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2011 DIGILAW 1553 (PAT)

Md. Arshad Hussain v. State of Bihar

2011-07-26

body2011
ORDER 1. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 21st April 2011 passed by the learned single Judge in above C.W.J.C. No. 8427 of 2006 the writ petitioner has filed the present Appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. 2. On 11th May, 1976 the appellant was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in Government Primary School. Upon an enquiry made in respect of the genuineness of his credentials it was found that the mark sheet and the certificate of teachers training produced by the appellant were not genuine. Under communication dated 17th July 2006 the appellant was informed that his credentials were found to be forged documents and he was called upon to submit his explanation. The said communication was responded by the appellant on 7th August, 2006. The appellant informed the respondent authorities that he was undergoing medical treatment and he would respond to the letter dated 17th July 2006 after completion of the medical treatment. It may be noted that since then the appellant did not respond to the letter dated 17th July 2006. In view of the finding that the appellant had secured employment by producing forged documents, his service came to be terminated by the District Superintendent of Education-cum-Sub Divisional Education Officer, Araria under his order dated 23rd November, 2007. 3. The appellant had filed the above C.W.J.C. No. 8427 of 2006 under Article 226 of the Constitution initially to challenge the action of the respondents in not paying his monthly salary. Subsequently, he also challenged the aforesaid order dated 23rd November 2007. According to the appellant the said order of termination of service was made without following due process of law; in violation of principles of natural justice and by an officer not authorized to make that order. 4. The petition was contested by the respondents. According to the respondents the appellant had been given due opportunity to put forth his defence. The appellant, however, did not avail of the said opportunity. 5. The learned single Judge has dismissed the writ petition. The learned single Judge was of the opinion that the appellant's appointment was void ab initio. 6. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner has preferred the present Appeal. 7. We have heard the learned counsels extensively and have perused the records. The appellant, however, did not avail of the said opportunity. 5. The learned single Judge has dismissed the writ petition. The learned single Judge was of the opinion that the appellant's appointment was void ab initio. 6. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner has preferred the present Appeal. 7. We have heard the learned counsels extensively and have perused the records. It is indeed true that the appellant had been given opportunity to put forth his defence but the appellant did not avail of it. Even before us, the learned advocate Mr. Janardan Prasad appearing for the appellant has not been able to dislodge the finding that the disputed documents were genuine or that they were not forged or fabricated documents nor the appellant has been able to produce the original documents which he claims to be genuine documents. We do agree with the learned single Judge that the employment secured by the appellant on the basis of forged and fabricated documents was void ab initio. It may also be noted that the appellant has not been dismissed, from service as alleged but his service was terminated. As to the competence of the authority making the order of termination of, I service, learned advocate Mr. Janardan Prasad appearing for the appellant has relied upon Bihar State Nationalised Primary School Teachers (Transfer and Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules, 2002, particularly Rule 21 thereof. He has submitted that sub-Rule (v) of the said Rule 21 empowers the Deputy Development Commissioner to impose a major penalty upon a Headmaster or an Assistant Teacher of a primary school. 8. We may note at the outset that the appellant has not established that he is governed by the aforesaid Rules of 2002. Second, as we have held that the appellant's appointment was void ab initio and the impugned order is that of termination of service and not of dismissal from service, the above referred Rule 21 shall not apply. No other contention is raised before us. We agree with the learned single Judge. The Appeal is dismissed in limine.