JUDGMENT : K. M. THAKER, J. – The petitioner has brought under challenge the order dated 2-8-2004 passed by the Industrial Tribunal in Reference (I.T.) No. 148 of 2000 whereby the learned Tribunal has set aside the order passed by the Departmental Appellate Authority and directed the petitioner-Corporation to allow consequential benefit which may become available on account of the appellate authority's order having been set aside by the Court. 2. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order and direction the petitioner-Corporation has challenged the award contending, inter alia, that the impugned award has been passed disregarding relevant facts, the evidence available on record and the powers of the revisional authority conferred by virtue of the applicable regulations. Another important contention which is raised by the petitioner-Corporation is that because of the impugned award' the respondent would go scot-free and will not face any penalty, though the, charge of misconduct has been proved during the enquiry. 3. So far as the facts relevant for and involved in the petition are concerned, the petitioner has stated that the respondent was serving with• the petitioner-Corporation in the cader of driver. The respondent was on duty on 3-11-1991 on the State Transport bus bearing registration No. GJ IT 9468. When the said bus reached near Amod village the respondent driver took the bus towards wrong side which resulted into collision with the cyclist who was coming from the side of the factory. The accident resulted into death of the said cyclist. 4. It is also alleged that due to the said rash and negligent driving by the respondent one more accident had also occurred wherein one car bearing registration No. GSJ 6781 coming from the Bharuch and going to Ahmedabad was damaged. 5. In view of such rash and negligent driving by respondent driver, report was submitted on the basis of which charge-sheet No. 42 of 1992 was served. Full-fledged departmental inquiry was conducted wherein respondent was afforded reasonable and sufficient opportunity of hearing and defence. The respondent remained present through his representative and upon conclusion of the proceedings and evaluation of the evidence on record, the Inquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the charges were proved. Full-fledged departmental inquiry was conducted wherein respondent was afforded reasonable and sufficient opportunity of hearing and defence. The respondent remained present through his representative and upon conclusion of the proceedings and evaluation of the evidence on record, the Inquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the charges were proved. The report of the Inquiry Officer was submitted to the disciplinary authority, who upon consideration of the report and the material on record, passed order dated 29-10-1994 and imposed penalty of stoppage of yearly increment for four years with permanent effect. The said order was taken in appeal before the departmental appellate authority, by the respondent. The appeal was rejected by the first appellate authority. Being aggrieved by the said order the respondent carried the matter into industrial dispute which came to be referred by way of the aforesaid Reference No. 148 of 2000. The reference was resisted by the Corporation by placing relevant facts and circumstances on record before the Tribunal. Subsequently, after hearing parties the Court passed the impugned award. 6. Mr. Munshaw, learned Advocate has appeared for the petitioner and Mr. Rathod, learned Advocate has appeared for the respondent. I have heard the parties and considered the record. In the facts and circumstances of the case, Rule. Mr. Rathod, learned Advocate waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of the respondent. 7. Mr. Munshaw, learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that merely because any of the passengers were not examined as witness of the accident, it should not be concluded that the charge of rash and negligent, driving is not proved. He also submitted that in present case the learned Tribunal erred in concluding that charge was not proved, merely because any passenger or eye-witnesses was not examined before the Inquiry Officer. He also submitted that when the penalty imposed was short of dismissal or discharge the learned Tribunal ought not have interfered with the punishment order and ought not have set it aside. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Rathod submitted that the charge of negligence cannot be said to have been proved when any passenger was not examined and driver claimed that he was driving the bus within speed limit. He submitted that the driver had asserted that he was driving the bus very slow. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Rathod submitted that the charge of negligence cannot be said to have been proved when any passenger was not examined and driver claimed that he was driving the bus within speed limit. He submitted that the driver had asserted that he was driving the bus very slow. He submitted that the learned Tribunal has not committed any error in setting aside the penalty order as the charge cannot be said to have been proved. 9. It appears on perusal of the record that the charges levelled against the respondent was duly proved and established. It is pertinent that the factum of the accident is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the accident occurred when the respondent was driving the bus. It is also not in dispute that the accident resulted in to death of the cyclist. 10. It is not in dispute, and it is most important fact, in the matter of departmental inquiry, that the panchnama showed that at the time of accident the bus was on the wrong side of the road. 11. When the factum of the accident is not in dispute and when the panchnama showed that the bus was on wrong side, then for the purpose of departmental proceedings, the evidence or material on record cannot be said to be inadequate for Inquiry Officer to conclude that the charge of negligence, and the charge of rash driving is proved. 12. Even if the driver's statements about speed limit were to be accepted, then also in face of the fact that at the time of accident the vehicle was on the wrong side of the road, the defence on the ground of speed limit would not help the driver to get out of the charge of negligence, and consequently of rash driving. Likewise, when the factum of accident and resultant death are not in dispute then merely because any passenger or other witness was not examined, the said failure would not render the Inquiry Officer's conclusion regarding driver's negligence, worthless or untenable.’ It is settled position that in departmental inquiry the requirement of proof is not to the extent of "proof beyond doubt", but it is in the realm of preponderance of probability, which is considered sufficient. 13. 13. In this view of the matter, the Inquiry Officer's findings cannot be or could not have been faulted when the aforesaid material was on record. Obviously such motor accident would also impose heavy financial burden on the Corporation by virtue of award in Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 14. In such circumstances, only on the ground that the order of acquittal was passed in favour of the driver in the criminal proceedings, it would not make him entitled, without anything more, for "nil order" in disciplinary proceedings where the degree of proof and nature of evidence relevant for the purpose are different than the criminal proceedings. 15. When the Inquiry Officer, upon evaluation of evidence came to the conclusion that charges of rash and negligent driving and negligence in performance of duty were duly proved and when the said conclusion was confirmed by the first appellate authority, the Labour Court ought not have interfered with the said findings particularly in view of the undisputed material viz. the pane/mama on record showing that the bus was on the wrong side of the road, only on the premise that any eye-witness or the passenger was not examined and the driver was acquitted in criminal proceedings. 16. When there was no allegation about mala fides or victimization and the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority was short of dismissal and when the factum of accident and resultant death were not in dispute and in the face of such facts coupled with the fact that the bus was on the wrong side at the relevant time, the learned Tribunal ought not have interfered with the disciplinary authority's order. 17. In present case, neither allegation of mala fides or victimization is made nor established. Under such circumstance, there was no reason or justification for the Tribunal to interfere with the order of penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority in such a manner that as a result of the award there would be no penalty at all inasmuch as the learned Court has, on one hand, set aside the order of penalty passed by the disciplinary authority, whereas on the other hand, it has not passed any other order imposing any other penalty. 18. 18. The Labour Court also failed to appreciate that the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority was short of penalty of discharge or dismissal and if the penalty order in question was set aside it would result into complete discharge from the entire charges and there would not be any punishment at all. 19. Even if the Labour Court's decision is to be treated as exercise of discretion in view of the provision under Sec. 11A then also the power should not have been exercised, in facts of present case, in such a manner so as to result into "no punishment" at all. 20. On the overall consideration of the facts of the case and nature of the charge levelled against the respondent and the fact that the disciplinary authority had imposed punishment of stoppage of yearly increment for four years with permanent effect, it appears, considering the submission of the learned Counsel of both sides - who have also addressed the issue about length of service and the respondent's service record and the default card, that punislm1ent of stoppage of yearly increment for two years with permanent future effect would be adequate penalty instead of penalty of stoppage of four increments as ordered by the disciplinary authority. 21. Therefore, the order of disciplinary authority and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court are modified and it is ordered that the disciplinary authority may pass appropriate orders, modifying its original order of punishment so as to impose punishment of stoppage of yearly increment for two years with permanent/future effect. 22. The award of the Labour Court accordingly stands set aside and modified, and the petition is accordingly partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. 23. The petition stands disposed of with aforesaid directions. However, no cost. (NRP) Petition partly allowed.