S.S. Chauhan, J.;- This revision has been filed against the judgment and order dated 7.9.2010 passed by the Judge, SCC/Additional District Judge, Court No.1, Lakhimpur Kheri. 2. The facts giving rise to the present revision are that plaintiff Usman Naqvi being a blind person and also incapable of protecting his right and interest by reason of unsoundness of mind and mental infirmity filed a suit through his next friend Shahnawaj Naqvi his father. Usman Naqvi proceeded to let out his shop to revisionist-defendant in the year 1996 on a monthly rent of Rs.1200/-. The said shop was given on rent by Shahnawaj Naqvi on behalf of Usman Naqvi and Shahnawaj Naqvi has been receiving the rent of the said shop. The shop was initially taken on rent for a period of one year and thereafter it was not vacated although the revisionist was required to vacate the shop in the month of September, 1997. A Suit was filed by the revisionist against the respondent in respect of the claim of Rs.20,000/- being taken by the respondent as advance although it is stated that the said advance was never taken in any form by the respondent. The shop was taken on rent for store purposes, but the revisionist started using it as a retailed shop to sell the food materials. A registered notice was sent to the revisionist on 10.12.2002 through his counsel, which was served on the revisionist on 13.12.2002 by means of which the tenancy of the revisionist was terminated after one month of the receipt of the notice and arrears of rent were also demanded, but despite the said notice revisionist did not pay the rent and neither vacated the shop in question. The shop in question is a newly constructed shop and the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short 'U.P. Act No.13 of 1972') do not apply on it. During the pendency of the Suit, plaintiff Usman Naqvi died and Shahnawaj Naqvi being the legal heir of Usman Naqvi was impleaded as party in the Suit. The actual rent due against the revisionist from October, 1997 to 13th January 2003 was to the tune of Rs.76,100/-, but in the Suit the rent for only three years was claimed along with damages to the tune of Rs.43,200/-. 3. The actual rent due against the revisionist from October, 1997 to 13th January 2003 was to the tune of Rs.76,100/-, but in the Suit the rent for only three years was claimed along with damages to the tune of Rs.43,200/-. 3. Written statement was filed by the revisionist denying the allegations made in the Suit and it was stated that the Suit is barred by the provisions of Order 32, Rule 15 CPC as the plaintiff is blind, but he is not mentally infirm and no inquiry as contemplated under law has been held in respect of the provisions contained under Order 32, Rule 15 CPC. The acceptance of notice and payment of rent were also denied. It was also stated in the additional plea that respondent resides in Kanpur City and he is unable to see, therefore, he gave shops no.8, 9 and 10 on rent received by him on allotment. The plaintiff-respondent had given the disputed shop no.8 to the revisionist in the month of May, 1997 on monthly rent of Rs.1200/- on rent and at the time of giving the shop on rent plaintiff had accepted Rs.30,000/- as advance from the revisionist and has promised that this amount shall remain deposited with the respondent as security money and as and when the shop would be vacated by the revisionist the respondent will return the said amount to the revisionist. It was also pleaded that in case the respondent will not be able to return the amount, he will adjust the same in the rent. However, no receipt was given to the revisionist by the respondent in regard to amount of Rs.30,000/- in spite of demand being made by the revisionist. The respondent has never given any receipt of rent to the revisionist. The respondent has given shop nos. 9 and 10 to other tenants, but he does not give any receipt to the aforesaid tenants also. The revisionist has started his business in the disputed shop in the name of Deepak Brothers of food materials after taking it on rent. He has also obtained licence regarding his business. Respondent has got no need of the shop as he does not reside in Lakhimpur Kheri nor he has any business in Lakhimpur Kheri and apart from the aforesaid fact he is a blind person and is unable to carry on any business. He has also obtained licence regarding his business. Respondent has got no need of the shop as he does not reside in Lakhimpur Kheri nor he has any business in Lakhimpur Kheri and apart from the aforesaid fact he is a blind person and is unable to carry on any business. The respondent wants to get the disputed shop vacated from the revisionist so that he may let it out to another person on higher rent. In the month of July, 2002 respondent came to Lakhimpur Kheri and asked the revisionist to vacate the shop in dispute and when the revisionist showed his inability to vacate the shop, then he was threatened by the respondent that he will get the shop vacated through police and antisocial elements. Thereafter, he filed Suit No.210 of 2002 before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Lakhimpur Kheri, which was decreed on 23.4.2005. The revisionist has been paying rent of the disputed shop till June, 2002. After filing of Suit No.210 of 2002 respondent stopped realising rent from the revisionist. The respondent received an amount of Rs.21,600/- towards arrears of rent along with interest on 6.11.2003 and gave receipt of it. During the pendency of the Suit the respondent has been receiving the rent regularly from the revisionist. 4. Shahnawaj Naqvi filed his evidence in the form of affidavit and he has been examined and cross-examined before the court as P.W.-1. An affidavit was also filed by the revisionist as D.W.-1 and he was also subjected to cross-examination before the court. 5. After considering the evidence adduced by the parties and after hearing the arguments advanced by the parties counsel, the Suit of the respondent was decreed by the court below by means of judgment and decree dated 7.9.2010. Feeling aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment, the present revision has been filed. 6. Submission of learned counsel for the revisionist is that the inquiry as contemplated under Order 32 Rule 15 CPC has not been held and merely on the basis of satisfaction of the court Shahnawaj Naqvi could not have been permitted to file the Suit as next friend as Usman Naqvi was not a person of unsound mind and this basic fact has not been examined and enquired into by the court below. The next submission on behalf of the revisionist is that signatures of the revisionist on the service could not be compared by the court and it ought to have been sent to the expert opinion. He has also submitted that points of determination have also not been framed and discussed point wise, therefore, the order passed by the court below is bad in law. It is also submitted that notice as contemplated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not served upon the revisionist and so the entire proceedings are vitiated for non-service of the notice. 7. Counsel for the respondent has vehemently denied the arguments of counsel for the revisionist and has submitted that full pledged inquiry as contemplated under Order 32 Rule 15 CPC is not required under law. In support of his contention he has relied upon the following decisions :- "Chapalamadugu Govindayya and another v. Suddapalli Ramamurthi and others, (28) AIR 1941 Madras 524, Smt. Godawari Devi v. Smt. Radha Pyari Devi and others, AIR 1985 Patna 366, Smt. Katori Devi v. Nawab Singh and others, 2010 All. C.J. 1218, and Abdul Asees v. Devaki in RCR Nos.36 & 86 of 2009 decided by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam on 8.4.2008." 8. The next argument on behalf of the respondent is that the court was fully empowered to tally the signatures as contemplated under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act and if the revisionist was having any objection, then he could have adduced expert opinion in support of his claim. It is also submitted that points of determination are not to be considered in the perspective as argued by the counsel for the revisionist, but if it could be inferred and it is evident from the judgment that various points have been considered and finding has been recorded in that respect, then the mere non-framing of the points will not vitiate the judgment. In support of his contention he has placed reliance upon the following decisions: "G. Amalorpavam and others v. R.C. Diocess of Madurai and others, (2006) 3 SCC 224 , and Irshad Ali (since deceased) and another v. Viresh Agarwal and others, 2008 (5) ALJ 537." 9. In support of his contention he has placed reliance upon the following decisions: "G. Amalorpavam and others v. R.C. Diocess of Madurai and others, (2006) 3 SCC 224 , and Irshad Ali (since deceased) and another v. Viresh Agarwal and others, 2008 (5) ALJ 537." 9. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that notice if sent through registered post, then presumption lies that the same has been sent and delivered to the addressee. Mere denial is not sufficient unless and until the addressee is able to prove the defect in the notice that signatures are not there on the acknowledgment due and if this fact is accepted and established before the court, then only the burden will shift upon the plaintiff-respondent to prove the service of notice. In support of his contention he has placed reliance upon the following decisions:- "Civil Revision No.352 of 2001, Sri Satish Jaiswal v. Sri Rameshwari Prasad and another, decided by this Court on 5.10.2009, Ghulam Waris Khan and another v. Lt. Col. Ajeet Singh and another, 2008 (2) ARC 548, Bhojraj Wadhwa and another v. Ixth Additional District Judge,Muzaffarnagar and others, 2008 (2) ARC 325, Waqf Allal Aulad/Waqf Alkhair Allahtala, Dr. Ziaul Haq, Bijnor and another v. Ist ADJ, Bijnor and others, 2008 (3) ARC 428, Jagtar Singh Chopra v. Trilok Chand, 1999 (2) ARC 292, Rais Ahmad v. Special/Additional District Judge, Saharanpur and others, 1997 (2) ARC190, Smt. Prakash Rani @ Prakashwati v. VIth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr and others, 2006 (64) ALR 592, Ateeq Ahmad v. Vth A.D.J. and others, 2005 (60) ALR 674, Shakti Mohan alias Arvind Mohan v. District Judge, Tehri Garhwal and others, 1995 (2) ARC 538, Parwati Bai v. Radhika, (2003) 12 SCC 551 , and M/s Green View Radio Service v. Laxmibai Ramji and another, AIR 1990 SC 2156 ." 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. The first argument of the counsel for the revisionist that the inquiry as contemplated under Order 32 Rule 15 CPC has not been held is devoid of merit and does not require much acceptance on account of the fact that the law in this regard has been settled by catena of decisions and an elaborate and full pledged inquiry is not required and it is a matter between the court and the plaintiff to be decided as to whether he should be allowed to be sued by a competent person as his next friend. The law does not suppose a full pledged trial, otherwise the litigation will never come to an end in view of the prolonged inquiry as argued by the counsel for the revisionist. 12. In the case Chapalamadugu Govindayya (supra) the Madras High Court considering the aforesaid issue summed the law as under :- " According to the above rule the provisions relating to minors should be applied as far as they are applicable. In the case of a person who is not adjudged to be of unsound mind but by reason of unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity is incapable of protecting his rights the plaint should be filed on his behalf by a next friend. That has been done in this case. But what is urged is that before a next friend can represent such a person it must be found on enquiry by the Court that the person by reason of unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity is incapable of protecting his interests. That is, there must be a preliminary enquiry and a finding of the Court before the plaint was filed. That is the view taken by our leaned brother Mockett, J. It seems to us that such a procedure is not contemplated by the provisions of the Code. Apparently our learned brother was having in view of the procedure similar to that adopted in pauper suits or the English practice. There is no provision in the Civil Procedure Code under which such an enquiry can be had. Apparently our learned brother was having in view of the procedure similar to that adopted in pauper suits or the English practice. There is no provision in the Civil Procedure Code under which such an enquiry can be had. What is contemplated is that the plaint must be filed by a next friend and the Court, before admitting the plaint, should satisfy itself on enquiry that the person on whose behalf the plaint is presented was by reason of unsoundness of mind incapable of protecting his interests and should be represented by a next friend. Ordinarily the next friend ought to file an application supported by an affidavit along with the plaint and the Judge should pass an order thereon. That the section does contemplate an enquiry there can be no doubt, but the nature of the enquiry is not indicated. It seems to us that if the affidavit in support of the request to permit a person to sue as a next friend discloses all the facts which would satisfy the Court that the person on whose behalf the plaint is presented is by reason of unsound mind or mental infirmity incapable of protecting his interests, without any further enquiry the Court can permit the next friend to sue on his behalf, or if the allegations in the affidavit are not convincing. It is open to the Court to direct the next friend to produce witnesses before it in order that it may satisfy itself as to the mental capacity of the person on whose behalf the plaint is presented. All that is needed is that there should be some prima facie proof such as to satisfy the Court that the person was by reason of unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity incapable of protecting his interests, because an order permitting the next friend to represent such a person is not final. It is always open to the defendant to take out an independent application to have the said order revoked when the Court can go fully into the matter. But when once the Court permits the next friend to sue on behalf of such a person, it is not open to the Court to raise an independent issue in the trial as to the competency of the next friend to represent him in the suit: vide (1914) 1 Ch 968, Richmondv. But when once the Court permits the next friend to sue on behalf of such a person, it is not open to the Court to raise an independent issue in the trial as to the competency of the next friend to represent him in the suit: vide (1914) 1 Ch 968, Richmondv. Brason & Sons followed in the City Civil Court Appeal No.36 of 1936." 13. In the case of Smt. Godawari Devi (supra) while considering the similar question held as under:- "6. It is common ground that herein we are not dealing with the category of persons adjudged to be of unsound mind. That different considerations would be attracted in their case is patent and, therefore, this category may, for all purposes, be left altogether apart. Adverting now to the second category, it seems plain that the issue of unsoundness of mind of the parties in this class is primarily betwixt the Court and the party and is certainly not a lis betwixt the parties themselves. The legislature in its wisdom has conferred a larger and paternal power on the Court to see that each party has the capacity to safeguard its legal interest and is no way handicapped by reason of any mental infirmity. It is equally significant to notice that this broad based power extends in cases of any mental infirmity and is not necessarily governed by the extreme situation of a person being of unsound mind altogether. To my mind, this beneficial and, indeed, paternal power is wholly vested in the Court and it is in its discretion alone, where it finds that any one of the parties is suffering from a weakness of mind, to proceed for taking steps to safeguard the interest of such a party. To use the language of another jurisdiction, namely, that of contempt, the lis herein is betwixt the Court and such a party and not betwixt the opposite parties as such. As has been said in that jurisdiction, the issue of contempt is primarily between the Court and the contemner, and even more so under. O 32 R. 15 in its second category, it is a matter entirely between the Court and the party alone and nobody else has any vested interest or right to agitate the unsoundness of mind of his opponent in this class. O 32 R. 15 in its second category, it is a matter entirely between the Court and the party alone and nobody else has any vested interest or right to agitate the unsoundness of mind of his opponent in this class. To put it tersely, it is not an issue betwixt the parties and neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has the locus standi to challenge or question the soundness of mind of the opposite side and claim an adjudication thereon at the very threshold. If this were to be so permitted in this field, there would, perhaps, be no end to allegations and counter allegations in this regard and its misuse would be capable of working grave public mischief. 9. To conclude, the answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in the negative and it is held that in the second category of cases under O. 32 R.15 where there is no adjudgement of unsoundness of mind a party has no right or locus standi to challenge the soundness of mind or the mental capacity of the other party and claim an enquiry therefor." 14. In the case of Smt. Katori Devi (supra) this Court held as under:- "18. It is settled law that all Courts of law are established for furtherance of interest of substantial justice and not to obstruct the same on technicalities. Reference Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply; AIR 1969 SC 1267 , wherein it has been held that if substantial justice and technicalities are pitted against each other the cause of substantial justice should not be defeated on technicalities. No procedure in a Court of law should be allowed to defeat the cause of substantial justice on some technicalities. Reference -Ghanshyam Dass and others v. Dominion of India and others, (1984) 3 SCC 46 ." 15. In the case of Abdul Asees (supra) the Kerala High Court dealing with the similar question held as under:- " While addressing the specific question as to whether it is necessary to follow the procedure envisaged by Order 32 in rent control petitions which are filed by or against minors or persons of unsound mind our answer is that substantially the same procedure should be adopted, though not in strict terms of the rule in Order 32. This means that when rent control petitions are filed by or against minors or persons of unsound mind a next friend/guardian will have to be permitted/appointed for the minor or person of unsound mind as the case may be. It will have to be ensured that the person permitted to function as next friend or appointed as guardian is qualified to be so permitted/appointed." 16. Upon consideration of the above case laws, I am in full agreement with the finding recorded by the trial court that appointment of Shahnawaj Naqvi as guardian on behalf of Usman Naqvi was valid and justified and the inquiry as argued by the counsel for the revisionist was permissible only to the limited extent which was permitted by the trial court and so the first point argued by the counsel for the revisionist fails. 17. The second point is in regard to the signatures on the acknowledgment due in pursuance to the notice sent to the revisionist. The trial court took into consideration Paper No.62C which was filed by the revisionist and the signatures on this paper of revisionist have been tallied with the signatures available on acknowledgment due, Ext.3 and they have been found to be identical in nature and so the presumption drawn in regard to service upon the revisionist cannot be doubted in any manner and the court can also tally the signatures to a certain extent where the situation is not too complex to ascertain the signatures on a particular document. The contention that the notice was not served on the revisionist cannot be accepted in view of the law settled by the apex Court as well as by this Court in various decisions. The revisionist has failed to discharge his burden and to convince the court that signatures were not there on the acknowledgment due and so he has not been able to rebut the burden cast upon him to disprove the service. 18. The law was summed up by the apex Court in regard to discharge of burden while rebutting the service of notice in the case of M/s Green View Radio Service (supra), which reads as under:- "Thus, in our view the presumption of service of a letter sent by registered post can be rebutted by the addressee by appearing as witness and stating that he never received such letter. If the acknowledgment due receipt contains the signatures of the addressee himself and the addressee as a witness states that he never received such letter and the acknowledgment due does not bear his signature and such statement of the addressee is believed then it would be sufficient rebuttal of the presumption drawn against him. The burden would then shift on the plaintiff who wants to rely on such presumption to satisfy the Court by leading oral or documentary evidence to prove the service of such letter on the addressee. The rebuttal by the defendant of the presumption drawn against him would of course depend on the verbity of his statement. The Court in the facts and circumstances of a case may not consider such denial by the defendant as truthful and in that case such denial alone would not be sufficient. But if there is nothing to disbelieve the statement of the defendant then it should be sufficient rebuttal of the presumption of service of such letter or notice sent to him by registered post." 19. In Rais Ahmad (supra) this Court laid down the law in regard to service of notice as under:- "4. If a notice is given by the landlord under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, there is a presumption of service of notice under Section 27 of General Clauses Act which provides that the service shall be deemed to have been effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post a letter containing document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. If a letter has been posted at the correct address, it will be deemed to have been served. The presumption relates not only regarding the posting and service of the notice but also of the signature of the recipient on the acknowledgment due form. The landlord is not bound to produce the post man to prove the service of the notice. In Full Bench decision of this Court in Ganga Ram vs. Smt. Phulwati, AIR 1970 Allahabad 446, it has been held that there is a presumption of official acts under Section 114 (e) and (f) of the Evidence Act. The landlord is not bound to produce the post man to prove the service of the notice. In Full Bench decision of this Court in Ganga Ram vs. Smt. Phulwati, AIR 1970 Allahabad 446, it has been held that there is a presumption of official acts under Section 114 (e) and (f) of the Evidence Act. The sender is not under the obligation to produce the postman regarding service of notice, even if there is endorsement of refusal by the postman." In Jagtar Singh Chopra (supra) this Court held as under:- "5. The first point for consideration in the present case is whether the notice was served on the revisionist. The plaintiff-landlord filed a carbon copy of the notice. He also filed a postal receipt showing that the notice was sent by registered post to the revisionist-tenant. He also filed the A.D. receipt and has stated on oath that this receipt dated 29th October, 1979 bears the signatures of the revisionist. There is no reason whatsoever to disbelieve the plaintiff-landlord. The bald statement of the defendant that he did not receive the notice, seems to have been rightly rejected by the learned trial court. The findings of the learned trial Court that the revisionist was served with the notice cannot, therefore, be disturbed." 20. The apex Court in the case of M/s Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand, AIR 1989 SC 630 proceeded to hold that a presumption has to be drawn as contemplated under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act in regard to service upon the addressee. The apex Court while considering the affect of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Order V of the CPC held that if the notice has been sent on the correct address by registered post, then it shall be presumed that the notice has been sent and received. In this context the apex Court held as under:- "We are of opinion that the conclusion arrived at by the courts below is correct and should be upheld. It is true that the proviso to Clause (i) of section 11(1) and the proviso to section 12(3) are intended for the protection of the tenant. Nevertheless it will be easy to see that too strict and literal a compliance of their language would be impractical and unworkable. It is true that the proviso to Clause (i) of section 11(1) and the proviso to section 12(3) are intended for the protection of the tenant. Nevertheless it will be easy to see that too strict and literal a compliance of their language would be impractical and unworkable. The proviso insists that before any amount of rent can be said to be in arrears, a notice has to be served through posts. All that a landlord can do to comply with this provision is to post a prepaid registered letter (acknowledgment due or otherwise) containing the tenant's correct address. Once he does this and the letter is delivered to the post office, he has no control over it. It is then presumed to have been delivered to the addressee under s. 27 of the General Clauses Act. Under the rules of the post office, the letter is to be delivered to the addressee or a person authorised by him. Such a person may either accept the letter or decline to accept it. In either case, there is no difficulty, for the acceptance or refusal can be treated as a service on, and receipt by, the addressee. The difficulty is where the postman calls at the address mentioned and is unable to contact the addressee or a person authorised to receive the letter. All that he can then do is to return it to the sender. The Indian Post Office Rules do not prescribe any detailed procedure regarding the delivery of such registered letters. When the postman is unable to deliver it on his first visit, the general practice is for the postman to attempt to deliver it on the next one or two days also before returning it to the sender. However, he has neither the power nor the time to make enquiries regarding the whereabouts of the addressee; he is not expected to detain the letter until the addressee chooses to return and accept it; and he is not authorised to affix the letter on the premises because of the assessee's absence. However, he has neither the power nor the time to make enquiries regarding the whereabouts of the addressee; he is not expected to detain the letter until the addressee chooses to return and accept it; and he is not authorised to affix the letter on the premises because of the assessee's absence. His responsibilities cannot, therefore, be equated to those of a process server entrusted with the responsibilities of serving the summons of a Court under Order V of the C.P.C. The statutory provision has to be interpreted in the context of this difficulty and in the light of the very limited role that the post office can play in such a task. If we interpret the provision as requiring that the letter must have been actually delivered to the addressee, we would be virtually rendering it a dead letter. The letter cannot be served where, as in this case, the tenant is away from the premises for some considerable time. Also, as addressee can easily avoid receiving the letter addressed to him without specifically refusing to receive it. He can so manipulate matters that it gets returned to the sender with vague endorsements such as "not found", "not in station", "addressee has left" and so on. It is suggested that a landlord, knowing that the tenant is away from station for some reasons, could go through the motions of posting a letter to him which he knows will not be served. Such a possibility cannot be excluded. But, as against this, if a registered letter addressed to a person at his residential address does not get served in the normal course and is returned, it can only be attributed to the addressee's own conduct. If he is staying in the premises, there is no reason why it should not be served on him. If he is compelled to be away for some time, all that he has to do is to leave necessary instructions with the postal authorities either to detain the letters addressed to him for some time until he returns or to forward them to the address where he has gone or to deliver them to some other person authorised by him. In this situation, we have to chose the more reasonable, effective, equitable and practical interpretation and that would be to read the words "served" as "sent by post", correctly and properly addressed to the tenant, and the word "receipt" as the tender of the letter by the postal peon at the address mentioned in the letter. No other interpretation, we think, will fit the situation as it is simply not possible for a landlord to ensure that a registered letter sent by him gets served on, or is received by, the tenant." 21. The aforesaid case law was relied upon in the case of Bhojraj Wadhwa (supra). 22. This Court in the case of Ghulam Waris (supra) summed up the law in regard to service of notice as under:- "20. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act also deals with the meaning of word 'service' by post and according to the same the service shall be deemed to be effected if the letter is properly addressed and the same is sent by registered post after the postal charges have already been paid unless contrary is proved to have been effected at the time if letter would have been delivered in ordinary course. 21. Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s Madan and Company v. Wazir Jaivir Chand, ARC 1989 (2) page 381, cited on behalf of revisionists has observed that if a registered letter addressed to a person at his residential address does not get served in normal course and is returned, it can only be attributed to the addressee's own conduct. It has been further observed that the dispatch of the notice by registered post is sufficient compliance, the landlord is required to fulfil. 22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaishyan Balan and another, (1999) 7 SCC 510 , has held that there is no significant difference when the notice is returned as "unclaimed" and not as "refused" and has further held that under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, there would be presumption of service in such cases and that it is upto the other party to rebut this presumption of service by post. Although the said case was under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act but the principle in such matter regarding service of notice will be applicable in the instant case also. Although the said case was under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act but the principle in such matter regarding service of notice will be applicable in the instant case also. Therefore, in the instance case also in view of the above endorsements it can safely be said that presumption would be that the notice was served on the defendant as he failed to rebut the said presumption by adducing any notice in rebuttal. It was open to the revisionist to produce either any of his employees to belie the endorsement of post man or post man himself." 23. In Civil Revision No.352 of 2001, Sri Satish Jaiswal (supra) this Court while considering the refusal of notice laid down that the matter is res integra and has been settled by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ganga Ram v. Smt. Phoolwati, 1970 AWR 198, which has taken into consideration the affect of refusal and held that it is not a duty of the plaintiff to prove that the defendant, after receiving the notice, had actually read it and understood its contents. The Full Bench answered the question by holding that it was not incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the endorsement of refusal on the notice sent by the registered post by producing the postman or other witnesses in case the defendant denies the service on him. In this context this Court held as under:- " So far as legal position is concerned, the same has been set at rest by a Full Bench decision of this Court in Ganga Ram Vs. Smt. Phoolwati 1970 AWR 198. In this case it has been held that when a registered article or registered letter is handed over to an accepting or receiving post office, it is the official duty of the postal authorities to make delivery of it to the addressee. While delivering a letter to an accepting and receiving post office it is reasonably expected that in normal course it would be delivered to the addressee. This is the official and normal function of the post office and taking into consideration the manner in which the post office deals with the registered letters, the endorsement on the notice "refused" strengthens the presumption that an attempt was made to deliver the notice to the addressee. This is the official and normal function of the post office and taking into consideration the manner in which the post office deals with the registered letters, the endorsement on the notice "refused" strengthens the presumption that an attempt was made to deliver the notice to the addressee. It has been further held that it is not a duty of the plaintiff to prove that the defendant, after receiving the notice, had actually read it and understood its contents. Taking into consideration the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Harihar Banerjee Vs. Ram Shashi Roy: AIR 1918 Privy Council 105, it has been held in paragraph 29 of the judgment that the fact that the notice was returned back to the sender with an endorsement "Refused" does not dislodge the presumption that the registered notice has reached the addressee. On the other hand, it strengthens the presumption that the notice has reached the addressee. It could not be delivered to him because he refused to accept it. Ultimately, the Full Bench answered the question no.2 in negative by holding that it is not incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the endorsement of refusal on the notice sent by the registered post by producing the postman or other witnesses in case the defendant denies the service on him. Noticeably, the ratio laid down in the above Full Bench decision has been approved by the Apex Court in Har Charan Singh Vs. Shiv Rani and others: AIR 1981 SC 1284 ." 24. The next point which has been argued by the counsel for the revisionist, is that points of determination have not been framed by the trial court and so the judgment rendered by the trial court is bad in law. 25. Counsel for the respondent has placed certain case laws to dislodge the claim of the revisionist and has contended that if the judgment has been rendered by discussing various points, then it has to be seen as to whether those points have been considered and discussed which are required in the given facts and circumstances of the case and if it is so, then there would be sufficient compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. 26. In the case of G. Amlorpavam (supra) the law was summed up by the apex Court as under:- "9. 26. In the case of G. Amlorpavam (supra) the law was summed up by the apex Court as under:- "9. The question whether in a particular case there has been a substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC has to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if there has been substantial compliance with it and the second appellate Court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate Court. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. Where the appellate court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion and its findings are supported by reasons even though the point has not been framed by the appellate Court there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of a point of determination. Where there is an honest endeavour on the part of the lower appellate court to consider the controversy between the parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations appearing on both sides is clearly manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it would be a valid judgment even though it does not contain the points for determination. The object of the Rule in making it incumbent upon the appellate court to frame points for determination and to cite reasons for the decision is to focus attention of the Court on the rival contentions which arise for determination and also to provide the litigant parties opportunity in understanding the ground upon which the decision is founded with a view to enable them to know the basis of the decision and if so considered appropriate and so advised to avail the remedy of Second Appeal conferred by Section 100 CPC." 27. In the case of Irshad Ali (since deceased) (supra) this Court was confronted with a similar position and answered the same in the following form:- "I have gone through the entire judgment of the lower appellate court and on a careful consideration, it is clear that each and every question raised by the respective counsels regarding issues framed by the trial court, findings given by the trial court have been taken into consideration while agreeing or disagreeing with the said conclusions. Interference in the second appeal on a technical approach has always been decred by the Apex Court. In the case of Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab Vs. Kumar and others (2006) 1 SCC page 46, the Apex Court held that all the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The procedural law may be liberal and stringent but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance cause of justice unless compelled by the express and specific language of the statute. Similar view was expressed by the Apex Court in the case of Rani Kusum (Smt.) Vs. Kanchan (Smt.) and others (2005) 6 SCC page 705, no straitjacket formula can be laid down, the court should only ensure that there should be no miscarriage of justice. The procedure of law is always subservient to, and is in aid to justice. In the circumstances, if provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. are to be interpreted in a hyper technical manner, it will only elude and frustrate the intention of legislature while amending the scope of 100 C.P.C. In the instant case, though points for determination have not been formulated in a serial manner yet the lower appellate court has recorded a categorical findings on each and every issue and error and reasons have been assigned while agreeing with the findings of the trial court and confirming it or while disagreeing with the part of the decision while granting benefit to the plaintiff/respondents." 28. The finding recorded by the trial court also goes to indicate that even if the amount of Rs.21,600/- is accepted as admitted by the respondent before the trial court, then also as against an amount of Rs.43,200/- only Rs.21,600/- has been received and so the rest of the amount has also to be paid, as such the revisionist was in default of arrears of rent. The amount of money advanced as claimed in the written statement could not be proved by any evidence nor by any receipt and so it seems that presumptive defence has been set up during the course of the proceedings. 29. On a careful consideration of the law and the points discussed hereinabove, I find that this revision has no force and is liable to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed.