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Andhra High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 15 (AP)

Kagitala Sambasiva Rao v. Labour Court

2011-01-19

L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2011
JUDGMENT Common questions of fact and law arise in these two writ petitions. Hence, they are disposed of through a common judgment. The petitioners were engaged as Cleaners/Sweepers in May, 1989 by the Gannavaram Depot of A.P.S.R.T.C (for short ‘the Corporation’). Alleging that their services were orally terminated, on 01-07-1992, they approached the Labour Court, Guntur, by filing I.D.Nos.280 and 282 of 1992; along with two other similarly situated candidates. Awards were passed by the Labour Court on 16-07-1997, holding that the termination is contrary to law, and directed the respondents 2 and 3 (for short ‘the respondent’) to reinstate the petitioners with continuity of service, back wages and attendant benefits. The awards were upheld by this Court. The petitioners filed E.P.No.10 and 12 of 1998 for execution of the awards, for reinstatement into service and payment of back wages. The petitioners claim that they are entitled to be paid their salary in minimum of the time scale, and the respondent did not pay such amounts. The respondent opposed the E.Ps. It was pleaded that the petitioners were paid the wages, in view of reinstatement, during the pendency of the writ petitions and writ appeal, and thereafter, emoluments were fixed and paid, in accordance with the relevant provisions of law. Through separate, but identical orders dated 13-05-2005, the Labour Court took the view that the petitioners are entitled to be paid the wages, which they were receiving, as on the date of removal, till the date oftheir reinstatement, and consequential directions were issued. The petitioners feel aggrieved by the orders passed by the Labour Court. The writ petitions are filed with a prayer to set aside the orders in E.Ps, and for direction to the respondents to pay the back wages and other benefits on par with the Cleaners, employed in the Corporation, from the date of appointment, till the date of filing of the writ petitions. Sri M. Pitchaiah, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the termination of the services of the petitioners was set aside by the Labour Court, granting relief of reinstatement into service with attendant benefits, back wages and continuity of service, and that the awards were upheld by this Court. Sri M. Pitchaiah, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the termination of the services of the petitioners was set aside by the Labour Court, granting relief of reinstatement into service with attendant benefits, back wages and continuity of service, and that the awards were upheld by this Court. He contends that the petitioners became entitled to be paid the wages, that are applicable to the post of Cleaner, and there was no justification for the respondents in paying meagre amount, that too, on piece rate basis. Placing reliance upon certain precedents, learned counsel submits that it is competent for a Labour Court to grant relief in terms of the Minimum Wages Act (for short ‘the M.W. Act’), in exercise of power under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the I.D. Act’) Sri Sunil Kumar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that once the awards passed in favour of the petitioners became final, they are entitled to be paid back wages based on the last drawn emoluments, till the date of reinstatement. He contends that the E.Ps were filed making a claim, far beyond the scope of the awards in the I.Ds, and the writ petitions are filed for an altogether different relief, claiming salary, on par with the Cleaners, from the date of appointment. He submits that the writ petitions were not maintainable in law. The petitioners were engaged as Cleaners/Sweepers on piece rate basis in May, 1989. They were to be paid the emoluments at the rate of Rs.1.25 ps., for each bus, which is cleaned and swept by them. By June, 1992, they were drawing a sum of Rs.470/-per month. With effect from 01-07-1992, they were discontinued. In the industrial disputes raised by them, the Labour Court took the view that they were retrenched in contravention of 25-F of the I.D. Act. The awards were challenged by the respondent, and order of stay was granted, subject to compliance with Section 17-B of the I.D. Act. Emoluments, which far exceed Rs.470/-per month, were paid, in compliance with Section 17-B of the I.D. Act. On dismissal of the writ petitions and writ appeal, the petitioners were reinstated into service. The petitioners filed execution petition Nos.10 and 12 of 1998 for enforcement of the awards, mainly in the context of payment of back wages. No specific provision of law is mentioned. On dismissal of the writ petitions and writ appeal, the petitioners were reinstated into service. The petitioners filed execution petition Nos.10 and 12 of 1998 for enforcement of the awards, mainly in the context of payment of back wages. No specific provision of law is mentioned. Across the Bar, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitions are referable under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act. Their grievance was that though they were entitled to be paid emoluments at the minimum of the pay scale of the post of Cleaner, they were paid a far lesser amount. The Labour Court took the view that they are entitled to be paid emoluments at the rate of Rs.470/-per month, till the date of reinstatement, with modifications, if any, in terms of the orders, that may have been passed by the respondent. In addition to ventilating the grievance against the orders passed by the Labour Court in the E.Ps., the petitioners claimed the relief in the form of a direction to the respondent to pay the salary for the posts of Cleaners from the date of their appointment, together with arrears.It is difficult to treat the E.Ps filed by the petitioners as petitions under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act. The first reason is that the provision was not invoked, and the second is that the subject-matter of the E.Ps does not fit into it. An application under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act can be maintained for recovery of the amounts, which have either been determined, on earlier round of proceedings, or as regards which, there is no dispute. Except directing that the petitioners be reinstated into service, with attendant benefits, back wages and continuity of service, the Labour Court did not quantify any benefits. It is not in dispute that the wages drawn by the petitioners, just before they came to be retrenched were, Rs.470/-per month. The respondent paid wages, which are, in a way, a bit excess; in compliance with Section 17-B of the I.D. Act. The petitioners, however, wanted that the wages at the scale of pay, referable to the post of Cleaner, be paid to them. The respondent paid wages, which are, in a way, a bit excess; in compliance with Section 17-B of the I.D. Act. The petitioners, however, wanted that the wages at the scale of pay, referable to the post of Cleaner, be paid to them. The claim was totally outside the scope of the awards.Reliance is placed upon the two judgments, rendered by separate Full Benches of this Court, in M/s Anand Oil Industries v. Labour Court, Hyderabad ( AIR 1979 AP 182 (FB)) andMaridegam Radhakrishna Reddy v Sri Bharathi Velu Bus Service ( AIR 1986 AP 102 ). The first one pertained to the claim for payment of bonus as well as the one under the M.W. Act. In the second case, the dispute was referable to the claim under Payment of Wages Act. The Payment of Bonus Act (for short ‘the Bonus Act’) ensures 8.33 minimum bonus to employees of an industrial undertaking, to which the provisions of that Act apply. Bonus, at a higher rate, is payable, in case the management decides, or, if the profits are higher. In AnandOil Industries’ case (1 supra), the Full Bench of this Court took the view that, where the claim is as to minimum bonus under the Act, it is not necessary that a dispute be raised under Section 22 of the Bonus Act, and that an application under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act can be maintained. The relevant portion reads as under:“Para-31: We are therefore, of the view that when a claim for the payment of minimum bonus is made by an employee of an establishment to which the Act applies, such a claim does not fall within S.22 of the Payment of Bonus Act so as to be deemed to be an “industrial dispute”, requiring reference under S.10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Such a claim can be investigated and the necessary relief awarded by the Labour Court upon a petition filed by the employee under S.33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act’In other words, if the claim is for bonus, over and above of 8.33%, the claim would fall within Section 22 of the Bonus Act, and thereby the remedy under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D Act would not be available for it. As regards the claim under the M.W. Act, it was observed that, if there is no dispute as to the status of the claimant, as workman, or the employer, as an industry, an application under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act can be maintained.In MaridegamRadhakrishna Reddy’s case (2 supra), the question arose under the Payment of Wages Act. The following principles, laid down by the Supreme Court, in U.P. Electricity Supply Company v. R.K. Shukla ( AIR 1970 SC 237 ), were extracted.1. “The proceeding under S.33-C(2) is analogous to an execution proceeding. 2. Section 33-C(2) is wider than Sec.33C(1). 3. For a claim to be maintainable under S.33-C(2) the workman should have an existing right in his favour to claim the money or the benefit; 4. If the workman has a right under a settlement, award, a scheme or a statute to claim any money or benefit, mere denial of that right by the employer will not be sufficient to negative his claim under S.33-C(2).”The claim in that case was pertaining to the period of suspension, and there was no dispute as to the emoluments, that were payable to the employee. Further, the following observation of the Supreme Court, in Town Municipal Council v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli ( AIR 1969 SC 1335 (1)), becomes relevant: “Para-7: We have examined the applications which were presented before the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Act in these appeals and have also taken into account the pleadings which were put forward on behalf of the appellant in contesting those applications and we are unable to find that there was any dispute relating to the rates. It is true that, in their applications, the workmen did plead the rates at which their claims had to be computed; but it was nowhere stated that those rates were being disputed by the appellant. Even in the pleadings put forward on behalf of the appellant as incorporated in the order of the Labour Court, there was no pleading that the claims of the workmen were payable at a rate different from the rates claimed by them. It does appear that, in one case, there was a pleading on behalf of the appellant that no rates at all had been prescribed by the Mysore Government. It does appear that, in one case, there was a pleading on behalf of the appellant that no rates at all had been prescribed by the Mysore Government. That pleading did not mean that it became a dispute as to the rates at which the payments were to be make by the appellant. The only question that arose was whether there were any rates at all fixed under the Minimum Wages Act for overtime and for payment for work done on days of rest. Such a question does not relate to a dispute as to the rates enforceable between the parties, so that the remedy under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act could not have been sought by the applicants in any of these applications. No question can, therefore, arise of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain these applications under Section 33C(2) of the Act being barred because of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act.”From the underlined portion of the judgment, it becomes clear that, if there is a dispute as to the payment of minimum wages, the remedy is under Section 20(1) of the M.W. Act, and not under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act.In the instant case, the petitioners were paid piece rate wages, under a contract of employment. The respondents did not refuse to pay those emoluments. The petitioners wanted emoluments to be paid at a higher rate, comparable to those, prescribed under the M.W. Act. For that purpose, the verification of the relevant notifications issued under the M.W. Act; their applicability to the employment under the respondent-Corporation; and the eligibility of the petitioners to be extended the benefit, needs to be verified. All this requires an independent adjudication on the basis of the pleadings of the respective parties and verification of the relevant notifications. As indicated by the Supreme Court, such claims squarely fall under Section 20 of that enactment. By no stretch of imagination, they claim can be made in an execution petition filed for enforcement of an award passed in an industrial dispute, raised under Section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act. The adjudication of a dispute under Section 2-A(2) is confined to the verification of compliance with Section 25-A, where it is a retrenchment-simplicitor, and the legality of the findings on charges of misconduct or misbehaviour, in case the termination is the result of disciplinary proceedings. The adjudication of a dispute under Section 2-A(2) is confined to the verification of compliance with Section 25-A, where it is a retrenchment-simplicitor, and the legality of the findings on charges of misconduct or misbehaviour, in case the termination is the result of disciplinary proceedings. There would not be any occasion for the Court to delve into the question of the quantum of emoluments, much less their adequacy, in terms of the notifications issued under the provisions of the M.W. Act. An execution petition or a miscellaneous petition, under Section 33-C (2) of the I.D. Act, in such proceedings, cannot travel beyond the scope of such adjudication, nor it would be permissible to add new dimensions to the lis,at the stage of execution. It is settled principle of law that an Executing Court cannot travel beyond the scope of the decree, or order, which is sought to be executed. Viewed from any angle, the writ petitions are devoid of merits, and they are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.