JUDGMENT : - Tarun Kumar Gupta, J.:- This appeal is directed against judgment and decree dated 20th April, 2005 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court-IV, Alipore in Title Appeal No.117 of 2004 affirming the judgment and decree of eviction dated 29th of June, 2004 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 5th Court at Alipore in Title Suit No.59 of 1990. 2. The respondents’ predecessor-in-interest viz Satkari Mondal as plaintiff filed said suit for eviction alleging that he was absolute owner of suit premises No.38 Upen Banerjee Road and the defendant was a monthly tenant under him at a rental of Rs.100/- per month payable according to English calendar month. Plaintiff filed said suit for eviction on the ground of default and reasonable requirement after sending a notice to quit dated 13th December, 1989 under registered post with A/D which returned with postal endorsement “refused”. During pendency of the suit original plaintiff Satkari Mondal died and present respondents were substituted in his place as heirs and legal representatives. An amendment petition was filed in 2003 to change the address of suit building as well as suit premises owned by original plaintiff from 38 Upen Banerjee Road to 38 A Upen Banerjee Road on the ground of renumbering of the same by Calcutta Municipal Corporation. 3. The appellant/defendant/tenant contested said suit by filing written statement followed by additional written statement denying material allegations of the plaint and amended plaint and contending inter alia that premises No.38 Upen Banerjee Road was not renumbered as 38 A Upen Banerjee Road and that alleged notice dated 13th of December, 1989 was not legal, valid and was not also received by the defendant and plaintiffs did not reasonably require suit premises. 4. After contested hearing learned Trial Court found the notice to quit legal and valid and was of the opinion that postal endorsement “refused” amounted to good service in the facts and circumstances of the case. Learned Trial Court decreed the suit for ejectment on the ground of reasonable requirement of the same by the plaintiffs and their family members for their own use and occupation but granted protection against eviction on the ground of default for compliance of relevant provisions of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. 5. Learned Trial Court decreed the suit for ejectment on the ground of reasonable requirement of the same by the plaintiffs and their family members for their own use and occupation but granted protection against eviction on the ground of default for compliance of relevant provisions of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. 5. Being aggrieved appellant/tenant preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No.117 of 2004 but the same was dismissed on contest. 6. At the time of admission of this second appeal the following substantial questions of law were framed:- (a) Whether both the learned Courts below committed substantial error of law in holding that the premises No.38 and 38 A Upen Banerjee Road are the same and identical premises even after coming to conclusion that the premises No.38, Upen Banerjee Road has been partitioned and a portion has been renumbered. (b) Whether both the learned Courts below committed substantial error of law in coming to the conclusion that the notice of ejectment has been properly served by the plaintiff / respondents. (c) Whether both the Courts below committed error of law by holding that the suit premises is required by the plaintiffs for their own use and occupation and they have no other alternative suitable and reasonable accommodation elsewhere. 7. Mr. Ayan Banerjee, learned advocate for the appellant, has submitted that the suit was filed describing the address of the suit premises as 38 Upen Banerjee Road but during pendency of the suit the plaint was amended to change the premises number of the suit premises from 38 to 38 A Upen Banerjee Road. According to Mr. Banerjee it came out during evidence that premises No.38 Upen Banerjee Road and 38 A Upen Banerjee Road are two distinct premises and that one Bishaka Mondal was the owner of premises No.38 whereas plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-interest Satkari Mondal was owner of 38 A Upen Banerjee Road and that the report of learned Commissioner clearly showed that the suit shop room had a sign board showing premises No.38 Upen Banerjee Road whereas present plaintiff landlords being heirs of Satkari Mondal were residing in premises 38 A Upen Banerjee Road. According to Mr. According to Mr. Banerjee as plaintiffs failed to establish that the suit shop room of the defendant was within premises No.38 A Upen Banerjee Road owned by the plaintiffs as owner landlords, learned Courts below committed gross mistake by allowing a decree of eviction overlooking said fact. According to him, without any conclusive finding of Court regarding identity of suit premises no decree of eviction should have been passed. 8. Mr. Gopal Ghosh, learned counsel for the respondent landlords, on the other hand, has submitted that it came out from the oral as well as documentary evidence that Satkari Mondal, predecessor in title of the plaintiffs, was owner of premises No.38 Upen Banerjee Road and that defendant was a tenant under him in respect of the suit premises which was admitted by the husband of the defendant in his cross-examination while deposing as D.W.1. According to Mr. Ghosh, it came out from evidence on record, both oral and documentary, that at the time of filing of the suit in 1990 the suit building owned by original plaintiff had premises No.38 Upen Banerjee Road and suit shop room was situated in the said building and that during pendency of the suit the portion of the building owned by Satkari Mondal was renumbered as 38 A Upen Banerjee Road, and rest portion of the building retained old address as 38 Upen Banerjee Road being owned by one Bishaka Mondal. In this connection he has drawn my attention to the certified copy of assessment register of Kolkata Municipal Corporation which was marked as Ext.5 (a) and 8. In this connection he has further submitted that it is true that during commission learned advocate commissioner noted the old address 38 Upen Banerjee Road in the sign board of the suit shop room and accordingly came to an erroneous finding that suit shop room was situated in 38 Upen Banerjee Road whereas plaintiffs were residing at 38 A Upen Banerjee Road. Mr. Ghosh has next submitted that it was nobody’s case that defendant was a tenant under any person other than Satkari Mondal, and rather D.W.1 admitted that Satkari Mondal, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs was owner landlord of the suit room. Mr. Ghosh has next submitted that it was nobody’s case that defendant was a tenant under any person other than Satkari Mondal, and rather D.W.1 admitted that Satkari Mondal, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs was owner landlord of the suit room. According to him, learned Courts below rightly held on the basis of said documents and evidence particularly admission of D.W.1 that plaintiffs through their predecessor-in-interest Satkari Mondal were owner landlords of suit premises which was originally numbered as 38 Upen Banerjee Road and later on renumbered as 38 A Upen Banerjee Road. Mr. Ghosh in support of his submission referred case laws reported in AIR 1974 Supreme Court page 471 (Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Iccharam alias Brijram and others) and AIR 1988 SC page 1858 (Dilbagrai Punjabi vs. Sharad Chandra). 9. In Nagindas Ramdas’s case (ibid) it was held by Hon’ble Apex Court that admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted and they by themselves can be made foundation of the rights of the parties. In Dilbagrai Punjabi’s case (ibid), the Hon’ble Apex Court again reiterated the same principle. According to Hon’ble Supreme Court tenant’s admission of the landlord’s title to disputed property should have been taken as sufficient proof of landlord’s ownership over the same and Courts below should have given reliance upon the same. 10. In the case in hand, one Reba Mondal being one of the substituted plaintiffs, on death of original plaintiff Satkari Mondal, deposed as P.W.1. She categorically stated that suit house was originally numbered as 38 Upen Banerjee Road and that later on it was renumbered as 38 A Upen Banerjee Road. In support of her contention she produced ration cards of the family members (Ext. 6 series) issued in between 1990 and 2003 which showed the premises number as 38 Upen Banerjee Road. She also filed municipal tax bills (Ext. 5 series) as well as certified copy of Kolkata Municipal Corporation’s assessment book (Ext.8 and 9) to show that one Bishaka Mondal was present owner of premises No.38 Upen Banerjee Road and that their predecessor-in-interest Satkari Mondal was owner of 38 A Upen Banerjee Road. Her evidence on this point remained unshaken in spite of lengthy corssexamination. 5 series) as well as certified copy of Kolkata Municipal Corporation’s assessment book (Ext.8 and 9) to show that one Bishaka Mondal was present owner of premises No.38 Upen Banerjee Road and that their predecessor-in-interest Satkari Mondal was owner of 38 A Upen Banerjee Road. Her evidence on this point remained unshaken in spite of lengthy corssexamination. It is true that some confusion cropped up as learned Advocate Commissioner in his report (Ext.7) described the suit shop room having premises No.38 Upen Banerjee Road and the place of residence of the plaintiffs as 38 A Upen Banerjee Road. However, D.W.1 being husband of defendant/tenant clearly admitted during his cross-examination that defendant was a tenant under the plaintiffs and that father of the plaintiffs was the owner of the suit shop room. As such, if said admission of D.W.1 coupled with other evidence on record, both oral and documentary, are viewed in the light of the ratio of the case laws as referred by Mr. Ghosh as stated above, then it is palpable that defendant was a tenant under owner landlord Satkari Mondal and on his death under the substituted plaintiffs. This is more so when it is nobody’s case that defendant was a tenant in the suit shop room under any other person or that defendant had more than one tenancy in that area. 11. In this connection it is pertinent to note that during commission work the suit shop room was identified by defendant tenant’s husband (D.W.1) as well as by one of the plaintiffs to the learned Advocate Commissioner. 12. Accordingly, I do not find any illegality in the findings of fact of learned Courts below that defendant was a tenant under original plaintiff Satkari Mondal who was also owner of the property and that on his death substituted plaintiffs being his heirs stepped into his shoes. 13. Mr. Ayan Banerjee, learned counsel for the appellant/tenant, has submitted that in view of specific denial of D.W.1 that defendant did not receive any notice of ejectment, learned Courts below should have examined the postal peon before accepting the alleged postal endorsement “refused” as good service. 13. Mr. Ayan Banerjee, learned counsel for the appellant/tenant, has submitted that in view of specific denial of D.W.1 that defendant did not receive any notice of ejectment, learned Courts below should have examined the postal peon before accepting the alleged postal endorsement “refused” as good service. In support of his contention he has referred a case law reported in AIR 1989 Calcutta page 14 (Mono Ranjan Dasgupta vs. Suchitra Ganguly and others) where this Court held “where a notice is required or authorized to be served by post under any Central or State enactment and a notice is accordingly despatched by registered post, an obligatory presumption of due service would arise under the relevant provisions of the Central or the State General Clauses Act. Where any such notice is not required or authorized to be served by post, but a notice is nevertheless served by post, registered or ordinary, a court may, not that it must, in a given case raise a presumption of due service under the provisions of Section 114 of the Evidence Act. But in either case, the Court may, in view of the sworn assertion of the addressee to the contrary, or some other reliable evidence on record, hold any such presumption, whether obligatory or optional, to have been rebutted.” 14. Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel for the respondent/landlords, on the other hand, has submitted that there was no specific averment in the written statement that there was no tender of said notice to the defendant/tenant and that in view of absence of said specific averment there was no question of calling the postal peon as a witness when it came out that the endorsement “refused” was preceded by several dates of visit of the house of the defendant/tenant by postal peon. 15. Notice under Section 13 (6) of the Act of 1956 was sent to the residential address of the defendant/tenant being a housewife. There is no evidence that defendant/tenant or any other authorized person was not present in said address on the relevant dates of visit of the postal peon. There is also no specific averment in the written statement that there was no tender of any such notice to the defendant/tenant. Under these facts and circumstances I do not find any infirmity in the findings of fact of learned Courts below that postal endorsement “refused” amounted to good service. 16. During hearing Mr. There is also no specific averment in the written statement that there was no tender of any such notice to the defendant/tenant. Under these facts and circumstances I do not find any infirmity in the findings of fact of learned Courts below that postal endorsement “refused” amounted to good service. 16. During hearing Mr. Banerjee did not make any submission regarding observations of learned Courts below accepting the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiffs for their own use and occupation. In view of the evidence on record, both oral and documentary, I am of opinion that the case of Siddharta Sen & another (ibid) as referred by learned counsel for the appellant has no application in the facts of this case. 17. As a result, the appeal fails. However, I pass no order as to costs. 18. Let the Lower Court record be returned along with a copy of this judgment at the earliest. 19. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment be supplied to the learned counsels of the party / parties, if applied for.