JUDGMENT Tarun Kumar Gupta, J.:- This appeal is directed against order No.35 dated 14th December, 2009 passed by learned Chief Judge being Judge-in-charge of Court No.11 of the City Civil Court in Title Suit No.618 of 2006. By the impugned order learned Judge disposed of the application of injunction filed by the appellants under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code by observing that respondent No.3 was in possession of the suit flat and that parties should maintain status quo relating to said possession of respondent No.3 in the suit flat with a further direction for not disturbing the egress and ingress of respondent No.3 in the suit flat by the appellants and their agents. 2. Being aggrieved with said order the instant appeal has been filed by the appellants. 3. It is the case of the appellants that Bhubaneswari Prasad Singh Deo got the suit house, that is, 2/1 Loudon Street, Kolkata, through a deed of gift executed by its owner Charubala Debi in 1948. Bhubaneswari Prasad Singh Deo married Mary Linda Singh Deo on 11th May, 1965 according to Special Marriage Act and four sons were born in their wedlock. Bhubaneswari Prasad Singh Deo died intested on 2nd October, 1972 leaving behind his wife Mary Linda Singh Deo and four minor sons as his only heirs and legal representatives. Mary Linda Singh Deo on behalf of self and on behalf of four minor sons as their guardian mother, sold the suit property to Vikramaditya Prasad Singh Deo (henceforth to be termed as V. P. Singh Deo) and Udayaditya Prasad Singh Deo (henceforth to be termed as U. P. Singh Deo) by a deed of sale dated 25th July, 1975. Said V. P. Singh Deo and U. P. Singh Deo leased out the suit property to Banwarilal Sharma and another for a period of 99 years with an option on the part of the lessees for renewal of another period of 99 years. Said Banwarilal Sharma died intested on 14th April, 2006 leaving behind the present appellants as wife and daughters. Said Banwarilal Sharma died intested on 14th April, 2006 leaving behind the present appellants as wife and daughters. The present appellants came to know that the respondent No.1 Maheshwari Debi alias Singh being sister of Bhubaneswari Prasad Singh Deo obtained an ex partie decree on 4th February, 1997 in Title Suit No.483 of 1994 declaring that the certificate of marriage dated 18th October, 1971 issued under Section 16 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 showing the registration of marriage between Bhubaneswari Prasad Singh Deo and Mary Linda Singh Deo was void. Said decree was obtained by practising fraud and by suppression of summons as well as suppression of material facts. The subsequent owners of the suit property namely V. P. Singh Deo and U. P. Singh Deo instituted a title suit being 503 of 2006 against Maheshwari Debi alias Singh for declaration for their title in the suit property and injunction, and obtained an ad interim order of injunction whereby Maheshwari Debi was restrained from interfering with peaceful possession of the property purchased by those plaintiffs namely V. P. Singh Deo and U. P. Singh Deo. The appellants came to know that after passing of the said order of injunction in Title Suit No.503 of 2006 present respondents were trying to dispose of and or encumber several flats and portions of the suit property. On or about 14th May 2006 H. M. Sharma, brother of late Banawarilal Sharma, found one Biswanath Chakraborty respondent No.4 to try to occupy the suit flat being flat No.5 in the suit house which was under possession of Respondent No.2 with the help of some unknown persons. Present appellants being plaintiffs filed Title Suit No.618 of 2006 for declaration that the decree dated 04.02.1997 was obtained by respondent No.1 by practising fraud, misrepresentation, and for injunction with other consequential reliefs. The appellants also filed a petition for temporary injunction for restraining respondents from acting in any manner on the basis of the ex parte decree dated 4th February, 1997 in Title Suit No.483 of 1994 and for restraining them from interfering with peaceful enjoyment of the appellants in respect of the suit premises with a further prayer for restraining respondents from transferring or alienating any part or portion of the suit premises. Learned Judge 6th Bench by order dated 20th May, 2006 directed all the parties to maintain status quo. 4. Learned Judge 6th Bench by order dated 20th May, 2006 directed all the parties to maintain status quo. 4. Respondent No.3 Sristi Vanijya Private Limited contested the said injunction application by filing a written objection. It was contended inter alia that Respondent No.1 Maheshwari Debi alias Singh entered into an agreement dated 21st January, 1992 with said respondent No.3 for transferring the suit premises in favour of Respondent No.3 and also received consideration for said transfer. Respondent No.1 represented at that time that entire royal estate of Panchkote was inherited by her only brother Bhubaneswari Prasad Singh Deo who died intested as bachelor on 2nd October, 1972. Thereafter the royal estate including the suit property was inherited by his mother Rani Rajmata Durgesh Kumari Devi. Rani Durgesh Kumari Devi died intested leaving behind her daughter Maheswari Debi alias Singh as her sole heir. Accordingly Maheshwari Debi alias Singh inherited the entire royal estate of Panchkote including the suit premises. The respondent No.3 was also informed by respondent No.1 Maheshwari Debi that by an order dated 24th July, 1997 the Hon’ble High Court at Calcutta issued letters of administration to Maheshwari Debi to administer the estate of late Raj Mata Durgesh Kumari Devi and that she was granted leave by Hon’ble Court to sell the properties of Raj Mata Durgesh Kumari Devi, since deceased, including the suit premises by an order dated 24.02.1998 in an application under G.A. No.547 of 1998 in P. L.A. No.115 of 1997. Respondent No.3 further contended that in view of the order dated 4th February, 1997 passed in Title Suit No.483 of 1994 filed by Maheshwari Devi, the marriage certificate between Bhubaneswari Prasad Singh Deo and Mary Linda Singh Deo was cancelled and that said judgment is still in operation and that transfer, if any, made by Mary Linda Singh Deo concerning the suit property was void and that all subsequent transfers were also void. In terms of authorization by and under the agreement dated 21st August, 1992 in between Maheshwari Devi and Sristi Vanijya Private Limited, Respondent No.3 negotiated with the occupier of flat No.5 at second floor of the suit building, that is, the Respondent No.2 and have the said flat vacated and started to possess the same. In terms of authorization by and under the agreement dated 21st August, 1992 in between Maheshwari Devi and Sristi Vanijya Private Limited, Respondent No.3 negotiated with the occupier of flat No.5 at second floor of the suit building, that is, the Respondent No.2 and have the said flat vacated and started to possess the same. It was further case of respondent No.3 that as Respondent No.1 was not acting upon said agreement dated 21st August, 1992 respondent No.3 instituted the suit being C. S. No.171 of 2007 with an application preferred being G. A. No. 457 of 2007 and that the Hon’ble High Court at Calcutta by an order dated 23rd August, 2007 restrained Maheshwari Debi and her men and agents from dealing with and or disposing and or transferring the suit premises. The present appellants had neither title nor possession in the suit flat and hence the injunction petition should have been dismissed. 5. After contested hearing learned Trial Judge disposed of the application for injunction filed by the present appellants by observing that respondent No.3 was in possession of suit flat No.5 and accordingly directed both parties to maintain status quo in respect of possession of Respondent No.3 in the suit flat till disposal of the suit with a further direction of not disturbing the egress and ingress of respondent No.3 in respect of the suit flat. 6. Being aggrieved with said order the instant appeal has been filed by the appellants. 7. Sri S. P. Roy Chowdhury, learned senior Counsel for appellants, has submitted that soon after filing of the suit learned Trial Court i.e., learned Judge Sixth Bench City Civil Court passed an interim order directing the parties to maintain status quo in respect of suit premises till disposal of the petition under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code filed by the appellants vide Order No.2 dated 20th May, 2006. He further submits that when the petition for temporary injunction came up for hearing before learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court upon transfer of the Title Suit from the Court of learned Judge sixth Bench, City Civil Court at the prayer of contesting Respondent No.3 and against opposition from the side of the appellants learned advocates of both sides submitted that they had no objection if the order of status quo was permitted to continue. According to him, in spite of said submission made by learned Advocates of both sides learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court went on to make some comments and observations which were against the documents on record, and passed the impugned order dated 14th of December, 2009 observing possession of respondent No.3 in the suit flat No.5 with a direction upon the appellants not to disturb the egress and ingress of Respondent No.3 in respect of suit flat No.5. 8. Sri Roy Chowdhury further submits that learned transferee Court i.e., Chief Judge, City Civil Court passed the impugned order dated 14th of December, 2009 being influenced by the electricity bill in respect of suit flat as produced by Respondent No.3 showing payment, by an order of injunction passed by the Hon’ble Court in a suit filed by the respondent No.3 wherein appellants were parties and by presuming possession of respondent No.3 in suit flat No.5 in view of consent given by the appellants for continuation of order of status quo. Sri Roy Chowdhury has submitted that some electricity bills on and from July, 2008 in the name of respondent No.3 showing mailing address at 6 Wood Street Kolkata-16 cannot be taken as reliable documents of possession of suit flat No.5 as those electricity bills were sent in the address of the office of respondent No.3 i.e., 6 Wood Street, Kolkata-16 and not in the address of suit flat and that those bills came in said address during continuation of order of status quo passed in the suit on 20th May, 2006. 9. Sri Roy Chowdhury has further submitted that the order of injunction initially passed by the Hon’ble High Court in the suit filed by respondent No.3 was vacated with observation that until the question of possession was determined there cannot be any finding in respect thereof and that parties should maintain status quo and that the issue regarding possession may be decided at a later stage in the event further evidence of possession is produced and that in the event respondent No.3 is entitled to egress and ingress, such egress or ingress shall not be disturbed. Sri Roy Chowdhury has submitted in this connection that said order of Single Judge was later vacated by the Division Bench in view of the impugned order and pendency of this appeal before this Bench and subject to the result of this appeal. Sri Roy Chowdhury has submitted in this connection that said order of Single Judge was later vacated by the Division Bench in view of the impugned order and pendency of this appeal before this Bench and subject to the result of this appeal. Sri Roy Chowdhury, learned senior advocate, has submitted that aforesaid observation of learned transferee Court in the impugned order that respondent No.3 was in possession, was against the documents on record namely the report of special officer dated 10th November, 2007 as appointed by Justice Maharaj Sinha, police report dated 18th November, 2007 in case number M.704 of 2007, police report dated 17th June, 2009 in case number M.514 of 2009, report of November, 2009 of receiver appointed by Hon’ble Justice Patherya, CESC bill in the name of respondent No.2 Anapol for the month of April, 2008 and order dated 30th October, 2009 passed by Hon’ble Justice Patherya in C. S. No.289 of 2009. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury from these reports and documents it is palpable that after removal of furniture, fittings and other belongings from the suit flat No.5 by respondent No.2 Anapole on 13th May, 2006 there was an attempt from the side of respondent No.3 in collusion with other respondents to take illegal possession of the same but it was prevented and that since then the suit flat was lying under lock and key in unused condition. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury the observations of learned transferee Trial Court that respondent No.3 was in possession of the suit flat had no basis. 10. Sri Shaktinath Mukherjee, learned senior advocate for the respondent No.3, has submitted that appellants had never any possession in the suit flat which was evident from the pleadings of the plaint as well as from letter dated 16th May, 2006 sent by present appellants to the officer-in-charge of the police station. According to Mr. Mukherjee the suit flat No.5 was admittedly under possession of respondent No.2 Anapol Consultancy Private Limited who admittedly vacated the same on 13th May, 2006. Mr. Mukherjee has further submitted that on 13th May, 2006 respondent No.2 Anapol handed over possession of said suit flat to this contesting respondent No.3 Sristi Vanijya Private Limited on receipt of money through bank draft after issuing a letter of handing over possession. According to Mr. Mr. Mukherjee has further submitted that on 13th May, 2006 respondent No.2 Anapol handed over possession of said suit flat to this contesting respondent No.3 Sristi Vanijya Private Limited on receipt of money through bank draft after issuing a letter of handing over possession. According to Mr. Mukherjee entire suit building was in possession of tenants and occupiers and the present appellants had no physical possession and that they cannot object in the matter of handing over possession of suit flat No.5 by Anapol to Sristi Vanijya Private Limited. Mr. Mukherjee has further submitted that as far back as in 1992 there was an agreement in between respondent No.1 Maheshwari Devi who inherited the suit property along with other properties as sole heir and legal representative of Maheshwari Devi in terms of letter of administration issued by the Hon’ble High Court, for sell of the suit building to respondent No.3 and she already received considerable amount from respondent No.3. Since then present respondent No.3 was continuing negotiation with different tenants and occupiers for taking possession of the suit building and in the process obtained possession of suit flat No.5 from Anapol on 13th May, 2006. According to Mr. Mukherjee said possession was obtained on 13th May, 2006, that is, before passing of order of status quo on 20th May, 2006. According to Mr. Mukherjee during inspection of the suit flat by the receiver appointed in case number C. S. 289 of 2009, the key of the flat was produced by the representative of respondent No.3., and in the list of inventory prepared by receiver, some files of respondent No.3 were found to be lying there. Respondent No.1 Anapol who was admitted occupier of said flat, did not raise any objection about said possession of respondent No.3 in suit flat No.5. 11. Mr. Mukherjee has further submitted that electric bills of the suit flat were paid by this contesting respondent No.3. According to him, sending of those electric bills in the address of respondent No. 3’s office at Wood Street did not show that respondent No.3 had no possession in the suit flat. In this connection, he has further submitted that present appellants in collusion with CESC personnels managed to change the name of consumer relating to the electric meter lying in the suit flat from respondent No.3 to respondent No.2 in some subsequent bills. In this connection, he has further submitted that present appellants in collusion with CESC personnels managed to change the name of consumer relating to the electric meter lying in the suit flat from respondent No.3 to respondent No.2 in some subsequent bills. According to him, respondent No.3 moved a Writ Court and obtained an order of direction upon CESC for reissuing the electric bills relating to suit flat in the name of respondent No.3, though said order was made subject to the result of this appeal. 12. Mr. Mukherjee has further submitted that any order restricting respondent number 3’s egress and ingress to the suit flat will amount to its eviction and that the same is not permissible in the facts and circumstances of this case. In this connection, he has referred a case law reported in AIR 1979 Calcutta page 308 (Smt. Nanibala Saha and another versus Charubala Saha and another) to impress upon this Court that plaintiffs establishing his rights and violation thereof will not entitle him to get an order of injunction if it is found that said injunction will cause greater hardship to the respondent. 13. Mr. Mukherjee has further submitted that even if it is assumed that the respondent No.3 was in unlawful possession of the suit flat still he cannot be evicted therefrom without due process of law. In this connection he has referred a case law reported in AIR 1968 Supreme Court page 620 (Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh and others) wherein it was held that lessor is not entitled to throw out even a trespasser in possession, by force. Mr. Mukherjee in this connection has further submitted that as respondent No.3 is in settled possession of the suit flat as it is apparent from receipt dated 13th May, 2006 issued by respondent No.2 Anapol, electric bills of the suit flat being sent in the name of respondent No.3, production of key of the suit flat by the representative of respondent No.3 during inspection by the receiver appointed by Court and list of inventory prepared by receiver showing presence of some files and papers of respondent No.3 in the suit flat, learned Trial Court was quite justified in giving the necessary direction in favour of the respondent No.3 by the impugned order. Mr. Mr. Mukherjee’s last but not the least important contention is that the alleged lease created by V. P. Singh Deo and U. P. Singh Deo in favour of predecessor in interest of the present appellants relating to suit building which was fully occupied by tenants and occupiers giving a right to collect rents and / or to file suits of eviction was not valid in the eye of law. In this connection he has referred a case law reported in 2002 (2) CHN page 627 (Swapan Kumar Dutta v. Dharam Chand Jaiswal and another. 14. Mr. Roychowdhury in reply has submitted that the report dated 10th of November, 2007 of this special officer appointed by Justice Maharaj Sinha in case No.646 of 2007, police report dated 18th January, 2007 submitted in Case No. M-704 of 2007, police report dated 17th of June, 2009 submitted in Case No. M-514 of 2009, report of November, 2009 of the receiver appointed by Hon’ble Justice Patherya in Case No. T.A. 646 of 2007 taken together go to show that suit flat was lying unused for long under lock and key and that electric boards in the suit flat were also lying in broken condition and that a name plate of respondent No.2 Anapol was hanging in front of said suit flat. According to him, save and except some alleged files of respondent No.3 which were alleged to be lying in the suit flat there was no indication to show that respondent No.3 was in fact in possession not to speak of settled possession of the suit flat. In this connection he has further submitted that sending of electric bills relating to suit flat to the address of the office of respondent No.3 in Wood Street that too from 2008 only showed that respondent No.3 had no possession in the suit flat in 2006 or at any point of time. In this connection he has further submitted that the alleged document of handing over of possession on 13th May, 2006 was not disclosed by respondent No.3 either in the written objection or in any paper filed in Court even in 2007 and 2008. According to Mr. Roychowdhury said letter of possession dated 13th May, 2006 was a manufactured and anti-dated document and should not be looked into. According to Mr. Roychowdhury said letter of possession dated 13th May, 2006 was a manufactured and anti-dated document and should not be looked into. Sri Roychowdhury has further submitted that appellants have already established a prima facie case and that balance of convenience / inconvenience is also in their favour and that impugned order so far as it relates to protecting alleged possession and right of egress and ingress of respondent No.3 should be set aside. 15. We have considered the submissions made by learned advocates of both sides and also perused the documents produced and referred during hearing. Admittedly, Bhubaneswari Prasad Singh Deo became the owner of the suit building though there were some disputes and differences as to the manner and mode of acquiring said property by him. Admittedly, there was a certificate dated 18th October, 1971 showing marriage in between Bhubaneswari Prasad Singh Deo and Mary Linda Singh Deo. Admittedly Bhubaneswari Prasad Singh Deo died intested on 2nd of October, 1972. Thereafter, Mary Linda Singh Deo claiming to be wife of Bhubaneswari Prasad Singh Deo sold away the suit property and other properties on behalf of self and four minor sons as their guardian mother through a Kobala dated 25th July, 1975 to V. P. Singh Deo and U. P. Singh Deo. V. P. Singh Deo and U. P. Singh Deo executed deed of lease for 99 years in respect of suit property and other properties in favour of Banwarilal Sharma, the predecessor in interest of the present appellants. There is also no denial that respondent No.1 Maheshwari Devi obtained an ex parte decree dated 4th of February, 1997 in Title Suit No.483 of 1994 declaring the certificate of marriage dated 18th October, 1971 showing marriage in between Bhubaneswari Prasad Singh Deo and Mary Linda Singh Deo as a nullity. She also claimed that Bhubaneswari Prasad Singh Deo died intested on 2nd of October as bachelor resulting inheritance of the estate of Bhubaneswari Prasad Singh Deo by his mother Durgesh Kumari Debi. Respondent No.1 Maheshwari Debi also obtained letter of administration (P.L.A. 115 of 1997) on 24th June, 1997 in respect of entire estate of Durgesh Kumari Debi which included the estate of Bhubaneswari Prasad Singh Deo. 16. Respondent No.1 Maheshwari Debi also obtained letter of administration (P.L.A. 115 of 1997) on 24th June, 1997 in respect of entire estate of Durgesh Kumari Debi which included the estate of Bhubaneswari Prasad Singh Deo. 16. Admittedly, present appellants have filed a Title Suit being T. S. No.618 of 2006 for declaring that the ex parte decree dated 4th of February, 1997 obtained by respondent No.1 Maheshwari Debi in Title Suit No.483 of 1994 declaring the marriage certificate dated 18th October, 1971 as void, was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. In said Title Suit No. 618 of 2006 there was also a prayer for permanent injunction restraining the Respondents from acting in any manner on the basis of the said ex partie decree dated 4th of February, 1997 obtained in Title Suit No.483 of 1994 and also from interfering with peaceful enjoyment of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit premises. 17. At the time of disposing of this appeal arising out of impugned order of injunction there is hardly any scope to go into the merit of the claims and counterclaims made by the parties. There is no dispute that the appellants have pressed their right to the suit property through a deed of lease executed by the purchasers of the suit property from Mary Linda Singh Deo. At this stage we should not prejudge the main issue of the Title Suit namely whether the ex partie decree dated 4th February, 1997 in Title Suit No.483 of 1994 was obtained by fraud, collusion and suppression of material fact and was void or not. It can only be said at this stage that present appellants have an arguable prima facie case to go into the trial. 18. It came out from the submissions of learned advocates of both sides as well as from the documents enclosed and referred by either side that the registered document on which appellants pressed their right to the suit property relayed back to 1984 (more particularly 1st of March, 1984) when V. P. Singh Deo and U. P. Singh Deo being purchasers of suit property and other properties from Mary Linda Singh Deo through registered Kobala dated 25th July, 1975, executed deed of lease in favour of appellants predecessor in interest Banwarilal Sharma. 19. 19. Though respondent No.3 claimed to have a memorandum of understanding dated 21st of August, 1992 purported to have been executed between Maheshwari Debi, respondent No.1 and Sristi Vanijya Private Limited, respondent No.3 regarding sale of suit property to respondent No.3, but claimed to come into possession of suit flat only on 13th May, 2006. The alleged letter of possession dated 13th May, 2006 executed by respondent No.2 Anapol in favour of respondent No.3 Sristi Vanijya Private Limited was not disclosed even at the time of filing written objection and other documents in 2007. Had there been any such letter of possession dated 13th May, 2006 executed by respondent No.2 Anapol who was admittedly in possession of the suit flat, then the same should have been disclosed in and annexed to the written objection and other papers filed in 2007 in Court. No explanation is also forthcoming for not disclosing of said paper /or not filing of letter of possession dated 13th May, 2006 in 2007. Though respondent No.3 claimed in the Trial Court in the written objection filed against petition of temporary injunction that the suit flat was being used as residence of the employees of respondent No.3 but it came out from various documents namely report dated 10th November, 2007 of the Special Officer appointed in Case No. T. A. No.646 of 2007, police report dated 18th November, 2007 submitted in Case No. M-704 of 2007, police report dated 17th June, 2009 filed in Case No. M-514 of 2009 and report of November, 2007 of the receiver in Case No. C. S. No.289 of 2009 that suit flat No.5 was lying under lock and key and that the inside condition of the suit flat palpably showed that it was lying unused for long and that a sign board of respondent No.2 Anapol and not of respondent No.3, Sristi Vanijya Private Limited was found outside the suit premises. It is true that representative of respondent No.3 produced the key of the suit flat during inspection by receiver in November, 2009 in connection with Case No. C. S. No.289 of 2009 and some papers of respondent No.3 were found lying in said suit flat. It is true that representative of respondent No.3 produced the key of the suit flat during inspection by receiver in November, 2009 in connection with Case No. C. S. No.289 of 2009 and some papers of respondent No.3 were found lying in said suit flat. It is also true that some electric bills relating to suit flat were sent to the address of respondent No.3 in Wood Street only in 2008, but all these things taken together only go to show that respondent No.3 had no settled possession in the suit flat. The term “settled possession” used to mean such clear and effective possession of a person, even if, he is a trespasser who gets the right under the criminal law to defend his property against attack even by the true owner. Even a trespasser in settled possession cannot be evicted without due process of law. But in the case in hand, we have already observed that the alleged possession, if any, of respondent No.3 was anything but settled possession entitling him any equitable right of injunction from a Court of law. In the case law reported in AIR 1968 page 620 (Yeshwant Singh v. Jadhish Singh) it was laid down that even a trespasser having settled possession cannot be dispossessed by force. As such aforesaid case law has no application in the facts and circumstances of this case. 20. If suit property is found to be lying under lock and key and in unused condition for long, an order of status quo will not prejudice either side. However, if it is found later on that respondent No.3 was really entitled to possess the suit property but for the order of status quo he could not enjoy said property then he can be compensated with money to make good his loss, if any. On the other hand, if respondent No.3 is permitted to enjoy and possess property on the strength of the impugned order and later on it is found that it had no right to possess the same, then the loss of the appellants would have been irreparable. In view of the above, the case law reported in AIR 1979 Calcutta page 308 (Sm. Nani Bala Saha and another v. Smt. Charu Bala Saha and another) as referred by Mr. Mukherjee is of no help to the contesting respondent No.3 in this case. In view of the above, the case law reported in AIR 1979 Calcutta page 308 (Sm. Nani Bala Saha and another v. Smt. Charu Bala Saha and another) as referred by Mr. Mukherjee is of no help to the contesting respondent No.3 in this case. We are not going to discuss the impact of the case of Swapan Kumar Dutta (ibid) in the present case. At this stage there is no scope of said discussion as it will amount to go into the merit of the case. Respondent No.3 is certainly at liberty to take this issue at the time of the trial. In this connection it is pertinent to note that at the time of hearing of the injunction petition before the learned Trial Court, both the parties agreed for continuation of the interim order of status quo till disposal of the suit, but learned transferee Trial Court out of her own notion made some observations affirming alleged possession of respondent No.3 in the suit flat and passed the impugned order of injunction against appellants. In view of the above discussions we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order of injunction in favour of respondent No.3 had no basis and is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the impugned order No.35 dated 14th December, 2009 passed by learned Chief Judge in Title Suit No.618 of 2006 is hereby set aside. The parties are hereby directed to maintain status quo as regards possession as on date in respect of suit premises till disposal of the suit. 21. In view of disposal of the appeal all connected pending applications become infractuous and stand disposed of. 22. In this connection we take the opportunity to request learned Trial Court to dispose of the suit early and preferably within six months from date of communication of the order. Learned Trial Judge should proceed with the case without granting unnecessary adjournments to either side. However, we make it clear that observations made at the time of disposal of this appeal, are tentative in nature and learned Trial Judge should not be swayed by those observations at the time of disposal of the suit as per law. 23. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment be supplied to the learned Counsels of party/parties, if applied for. Subhro Kamal Mukherjee, J.: I agree.