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2011 DIGILAW 1583 (RAJ)

Bharat Singh v. The State of Rajasthan

2011-08-03

SANDEEP MEHTA

body2011
JUDGMENT 1. - The present Criminal Misc. Petition has been filed by the accused-petitioner who is facing trial in the Court of Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate in connection with Criminal Case No. 497/2002- State v. Bharat Singh for the offences under Sections 408, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B, IPC. The present petition has been filed assailing the order dated 26.07.2010 passed by the revisional Court whereby the revision filed by the accused against the order dated 11.05.2011 passed by the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra directing framing of charges against the petitioner for the aforesaid offences has been affirmed. Assailing the order framing charges and proceedings going on against the petitioner, it has been submitted by Shri H.S.S. Kharlia, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Ramandeep Singh Sidhu appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner was the employee of the Bhadra Kraya Vikraya Sahakari Samiti, Badara and while being so posted, I the petitioner is alleged to have committed the offence of defalcation and forgery in relation to the accounts of the Samiti during the period of 1981-82. The FIR was filed on 21.06.1985 by the Vyavasthapak of the Samiti arraying the petitioner as accused for the offence under Section 408 Indian Penal Code at the Police Station, Bhadra District Sri Ganganagar. The same was registered at the 1 Police Station on 21.06.1985. The allegation was regarding the defalcation of the funds of the Samiti. The initial investigation was carried out and at the conclusion of the investigation, first charge-sheet against the accused and in relation to the total period of the alleged offence was submitted in the I competent Court on 21.11.1992, i.e. after ten years of the commission of alleged offences and after seven years of the registration of the FIR. 2. Thereafter, the matter kept on lingering for framing of the charges against the accused. On 31.06.1993, the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate directed the learned public prosecutor to file a separate charge sheet in the matter because the alleged period of defalcation was not such that the offence in relation thereto could be tried together. Thereafter, the matter kept on pending for filling of the separate charge sheet by the prosecution. On 27.07.1995, the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate directed the prosecution to file the charge sheet on the very next date, failing which the learned Addl. Thereafter, the matter kept on pending for filling of the separate charge sheet by the prosecution. On 27.07.1995, the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate directed the prosecution to file the charge sheet on the very next date, failing which the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate observed that the case would be 1 decided on the basis of the papers already available on record. However, I despite this last opportunity, again time was given for filing of the separate charge sheet. Before that tom co-accused, namely, Pushkar Dutt and Sadhu Ram filed application on 14.05.1996 to discharge under Section 239, Criminal Procedure Code. However, it appears that without the separate charge sheet being filed, the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate proceeded to post the matter for arguments on charges on 15.11.1996 and then the matter kept on lingering for argument on charges till February, 1998 and on 15.02.1999 the charges were framed against the accused person on the basis of the original charge sheet itself. The aforesaid order dated 15.02.1999 was challenged by the accused by way of a revision and the revisional Court remanded the matter back on 27.09.2000 with the direction to lower Court to pass a reasoned order. On 05.12.2000, on the basis of the arguments on behalf of the accused persons, the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate again directed the public prosecutor to file separate charge sheet and the accused was discharged with liberty given to the prosecution to file separate charge-sheet against the accused petitioner. The file of the case was directed to be consigned to record. 3. It may be mentioned here that in the meantime proceedings under Section 74 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act was going on against the petitioner and the enquiry officer arrived at the finding that the petitioner herein is responsible for the defalcation alleged against him. The Assistant Registrar by order dated 27.03.1984 fixed the liability on the accused and directed him to deposit the money in time. The said order was challenged by Kashi Ram and Aad Ram and the appellate authority found most of the charges not to be proved and ultimately, the finding was given that Kashi Ram was liable to pay a sum of Rs. 85/- with interest and Aad Ram was liable to pay a sum of Rs. 1500/- with interest. 4. The said order was challenged by Kashi Ram and Aad Ram and the appellate authority found most of the charges not to be proved and ultimately, the finding was given that Kashi Ram was liable to pay a sum of Rs. 85/- with interest and Aad Ram was liable to pay a sum of Rs. 1500/- with interest. 4. The prosecution, thereafter filed a second charge sheet in the Court of 25.11.2002 and the accused were directed to be summoned. The accused appeared in the Court on 28.03.2003 and the matter was adjourned for framing or charges till April/May, 2004. The learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate by two orders dated 07.05.2004 directed framing of charges against the petitioners Kashi Ram, Banwari and Aad Ram for the offences under Sections 408, 467, 468 and 120-B Indian Penal Code. As regards co-accused Sadhu Ram, Rameshwear, Pushkar Dutt and Bharat Singh, the order framing charges was passed on 11.05.2004. The accused persons preferred a separate revisions against the aforesaid orders and the revision petitions were decided by separate orders but on the same day, i.e. 26.07.2010 wherein the revisional Court rejected the revisions filed by the accused. 5. As regards the question of delay, the revisional Court observed that the delay can be a ground for quashing the proceedings under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. As regards the exoneration of the accused by the Addl. Registrar, Rajasthan Co-operative Societies, Jodhpur, the learned revisional Court was of the opinion that the exoneration in the enquiry under the Co-operative Societies Act could not be a ground to discharge the accuse. Now the accused petitioner is before this Court by way of this criminal misc. petition seeking quashing of the proceeding against him on various grounds including the ground of the delay occasioned in the trial of the case amounting to the infringement of the fundamental right of the accused of an expeditious trial. 6. Arguing on behalf of the petitioner, Shri Kharalia submitted that in this case the offences are of the year 1981-82. The FIR was filed four years after the alleged offences on the basis of the audit report and initially a joint charge sheet was filed which was found to be illegal and as such, the Court directed the prosecution to file a separate charge sheets. The FIR was filed four years after the alleged offences on the basis of the audit report and initially a joint charge sheet was filed which was found to be illegal and as such, the Court directed the prosecution to file a separate charge sheets. The matter kept on pending for a long period because the prosecution did not file separate charge sheets despite the directions of he trial Court and despite being provided opportunities for a period of almost 15 years. Ultimately, the dilatory tactics of the prosecution forced the trial Court to close the proceedings on 15.12.2000, Even thereafter, the prosecution took long period of almost two years to file separate charge sheets against accused persons. By the time the separate charge sheet was filed, the offence was already more than 21 years old. Before coming to a conclusion on the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners, it would be appropriate to consider the views of the Apex Court on this issue. The delay in investigation and trial of the case has been frowned upon by the Hon'ble Apex Court in numerous decisions and particularly when the accused is not responsible for the delay. The Hon'ble Apex Court has recommended the exercise of powers under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. For quashing of the delayed proceedings. It has been observed that the delay in investigation and the trial of the case often results into the evidence of the prosecution as well as the defence becomes unavailable thereby prejudicing both, the prosecution as well as the accused. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bilmr, AIR 2009 SC 1822 has observed as below:- "Time and again this Court has emphasised the need for speedy investigations and trial as both are mandated by the letter and spirit of the provisions of the Cr.P.C. (In particular, Sections. 197, 173, 309, 437 (6) and 468 etc.) and the constitutional protection enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. Inspired by the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by a seven Judge Bench of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr. , in Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. 197, 173, 309, 437 (6) and 468 etc.) and the constitutional protection enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. Inspired by the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by a seven Judge Bench of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr. , in Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar , this Court had observed that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law; that such procedure is not some semblance of a procedure but the procedure should be 'reasonable, fair and just'; and therefrom flows, without doubt the right to speedy trial. It was also observed that no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21. The Court clarified that speedy trial means reasonably expeditious trial which is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The exposition of Article 21 in Hussainara Khatoon's case (supra) was exhaustively considered afresh by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehnian Antulay and Ors. v. R.S. Nayak and Anr. Referring to a number of decisions of this Court and the American precedents on the Sixth Amendment of their Constitution, making the right to a speedy and public trial a constitutional guarantee, the Court formulated as many as eleven propositions with a note of caution that these were not exhaustive and were meant only to serve as guidelines. For the sake of brevity, we do not propose to reproduce all the said propositions and it would suffice to note the gist thereof. For the sake of brevity, we do not propose to reproduce all the said propositions and it would suffice to note the gist thereof. These are : (i) fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily; (ii) right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial; (iii) in every case where the speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is - who is responsible for the delay?; (iv) while determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the Court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on -what is called, the systemic delays; (v) each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. How' ever, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case; (vi) ultimately, the Court has to balance and weigh several relevant factors-'balancing test' or 'balancing process' - and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied; (vii) Ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to a conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open and having regard to the nature of offence and other circumstances when the Court feels that quashing of proceedings, cannot be in the interest of justice, it is open to the Court to make appropriate orders, including fixing the period for completion of trial; (viii) it is neither advisable nor feasible to prescribe any outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the Court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint; (ix) an objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in the High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis. Notwithstanding elaborate enunciation of Article 21 of the Constitution in Abdul Rehman Antulay (supra), and rejection of the fervent plea of proponents of right to speedy trial for laying down time-limits as bar beyond which a criminal trial shall not proceed, pronouncement of this Court in "Common Cause" A Registered Society v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. , "Common Cause", A Registered Society v. Union of India and Ors. , Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar and Raj Deo Sharma II v. State of Bihar gave rise to some confusion on the question whether an outer time limit for conclusion of criminal proceedings could be prescribed where after the trial Court would be obliged to terminate the proceedings and necessarily acquit or discharge the accused. The confusion on the issue was set at rest by a seven-judge Bench of this Court in P. Raniachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka . Speaking for the majority, R.C. Lahoti, J. (as his Lordship then was) while affirming that the dictum in A.R. Antulays case (supra) as correct and the one which still holds the field and the propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in the said case adequately take care of right to speedy trial, it was held that guidelines laid down in the A.R. Antulay's case (supra) are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to be applied as a strait-jacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact-situation of each case as it is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalisation can be made. They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to be applied as a strait-jacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact-situation of each case as it is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalisation can be made. It has also been held that it is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. Nonetheless, the criminal Courts should exercise their available powers such as those under Sections 309, 311 and 258 of Criminal Procedure Code to effectuate the right to speedy trial. In appropriate cases, jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code and Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief or suitable directions. The outer limits or power of limitation expounded in the aforenoted judgments were held to be not in consonance with the legislative intent. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in Court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal prosecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the Court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, enumerated above, and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. Where the Court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the Court feels that having reared to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing off proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a situation, it is open to the Court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of time frame for conclusion of trial." 7. In such a situation, it is open to the Court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of time frame for conclusion of trial." 7. Again in the decision rendered in the judgment of Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC 3077 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has exercised the powers, relying upon the judgments of Abdul Rehman Antulay, Hussainara Khatoon and Meneka Gandhi, to quash the criminal proceedings against the petitioner when the same were suffering from latches, not attributable to the accused. The observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court reads as below:- "The scope and ambit of powers of the High Court under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code or Article 227 of the Constitution has been enunciated and reiterated by this Court in series of decisions and several circumstances under which the High Court can exercise jurisdiction in quashing proceedings have been enumerated. Therefore, we consider it unnecessary to burden the judgment by making reference to all the decisions on the point. It would suffice to state that though the powers possessed by the High Courts under the said provisions are very wide but these should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone to Court exist. The inherent powers do not confer and arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. The powers have to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest or rare cases, where the Court is convinced, on the basis or material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse or the process or the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. [See: Janata Dal v. H.S. Choudhary and Ors. 6 , Kurukshetra University and Ant. v. State of Haryana and Anr. and State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [See: Janata Dal v. H.S. Choudhary and Ors. 6 , Kurukshetra University and Ant. v. State of Haryana and Anr. and State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. Although in Bhajan Lal's case (supra), the Court by way of illustration, formulated as many as seven categories or cases, wherein the extraordinary power under the aforeastated provisions could be exercised by the High Court to prevent abuse of process of the Court yet it was clarified that it was not possible to lay down precise and inflexible guidelines or any rigid formula or to give an exhaustive list of the circumstances in which such power could be exercised. The purport of the expression "rarest or rare cases" has been explained very recently in Soui Mittal (supra). Speaking for the three-judge Bench, Hon'ble the Chief Justice has said thus: "When the words 'rarest of rare cases' are used after the words 'sparingly and with circumspection' while describing the scope of Section 482, those words merely emphasise and reiterate what is intended to be conveyed by the words 'sparingly and with circumspection'. They mean that the power under Section 482 to quash proceedings should not be used mechanically or routinely, but with care and caution, only when a clear case for quashing is made out and failure to interfere would lead to a miscarriage of justice. The expression "rarest of rare cases" is not used in the sense in which it is used with reference to punishment for offences under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, but to emphasise that the power under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code to quash the FIR or criminal proceedings should be used sparingly and with circumspection." Bearing in mind the above legal position, we are of the opinion that, for the reasons stated hereafter, the ends of justice require that prosecution proceedings in the instant case be quashed. Time and again this Court has emphasised the need for speedy investigations and trial as both are mandated by the letter and spirit of the provisions of the Cr.P.C. (In particular, Sections 197, 173, 309, 437 (6) and 468 etc.) and the constitutional protection enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. Inspired by the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by a seven-judge Bench of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr. , in Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. Inspired by the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by a seven-judge Bench of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr. , in Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar , this Court had said that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law; that such procedure is not some semblance of a procedure but the procedure should be 'reasonable, fair and just'; and therefrom flows, without doubt, the right to speedy trial. It was also observed that on procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21. The Court clarified that speedy trial means reasonably expeditious trial which is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The exposition of Article 21 in Hussainara Khatoon's case (supra) was exhaustively considered afresh by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay and Ors. v. R.S. Nayak and Anr. Referring to a number of decisions of this Court and the American precedents on the Sixth Amendment of their Constitution, making the right to a speedy and public trial a constitutional guarantee, the Court formulated as many as eleven propositions with a note of caution that these were not exhaustive and were meant only to serve as guidelines. For the sake of brevity, we do not propose to reproduce all the said propositions and it would suffice to note the gist thereof. For the sake of brevity, we do not propose to reproduce all the said propositions and it would suffice to note the gist thereof. These are: (i) fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily; (ii) right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial; (iii) in every case where the speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is - who is responsible for the delay?; (iv) while determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the Court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on - what is called, the systemic delays; (v) each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case; (vi) ultimately, the Court has to balance and weigh several relevant factors - 'balancing test' or 'balancing process' - and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied; (vii) Ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open and having regard to the nature of offence and other circumstances when the Court feels that quashing of proceedings cannot be in the interest of justice, it is open to the Court to make appropriate orders, including fixing the period for completion of trial; (viii) it is neither advisable nor feasible to prescribe any outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. In every case of complaint of denial of right to Speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. In every case of complaint of denial of right to Speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the Court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint; (ix) an objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis. Notwithstanding elaborate enunciation of Article 21 of the Constitution in Abdul Rehman Antulay (supra), and rejection of the fervent plea of proponents of right to speedy trial for laying down time-limits as bar beyond which a criminal trial shall not proceed pronouncements of this Court in "Common Cause" A Registered Society v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. , Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar and "Common Cause", A Registered Society v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. , Raj Deo Sharma II v. State of Bihar gave rise to some confusion on the question whether an outer time limit for conclusion of criminal proceedings could be prescribed where after the trial Court would be obliged to terminate the proceedings and necessarily acquit or discharge the accused. The confusion on the issue was set at rest by a seven-judge Bench of this Court in P. Raniachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka . Speaking for the majority, R.C. Lahoti, J. (as his Lordship then was) while affirming that the dictum in A.R. Antulay's case (supra) is correct and still holds the field and the propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in the said case adequately take care of right to speedy trial, it was held that guidelines laid down in the A.R. Antulay's case (supra) are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to be applied like a strait-jacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact situation of each case as it is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalisation can be made. They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to be applied like a strait-jacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact situation of each case as it is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalisation can be made. It has also been held that it is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. Nonetheless, the criminal Courts should exercise their available power such as those under Sections 309, 311, and 258 of Criminal Procedure Code to effectuate the right to speedy trial. In appropriate cases, jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code and Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief or suitable directions. The outer limits or power of limitation expounded in the afore noted judgments were held to be not in consonance with the legislative intent. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in Court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal persecution and is not confined to any particular category of cases. In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the Court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, enumerated above, and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. Where the Court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be? quashed unless the Court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a situation, it is open to the Court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of time for conclusion of trial." 8. quashed unless the Court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a situation, it is open to the Court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of time for conclusion of trial." 8. Per contra, the learned public prosecutor has submitted that the delay alone cannot be the ground to quash the criminal prosecution because the prosecution was for serious allegations and the accused was also responsible for the delay inasmuch as the accused filed the revision against the order of framing charges in the year 1998 as well as 2004 and that the delay again since 2004 was attributable to the accused. 9. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced at the Bar. In the opinion of this Court, in this case, the delay which has occurred in the investigation and the trial of the case, cannot be attributed to the accused. The offences alleged are of the year 1981-82. The FIR for the offences alleged was filed in the year 1985, i.e. After four years of the commission of the offence. The initial charge sheet was filed by the prosecution in 1992, i.e. after 10 years of the commission of the offence, obviously, the accused could not have been responsible for this delay. Thereafter, the matter kept on pending for framing of charges and on 30.06.1993, the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate found that the charge sheet filed was illegal for the reason that there was misjoinder of the accused as well as offences and the prosecution was given time to file separate charge sheet. The matter again kept on lingering till 1999 when the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate framed charges against the accused on 15.02.1999. Again this period could not have been attributed to the accused because the prosecution was under a burden to file separate charge sheets as referred to above. The order dated 15.02.1999 was assailed by the accused successfully before the revisional Court and the case was remanded back for passing a reasoned order. Ultimately, the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate was forced to close the prosecution case on 15.12.2000. Two years down the line, the prosecution filed separate charge sheets on 25.11.2002. 10. The order dated 15.02.1999 was assailed by the accused successfully before the revisional Court and the case was remanded back for passing a reasoned order. Ultimately, the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate was forced to close the prosecution case on 15.12.2000. Two years down the line, the prosecution filed separate charge sheets on 25.11.2002. 10. The inference which has to be drawn is that the lackadaisical manner of investigation spread over a period of 17 years, was only and only attributable to the prosecution and the accused was not at all responsible for the delay occasioned in the filing of the proper charge sheet. The subsequently delay wherein the accused challenged the charges in the revision cannot be said to be a delay occasioned in the prosecution, but the fact remains that the proper charge sheet in the matter was filed after 17 years of the FIR and after more than 20 years from the date when the offence was committed. 11. Tested on the touch stone of the broad principles enumerated above, this Court is of the view that in the instant case, the petitioner's fundamental right for a speedy trial recognised under Article 21 of the Constitution of India stands violated. The proper charge sheet in this case was filled after more than 20 years from the commission of the offence and during this period, the prosecution was responsible for seeking adjournments from the Court for filling of the charge-sheet. The accused has already been exonerated in relation to major charges by the Addl. Registrar under Section 74 of the cooperative Societies Act and, therefore, the possibility of the accused now has become extremely remote. Therefore, this Court is of the firm opinion that the prosecution/proceedings against the accused-petitioner are vitiated on account of their being violative of petitioner's fundamental rights speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 12. Consequently, this Criminal Misc. Petition is allowed and the criminal proceedings against the accused in Criminal Case No 497/2002 pending in the Court of Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra are hereby quashed.Petition allowed. *******