can seek a decree of nullity of marriage by way of a petitioner or respondent which is permissible under S. 23A of the Act. It may also be seen that in pending proceedings even at the instance of a second wife in a void bigamous marriage the Court is empowered to make attempt for reconciliation, to pass necessary orders with regard to the custody of children and a disposal of property exchanged at the time of marriage. THE Court has also power in such proceedings to make an order of permanent alimony or maintenance under S. 25 of the Act. THE Court is empowered under S. 25 of the Act to pass an order of permanent alimony in favour of a wife although her petition for restitution of conjugal rights may fail on the ground that it was a prohibited bigamous marriage in Hindu law. THE Act thus confers wide powers on the matrimonial Court so as to regulate the matrimonial relationship between the parties and such powers are to be exercised by the Court even in a case of alleged or proved invalid bigamous marriage. THE Act thus confers wide powers on the matrimonial Court so as to regulate the matrimonial relationship between the parties and such powers are to be exercised by the Court even in a case of alleged or proved invalid bigamous marriage. It is for the purpose of exercise of those powers by the Court that the Court has been further empowered to fix some interim maintenance to one of the needy spouse so as to sustain herself/ himself during the pendency of the proceedings in the Court and to meet the expenses of the litigation. It is with this benevolent object to assist the parties and the Court for passing adequate reliefs under the Act that S. 24 has been enacted providing for maintenance pendente lite. Keeping in view the aims and object of the Act and the wide powers conferred on the matrimonial Court in that respect, I am of the view that the expression "wife and husband" used in S. 24 have not to be given strict literal meaning as to convey only legally married wife and husband. According to me, the expression 'wife and husband' in the context of the section and scheme of the Act should mean a 'person claiming to be a wife or husband.' 9. I am aware of the danger which is involved in putting such an interpretation on the expression 'wife and husband' for the purpose of interim maintenance under S. 24 as it was pointed out on behalf of the counsel for the husband that the provision so construed would give opportunities to clever parties to come up with false cases in the matrimonial Court alleging false marital relationship only with a purpose to get interim maintenance. I, however, do not think that merely because such a mischief is possible any other interpretation can be placed on the words 'wife and husband' used in S. 24 of the Act. I agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the husband that proceedings under S. 24 of the Act contemplate summary enquiry by the Court which will include going into the merits of the case. I agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the husband that proceedings under S. 24 of the Act contemplate summary enquiry by the Court which will include going into the merits of the case. I am not prepared to accept the submission made by the learned counsel for the wife that where the only contention between the parties is about the factum or (sic of) validity of marriage, the Court cannot go into that question even in a summary way for the purpose of fixing interim maintenance under S. 24 of the Act. In my considered view when an application for maintenance pendente lite under S. 24 of the Act is made, it is the duty of the matrimonial Court to hold a summary enquiry to determine prima facie the merits of the case as also the question of means of the parties for maintenance. THE scope of enquiry under S. 24 of the Act can be compared with the scope of enquiry in a civil matter where some interim relief in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of receiver is claimed by one of the parties. At the first stage when an interim relief is claimed by the party in a suit or action in a Court of law, the Court is required to examine prima facie the case of the parties and the necessity of granting interim relief. THE scope of enquiry under S. 24 of the Act is not as wide as the full fledged trial of the suit or proceedings but would be certainly an enquiry based en oral evidence or affidavits of the parties sufficient enough to decide the question of grant of interim relief. 16. ULTIMATELY, it was held in paragraph 11A as follows: -***I am, therefore, supported in my view by the above decisions that the expression 'wife' or the 'husband' used in S. 24 of the Act have not to be literally construed but has to be liberally construed to mean "'petitioner' or 'respondent' claiming to be wife or husband in a pending matrimonial cause". Construing the expression thus would fulfil the intent of the provisions and aims and objects of the Act to provide some interim subsistence to a needy spouse unable to maintain herself or himself to effectively take part in the pending proceedings before the Court of law. Construing the expression thus would fulfil the intent of the provisions and aims and objects of the Act to provide some interim subsistence to a needy spouse unable to maintain herself or himself to effectively take part in the pending proceedings before the Court of law. I, therefore, hold that the wife in the present case was not disentitled from claiming maintenance pendente lite under S. 24 of the Act even on a prima facie case having been found in favour of the husband that her marriage was bigamous and liable to be declared void under under S. 11 read with S. 5(i) of the Act.- The facts in Ramesh Chandra Rampratapji Daga (supra) were these. The first marriage of the appellant-husband was solemnized in the year 1963 and in the wedlock with her wife, three children were born. After the death of his wife, the appellant-husband remarried the respondent-wife on July 11, 1981. The marriage of the respondent-wife, it was alleged, was arranged with one Girdhari on May 15, 1979. According to the respondentwife, the customary rituals of marriage were not completed as in the marriage ceremony family members quarreled over dowry. She had filed a divorce petition in the matrimonial Court but it was not prosecuted and no decree of divorce was passed. It was the case of the respondent-wife that in accordance with the prevalent custom in Maheshwari community, a -chhor chithhi- or a document of dissolution of marriage was executed between her and Girdhari, her previous husband and it was later registered. In the wedlock of the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife, a daughter (Puja) was born on July 14, 1983. According to the version of the respondent-wife, the document of registered -chhor chithhi- was shown and given to the appellant-husband before his accepting the second matrimony with the respondent-wife. Alleging that she was being ill-treated by the appellant-husband and driven out of her matrimonial home, the respondent-wife applied for judicial separation and maintenance for herself and her daughter. The appellant-husband filed a counter petition seeking declaration of his marriage with the respondent-wife as nullity on the ground that her previous marriage with Girdhari had not been dissolved by any Court in accordance with the provisions of the HM Act. He disputed not only validity of the marriage but also the parentage of Puja. The appellant-husband filed a counter petition seeking declaration of his marriage with the respondent-wife as nullity on the ground that her previous marriage with Girdhari had not been dissolved by any Court in accordance with the provisions of the HM Act. He disputed not only validity of the marriage but also the parentage of Puja. The Family Court while rejecting the claim of the appellant-husband allowed that of the respondent-wife and granted maintenance to her and the daughter. Appeal and cross-objection at the instance of the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife respectively followed in the High Court. The decision of the Family Court was reversed, meaning thereby that declaration in favour of the appellant-husband that marriage between him and the respondentwife was null and void was granted and the decree for judicial separation obtained by the latter was set aside. However, the order directing maintenance was maintained. The Supreme Court, on being approached, ruled that the respondent-wife could not establish that her marriage with Girdhari was dissolved according to law and, therefore, did not upset the decree passed by the High Court. However, the contentious issue as to whether despite a declaration that the marriage between the parties was null and void the High Court could grant permanent alimony was answered in favour of the respondent-wife. In the process, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court were of the view that an earlier decision reported in 1993 AIR SCW 2548 : Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal Dhawan squarely covered the point against the appellant-husband, and the decision in Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav (supra) and the other cited decisions were distinguishable (see paragraph 16 of the decision). 17. IN Chand Dhawan (supra), the point involved was whether payment of alimony is admissible without the relationship between the spouses being terminated. Section 25 of the HM Act came up for interpretation and it was ruled that the expression -at the time of passing any decree- therein includes a decree of nullity of marriage. Their Lordships also ruled that unless by a decree of the Court the marital status of the parties is disrupted or affected, maintenance under the HM Act cannot be granted. It would be useful to note the relevant observations from Chand Dhawan (supra), which were quoted in Ramesh Chandra Rampratapji Daga (supra). Their Lordships also ruled that unless by a decree of the Court the marital status of the parties is disrupted or affected, maintenance under the HM Act cannot be granted. It would be useful to note the relevant observations from Chand Dhawan (supra), which were quoted in Ramesh Chandra Rampratapji Daga (supra). The same read as follows: "On the other hand, under the Hindu Marriage Act, in contrast, her claim for maintenance pendente lite is durated (sic) on the pendency of a litigation of the kind envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and her claim to permanent maintenance or alimony is based on the supposition that either her marital status has been strained or affected by passing a decree for restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation in favour or against her, or her marriage stands dissolved by a decree of nullity or divorce, with or without her consent. Thus when her marital status is to be affected or disrupted the court does so by passing a decree for or against her. On or at the time of the happening of that event, the court being seisin of the matter, invokes its ancillary or incidental power to grant permanent alimony. Not only that, the court retains the jurisdiction at subsequent stages to fulfill this incidental or ancillary obligation when moved by an application on that behalf by a party entitled to relief. The court further retains the power to change or alter the order in view of the changed circumstances. Thus the whole exercise is within the gammit (sic gamut) of a diseased or a broken marriage. And in order to avoid conflict of perceptions the legislature while codifying the Hindu Marriage Act preserved the right of permanent maintenance in favour of the husband or the wife, as the case may be, dependent on the court passing a decree of the kind as envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Act. IN other words without the marital status being affected or disrupted by the matrimonial court under the Hindu Marriage Act the claim of permanent alimony was not to be valid as ancillary or incidental to such affectation or disruption. IN other words without the marital status being affected or disrupted by the matrimonial court under the Hindu Marriage Act the claim of permanent alimony was not to be valid as ancillary or incidental to such affectation or disruption. The wife's claim to maintenance necessarily has then to be agitated under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 which is a legislative measure later in point of time than the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, though part of the same socio-legal scheme revolutionizing the law applicable to Hindus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . We have thus, in this light, no hesitation in coming to the view that when by court intervention under the Hindu Marriage Act, affectation or disruption to the marital status has come by, at that juncture, while passing the decree, it undoubtedly has the power to grant permanent alimony or maintenance, if that power is invoked at that time. It also retains the power subsequently to be invoked on application by a party entitled to relief. And such order, in all events, remains within the jurisdiction of that court, to be altered or modified as future situations may warrant.- (emphasis supplied by me) The Court continued to hold in respect of maintenance that could be claimed under the HM Act and the HAandM Act as follows: -IN contrast, without affectation or disruption of the marital status, a Hindu wife sustaining that status can live in separation from her husband, and whether she is living in that state or not, her claim to maintenance stands preserved in codification under Section 18(1) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. The court is not at liberty to grant relief of maintenance simpliciter obtainable under one Act in proceedings under the other. As is evident, both the statutes are codified as such and are clear on their subjects and by liberality of interpretation inter-changeability cannot be permitted so as to destroy the distinction on the subject of maintenance.- 18. ON due consideration of the authorities cited by the parties and the relevant law, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Maity. ON due consideration of the authorities cited by the parties and the relevant law, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Maity. The decisions rendered by the Supreme Court as well as this Court on applications under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., in my considered view, cannot be pressed into aid for deciding whether a woman is entitled to alimony pendente lite under Section 36 of the SM Act during the pendency of a suit even when, prima facie, the marriage is found to be nullity, in view of the decision in Ramesh Chandra Rampratapji Daga (supra). The decisions in Satyavir Vashist (supra) and T.P. Sharma (supra) arise out of proceedings initiated under the HAandM Act. The considerations that ought to weigh in the matter of grant of maintenance thereunder are not quite the same while considering a prayer for alimony pendente lite under either the HM Act or the SM Act and, therefore, are not of much help. 19. I quite agree with the observation in Laxmibai (supra) that the expression -wife- in Section 24 of the HM Act ought not to be literally read as meaning a legally married wife in the purest sense of the term but should mean a person claiming to be a wife. The provisions of Sections 24 and 25 of the HM Act and Sections 36 and 37 of the SM Act seek to serve the same object and facilitate the same purpose. Therefore, there is no reason as to why the same interpretation should not be placed in respect of -wife- used in the provisions of Sections 36 and 37 of the SM Act. If indeed the Court has the power to grant permanent alimony when it passes a decree of nullity of marriage, it is inconceivable that at the interim stage of the proceedings it has no power to order alimony pendente lite. Power to award alimony pendente lite is conferred on the Court in any proceeding initiated under Chapters V or VI of the SM Act. Section 24 in Chapter VI envisages presentation of a petition for declaration of a marriage solemnized under the SM Act as nullity and a decree may be passed if conditions in clause (i) or (ii) are satisfied. Chapter VI of the SM Act squarely comprehends the action initiated by the petitioner. Section 24 in Chapter VI envisages presentation of a petition for declaration of a marriage solemnized under the SM Act as nullity and a decree may be passed if conditions in clause (i) or (ii) are satisfied. Chapter VI of the SM Act squarely comprehends the action initiated by the petitioner. Nothing contained in the SM Act can be construed to be a fetter on the Court to award alimony pendente lite to a woman who gets married in terms of the provisions contained in Sections 5 to 12 of the SM Act. I am inclined to hold that -wife- used in Sections 36 and 37 of the SM Act would include a woman whose marriage has been solemnized with a man under the SM Act, in the sense that the requirements of Section 5 to 12 thereof have been duly adhered to, where after a certificate of marriage has been entered in the Marriage Certificate Book being the conclusive evidence of the fact that a marriage has been solemnized under the SM Act and all formalities in respect of signatures have been complied with, and notwithstanding that such marriage deserves to be or may have been dissolved by a decree on the ground that such marriage is a nullity for reasons traceable in Section 4, that would not be a bar for such woman to claim alimony pendente lite or permanent alimony, as the case may be, and the trial Court may, having regard to the facts and circumstances before it, in its discretion, grant alimony. 20. PARLIAMENT in its wisdom has engrafted special provisions in the Constitution for protection of women. One provision that readily comes to mind is Article 15(3). When a provision enacted to ameliorate the economic condition of a woman in distress comes up for interpretation of the Court, progressive interpretation of the said law ought to be made instead of compromising with regressive trends. The observations of the Supreme Court in its decision reported in AIR 1979 SC 362 : Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fidaalli Chothia, although in the context of Section 125, Cr. P.C. are worth quoting. The observations of the Supreme Court in its decision reported in AIR 1979 SC 362 : Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fidaalli Chothia, although in the context of Section 125, Cr. P.C. are worth quoting. The same read : -1.**** Welfare laws must be so read as to be effective delivery systems of the salutary objects sought to be served by the Legislature and when the beneficiaries are the weaker sections, like destitute women, the spirit of Article 15(3) of the Constitution must belight the meaning of the section. The Constitution is a pervasive omnipresence brooding over the meaning and transforming the values of every measure.*** 7. The meaning of meanings is derived from values in a given society and its legal system. Article 15(3) has compelling, compassionate relevance in the context of Section 125 and the benefit of doubt, if any, in statutory interpretation belongs to the ill-used wife and the derelict divorcee. This social perspective granted, the resolution of all the disputes projected is easy. Surely, PARLIAMENT, in keeping with Article 15(3) and deliberate by design, made a special provision to help women in distress cast away by divorce. Protection against moral and material abandonment manifest in Article 39 is part of social and economic justice, specificated in Article 38, fulfilment of which is fundamental to the governance of the country (Article 37). From this coign of vantage we must view the printed text of the particular code. 12.*** Law is dynamic and its meaning cannot be pedantic but purposeful.***- Tested on the touchstone of Constitutional norms and principles, the provisions of Sections 36 and 37 of the SM Act, as interpreted above, find countenance. The provisions of the SM Act, unless interpreted in the manner as aforesaid, might lead to disastrous result. I may cite an instance. A man having a spouse living may induce a woman to believe that he is single and unmarried. The woman falls in the trap laid by the man and marries him. The provisions of the SM Act, unless interpreted in the manner as aforesaid, might lead to disastrous result. I may cite an instance. A man having a spouse living may induce a woman to believe that he is single and unmarried. The woman falls in the trap laid by the man and marries him. If after marriage the couple drift apart and proceedings are initiated by either of them under the HM Act or under the SM Act, whichever is applicable, for declaring the marriage as nullity on the ground that the man had a spouse living on the date of marriage, assuming the facts to be established should it be held that since the marriage is apparently void the woman would not be entitled to permanent alimony? The answer ought to be rendered in the negative. 21. NOW, reverting to the rival claims in the present case, it is found that although the marriage between Ranjit and the opposite party was admittedly subsisting on the date marriage between the latter and the petitioner was registered in terms of the SM Act, if the opposite party could prove before the trial Court the material facts alleged in her written statement, as recorded in paragraph 3 (supra), in my view, even after declaration of the marriage as null and void by the trial Court, in its discretion the trial Court may hold the opposite party entitled to permanent alimony in terms of Section 37 of the SM Act keeping in view the law laid down in Ramesh Chandra Rampratapji Daga (supra) and Chand Dhawan (supra). The same analogy would apply in case of an application under Section 36 of the SM Act, which is conceived to provide support to the weaker spouse during the pendency of the proceedings for dissolution of marriage. The party in financial distress cannot be made to starve. If the basic ingredients for award of alimony pendente lite are established, there is no reason as to why a woman like the petitioner ought to be deprived on the specious ground that her marriage appears to be a nullity. 22. FOR the reasons aforesaid, while respectfully disagreeing with the view expressed in Manjeet Kaur (supra) I have no hesitation to hold that the learned Judge of the trial Court did not commit any error of jurisdiction in passing the order impugned. 22. FOR the reasons aforesaid, while respectfully disagreeing with the view expressed in Manjeet Kaur (supra) I have no hesitation to hold that the learned Judge of the trial Court did not commit any error of jurisdiction in passing the order impugned. The revisional application stands dismissed without order for costs. Photostat certified copy of this judgment and order may be furnished to the applicant at an early date.