Research › Search › Judgment

Orissa High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 148 (ORI)

S. SIBA RAO v. NABIN MAHAKUR

2011-03-04

H.S.BHALLA

body2011
JUDGMENT : H.S. Bhalla, J. - Heard learned counsel for the appellant. 2. The appellant has filed this application to exempt him from paying the statutory deposit. S. SIBA RAO-V- NABIN MAHAKUR [H.S.BHALLA, J.] 3. Perusal of the file clearly spells out that the appellant has not made statutory deposit of Rs.25,000/- as per the requirement of Section 173 of the M.V. Act, 1988 for maintaining this appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that since the liability of the Insurance Company at the first instance has been fixed by the Tribunal, therefore, the appellant, who is the owner of the vehicle in question is not required to deposit the statutory deposit of Rs.25,000/- for maintaining this appeal and he filed an application for exempting the appellant from making the statutory deposit of Rs.25,000/-. But at a later stage, he also undertook to deposit the amount and number of opportunities was granted to him but so far the statutory deposit has not been made. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the requirement of Section 173 of the M.V. Act, 1988 is satisfied as the Insurance Company has been directed by the Tribunal to deposit the entire amount to pay compensation and no useful purpose would be served directing the appellant, who is the owner of the vehicle to deposit Rs.25,0007- for filing the appeal. The purpose of this Section is to ensure deposit of Rs.25,0007- only with a view to pay the said amount to the aggrieved party. But in the present case, since the entire amount at the first instance is required to be deposited by the Insurance Company, therefore, the object of Section 173 has already been achieved and there will be no use to direct the appellant to deposit Rs.25,000/- for the same award under challenge. He further submitted that if the application is not allowed, serious prejudice would be caused to the appellant. Therefore, his exemption application should be allowed. 5. Before examining the prayer of the appellant with regard to exemption to deposit Rs.25,000/- for filing the present appeal, the language used in sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the M.V. Act, 1988 is required to be looked into, which is re-produced below: 173. Therefore, his exemption application should be allowed. 5. Before examining the prayer of the appellant with regard to exemption to deposit Rs.25,000/- for filing the present appeal, the language used in sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the M.V. Act, 1988 is required to be looked into, which is re-produced below: 173. Appeals (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court; Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees of fifty percent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court: Provided further that, the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the INDIAN LAW REPORTS, CUTTACK SERIES [2011] appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. (2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees. 6. From plain reading of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 173, it is apparent that any person, who is required to pay any amount under the award passed by the Claims Tribunal his appeal can be entertained by the High Court only if he makes deposit of specific amount as required by the said proviso and can not claim exemption from making the deposit on the ground that the amount under challenge is required to be deposited at the first instance by the Insurance Company. 7. The first and preliminary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The question of interpretation arises only when the language is ambiguous, and is capable other interpretation also. 8. From a bare perusal of the language of the proviso of sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it is apparent that the language is clear and unambiguous and no second meaning as contained in the Section itself can be given. 9. The Apex Court in the case of Nelson Motis Vs. 8. From a bare perusal of the language of the proviso of sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it is apparent that the language is clear and unambiguous and no second meaning as contained in the Section itself can be given. 9. The Apex Court in the case of Nelson Motis Vs. Union of India and another, ; Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, ; State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, has held that if the words of statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. 10. The Apex Court in the case of Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and Others has held that the results of construction are not matter for the Court even though they may be strange or surprising, unreasonable or unjust or oppressive. 11. The matter can be examined from another angle also. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Act contains the word "shall" and where in the statute the word "shall" is used, it is normally read as must and in other words mandatory. 12. The Apex Court in the case of The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Babu Ram Upadhya has held that the use of word "shall" raises presumption that particular provision is imperative. S. SIBARAO-V- NABIN MAHAKUR [H.S.BHALLA, J.] 13. The decision is otherwise also. The Apex Court in the case of Sainik Motors, Jodhpur and Others Vs. The State of Rajasthan has held that the word "shall" is ordinarily mandatory but it is sometimes not so interpreted if the context or intention otherwise demands. 14. The Apex Court in the case of Govindlal Chhaganlal Patel Vs. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Godhra and Others has held that when the statute uses word "shall" prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. 15. 14. The Apex Court in the case of Govindlal Chhaganlal Patel Vs. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Godhra and Others has held that when the statute uses word "shall" prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. 15. From the perusal of the above decisions of the Apex Court, it is clear that the word "shall" used in the statute is normally mandatory and sometimes it is directory also if the circumstances so demand but here in the particular case since the Tribunal has found the liability of the appellant to pay the amount of compensation to the claimant and only given a breathing time to the appellant by directing the Insurance Company to pay the awarded amount to the claimant and then recover from the appellant, therefore, the initial liability is of the appellant and not of the Insurance Company. In view of this, it can not be said that any prejudice will be caused to the appellant in case he is required to deposit Rs.25,000/- as required u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 16. Since, the Insurance Company has not come before this Court and the owner of the vehicle has filed the present appeal and in view of the Tribunal's judgment awarded amount paid to the claimant has to be recovered from the appellant, therefore, pre-requisite condition of deposit of Rs.25,000/- or 50% whichever is less in view of Section of the Motor Vehicles Act for the purposes of filing the appeal is applicable in full force in view of the language used in the section. 17. In view of that I am of the opinion that the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is mandatory and the appellant is required to deposit Rs.25,000/- as per the scheme of the Act and without statutory deposit by the appellant, the appeal will not be maintainable. 18. As already observed above, learned counsel for the appellant thrice undertook to deposit the statutory amount as is evident from the orders dated 16.3.2010, 25.11.2010 and 14.1.2011, but even then the same was not deposited. 18. As already observed above, learned counsel for the appellant thrice undertook to deposit the statutory amount as is evident from the orders dated 16.3.2010, 25.11.2010 and 14.1.2011, but even then the same was not deposited. In view of series of lapses on the part of the appellant, particularly when he undertook to deposit the statutory deposit on number of times, no case is made out to allow any further time for deposit of the statutory amount. INDIAN LAW REPORTS, CUTTACK SERIES [2011] 19. In the final analysis, in the absence of statutory amount and for the reasons discussed above, the present appeal can not be entertained and the same is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed