JUDGMENT 1. The three petitioners and the first nine opposite parties are the plaintiffs in Title Suit No. 1181 of 2010, pending on the file of the learned Judge, 6th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta. The opposite parties 10 & 11 are defendants 1 & 2 respectively therein. 2. It is the plaint case that the name of the defendant no.1 has changed and it is presently known as the defendant no.2; that the plaintiffs have acquired the entirety of premises no.2 Russel Street, Kolkata 700071 (hereafter the said premises) by 12 (twelve) registered deeds of conveyance dated September 21 & 23, 1996; that the income earned from the said premises is not sufficient for maintenance of the building comprised therein or for payment of Corporation taxes; that they intended to construct a new building on the said premises; that the defendant no.1 is a tenant in respect of a shop-room (shop no. 6) in the said premises and apart from defaulting in making payment of rent since October, 1996 had sublet, transferred, assigned and/or parted with possession of the portion of the suit premises in its occupation without the written permission of the landlords; and thereby, the defendant no.1 had made itself liable to be evicted. Accordingly, the plaintiffs prayed for a decree declaring that the defendant no.1 was the monthly tenant in respect of the suit shop-room, for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from transferring and/or assigning and/or parting with possession of the suit shop-room and also from transferring any shares of the defendant no.1 to any third party or parties, and other relief. 3. The plaintiffs had filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. The trial Court passed an order on March 18, 2010 restraining the defendants from transferring, assigning and/or parting with possession of the suit shop-room to any third party till April 19, 2010. The said order was extended from time to time and ultimately has been made absolute by an order dated May 16, 2011. 4. The trial Court passed an order on March 18, 2010 restraining the defendants from transferring, assigning and/or parting with possession of the suit shop-room to any third party till April 19, 2010. The said order was extended from time to time and ultimately has been made absolute by an order dated May 16, 2011. 4. On an unspecified day in August, 2011, an application under Section 151 of the Code was filed by the plaintiffs seeking police help for proper implementation of the order of injunction dated March 18, 2010, since made absolute on May 16, 2011, and for ensuring that possession of the suit shop-room is not transferred and/or parted with by the defendants to any third party and also from changing the nature and character thereof. It was alleged therein that the defendants in the suit, intending to induct Gangaur Dry Fruits (hereafter Gangaur) in the suit shop-room, had printed and distributed invitation cards amongst their guests on the occasion of inauguration, scheduled on Janmashtami, i.e. August 22, 2011. Copy of one such invitation card was annexed to the application for consideration of the trial Court. 5. The application was heard on contest by the trial Court and disposed of by an order dated August 20, 2011, which is impugned in this revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution. The learned Judge was of the view that whether or not the defendant no.2 is subletting or transferring any portion of the suit shop-room to Gangaur cannot be ascertained at this stage unless proper evidence was taken and directed the parties to adhere to the order dated March 18, 2010, failing which law would take its own course. 6. I have heard Mr. Kapoor and Mr. Mitra, learned senior counsel representing the petitioners and the opposite parties 10 & 11, who have argued at length in support of the respective claims of the parties. 7. It is settled law that power under Article 227 has to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases. It is in rare cases where the subordinate Court acts beyond the bounds of its authority, or passes a perverse order, or acts in flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law and justice thereby causing miscarriage of justice, that interference by the High Court may be justified. It is in rare cases where the subordinate Court acts beyond the bounds of its authority, or passes a perverse order, or acts in flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law and justice thereby causing miscarriage of justice, that interference by the High Court may be justified. The question that requires an answer on this revisional application is whether the order impugned warrants to be interdicted on any of the available grounds for judicial review or not. 8. No authority is required to be referred to for the proposition that Section 151 of the Code is not to be resorted to when the Code provides a remedy for the aggrieved party. An order of injunction, if not complied with or obeyed by a party bound by such order, may be executed in terms of Section 36 of the Code read with Order 21 Rule 32 thereof. Also, the party complaining of violation or disobedience may pursue the remedy under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code. True it is, an aggrieved party may not have immediate relief by pursuing the remedy of execution. It is equally true that although Order 39 Rule 2A deals with the subject of imposition of penalty on the party guilty of violation or disobedience of an order of Court, it does not provide any relief to the party in whose favour the Court has passed the order. It is, therefore, recognized that in appropriate cases where (i) facts are not in dispute, and (ii) the Court is satisfied that a party bound by an order of injunction has violated and/or disobeyed the same, (iii) thereby causing grave and serious injury to his adversary, and (iv) ends of justice demand the Court’s interference for granting immediate relief to the party suffering the injury, that recourse to Section 151 of the Code may be had for setting things right. 9. Ordinarily, a party to the suit suffering an order of injunction against which no appeal has been preferred or review has not been applied for ought not to complain if the Court directs the police to render help for ensuring implementation of such order. 9. Ordinarily, a party to the suit suffering an order of injunction against which no appeal has been preferred or review has not been applied for ought not to complain if the Court directs the police to render help for ensuring implementation of such order. However, an order for police help cannot be made on the mere asking of a party but the inherent power must be exercised with care, caution and circumspection after reaching a satisfaction that the party urging the Court to come to his aid has, without any iota of doubt, been able to establish attempted or actual violation of/disobedience to an order of Court. 10. The oral defence of the opposite parties 10 & 11 before the trial Court was that there would be no parting of possession of the suit shop-room in favour of Gangaur and that they would continue to enjoy exclusive possession thereof as its franchisee and sell its products. Whether or not the stand of the opposite parties 10 & 11 is correct is a disputed question of fact, which could not have been decided in course of consideration of an application under Section 151 of the Code. For arriving at a definite conclusion on the rival claims, it would have been obligatory for the trial Court to allow the parties to lead evidence. That could be led, if an application for execution of the order were filed. Without appreciation of the evidence that the parties could lead, it seems to be impossible for the trial Court to return a specific finding that the opposite parties 10 & 11 indeed had indulged in acts of commission by parting with possession of the suit shop-room to Gangaur, amounting to violation of and/or disobedience to the order of injunction. The trial Court, justifiably, did not record any specific finding of violation and/or disobedience. A party to the lis ought not to suffer an order merely on the allegation made by the party in the absence of proof of the facts alleged. Circumstances justifying exercise of inherent power were not present and the learned judge was right in the exercise of his jurisdiction. Interference under Article 227 of the Constitution, therefore, is not warranted. 11. The revisional application stands dismissed, without order for costs. Photostat certified copy of this judgment and order may be furnished to the applicant at an early date.