JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—The petitioners have challenged selection for the post of Constable (Civil Police) pursuant to advertisement No. 10-51-2004II. The facts in brief giving rise to the present dispute are as under: 2. An advertisement was published on 7th April, 2006 by the Police Headquarter U.P. Allahabad notifying applications for recruitment of constables. 5404 vacancies in all were advertised for which selection was to be held at 16 centres having vacancies centrewise. In the case in hand, we are concerned with recruitment for selection centre Bulandshahr where 400 vacancies were notified. Petitioner Nos. 1 to 5 and 7 are the candidates belong to other backward class and petitioner No. 6 is general category candidate. The selection consist of three stages i.e. Physical test of 100 marks, written test of 50 marks and interview of 20 marks. All the petitioners having qualified physical test and written test required to appear for interview which was held for about 6 days. It is said that about 4890 candidates were interviewed during this period. The result was declared on 16th June, 2006 wherein petitioners were not selected. 3. This writ petition has been filed immediately after declaration of result challenging selection on the ground that interview was held in an arbitrary and illegal manner and there were several other irregularities in the selection. It is said that after physical test, candidate was permitted to sign a sheet in which marks were awarded but in the present case, all the candidates including petitioners were directed to sign sheets on which marks were given later on and this procedure was adopted to favour certain choiced candidates. Some candidates who had not even passed written examination, yet have been selected. 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed by respondents stating that at selection centre Bulandshahr, Selection Committee which held the selection, consist of Sri Prabhat Kumar, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Chitrakoot Dham Range, Poonam Srivastava, Addl. Superintendent Superintendent of Police, Border Force, Saharanpur, Sri Lakhi chandra, Deputy Superintendent of Police, R.T.C. Chunar, Mirzapur, Sri Swami Nath, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gorakhpur and Sri Habibul Hasan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lucknow. On the basis of applications received, 14849 candidates were found fit to appear in physical test which was held on 24th April, 2006 wherein 9699 candidates participated and 8010 qualified. On the basis of applications received, 14849 candidates were found fit to appear in physical test which was held on 24th April, 2006 wherein 9699 candidates participated and 8010 qualified. Thereafter written test was held on 28th May, 2006 in which 7462 candidates appeared but only 4795 could pass. These 4795 candidates were called for interview whereafter final select list of 398 candidates was prepared and declared. Two posts of ST category were kept vacant because the candidate of that category could not become available. The selected candidates have also been sent for training. The allegations of mala fide, bias and procedural irregularities are denied. It is said that interview was held, as a matter of fact, from 8 a.m. and continued up to the last candidate called for interview on that date with 120 minutes interval for lunch. 5. The very first obstruction in the way of petitioners in this case is that whatever complaint they have raised, if true, had occurred much before declaration of result but the writ petition has been filed only when petitioners had ultimately not been selected. If there was any alleged irregularity in the process of selection commencing from physical test and onwards, it was always open to the petitioners to raise grievance thereagainst and avail appropriate remedy at the earliest. There is nothing on record to show that at any point of time petitioners raised any such grievance before higher authorities of police department and took steps for bringing the matter before this Court. It is now well settled that a candidate, who has failed in the selection, ought not to be allowed to challenge the selection later on, on the allegations of irregularities since he is estopped from doing so. 6. So far as the question of lack of time for interview is concerned, the respondents have explained that initially time was fixed for interview from 9 a.m. to 7 P.M. with lunch break of 2 hours but actually interview started from 8 a.m. and continued till the last candidate called on that day was interviewed. No rejoinder-affidavit has been filed denying the said averments. In the interview, it is said that the discretion was to consider only the personality of candidate as his merit and physical capability had already undergone test by way of physical and written test. No rejoinder-affidavit has been filed denying the said averments. In the interview, it is said that the discretion was to consider only the personality of candidate as his merit and physical capability had already undergone test by way of physical and written test. It is for this reason that a very few questions of General Knowledge and common sense were asked by the Interview Board accompanied by Psychologist. 7. In the absence of any reply controverting the fact at all stated in the counter-affidavit by filing rejoinder-affidavit, I do not find any reason to disbelieve what has been said by the respondents in the counter-affidavit. The scope of judicial review in such matters has been considered in detail by this Court in Taram Dhawaj and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2009(9) ADJ 176 and this Court in paras 67 to 69 has said as under : “67. Judicial review in such matters is not extended to the extent of making a fishing and roving inquiry as and when some allegations are made that a selection is vitiated on account of corrupt activities, favouritism, unfairness etc. In such matters, scope of judicial review is limited. It is not an appeal from a decision but is a review of the manner in which the decision has been taken i.e., whether there is any illegality in the decision making process. Judicial review is entirely different from an ordinary appeal. Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire Country Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment, 1986 AC 240 put a note of caution for exercise of power of judicial review in the following words : “Judicial review is a great weapon in the Hands of the Judges; but the Judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our parliamentary system upon the exercise of this beneficent power.” 68. The grounds on which an administrative decision can be brought within the purview of judicial review may be classified in the following three categories (1) Illegality (2) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness and (3) Procedural impropriety. 69. Something is “illegal”when it is contrary to the statute or set principles of law. The “irrational”means “Wednesbury unreasonableness”. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standard that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question on the given facts and circumstances would come to such conclusion. Something is “illegal”when it is contrary to the statute or set principles of law. The “irrational”means “Wednesbury unreasonableness”. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standard that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question on the given facts and circumstances would come to such conclusion. In other words, it can be said to be another facet of perversity. The Court, while applying the doctrine of “Wednesbury unreasonableness”would not go into the correctness of the decision and would not substitute the decision of the administrative authority.” 8. If the action or decision is perverse or is such that no reasonable body of persons, properly informed, could come to, or has been arrived at by the authority misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong approach, or has been influenced by some extraneous matters, the Court would be justified in interfering with the same, but merely for the reason that another view would have been a better view, the decision taken by the authority otherwise which is also a probable and reasonable view shall not be interfered. “(Refer to Barium Chemicals, AIR 1967 SC 296)”. In Smt. Shalini Soni v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 431 , the Court observed— “It is an unwritten Rule of the law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision-making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only, eschewing the irrelevant and the remote.” 9. In the matter of challenge to a selection, deprecating the practice of the High Court to go on its own for investigation instead of considering the pleadings and material placed by the party who challenges the selection, the Apex Court in Jyotish Kaiborta and others v. State of Assam and others, (2009) 4 SCC 516 , referring to the case of Sadananda Halo and others v. Momtaz Ali Sheikh and others, (2008) 4 SCC 619 quoted para 58 thereof as under: “It is settled law that in such writ petitions a roving inquiry on the factual aspect is not permissible. The High Court not only engaged itself into a non-permitted fact finding exercise but also went on to rely on the findings of the amicus curiae, or as the case may be, the scrutiny team, which in our opinion was in appropriate. While testing the fairness of the selection process wherein thousands of candidates were involved, the High should have been slow in relying upon such microscopic findings. It was not for the High Court to place itself into a position of a fact finding commission, that too, more particularly at the instance of those petitioners who were unsuccessful candidates. The High Court should, therefore, have restricted itself for the Selection Committee and also in the process assumed the role of the respondents. Unfortunately, the High Court took it upon itself the task of substituting itself for the Selection Committee and also in the process assumed the role of an appellate tribunal which was, in our opinion, not proper. Thus, the High Court converted this writ petition into a public interest litigation without any justification.” 10. In Noor Agha v. State of Punjab and another, 2008(56) BLJR 2254, the Apex Court observed in para 83 of the judgment observed “It is well settled that suspicion, howsoever high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal evidence.” 11. The above view was reiterated in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and others, 2009(2) SCC 570 . 12. Whenever a challenge is made on the ground of impartiality, unfairness, etc. in a matter of selection, the Court has to proceed in the matter with care so as not to influence its decision on strong suspicion unless there is material, sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that there actually existed the circumstances which have resulted in an illegal and unjustified selection. In other words, the impartiality, favouritism, corruption etc. has to be proved by positive material and in the absence of such proof, mere suspicion even if very strong would not justify interference by a Court of law with the selection which has already attained finality otherwise. 13. The time for interview of the candidates and challenge on this ground has also been considered in Taram Dhawaj (supra) in paras 83 to 87 and the observations made thereunder are equally applicable to the case in hand also. 13. The time for interview of the candidates and challenge on this ground has also been considered in Taram Dhawaj (supra) in paras 83 to 87 and the observations made thereunder are equally applicable to the case in hand also. It is well settled that a litigant, who makes allegations of irregularities or illegalities committed by the State authorities in performing statutory duties, must place sufficient material to substantiate his submissions. Only thereafter the Court can require the State to repel the allegations. 14. In Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC2181, the Apex Court held that “a party raising the point must plead and annex to the petition not only the facts but also evidence in proof of the facts in a writ petition.” 15. The view taken in Bharat Singh (supra) has been followed by a Full Bench of this Court in Bhupendra Nath Tripathi v. State of U.P. and others, 2009(1) ADJ 232 (FB). 16. In para 42 of the judgment in Sadananda Halo (supra), the Apex Court further said: “It is settled law that in such writ petitions a roving inquiry on the factual aspect is not permissible. The High Court not only engaged itself into a non-permitted fact-finding exercise but also went on to rely on the findings of the Amicus Curiae, or as the case may be, the Scrutiny Team, which in our opinion was inappropriate ate. While testing the fairness of the selection process wherein thousands of candidates were involved, the High Court should have been slow in relying upon such microscopic findings. It was not for the High Court to place itself into a position of a fact-finding commission, that too, more particularly at the instance of those petitioners who were unsuccessful candidates. The High Court should, therefore, have restricted itself to the pleadings in the writ petition and the say of the respondents. Unfortunately, the High Court took it upon itself the task of substituting itself for the Selection Committee and also in the process assumed the role of an Appellate Tribunal which was, in our opinion, not proper. Thus, the High Court converted this writ petition into a public interest litigation without any justification.” (Emphasis supplied by the Court) 17. Unfortunately, the High Court took it upon itself the task of substituting itself for the Selection Committee and also in the process assumed the role of an Appellate Tribunal which was, in our opinion, not proper. Thus, the High Court converted this writ petition into a public interest litigation without any justification.” (Emphasis supplied by the Court) 17. In Jyotish Kaiborta (supra) also the Apex Court considering a similar aspect referred para 65 of Sadananda Halo (supra) as under: “We also do not approve of the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge of the High Court as going all the way into the facts and the microscopic details not via the pleadings of the parties but on the basis of an unnecessary investigation.” 18. In Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain and others v. Ramakant Eknath Jadoo, (2009) 5 SCC 713 it was held that “the pleadings not to be considered provided any evidence in support thereof had been adduced.” 19. In State of West Bengal and another v. West Bengal Regn. Copy Writers Association and another, JT 2009(8) SC 531, it was held as under: “A writ petitioner has to stand on his own legs and has to rely on the pleadings in the writ petition.” 20. Dealing a similar issue as referred in this writ petition, regarding undue urgency and interview in which a large number of candidates were interviewed in six days with regard to requirement of pleading in Sadanand Halo (supra) the Apex Court observed: “This is apart from the fact that the Courts below did not have any tangible evidence regarding the interviews being farcical except the self-serving statement made by the unsuccessful candidates in the writ petitions. The learned Judges even did not have the reasons for which the unsuccessful candidates were rejected. We, therefore, do not see any reason as to how a concrete finding could have been given that the Selection Board could interview only 250 candidates per day and not more.” 21. In absence of proper pleadings and material to substantiate the allegations, it would not be proper for the Court to Act as an investigating agency for the benefit of the party who is making the allegations or to find out something in favour of the allegation made by the said party. 22. In absence of proper pleadings and material to substantiate the allegations, it would not be proper for the Court to Act as an investigating agency for the benefit of the party who is making the allegations or to find out something in favour of the allegation made by the said party. 22. Having considered the entire matter at length, I do not find sufficient material on merit or record justify interference in the selection in question. 23. In the circumstances, the writ petition being devoid of merit. Dismissed. —————