Judgment This Writ Petition is filed for a mandamus to set-aside Judgment dated 7-2-2007 in O.A.No.172/2004 on the file of A.P. Co-operative Tribunal, at Visakhapatnam. At the hearing, there is no representation for the petitioner. I have heard Sri P.Ratnam, learned counsel for respondent No.4 and perused the record. Respondent No.4 was an employee of the petitioner-Co-operative Society. On the allegation that he has misappropriated amount to a tune of Rs.99,463/-, the petitioner made a claim before respondent No.2who vide his award dated 29-5-2004 passed a decree in favour of the petitioner for Rs.99,463.75 with interest at 14% per annum from 11-4-1999 till realisation. The said award was questioned by respondent No.4 in O.A.No.172/2004 before respondent No.1-A.P. Co-operative Tribunal (for short “the Tribunal”). The Tribunal by the Judgment impugned in this Writ Petition set-aside the same. A perusal of the Judgment of the Tribunal shows that the award was set-aside on two grounds, namely, that respondent No.4 was acquitted in the criminal case registered on the basis of the same allegation and that the ex-President of the Society has admitted his responsibility vide his letter dated 11-4-1999 for the deficit stock worth Rs.99,463/- undertaking to pay the said amount within three months with interest. Under Section 75 of the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act 1964 (for short “the Act”), the Tribunal is constituted. It is headed by a Chairman who is or has been a Judicial Officer not below the rank of a District Judge. Under Section 76 of the Act, the Tribunal is vested with the jurisdiction to entertain appeals against orders passed under various provisions of the Act indicated therein. Therefore, there is no gain saying the fact that the Tribunal is constituted to exercise quasi judicial functions and is headed by a full-fledged and well trained Judicial Officer of the rank of a District Judge. It is therefore axiomatic that the standards of the orders and Judgments passed by the Tribunal should at least have reasonable quality and be supported by proper and sound reasons. An analysis of the reasons assigned by the Tribunal for allowing the appeal would reveal that, they woefully fall short of the minimum standards that are expected from a quasi judicial body headed by a District Judge. An analysis of the reasons assigned by the Tribunal for allowing the appeal would reveal that, they woefully fall short of the minimum standards that are expected from a quasi judicial body headed by a District Judge. The Tribunal failed to discuss any material and not to say of any of the provisions of the Act in coming to the conclusion that the award of the arbitrator cannot be sustained. It failed to advert to the relevantprovisions of the Act to support its conclusion that acquittal of respondent No.4 in the criminal case would obliterate his civil liability. Ordinarily, the legal proposition is that mere acquittal of a person in a criminal case would not automatically lead to his discharge from civil liability unless a statutory provision to that effect is incorporated in the extant statute. In the absence of such a provision, the Judgment of the criminal court would at best constitute the basis for the Tribunal or the court dealing with the civil liability of the accused in adjudicating such a liability. If the court or the Tribunal is satisfied that evidence in both the cases is common and the criminal court has properly analysed the evidence, it can give due weight to the Judgment of the criminal court. The principle that the Judgment of a criminal court cannot be made the sole basis for absolving a person of civil liability stems from the fact that the degree of proof required in a criminal case is more stringent and therefore the acquittal of an accused in a criminal case would not automatically absolve him of his civil liability. The Tribunal has ignored this fundamental legal position in setting aside the arbitrator’s award. Even with regard to the second reason assigned by the Tribunal, it has failed to consider and discuss the finding of the arbitrator in his award that through his letter dated 16-5-1999 respondent No.4 has admitted his liability and had undertaken to pay the amount back. For the above reasons, the Judgment of the Tribunal cannot be sustained and the same is accordingly set-aside. The matter is remitted to the Tribunal for disposing of the same afresh after hearing the parties. The petitioner and respondent No.4 are entitled to raise all legally permissible grounds before the Tribunal. The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above.