JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed by the plaintiff-appellant against the judgment & decree of the first appellate court dated 22/9/1987 dismissing his appeal thereby upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge Bharatpur dated 2/4/1983. 2. Factual matrix of the case is that plaintiff-appellant filed a suit against the defendant-respondent for eviction from the tenanted premises, which was a shop, inter-alia on the ground that this shop was gifted to him by a registered gift-deed dated 6/4/1968 executed by Ramcharan Lal. He has thus become landlord of the shop. Suit was filed on the ground of : (i) denial of title of the plaintiff by the defendant, (ii) default committed by the defendant in paying of rent for more than six months and that (iii) the plaintiff required the shop for his reasonable bonafide necessity, for his own occupation for carrying on the business in weights, brass, iron and other metallic kaserat goods. According to the plaintiff, defendant had purchased two shops in front of the tenanted shop in dispute in the name of his son Hari Shankar and other in the name of his (defendant) wife Smt.Triveni Devi. He himself had been carrying on the business from one of these shops. Defendant in his written-statement denied that Ramcharan Lal, original landlord executed any gift-deed in favour of the plaintiff nor any such gift-deed was registered. Therefore, necessity of the plaintiff cannot be considered reasonable and bonafide. This has been done by the plaintiff in collusion with Ramcharan Lal only to ensure eviction of the defendant. It was denied that any default in payment of rent was committed and also denied that defendant had purchased two shops in front of the tenanted shop. Shops were purchased by his son Hari Shankar and wife of the defendant Smt.Triveni Devi from their own money and defendant was not in possession of any of them. Plaintiff filed rejoinder pleading that father of Ramcharan Lal filed a suit being Suit No.47/1955, which was decided on 6/4/1965 against the defendant and his father on the ground of default of payment of rent and reasonable bonafide necessity. Defendant deposited the arrears of rent and cost of the suit and got the suit dismissed. Plaintiff filed rejoinder pleading that father of Ramcharan Lal filed a suit being Suit No.47/1955, which was decided on 6/4/1965 against the defendant and his father on the ground of default of payment of rent and reasonable bonafide necessity. Defendant deposited the arrears of rent and cost of the suit and got the suit dismissed. It was also pleaded that in the suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendant for fixation of standard rent, provisional rent was determined and same was not paid regularly in time for more than six months and therefore defendant too was a defaulter of second time, hence not entitled to any protection under the Rent Control Act, 2001. Alleged collusion between the plaintiff and Ramcharan Lal was denied. It was asserted that the plaintiff had been living separately from Ramcharan Lal and they are carrying on their business separately. Regarding purchase of the shops by the defendant, it was reiterated that those shops were purchased by not son of the defendant and defendant's wife but such purchase was made by the defendant from his own money. Trial court dismissed the suit and the first appeal there against was also dismissed. Hence, this second appeal by the plaintiff. 3. This Court admitted the appeal on 14/9/1988 for hearing on following substantial questions of law:- (i) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the defendant has denied the title of the plaintiff in the suit premises particularly in view of the fact of his having admitted the gift of the shop in favour of the plaintiff by Ramcharan Lal in the suit for determination of the standard rent filed by the defendant in July, 1968 soon after the execution of the gift-deed? (ii) Whether in view of the fact that he had accepted the derivative title of the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises the defence was estopped from disputing the fact that the plaintiff was his landlord? 4. Shri J.P. Goyal, learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant has argued that allegation of defendant of gift-deed being fictitious and collusive document was clearly an afterthought because defendant himself on 6/4/1968 has admitted the correctness of the gift-deed in Suit No.105/1968 filed on 5/7/2008 wherein, standard rent of Rs. 35/- was fixed. 4. Shri J.P. Goyal, learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant has argued that allegation of defendant of gift-deed being fictitious and collusive document was clearly an afterthought because defendant himself on 6/4/1968 has admitted the correctness of the gift-deed in Suit No.105/1968 filed on 5/7/2008 wherein, standard rent of Rs. 35/- was fixed. Thereafter, the defendant also treated the appellant as landlord and paid rent by money order to the plaintiff-appellant in the suit for determination of provisional rent therein, which fact is evident from the order dated 5/7/1968 passed by the learned Munsiff Magistrate Bharatpur. Defendant is therefore estopped from questioning title of the plaintiff. Both the courts below in the circumstances therefore erred in law in holding that there was no denial of title whereas, in former Suit No.110/1968, which was filed by the plaintiff for ejectment and arrears of rent regarding the very much shop, defendant filed written-statement on 13/2/1969, which was exhibited in this suit as Ex.6 in which he categorically denied title of the plaintiff. That suit was rejected on technical ground of non-service of statutory service required by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Even then, the title of the plaintiff was denied by the defendant, which is clearly evident therefrom. The courts below have failed to consider the clear statement of PW2-Ramcharan Lal that he had gifted the shop in dispute to the plaintiff-appellant therefore there can be no question of gift-deed being fictitious. Learned District Judge in Para 18 of the judgment having held that gift-deed was rightly executed in favour of the plaintiff but in later part of the judgment illegally held that the gift-deed is fictitious. Findings recorded by him thus suffer from irreconcilable contradictions. Learned courts below failed to appreciate that plaintiff was grand-son of the sister of PW2-Ramcharan Lal, which fact was admitted by Ramcharan Lal before the court saying that he had brought up the plaintiff from childhood and gifted the shop to him out of love and affection so that he can start his own business. 5. At the outset, it must be noted that learned counsel for the appellant and respondent have made submissions on various other issues, which are not covered by substantial questions of law framed, which are therefore not being noticed and considered in detail by this court. 5. At the outset, it must be noted that learned counsel for the appellant and respondent have made submissions on various other issues, which are not covered by substantial questions of law framed, which are therefore not being noticed and considered in detail by this court. Suffice it to say, all those issues in my considered view only are factual issues and do not raise any question of law, muchless substantial question of law. Only such of the arguments of the appellant or the respondent require consideration, which substantial questions of law, as framed in this appeal, pertaining to the ground of denial and title. 6. Shri J.P. Goyal, learned senior counsel for the plaintiff-appellant in support of his argument has relied on the judgments of Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali : AIR 2010 SC 2679 , Dharam Singh v. Karnail Singh and others : (2008) 9 SCC 759 , Budhwanti and another v. Gulab Chand Prasad : AIR 1987 SC 1484 and of this Court in Bhagwan Das v. Brij Mohan and another : 2007 WLC (Raj.) UC 382. 7. Shri Rinesh Gupta, learned for the defendant-respondent has argued that there is no denial of title. What was denied by the appellant was factum of gift-deed and not title. A bonafide defence of this nature cannot be taken as a plea of denial of title and ground of eviction of the tenant. It would otherwise obstruct the truth from coming to the light. What actually was contended by the defendant was that gift-deed was prepared only with motive of creating a ground of bonafide necessity by the plaintiff and therefore it was prepared with a oblique motive and not on bonafide ground. Plaintiff in his statement as PW1 himself admitted that he had given a notice for enhancing the rent and when that was not done, he filed a suit. Learned counsel in support of his argument has relied on the judgments of Supreme Court in J.J. Lal Pvt.Ltd and others v. M.R. Murali and another : AIR 2002 SC 1061 , A.V.G.P. Chettiar & Sons and others v. T. Palanisamy Gounder : (2002) 5 SCC 337 & Smt. Pramod Kumari Bhatia v. Om Prakash Bhatia and others : AIR 1980 SC 446 . He also argued that concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below are not open to interfere in second appeal, which even otherwise do not raise any substantial question of law. Findings of fact are not open to interfere by this Court howsoever wrong or inexcusable they may be. In support of the argument, judgments of Supreme Court have been relied in Bholaram v. Ameerchand : (1981) 2 SCC 414 and Gurudev Kaur and others v. Kaki and others : (2007) 1 SCC 546 . 8. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions, perused the impugned judgment and record and the case law cited on the subject. 9. Although learned counsel for the parties have addressed the Court on all the other issues as said earlier, but I see no justification to extend the scope of examination beyond what is confined to two substantial questions of law framed by this Court while admitting this appeal. It does not mean to say that this Court cannot in appropriate case go beyond those questions and examine any other issue in its discretion, which may additionally arise in a given case but not formulated by it. In my view, other questions that are recorded in this matter with regard to default in making payment of rent and reasonable and bonafide necessity, are consequently based on findings of fact, which in my view, are not based on any misconstruction or misreading of any document so as to castigate them as perverse and justify interference in the scope of a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I would therefore proceed to examine the matter only on two substantial questions of law that were formulated at the time of admission of appeal, which pertain to grounds of denial of title urged by the plaintiff and not upheld by the courts below. 10. I would therefore proceed to examine the matter only on two substantial questions of law that were formulated at the time of admission of appeal, which pertain to grounds of denial of title urged by the plaintiff and not upheld by the courts below. 10. Plea that was taken by the defendant in the written-statement was that gift-deed dated 6/4/1968 was written by landlord Ramcharan Lal in favour of the plaintiff only with a view to creating a ground for bonafide personal necessity of the plaintiff-appellant whereas, gift-deed itself was not bonafide and that it was made with an ulterior motive in view of the fact that it was preceded by notice for enhancement of rent was served by the plaintiff on the defendant, which shows that the real intention was to pressurise the defendant to enhance the rate of rent and not to occupy the shop for his reasonable bonafide necessity. Otherwise, there was no reason why only this shop was gifted whereas landlord Ramcharan Lal had 18-19 more shops. Ramcharan Lal in his own statement stated that he was receiving the lowest rate of rent from the shop in dispute, which proves that real intention was to enhance rent. This plea of the defendant has not only been accepted by the trial court but also the first appellate court while upholding this finding of the trial court. In the suit filed for enhancement of rent, plaintiff-appellant herein had impleaded Ramcharan Lal as defendant and accepted himself as his tenant. Learned appellate court has described this to be a protected denial where he accepted him as owner of the premises in question and as his landlord but doubts execution of the gift-deed. 11. Question that arises for consideration is whether this could be treated denial of title in the meaning of Section 13(1) of the Rent Control Act, 2001 so as to justify on that basis a decree of eviction. None of the judgments cited by the counsel for the appellant is direct on this question however, judgment of the Supreme Court relied on by the counsel for respondent in J.J. Lal Pvt.Ltd supra does throw light on this argument. None of the judgments cited by the counsel for the appellant is direct on this question however, judgment of the Supreme Court relied on by the counsel for respondent in J.J. Lal Pvt.Ltd supra does throw light on this argument. Supreme Court in para 18 of the said judgment observed as under:- "What amounts to denial of title, and whether such denial is bona fide or not, are the questions to be determined in the facts and circumstances of each case. As a general rule the vulnerability of denial of title by the tenant shall be tested by reference to rule of estoppel contained in Section 116 of the Evidence Act which estoppes the tenant from denying the title of the landlord at the commencement of the tenancy and the estoppel continues to operate so long as the tenant does not surrender possession over the tenancy premises to the landlord who inducted him in possession. The tenant is not estopped from denying the title of the landlord if it comes to an end subsequent to the creation of the tenancy nor is he estopped from questioning the derivative title of a transferee of his landlord. However, the rule of estoppel contained in Section 116 of the Evidence Act is not exhaustive. To operate against the tenant as providing a ground for eviction under Section 10 of the Act a mere denial of the title of the landlord is not enough; such denial has to be 'not bona fide'. 'Not bona fide' would mean absence of good faith or non genuineness of the tenant's plea. If denial of title by the tenant is an outcome of good faith or honesty or sincerity, and is intended only to project the facts without any intention of causing any harm to the landlord it may not be 'not bona fide'. Therefore, to answer the question whether an assertion of denial of landlord's title by the tenant was bona fide or not, all the surrounding circumstances under which the assertion was made shall have to be seen. The counter highlights the factum and contents of notice by the Municipal Corporation served on the tenant, reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment and the reaction of tenants to the threat coupled with temptation held out by Corporation. The counter highlights the factum and contents of notice by the Municipal Corporation served on the tenant, reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment and the reaction of tenants to the threat coupled with temptation held out by Corporation. This notice by Municipal Corporation states the tenants having informed the Municipal Corporation that they were in possession of the premises; that they had agreed to pay to the Corporation the lease amount which was presumably in arrears on account of non-payment by their landlords (i.e. the respondents); that the Municipal Corporation threatened the tenancy premises being subjected to public auction if the arrears were not cleared. This notice is by reference to letter dated 26.3.1993 sent by the tenants to the Municipal Corporation which is not available on record. The landlords on whom lay the burden of proving availability of the ground of eviction took no steps for the production of this letter. The contents of the letter would have provided vital evidence relating to the nature and manner of denial of title by the tenants and the bona fides of denial could have been inferred. The High Court in its judgment has made a reference to "a series of attempts to deprive the landlords of their lawful rights" by tenants. The High Court appears to have taken into consideration some other documents referable to some other litigation between the parties which documents, in our opinion, could not have been taken into consideration unless tendered in evidence and brought on record consistently with procedural law governing trial of civil cases. There is yet another error committed by the High Court. So far as the additional counter and contents of the notice by Municipal Corporation to the tenants are concerned we do not think that a case of denial of title is made out. In any case it cannot be considered to be 'not bona fide'. The tenants have stated that the ultimate owners of the property were the Municipal Corporation and they had agreed their willingness to pay rent to the Municipal Corporation under threat of eviction solely for the purpose of protecting their own possession over the premises. In any case it cannot be considered to be 'not bona fide'. The tenants have stated that the ultimate owners of the property were the Municipal Corporation and they had agreed their willingness to pay rent to the Municipal Corporation under threat of eviction solely for the purpose of protecting their own possession over the premises. They have neither disowned the title of their own landlords at the inception of the tenancy nor have set-up any title in themselves nor attorned in favour of the Municipal Corporation by voluntarily entering into direct tenancy with the Municipal Corporation by-passing their own landlords. We are therefore clearly of the opinion that no case of eviction on the ground of "tenants' denial of landlords' title "not bona fide" is made out". 12. It would thus be evident from the above that a tenant is not precluded from questioning the derivative title of a transferee of his landlord but mere denial of title of the landlord in itself is not enough to furnish a ground of eviction of the tenant. If such denial is bonafide denial, which would otherwise mean that it has been raised in good faith, as a genuine, honest and sincere plea and is intended to only project facts without meaning and any harm to landlord, it can not be considered as denial of title. In order to qualify this litmus test, all the surrounding circumstances under which such assertion has been made have to be exhausted. Herein, defendant is not denying the title of landlord Ramcharan Lal. He only questions and doubts the gift-deed that is executed by Ramcharan Lal in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant thus does not deny title of his landlord from the very inception of his tenancy nor does he set up the title of himself. In A.V.G.P. Chettiar supra the Supreme Court while affirming its earlier judgment in J.J. Lal Pvt.Ltd supra held that bonafide denial of title cannot be a reason of decree to direct eviction on the ground of denial of title. 13. The Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. India Automobiles and Co. and others, (1990) 4 SCC 286 held that decision in proceedings for fixation of fair rent in respect of the tenanted premises whether at the instance of landlord or tenant under the Tamilnadu Rent Act constitutes only a prima-facie decision on the colleteral issue. 13. The Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. India Automobiles and Co. and others, (1990) 4 SCC 286 held that decision in proceedings for fixation of fair rent in respect of the tenanted premises whether at the instance of landlord or tenant under the Tamilnadu Rent Act constitutes only a prima-facie decision on the colleteral issue. Such a decision would not create a bar on the principle of res judicata on civil court's jurisdiction to examine and decide the question of title to the property in case of bona fide denial of the title. If the civil court finds existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties, it will have to pass a decree on the basis of fair rent fixed by the rent controller. However, jurisdiction of civil court to decide that question on merits is not ousted. It must therefore be held that in the scheme of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950 for the purpose of eviction under Section 13 also, the word "landlord" has got a different meaning than the word "owner or title holder" and therefore meaning of that word has to be understood in a limited sense. 14. The Supreme Court in E. Parshuraman v. Doraiswamy - (2006) 1 SCC 658 , held that in an eviction proceeding under Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, at the instance of landlord against tenant, a landlord need not be the owner of the premises, therefore, the question, whether or not the landlord had failed to inherit absolute title of the suit premises, was irrelevant. 15. The order passed by the court for determination of standard rent wherein Ramcharan Lal, was also a party cannot therefore debar the defendant in taking defence of denial of title. 16. An application has been filed in this second appeal by the plaintiff-appellant under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC to substantiate the argument of bonafide personal necessity. Therewith, he has filed sale-deed executed in favour of the wife of the appellant Smt. Triveni Devi. Another sale-deed has also been filed showing purchase of the shop in favour of his son Hari Shanker. Although such a plea was raised by the appellant before the courts below also but supporting documents were not placed before the trial court and the first appellate court. Now, he cannot be allowed to fill in the lacunae by bringing on record such documents. Although such a plea was raised by the appellant before the courts below also but supporting documents were not placed before the trial court and the first appellate court. Now, he cannot be allowed to fill in the lacunae by bringing on record such documents. In Smt. Pramod Kumari Bhatia supra the Supreme Court uphelding the judgment of High Court, which rejected the application filed under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC for production of additional evidence belatedly filed by the appellant therein observed that the High Court rejected the application, which was made after many years of the suit had been filed and after several years of filing appeal before the High Court. This appeal arises out of the suit filed in the year 1975 but this second appeal was filed in the year 1988 as far as back 2/7/1988 in which the application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC has been filed by the plaintiff-appellant after 11 years of the filing of second appeal before this Court on 16/3/2009 which is nothing but an attempt to fill in the lacunae, which cannot be allowed. The Supreme Court in Basayya I. Mathad v. Rudrayya S. Mathad & Ors., (2008) 3 SCC 120 held that parties to the lis are not entitled to produce additional evidence as a matter of course or routine. For the said purpose, they must satisfy the conditions stated in sub-clause (a) and (aa). The finding on the basis of documents produced at the time of arguments dehors Order 41, Rule 27 could not be sustained in the eye of law. 17. Similarly in K.R. Mohan Reddy v. Network Inc. represented through MD, (2007) 14 SCC 257 , it was held by the Supreme Court that the conditions precedent for application of clause (aa) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 Order 41 are different from that of clause (b). When the former is applied, it would be for the applicant to show that the ingredients or conditions precedent mentioned therein are satisfied. If, however, clause (b) to sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 Order 41 CPC is to be taken recourse to, the appellate court is bound to consider the entire evidence on record. When the former is applied, it would be for the applicant to show that the ingredients or conditions precedent mentioned therein are satisfied. If, however, clause (b) to sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 Order 41 CPC is to be taken recourse to, the appellate court is bound to consider the entire evidence on record. Relying on the earlier judgment of Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008 , their Lordships observed that though the appellate court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined under that provision, but the requirement of the said Court must be limited to those cases where the Court finds it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgement in the case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncement of judgment in a particular way. 18. The appeal was admitted only on two questions, which relate to ground of denial and title. No substantial question of law on the issue with regard to which documents are sought to be produced on record by recourse to Order 41, Rule 27 CPC was framed by this Court while admitting the appeal. Even otherwise therefor those documents cannot be considered. 19. The substantial questions of law reproduced at the beginning of this judgment thus stand answered accordingly. 20. In view of above discussion, I do not find any merit in this second appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******