Hon'ble MAHESHWARI, J.—By way of this writ petition, the plaintiffs-petitioners seek to question the order dated 19.7.2011 as passed by the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer (`the Board') in Revision Petition No. TA/1698/2011/Jodhpur whereby the Board has dismissed the revision petition and in consequence, has affirmed the order dated 17.3.2011 as passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jodhpur (`the RAA') in Appeal No. 8/2011. The RAA, by the said order dated 17.3.2011 had dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners and in consequence, affirmed the order dated 17.2.2011 as passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Jodhpur (`the SDO') in Misc. Application No. 8/2011. 2. By the said order dated 17.2.2011, the learned SDO, while dealing with the revenue suit for partition and injunction as filed by the present petitioners against the respondent No. 3, considered the prayer for temporary injunction per Section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (`the Act of 1955') read with Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 CPC and declined the prayer essentially with the observations that the disputed Aaraji had been recorded in the revenue records separately in relation to the parties with separate accounts; i.e., the land in relation to the petitioners was recorded as Khasra No. 1036/740, whereas that in relation to the respondent No. 3 was recorded as Khasra No. 1840/1036. The learned SDO observed. The learned SDO observed. ^^geus izLrqr izkFkZuk i=] tokc izkFkZuk i=] jktLo fjdkWMZ ,oa mHk; i{k fo}ku vf/koDrk }kjk dh x;h cgl ,oa cgl ds nkSjku fn;s x;s rdksZ rFkk rdksZa ds leFkZu esa vizkFkhZ fo}ku vf/koDrk }kjk izLrqr U;k; fu.kZ;ksa dks lexz :i ls v/;;u dj fopkj fd;k x;kA fooknxzLr vkjkth tks izkFkZuk i= ds lkFk izLrqr dh x;h gS] mDr fooknxzLr vkjkth orZeku esa i{kdkjksa ds e/; jktLo fjdkMZ esa vyx vyx ntZ gS rFkk vyx vyx [kkrksa esa vadu gSaA vizkFkhZ us mDr Hkwfe dks vd`f"k Hkwfe esa ifjorZu gsrq 'kqYd vkfn Hkh tek djok pqdk gSA vizkFkhZ us mDr Hkwfe ij vukt Hk.Mkj ds fy, Hk.Mkj d{k dk fuekZ.k djok jgs gS] tks mlds LokfeRo dh gSA izkFkhZ dh Hkwfe vyx gSA izkFkhZ ds uke [kljk uEcj 1036@740 [kkrsnkjh esa ntZ gS tcfd vizkFkhZ ds uke [kljk uEcj 1840@1036 [kkrsnkjh esa uke ntZ gSA bl izdkj izkFkhZ ,oa vizkFkhZ ds [kkrsnkjh ds [ksr vyx vyx gSaA blfy, izkFkhZ ;g lkfcr ugha dj ik;k gS fd mlds [kkrsnkjh [ksr esa fdlh izdkj ls gLr{ksi dj jgs gSaA orZeku izdj.k esa u rks izkFkhZ ds i{k esa lqfo/kk dk larqyu gS] u gh izFke n`"V;k ekeyk izkFkhZ ds i{k esa curk gS rFkk u gh izkFkhZ dks viwf.kZ; {kfr gksus dk vans'kk gSaA vr% izkFkhZ dk izkFkZuk i= [kkfjt fd;k tkrk gSaA** 3. Aggrieved by the order aforesaid the plaintiffs-petitioners preferred an appeal that was considered and decided by the RAA by the order dated 17.3.2011. Aggrieved by the order aforesaid the plaintiffs-petitioners preferred an appeal that was considered and decided by the RAA by the order dated 17.3.2011. The learned RAA again dealt with the plea of the petitioners that they were standing in the capacity of the co-tenants and found them not entitled to any injunction with the following observations:- ^^tkfgj gS fd jktLo fjdkWMZ ds vuqlkj vihyk.V~l ,oa jsLiks- la[;k ,d dks izFke n`"V;k lg[kkrsnkj ugha ekuk tk ldrk gSA tc vihyk.V~l i`Fkd :i ls [kljk la[;k 1036@740 ds [kkrsnkj ntZ gS ,oa jsLiks- la[;k ,d vyx [kljk la[;k 1842@1036 dk [kkrsnkj ntZ gS vkSj bl ekeys esa fdlh Hkh Lrj ij vihyk.V~l }kjk jsLiks- la[;k ,d dh vksj ls fuekZ.k dk;Z [kljk la[;k 1842@1036 ls brj [kljk la[;k 1036@740 ;k vU; fdlh [kljk dh Hkwfe ij fd;s tkus ckcr dksbZ vk{ksi ugha fy;k x;k gS rks ,slh fLFkfr esa jsLiks- la[;k ,d dks mldh [kkrsnkjh ds [kljk la[;k 1842@1036 ds mi;ksx ,oa miHkksx ckcr vLFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk ls ikcUn fd;k tkuk mfpr izrhr ugha gksrk gSA ;|fi miyC/k jktLo fjdkWMZ ds vk/kkj ij vihyk.V~l ,oa jsLiks- la[;k ,d izFke n`"V;k lg[kkrsnkj izrhr ugha gksrs gSa] blds mijkUr Hkh ;fn rdZ ds fy, bUgsa lg[kkrsnkj eku Hkh fy;k tkos rks Hkh lkekU;r% ,d lg[kkrsnkj vU; lg [kkrsnkj ds f[kykQ vLFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk izkIr djus dk eq'rgd ugha gS] tSlk fd 1982 vkjvkjMh 365 esa izfrikfnr fd;k x;k gSA blds vfrfjDr ;g Hkh mYys[kuh; gS fd 1974 vkjvkjMh 446 esa izfrikfnr erkuqlkj U;k;ky; dk Lofoosdh; vkns'k gksrk gSA mijksDr leLr foospu ds vk/kkj ij vnkyr gktk dh jk; esa v/khuLFk U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vihyk/khu vkns'k fnukad 17-2-2001 U;k;ksfpr ,oa fof/klEer% ik;k tkrk gSA vr% vihy vihyk.V Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; ugha gksus ls rnuqlkj [kkfjt dh tkrh gS vkSj v/khuLFk U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vihyk/khu vkns'k fnukad 17-2-2011 cgky j[kk tkrk gSaA** 4. The petitioners took the matter yet further in revision petition before the Board. The Board, however, again found that the plaintiffs-petitioners and the defendant-respondent had purchased separate pieces of land that were recorded in the revenue record separately. The petitioners took the matter yet further in revision petition before the Board. The Board, however, again found that the plaintiffs-petitioners and the defendant-respondent had purchased separate pieces of land that were recorded in the revenue record separately. The Board, of course, observed that the question as to whether partition had taken place or not would be a matter of consideration in the suit but, as at present, when there were separate Khasra numbers assigned to the separate land holdings of the parties, neither any prima facie case was made out in favour of the petitioners nor the aspects of balance of convenience and irreparable injury were in their favour. The Board, thus, proceeded to dismiss the revision petition with the following observations:- ^^i=koyh ds voyksdu ls ;g Li"V gS fd izkFkhZx.k us Jherh xhrknsoh ,oa lksuk nsoh dh [kkrsnkjh dh vkjkth [kljk uEcj 1036@740 dks [kjhnk gSA vizkFkhZ la[;k 1 ds [kkrsnkjh dh vkjkth [kljk uEcj 1842@1036 gSA nksuksa v/khuLFk U;k;ky;ksa us ;g ekurs gq, nksuksa i{kdkjksa ds [kljk uEcj vyx vyx gSa] leorhZ fu.kZ; ikfjr djrs gq, izkFkhZx.k dk izFke n`"V;k izdj.k ugha ekuk gSA i=koyh ds voyksdu ls ;g Hkh izFke n`"V;k Li"V gS fd fookfnr Hkwfe pSukjke dh Fkh ,oa pSukjke 4 ch?kk 1 fcLok Hkwfe xhrknsoh o lksuk nsoh us [kjhnh rFkk 3 ch?kk 19 fcLok Hkwfe vizkFkhZ la[;k 1 egkohj tSu us [kjhnhA foØ; ds vk/kkj ij jktLo vfHkys[k esa nksuksa Øsrkvksa ds [kljk uEcj vyx vyx Mkys x;s gSa ,oa izkFkhZx.k us xhrknsoh o lksuk nsoh dh vkjkth [kljk uEcj 1036@740 dks tfj;s cD'kh'k izkIr fd;k gSA gkykafd fookfnr Hkwfe dk fof/kor foHkktu gqvk gS vFkok ugha vkfn iz'uksa dk fuLrkj.k lk{; lcwrksa ls ewyokn esa gksuk gSA orZeku esa ;g Li"V gS fd izkFkhZx.k ds uke vyx [kljk uEcj gS ,oa vizkFkhZ la[;k 1 ds uke vyx [kljk uEcj gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa nksuksa v/khuLFk U;k;ky;ksa us izkFkhZx.k dk izFke n`"V;k izdj.k] lqfo/kk dk lUrqyu ,oa viwoZuh; {kfr ugha ekurs gq, fu.kZ; ikfjr djus esa fdlh izdkj dh voS/kkfudrk vFkok vfu;ferrk ugha dh gSA ftlls ;g fuxjkuh [kkfjt fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSaA** 5. Seeking to assail the orders aforesaid, it has strenuously been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the fundamental fact remains that the respondent No. 3 and so also the predecessors of the petitioners purchased the land as comprised in Khara No. 1036/740 that was originally recorded in the name of Chaina Ram.It is clarified that the predecessors of the petitioners purchased the land from Chaina Ram and, thereafter, they executed a gift deed in favour of the petitioners. It is submitted that the land has been comprised in a joint Khata and neither any dimension has been spelt out in any of the sale deeds nor any division has taken place at the site. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the petitioners as well the respondent became co-sharers of the land of Khara No. 1036/740. It is submitted that once the parties are standing in the capacity of co-sharers, the respondent No. 3, being one of the co-sharers, is not entitled to alter the character of the property in question or to carry out any construction thereat without the consent of the petitioners and without adhering to the requirements of law including those of seeking specific orders for land use conversion which, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, have never been obtained by the respondent. The learned counsel for the petitioners has particularly referred to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gangubai Bablya Chaudhary & Ors. vs. Sitaram Bhalchandra Sukhtankar & Ors. : (1983) 4 SCC 31 and Dorab Cawasji Warden vs. Coomi Sorab Warden: AIR 1990 SC 867 . The learned counsel for the petitioners has also referred to the decisions of this Court in Ram Singh & Ors. vs. Amra & Ors. : 1996 AIHC 3062 and Vinay Kumar vs. Devi Lal & Ors.: 2006(2) RRT 1369; and the decision of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Awadh Narain vs. IVth Addl. District Judge, Jaunpur & Ors.: 2002(1) Civil Court Cases 347 (Allahabad). It is submitted that the revenue authorities have proceeded on entirely irrelevant considerations and on the misplaced notion as if the petitioners and the respondent No. 3 are having separate pieces of land whereas the fact remains that they are the co-sharers in the same land comprised in Khasra No. 1036/740. It is submitted that the revenue authorities have proceeded on entirely irrelevant considerations and on the misplaced notion as if the petitioners and the respondent No. 3 are having separate pieces of land whereas the fact remains that they are the co-sharers in the same land comprised in Khasra No. 1036/740. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that specific method has been provided for division of holdings per Section 53 of the Act of 1955 and no such proceedings having taken place, this property remains a joint one; and the Board too has observed that the question of division is yet to be gone into. According to the learned counsel, when the land in question remains joint and the issue of division is yet to be adjudicated, on the basic principles as enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions above referred, the respondent No. 3 ought to be restrained from carrying out any construction during the pendency of the suit for preservation of the property. 6. Having given a thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, this Court is unable to find any reason to consider interference in the writ jurisdiction in this matter. 7. On the prayer for interim injunction during the pendency of the suit, the three revenue authorities have concurrently found no case for grant of any such injunction essentially with the findings that the holdings of the petitioners and those of the respondent No. 3 are recorded separately in the revenue records and prima facie, the petitioners have failed to show if the respondent No. 3 was in any manner interfering with the land belonging to them. The submissions that the division is yet to take place and the Board itself has observed in its order that the question of partition was yet to be gone into, when read in the context of other observations and record, clear it is that the Board has only commented on the aspects of the question involved in the suit but at the same time, the Board has also pointed out that no prima facie case exists in favour of the petitioners. 8. Upon examination of the Jamabandi (Annex. 8. Upon examination of the Jamabandi (Annex. 1), this Court finds justified the observations as made by the revenue authorities that the holdings of the petitioners and those of the respondent No. 3 are recorded separately in the revenue records. In the said Jamabandi, the entries in relation to the land in question are to the following effect.:- "1036/740 21.12 ckjkuh {T 21.12 ukek- la- 1200 cspku 23-11-2005 psukjke fi- Nojjke ds LFkku ij 1- egkohj fi- izdk'kpUn tkfr tSu fu- elqfj;k iqfyl pkSdh ds ikl [k-ua jdck yxku 1842@1036 3-19 0-63 2- xhrknsoh iRuh f[k;kjke nsoklh fu- tqisyky rg- lkstrflVh lksuh iRuh >wejyky jkBh ekgs'ojh [k-ua jdck yxku 1036@740 4-01 0-65 9. It is but apparent that out of the land of Khasra No. 1036/740, 3 bighas and 19 biswas of land as comprised in Khasra No. 1842/1036 has been recorded in the name of respondent No. 3 with lagan of 9.63 whereas 4 bighas and 1 biswa of land as comprised in Khasra No. 1036/740 has been recorded in the name of the alleged predecessors of the petitioners with lagan 0.65. The copies of the sale deeds, placed on record as Annexures-2 and 3, also make it clear that such sale deeds were executed and registered on the same date, i.e. 13.10.2005 but then, in the sale deed Annexure-2 the vendor Chaina Ram specifically sold 4 bighas and 1 biswas of land of Khasra No. 1036/740 to the respondent No. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that such recitals in the sale deeds are only in regard to the area of the land but cannot be taken to be specifying a particular piece of land with boundaries so as to come to the conclusion that separate parcels of land were sold by the two different sale deeds; and contended that the purchasers became coshares by virtue of the said sale deeds. The submissions have their short-comings because in the sale deeds executed on the same date, the vendor specifically stated selling 4 bighas and 1 biswas of land to the predecessors of the petitioners and 3 bighas and 19 biswas of the land to the respondent No. 3. The submissions have their short-comings because in the sale deeds executed on the same date, the vendor specifically stated selling 4 bighas and 1 biswas of land to the predecessors of the petitioners and 3 bighas and 19 biswas of the land to the respondent No. 3. It would be a matter, of course, for the consideration in the suit as to whether in fact a division has taken place or not and the Board has rightly observed in that regard but then, in the existing position of the record where separate pieces of land have been sold and then, have been recognized in the revenue record as such with different identification numbers and with different lagan, the learned revenue authorities cannot be said to have committed any jurisdictional error in not finding prima facie case in favour of the petitioners. 10. There is no and there cannot be any quarrel on the principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gangubai (supra) that grant or refusal is considered on the touch-stone of the prejudice likely to be caused but then, in the present case, in the first place, no prima facie case is found in favour of the petitioners. Then, during the course of submissions, the questions were precisely posed to the learned counsel for the petitioners if the respondent No. 3 was in any manner raising construction beyond 3 bighas and 19 biswas of land or intruding into 4 bighas 1 biswa of land said to be belonging to the petitioner to which, the learned counsel submitted that raising any construction on the land in question would be interfering with the rights of the co-sharers and with the joint property. The position again gets deflected to the very fundamental aspect that jointness as alleged by the petitioners is in serious doubt and the existing record is to the contrary. In the given set of facts, no case for grant of temporary injunction is made out on the basis of the principles in Gangubai (supra). 11. The decision in Dorab Gaswasji Warden's case (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case. Therein, the issues related to the house property originally purchased by the father and mother of the plaintiff where construction had been raised subsequent to the purchase. 11. The decision in Dorab Gaswasji Warden's case (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case. Therein, the issues related to the house property originally purchased by the father and mother of the plaintiff where construction had been raised subsequent to the purchase. After the death of the mother of the plaintiff, he and his father came to own the property as surviving joint tenants. Under an agreement, they agreed to hold the property as tenants in common, each having equal undivided share therein so that each can dispose of his undivided share. Subsequently, the plaintiff's father transferred his undivided share in favour of another son. Thus, the plaintiff and his brother came to hold equal undivided 1/2 share each as tenants in common. The plaintiff's brother died and his widow and two minor sons sold their undivided 1/2 share; and the plaintiff filed the suit against the vendors under Section 44 of the Transfer Property Act on the ground that the suit property was a dwelling house belonging to the undivided family. In the given fact situation and the position of record, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in the absence of document evidencing partition of the suit house by metes and bounds and on the documentary evidence showing that the property was held by the plaintiff and his brother in equal undivided shares, there was a prima facie case about dwelling house belong to a undivided family; and the transfer was prima facie within the mischief of second paragraph of Section 44. The other factual aspects of the matter were also, considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and in the totality of the circumstances, the Hon'ble Court found the case fit for granting requisite injunction. In the first place the present one is a matter relating to the revenue paying land and not a dwelling house. In any case, as observed above, the existing record contradicts the suggestions about jointness. 12. The decision in Ram Singh's (supra) again related to the dispute in regard to the land jointly held by the parties. As noticed herein, in the given status of the record, it is difficult to accept as at present that the petitioners stand in the capacity of co-sharers. This decision is also of no help to the petitioners. 13. 12. The decision in Ram Singh's (supra) again related to the dispute in regard to the land jointly held by the parties. As noticed herein, in the given status of the record, it is difficult to accept as at present that the petitioners stand in the capacity of co-sharers. This decision is also of no help to the petitioners. 13. In Vinay Kumar's case (supra), there had been a dispute about the boundaries of the plots claimed by the two parties; and that was found to be a bona fide dispute calling for a status-quo order. The situation herein, as noticed above, remains entirely different as there had been different sale deeds made in relation to the different parcels of land; and in the record of rights, separate Khasra numbers with separate lagans have been mentioned. 14. In regard to the decision in Awadh Narain's case (supra), again the position remains the same. The dispute therein had been regarding a joint property and prima facie it was found that both the parties were co-sharers with partition having not taken place. As observed in this case, the very fundamental facts are different and prima facie the claim of the petitioners as alleged co-sharers has not been accepted. 15. In view of what has been discussed above, this Court is unable to find any jurisdictional error in the orders impugned so as to consider interference in the writ jurisdiction and, therefore, this writ petition is required to be dismissed. 16. However, in the interest of justice, it is made clear that the observations, whether made by this Court in this order or by the learned subordinate revenue authorities in the orders impugned, shall remain confined for the purpose of considering grant or refusal of temporary injunction only and shall not otherwise have bearing on the merits of the case of either of the parties in the suit. 17. With the observations forgoing, the petition stands dismissed.