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2011 DIGILAW 1564 (MAD)

Taj Connemara, A unit of Indian Hotels Company Ltd. , represented by its General Manager Vijay Pratap Shrikent, Chennai v. Managing Director, Chennai Metro Water Supply and Sewerage Board

2011-03-18

R.SUDHAKAR

body2011
Judgment :- 1. Writ Petition is filed praying to issue a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records of the second respondent in Lr.No.CMWSSB/Area-VII/B&C/1559/2010 dated 2.2.2011 and quash the same. 2. Mr.V.Manoharan, learned counsel takes notice on behalf of the respondents. By consent of both parties, the writ petition is taken up for final disposal. 3. In a Writ Petition No.8111 of 2010 filed by the very same petitioner against the first respondent and another, on 4.8.2010, this Court passed the following order:- "9. In the light of the regulation available to consider the waiver request of the petitioner regarding surcharge as stated supra, the petitioner is directed to make a representation before the first respondent seeking waiver of surcharge and if such request is made by the petitioner, the first respondent is directed to consider the same and pass necessary orders within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The said waiver of surcharge request can be considered by the first respondent only if the petitioner is paying the principle amount of Rs.9,32,574/- and enclose the proof for the same along with representation." 4. It is stated that the petitioner has paid the admitted water charges. Insofar as the waiver of surcharge is concerned, a detailed representation has been made on 8.9.2010. Petitioner's plea is that from 1.1.2000 till disconnection of water line on 19.2.2003, there was no water supply and therefore, they are not liable to pay surcharge and sought for waiver. This Court specifically directed the authority to consider the waiver on merits. However, on going through the order under challenge, this Court finds that the order has been passed in a very cryptic and laconic manner whereby a sum of Rs.2,62,039/- alone has been waived and the balance amount has been claimed. The detailed representation given by the petitioner, which is based on the order of this Court as mentioned above has not been considered at all. As to what is the basis of the original surcharge demand of Rs.13,94,195/- and the basis of determining the sum of Rs.2,62,039/- towards waiver is not reflected in the impugned proceedings. The arithmetical calculation is totally devoid of reasons, the waiver is arbitrary and consequently, this court is of the view that such order has to be set aside. 5. As to what is the basis of the original surcharge demand of Rs.13,94,195/- and the basis of determining the sum of Rs.2,62,039/- towards waiver is not reflected in the impugned proceedings. The arithmetical calculation is totally devoid of reasons, the waiver is arbitrary and consequently, this court is of the view that such order has to be set aside. 5. It is well established principle in law that Administrative Authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record reasons for its decision. In S.N.Mukherjee v. Union of India reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1984, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paragraphs 35, 38 and 39 as follows:- "35. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decisions-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge." "38. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge." "38. The object underlying the rules of natural justice "is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fair play in action". As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case." "39. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case." "39. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision." 6. In the instant case, the authority who passed the impugned proceedings dated 2.2.2011 has not stated any reasons and only for this reason, the impugned order has to be set aside. 7. In view of the same, the impugned order is set aside. As pleaded by Mr.V.Manohar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, the first respondent is directed to reconsider the matter and pass a reasoned order within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order based on the earlier representation. Till such time, the issue is decided by the first respondent, the impugned claim of surcharge shall be kept in abeyance. 8. The Writ Petition is allowed by way of remand as above. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.