ORDER By the Court.-For an offence that was committed on or about 27.1.1981. the petitioner was tried along with others and convicted by 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Ara, in Sessions Trial No. 11 of 1983 and sentenced to life imprisonment for an offence under Section 302 read with Sections 34/149 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act judgment dated 6th of July, 1985. Thus, the trial came to an and on 6th of July. 1985. The petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal before this Court being Cr. Appeal No. 183 of 1985. which was heard and dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court by judgment dated 13th September, 1991. The petitioner then preferred Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No. 2544-45/92 before the Supreme Court, which appeal was summarily dismissed on 5.1.1996 for want of proof of surrender. However, liberty was given that if proof of surrender is filed, even later on, the Apex Court would consider reviving the matter. 2. It appears that subsequent1y the petitioner was taken into custody only on 12.7.2007 whereafter he is serving out his sentence but has chosen not to move the Apex Court reviving his appeal against his conviction. 3. By this writ application, the petitioner wants to be given the benefit of the alleged fact that he was a minor, under the age of eighteen years, on the date when the offence was committed and that being so his sentence of life imprisonment must be quashed and he must be released from imprisonment. 4. Firstly in order to substantiate the fact that on the date of occurrence i.e. 27. 1.1981, the petitioner was a minor, petitioner has annexed as Annexure 1 a certificate issued by the Principal of Ramanand High School, Birampur, District Bhojpur, which certificate was obtained and granted on 8.9.1981 that is almost nine months after the date of occurrence. The certificate is to the effect that the petitioner stopped his study with effect from 1st June, 1981, when he was a student of Class X and his date of birth, as recorded in the admission register, is 15.5.1966. It appears that having been made an accused in the case aforesaid, the petitioner was taken into custody. He had moved before 3rd Additional Sessions Judge. Ara, for bail in Cr. Misc. No. 1533 of 1981, which was disposed of by order dated 16.12.1981 (Annexure 2). It appears that having been made an accused in the case aforesaid, the petitioner was taken into custody. He had moved before 3rd Additional Sessions Judge. Ara, for bail in Cr. Misc. No. 1533 of 1981, which was disposed of by order dated 16.12.1981 (Annexure 2). The attention of this Court is drawn to the observations of the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge while disposing of this bail matter with regard to the certificate as aforesaid, (Annexure 1) as also the age, as estimated by the Judge, to be 16-17 years and grant of bail to the petitioner on the ground of his minority. 5. The fact remains that even though the petitioner claims to be a minor, he never pressed this issue any further except for bail, as noticed above. In the trial Court nor before the appellate Court Le. Division Bench, of this Court nor before the Apex Court, the issue of minority was ever raised. It may be noticed here that the trial Court in its judgment, delivered on 6.7.1985, assessed his age at 23 years, which would make him above eighteen years of age on the date of offence. This is being raised, for the first time, in this Criminal writ petition after fifteen years of his Special Leave Petition being dismissed by the Supreme Court. The question is whether once the Apex Court has dismissed his appeal against conviction and sentence, at this belated stage. Can he be permitted to raise this plea of being a minor on the date of offence being committed? 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that when the offence was committed on 27.1.1981, the Bihar Children Act. 1970 was in force of which Section 2(d) defined a child-to mean a boy or a girl, who has not attained the age of eighteen years. In view of the certificate (Annexure 1) and the observation of the Judge, while granting bail (Annexure 2), he was less than eighteen years of age when the offence was said to have been committed and as such he was to get the protection under the said Act. Meaning thereby that he could not be tried along with others and the order that could be passed was as contemplated under Section 21 thereof. His trial and sentence stood vitiated and was wrongly not interfered by the Supreme Court. Meaning thereby that he could not be tried along with others and the order that could be passed was as contemplated under Section 21 thereof. His trial and sentence stood vitiated and was wrongly not interfered by the Supreme Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that the provisions of Bihar Children Act. 1982 would not apply inasmuch as the said Act which changed the definition of child materially reducing the age of boy to sixteen years inasmuch as the said Act came into force with effect from 15.12.1983 i.e. after the date of occurrence. 7. Here we think it appropriate to refer to the legislative history with regard to delinquency by child/juvenile to show that the plea of the petitioner is not sustainable. 8. We would first like to observe that once the Apex Court declined to interfere with the conviction and sentence, as awarded to the petitioner, it would not be appropriate for this Court to interfere because that would amount holding that the conviction and the sentence, as awarded by the trial Court affirmed by Division Bench of this Court and not interfered by the Apex Court, were all wrong. It is not open for this Court to hold so. The remedy to the petitioner lay in moving the Apex Court itself, specially when the Apex Court had given leave to the petitioner in this regard while disposing the Special Leave Petition. Unfortunately, the petitioner was advised to pursue this Court only. 9. The earliest provisions dealing with juvenile are contained in Sections 82 and 83 of the Indian Penal Code, which are quoted hereunder "82. Act of a child under seven years of age. - Nothing is an offence. which is done by a child under seven years of age, 83. Act of a child above seven and under twelve of immature understandingd.-Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and under twelve, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion." 10. Act of a child above seven and under twelve of immature understandingd.-Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and under twelve, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion." 10. From the aforesaid it would be seen that Section 82 of the Indian Penal Code gives complete immunity from being charged of an offence to a person, who is under seven years of age, he being a child, but in respect of a person, who is not a child i.e. above seven years but under twelve years. The immunity is conditional upon maturity and understanding. If a person is above twelve years then he enjoys no immunity. 11. In 1960, the Parliament enacted The Children Act, 1960. This Act defines child to mean a boy, who has not attained the age of sixteen years and a girl, who has not attained the age of eighteen years but this Act by virtue of Section 1(2) extended only to the Union Territory and was thus not applicable to the State of Bihar, In the State of Bihar. Bihar Children Act, 970 was enacted and this defined a child- to mean a boy or a girl, who had not attained the age of eighteen years by virtue of Section 2(d) thereof. Apparently, it is because of this defined, the petitioner claims that he having been estimated to be less than eighteen years when the offence was said to have been committed, he would be entitled to the benefit of this Legislature. It would be noted that the petitioner was not entitled to any relief under Indian Penal Code or under Central Children Act, 1960 but claims benefits under this Bihar Children Act, 1970. The petitioner has sought to avoid application of the Bihar Children Act, 1982, which allegedly came after the date of occurrence specially in view of the age of boy being reduced from eighteen to sixteen years to qualify as a child and the protection under the Act. 12. In our view, the stand the learned counsel for the petitioner is misconceived statutorily. The petitioner would not be entitled to protection under Bihar Children Act, 1970 because the said Act was repealed by Bihar Children Ordinance, 1973, which Ordinance was re-plumgated one after another in series. 12. In our view, the stand the learned counsel for the petitioner is misconceived statutorily. The petitioner would not be entitled to protection under Bihar Children Act, 1970 because the said Act was repealed by Bihar Children Ordinance, 1973, which Ordinance was re-plumgated one after another in series. The last being the Bihar Children Ordinance, 1982, which was then repealed and replaced by Bihar Children Act, 1982. The material provisions of the Bihar Children Ordinance, 1973 are the same as the Bihar Children Act, 1982. This Act and the predecessor Ordinances changed the definition of a child. Section 2(d) of Ordinance of 1973 repealing the said Bihar Children Act, 1970 reduced the age of a boy to qualify as a child to sixteen years, thus, depriving the petitioner of the privilege of being a child on the date when the occurrence took place as in view of his own admission in the certificate (Annexure 1), though obtained after the date of occurrence, his age would be more than sixteen years. Thus, seen he would not get any benefit from either the Bihar Children Act. 1970 or the Bihar Children Ordinance, 1973 and successive Ordinances thereafter till the Bihar Children Act, 1982. 13. This position radically changed with the coming in force of the Juvenile Justice Act. 1986, which was enforced with effect from 2.10.1987, here juvenile was defined by Section 2(h) to mean a boy, who had not attained the age of sixteen years. It would thus be seen that with effect from 13.8.1987, a boy would be deemed to be a juvenile and entitled to certain immunity if he was of age under-sixteen years. In this Act there is Section 26. It provides for pending cases. Section 26 of the Act reads as follows- "26. It would thus be seen that with effect from 13.8.1987, a boy would be deemed to be a juvenile and entitled to certain immunity if he was of age under-sixteen years. In this Act there is Section 26. It provides for pending cases. Section 26 of the Act reads as follows- "26. Special provision in respect of pending cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any Court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that Court as if this Act had not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile- has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Juvenile Court which shall pass orders in respect of the juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that the juvenile has committed the offence." 14. A reading of Section 26 of, the Act of 1986 would show that if any proceeding was pending, that means if an offence was alleged to have been - committed prior to 1986 Act but the proceedings were pending and the plea of juvenile was raised, as per the Act of 1986, then the Court had to record its finding and pass orders in accordance with the provisions of Act of 1986 instead of sentencing. A bare reading of the said section would show that it applies to the pending cases. Admittedly, in the case of the petitioner, the petitioner had already been found guilty and sentenced for life imprisonment long before this Act came into force. He would thus not get the benefit of Section 26 of the said Act. 15. We may also notice one another fact. The petitioner has been ad-judged to be admittedly more than sixteen years of age and offence was committed in 1981. At that time he had benefit only of the Indian Penal Code, which, as noticed above, gave no immunity to a person under above twelve years of age. 1986 Act also gave immunity to a person not above sixteen• years of age, as noted above. Thus, the petitioner did not get any immunity. 16. At that time he had benefit only of the Indian Penal Code, which, as noticed above, gave no immunity to a person under above twelve years of age. 1986 Act also gave immunity to a person not above sixteen• years of age, as noted above. Thus, the petitioner did not get any immunity. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner then referred to Juvenile Justice (Care and protection of Children) Act. 2000. He referred Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice Act. 2000 which reads as follows "2(k) "Juvenile" or "child" means a person who has not completed eighteenth year of age." 17. He submits that in view of provisions of this Act, which came in the year - 2000 he was a juvenile in conflict with law when the offence was committed in 1981. He then refers to Section 20 of this Act, which is quoted hereinafter "20. Special Provision in respect of pending cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act. all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any Court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that Court as if this Act had not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that the juvenile has committed the offence: Provided that the Board may, for any adequate and special reason to be mentioned in the order, review the case and pass appropriate order in the interest of such juvenile." 18. A reference to Section 20 of 2000 Act would show that it is in two parts. The first part states that pending proceeding would be continued as if this 2000 Act had not came in force but the sentence was to be passed after this Act came into force and a person is found to be juvenile when the offence was committed, instead of passing of sentence, order in terms of the Act would be passed. In our considered view, for the reasons as indicated earlier in regard to non applicability of 1986 Act. In our considered view, for the reasons as indicated earlier in regard to non applicability of 1986 Act. This Act would also not apply because we are not dealing with the pending cases. The trial of the petitioner ended way back in 1985 when he was convicted and sentenced. The petitioner's special leave was dismissed by the Apex Court on 5.1.1996. Long before the 2000 Act came into force. Section 20 also thus does not apply. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner then made a desparate argument based on Section 7-A of 2000 Act, which is quoted hereunder- "7 -A. Procedure to be followed when• claim of juvenility is raised before any Court.-(l) Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised before any Court or a Court is of the opinion that an accused person was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence. The Court shall make an inquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so as to determine the age of such person, and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be-Provided. That a claim of juvenility may be raised before any Court and it shall be recognized at any stage. Even after final disposal of the case and such claim shall be determined in terms of the provisions contained in this Act and the rules made thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of this Act. (2) If the Court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence under sub-section (1), it shall forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate order and the sentence, if any, passed by a Court shall be deemed to have no effect." 20. He submits that in view of the proviso to Section 7-A of the said Act he could raise the plea of juvenility "before any Court" at any stage, even after disposal of the case has to be read harmoniously as a scheme and it (sic). In other words, he could raise the plea even after fifteen years of the order of the Apex Court not interfering with his conviction and sentence. In other words, he could raise the plea even after fifteen years of the order of the Apex Court not interfering with his conviction and sentence. First we may point out this provision i.e. Section 7-A was introduced in 2000 Act with effect from 22nd of August. 2006 i.e. ten years after the Apex Court dismissed the special leave petition of the petitioner. In our view, the expression "before any Court", "at any stage" and "even after disposal of the case" has to be read harmoniously as a scheme and it can only mean before any Court of competent jurisdiction in respect of the offences at any stage in the proceeding related to trial of the offence and even after the final disposal of the case i.e. after the order of conviction is passed or appeal is heard but by the same Court and not any other independent Court or in any collateral independent proceeding not being continuation of the original case. To us giving any other meaning would lead to absurdity, as in the present case. This Court surely cannot say that the order of the Apex Court was wrong. The plea has to be taken in the proceeding related to the trial or appeal there from or before the Court, which finally disposed of the case emanating from the trial and not by a Court in any collateral independent proceeding like these proceedings. 21. In fairness of learned counsel for the petitioner we must notice that he has cited decisions of the Apex Court to show that the Apex Court has entertained the plea at later stages as well. Suffice to say that all those cases were either appeals pending and issues were raised for the first time in pending appeals or before the Court, which finally determined the appeal but not a single case could be cited where independent of the appellate proceeding, issue was raised after final decision before a Subordinate Court and entertained. 22. Apparently even though the petitioner had raised the plea of juvenility at the stage of bail but realizing the legal position, as aforesaid, did not pursue this matter any further either before the trial Court or before this Court in appeal or before the Apex Court as it was futile. 23. Thus, as found by us, the offence was committed on 29.1.1981. 23. Thus, as found by us, the offence was committed on 29.1.1981. when the Bihar Children Ordinance, 1980 was in force which is the same as Bihar Children Act, 1982 conferring no benefit on the petitioner who was, on his own showing above sixteen years of age then and further the sentencing and the appellate proceedings up to the Apex Court having ended in 1996 before the Act of 2000 came into force enhancing the age to eighteen years, the petitioner cannot get benefit of minority even by virtue of Section 7 -A there of as inserted in the year 2006. 24. Thus, the writ petition merits no consideration and is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed as such. Petition dismissed,