JUDGMENT 1. The appellant has challenged the acquittal of the accused - respondents from offences under Sections 302, 341, 302/34 and 447 I.P.C. by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Bandikui Head Quarter, Dausa in Sessions Case No. 15/2009, State v. Daya Shanker & Anr. dated 10.05.2011 . 2. Ram Bai W/o Suraj Mal, the appellant, submitted written report Ext.P1 on 19.03.09 at 2.00 PM to the Incharge Police Station, Lalsot at Lalsot Hospital mentioning therein that on that day at about 12.00 in the afternoon, she was working in their field alongwith her husband, Suraj Mal, and daughter-in-law, Paan Bai. Her husband was collecting wood. In the meantime, Daya Shanker S/o Moti Lal and his mother, Kajodi, resident of Shrima, arrived there and started abusing them. Daya Shanker caught hold of her husband and Kajodi threw a stone which caused an injury on the head of her husband who expired on the spot. Sita Ram and others took her husband to Lalsot Hospital. Her husband was killed by Daya Shanker and Kajodi. On getting the aforesaid written report, an FIR No.163/09 was registered at Police Station, Lalsot under Sections 302 IPC and 341 IPC. The Police conducted investigation. During investigation, a site plan was prepared, and post-mortem of deceased, Suraj Mal, was got conducted. The samples of viscera etc. were sent to FSL. The accused persons were arrested. On the information given by the accused, Daya Shanker, one lathi was recovered. On completion of the investigation, a case was filed against the accused persons and they were committed to stand trial before the Sessions Judge, Dausa. The case was subsequently transferred to the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) Bandikui. Charges for offences under Sections 341, 302, 302/34 and 447 IPC were framed against the accused persons. They pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution produced 12 witnesses to support its case and documents Ext.P1 to P14. The accused persons were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and they stated that the prosecution witnesses have made false statements. They produced Badri DW-1 in defence and documents Ext.D1 to D3 were produced. After hearing the parties, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused persons from offences under Sections 341, 302, 302/34 and 447 IPC. However, Smt. Kajodi was held guilty of offence under Section 325 IPC and sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 10,000/-. They produced Badri DW-1 in defence and documents Ext.D1 to D3 were produced. After hearing the parties, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused persons from offences under Sections 341, 302, 302/34 and 447 IPC. However, Smt. Kajodi was held guilty of offence under Section 325 IPC and sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 10,000/-. In default of payment fine, she was to undergo six months further imprisonment. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the public prosecutor. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the accused - respondents are liable to be convicted and sentenced for the offences committed by them as from the evidence on record it is clearly proved that deceased Suraj Mal died on account of the injuries received on his person. He has also submitted that the accused - respondents were responsible for causing injuries as a result of which Suraj Mal died. He has further submitted that the learned Trial Court has erred in discarding the prosecution evidence on account of minor omission and contradictions even though the prosecution succeeded in proving a case beyond reasonable doubt. Accused - respondent Daya Shanker is liable for the offences with the aid of section 34 IPC. 5. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor has supported the impugned judgment passed by the Trial Court and submitted that it is based on material on record. He has also submitted that the learned Trial Court, after careful scrutiny of each and every aspect of the matter, has held that the prosecution has failed to establish offences under sections 302, 447, 302/34 IPC against the accused - respondents. His further submission is that even the medical evidence on record does not support the prosecution case. 6. We have given our anxious and thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the parties. The judgment under challenge has been carefully perused by us alongwith evidence on record produced by the prosecution. The learned Trial Court has acquitted accused - respondents from offence under section 302 IPC as it is not established from the evidence on record that they intended to commit culpable homicide amounting to murder. A careful scrutiny of the prosecution evidence shows that there are three eye witnesses of the incident namely, Paan Bai PW-1, Ram Bai PW-2, Sita Ram PW-3. A careful scrutiny of the prosecution evidence shows that there are three eye witnesses of the incident namely, Paan Bai PW-1, Ram Bai PW-2, Sita Ram PW-3. From their statements it is found that accused-respondent Smt. Kajodi caused an injury on the head of Suraj Mal by hitting him with a stone. After the stone hit Surajmal, he fell down and expired. The prosecution has produced Dr. L.C. Meena PW-7 to prove the postmortem report of deceased Suraj Mal Ext.P8 which shows that he had the following injuries on his person: 1. Abrasion 2 cm W 2 cm on left hand dorsally. 2. Lacerated wound 3 cm W 1 cm in right occipital region. 3. Swelling 7 cm W 5 cm. 4. Bruise 2 W 2 cm in right occipital area of scalp. 7. Fracture of right occipital bone was discerned and the cause of death was coma due to head injury. The prosecution has also produced Dr. B.L. Agarwal PW-10 to prove the post-mortem report and FSL report Ext.P8 and P9. The learned Trial Court has carefully considered the statements of both the Doctors and observed that they have not stated that the injuries caused to Suraj Mal were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. We have carefully considered the matter. 8. Section 300 IPC provides that except in the cases here-in-after excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or, "3rdly, if it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death." 9. In the instant case, surprisingly, the prosecution did not adduce any evidence to prove that the injuries caused on the body of Suraj Mal were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Neither the eye witnesses nor the Doctors produced by the prosecution, have stated so. We have closely and carefully gone through the statements of Dr.L.C. Meena PW-7 and Dr.B.L. Agarwal PW-10 as well as post-mortem report Ext.P8 and find that there is nothing to prove the aforesaid aspect of the case. In these circumstances, the finding of the learned Trial Court that offence under section 302 IPC is not proved against the accused - respondents is fully justified. 10. In these circumstances, the finding of the learned Trial Court that offence under section 302 IPC is not proved against the accused - respondents is fully justified. 10. The learned Trial Court has examined the prosecution evidence and recorded that the dispute between the parties arose on account of cutting of 'Babool tree. After careful consideration of the statements of witnesses, namely, Paan Bai PW-1, Ram Bai PW-2, Sita Ram PW-3, Tej Raj Singh PW-11 and the site plan Ext.P2, it has held that the tree was standing at the boundary of the fields of accused Daya Shanker and deceased Suraj Mal. The incident also took place at that spot. In the circumstances, there is no question of the accused-respondents having committed criminal trespass as they had every right to go and work in their field. An attempt has been made by some of the prosecution witnesses to say that the tree was not on the boundary of the fields of accused Daya Shanker and deceased Suraj Mal, but in the field of deceased Suraj Mal. However, learned Trial Court has disagreed with it. We have also looked into the statement of Tej Raj Singh PW-11, the Investigating Officer, and feel that the conclusion of the learned Trial Court is correct. The accused - respondents were also charged for offence under Section 341 IPC but there is no evidence to show that the accused persons restrained the deceased from moving in any direction. Hence, this offence is also not proven. 11. Lastly, we have to consider whether accused Daya Shanker can be held responsible for offences with the aid of section 34 IPC. To invoke Section 34 IPC, pre-arranged plan/meeting of minds is a sine qua non. Several persons can simultaneously attack a man and each can have the same intention, namely, the intention to kill, and each can individually inflict a separate fatal blow and yet none may have the common intention required by the section because there was no prior meeting of minds to form a prearranged plan. Several persons can simultaneously attack a man and each can have the same intention, namely, the intention to kill, and each can individually inflict a separate fatal blow and yet none may have the common intention required by the section because there was no prior meeting of minds to form a prearranged plan. In a case like that, each would be individually liable for whatever injury he caused but none could be vicariously convicted for the act of any of the others; and if the prosecution cannot prove that his separate blow was a fatal one he cannot be convicted of the murder however clearly an intention to kill could be proved in his case. To convict the accused of an offence applying Section 34, it should be proved that the criminal act was done in concert, pursuant to the pre-arranged plan. Taking similar view in an M.P. Case, it was held that when there is no pre-concert nor there is any pre-arranged plan and injuries caused by the accused are not individually sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, but collectively they resulted in death of the victim, the offence answers not section 302 read with section 34 but Section 326 IPC. 12. This Court in the case of Sheodan v. State of Rajasthan, 1973 Rajasthan Law Weekly 572 has held that inference of common intention should never be reached unless it is necessary inference deducible from the circumstances of the case. The fact that accused are present at the place of occurrence and their running away after occurrence without further materials or without direct evidence of prior concert cannot be said to be incompatible with innocence of accused. Existence of prior concert has to be ascertained from facts and circumstances such as conduct of the accused preceding commission of the offence, nature and manner of inflicting and seat of the injuries, conspiracy before commission of the offence and subsequent conduct, like running away together. 13. Existence of prior concert has to be ascertained from facts and circumstances such as conduct of the accused preceding commission of the offence, nature and manner of inflicting and seat of the injuries, conspiracy before commission of the offence and subsequent conduct, like running away together. 13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1994 SC 1651 has held that appellant accused along with co-accused caught hold of deceased and another accused, taking out a knife from his pocket, inflicted single injury on deceased and the fact that this accused was carrying a knife was not known to the other two accused, but High Court convicted them under Section 34/302. Supreme Court reversing the order of High Court (P&H) held that stabbing cannot be said to be a conjoint act so as to attract the element of common intention on the part of the other two accused. 14. The learned Trial Court has considered this question carefully on Page No.23 of the judgment. It has mentioned the circumstances due to which it cannot be held that there was pre-arranged plan to murder Suraj Mal by both the accused. The circumstances mentioned are that only one injury was caused in the head of Suraj Mal by accused Smt. Kajodi. The injury was caused all of a sudden with a stone. The prosecution has in effect failed to prove that the said injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. It has further noted that the dispute between parties occurred all of a sudden when Suraj Mal started taking the wood of the tree from the field. There was no pre-arranged plan of the accused persons to cause injury to Suraj Mal. The prosecution has not produced any evidence about the size of the stone which caused the injury. The alleged stone has not been recovered from the site. The wood, which was being taken by Suraj Mal, was not seized by Police during investigation. No evidence has been produced to show from what distance the stone was hit. There was only one assault by accused Kajodi and it was not repeated. No injury was caused by Daya Shanker and his holding the hand of Suraj Mal cannot be construed as having common intention of causing his murder. No evidence has been produced to show from what distance the stone was hit. There was only one assault by accused Kajodi and it was not repeated. No injury was caused by Daya Shanker and his holding the hand of Suraj Mal cannot be construed as having common intention of causing his murder. We have carefully considered the aforesaid circumstances of the case and feel that the accused Daya Shanker cannot be held liable for the offences with the aid of Section 34 IPC for want of evidence. 15. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court dated 10.05.2011 is just and proper and based on material on record. There is nothing in the impugned judgment so as to hold that it is either perverse or the same is not based on the evidence produced by the parties. Moreover, there is no cogent reason for this Court, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, to reverse the finding arrived at by the learned Trial Court or to take a different view from the one taken by the Trial Court. In such view of the matter, the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court dated 10.05.2011 does not warrant any interference by this Court. 16. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed as being devoid of merits.Appeal dismissed. *******