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Andhra High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 165 (AP)

N. Vinatha Naini v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2011-02-28

SANJAY KUMAR

body2011
Judgment : Common Order Selection and appointment to two posts of Assistant Professor in Zoology in Kakatiya University, Warangal, are called in question. Writ Petition Nos.12563 of 2010 and 24732 of 2010 are filed by Dr. Vinatha Naini and Dr. Damayanthi respectively challenging the appointment of Dr.Ch. Sravanthy to one such post under Open Competition (Women) (OC-W) reserved category, while Writ Petition No.15138 of 2010 is filed by Dr. M. Radha Krishna assailing the appointment of Dr. Gowda Rajender to the other post reserved for Backward Classes – Group B (BC-B) category. The matters were listed before this Court for hearing on the interlocutory applications. However, as copious and comprehensive arguments covering the merits of the main cases were advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, the writ petitions were taken up for disposal with their consent. The Kakatiya University, Warangal, issued Notification No.2/2009 dated 31.12.2009 calling for applications from qualified candidates for appointment to various posts of Assistant Professor and Associate Professor in its faculties. In so far as the discipline of Zoology is concerned, two posts of Assistant Professor were notified – one, reserved for OC-W category and the other, for BC-B category. Twenty five applicants aspired for these two posts and twenty two of them were found eligible. Interviews by the Selection Committee for filling up the two posts were conducted on 20.04.2010. Out of the twenty two eligible candidates called for the interviews, five candidates failed to appear. Thus, five candidates were interviewed for the post reserved for OC-W category and twelve candidates for the post reserved for BC-B category. The Selection Committee, by its proceedings dated 20.04.2010, recommended the names of Dr.Ch.Sravanthy and Dr.Gowda Rajender for appointment to the two posts. The Executive Council of Kakatiya University in its 87th Meeting held on 30.04.2010 resolved to approve these recommendations. Accordingly, appointment orders dated 30.04.2010 were issued by the Kakatiya University through its Registrar to Dr.Ch.Sravanthy and Dr.Gowda Rajender. They joined duty as Assistant Professors in Zoology on 01.05.2010. Unsuccessful in their bid for the posts, Dr.Vinatha Naini, Dr.M.Radha Krishna and Dr.Damayanthi are before this Court challenging the above selection and appointments. The case of Dr. Vinatha Naini is founded on the charge that Dr.Ch. Sammaiah, the Chairman of the Board of Studies in Zoology of Kakatiya University, who is no other than the father of Dr.Ch. Unsuccessful in their bid for the posts, Dr.Vinatha Naini, Dr.M.Radha Krishna and Dr.Damayanthi are before this Court challenging the above selection and appointments. The case of Dr. Vinatha Naini is founded on the charge that Dr.Ch. Sammaiah, the Chairman of the Board of Studies in Zoology of Kakatiya University, who is no other than the father of Dr.Ch. Sravanthy, misused his office to get his daughter appointed. It is her allegation that Dr.Ch. Sammaiah was a member of the Selection Committee which chose Dr.Ch. Sravanthy for the post. Dr. M. Radha Krishna, on the other hand, challenged the appointment of Dr. Gowda Rajender on the ground that the meeting of the Executive Council held on 30.04.2010 was short of the required quorum as stipulated under the A.P. Universities Act, 1991 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1991’) and therefore, the appointment based on the approval by the Executive Council in such a defective meeting was legally invalid. Dr. Damayanthi raised various grounds in support of her challenge to the appointment of Dr.Ch. Sravanthy. According to her, the evaluation of candidature by the Selection Committee was unjust, arbitrary and illegal. She also attributed mala fides to the members of the Selection Committee in the award of marks under the head ‘interview performance’. She alleged that the Selection Committee was biased in favour of Dr.Ch. Sravanthy owing to her relationship with Dr.Ch. Sammaiah, Chairman of the Board of Studies, Zoology, Kakatiya University. She further alleged that the constitution of the Selection Committee itself was not valid being in violation of the relevant statutory provision. The Kakatiya University, the appointed candidates and Dr.Ch.Sammaiah, Chairman, Board of Studies, Zoology, Kakatiya University, filed separate counters contesting the petitioners’ claims. Heard Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned senior counsel representing Smt. G. Jaya Reddy, learned counsel for Dr. Vinatha Naini; Sri G. Vidya Sagar, learned counsel for Dr. M. Radha Krishna; Sri Ghanshyamdas Mandhani, learned counsel for Dr. Damayanthi; Sri Deepak Bhattacharjee, learned standing counsel for Kakatiya University; Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel representing Sri A. Muneendhar Reddy, learned counsel for Dr.Ch. Sravanthy; Sri N. Sridhar Reddy, learned counsel representing Sri A. Santosh Kumar, learned counsel for Dr. Gowda Rajender and Sri CVR Rudra Prasad, learned counsel for Dr.Ch. Sammaiah. Damayanthi; Sri Deepak Bhattacharjee, learned standing counsel for Kakatiya University; Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel representing Sri A. Muneendhar Reddy, learned counsel for Dr.Ch. Sravanthy; Sri N. Sridhar Reddy, learned counsel representing Sri A. Santosh Kumar, learned counsel for Dr. Gowda Rajender and Sri CVR Rudra Prasad, learned counsel for Dr.Ch. Sammaiah. On a conspectus of the pleadings and the arguments advanced, the issues that arise for consideration in these cases may be summarized under the following heads: 1) Maintainability of Writ Petition Nos.12563 of 2010 and 24732 of 2010 on the issue of mis-joinder. 2) Evaluation of the comparative merits of the candidates by the Selection Committee. 3) Bias and/or mala fides, if any, of the Committee in the process of selection. 4) Invalidity of the appointments owing to the alleged lack of requisite quorum in the Executive Council meeting held on 30.04.2010. 1) Maintainability of Writ Petition Nos.12563 of 2010 and 24732 of 2010 on the issue of mis-joinder. No specific objection as such was raised in any of the counters filed by the contesting respondents as to the maintainability of these two writ petitions on the ground of misjoinder of parties. Relevant to note, the University itself did not choose to raise this issue. However, as the issue turns upon the interpretation of the statutory provision and arguments were advanced on this aspect by Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel, this Court deems it necessary to consider and deal with the same. It is the contention of Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned senior Counsel, that as per Section 3(3) and (4) of the Act of 1991, the University ought to have been impleaded represented by its Registrar and as in these two writ petitions, it was impleaded represented by its Vice-Chancellor, the writ petitions would not be maintainable. The learned senior counsel placed reliance on CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS, GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. COLLECTOR (2003) 3 SCC 472 , wherein the Supreme Court, while stating that a legal entity – a natural person or an artificial person – can sue or be sued in his/its own name in a Court of law or Tribunal, observed that there are special provisions with regard to how juristic persons can sue or be sued. The Court affirmed that it is not merely a procedural formality but is essentially a matter of substance and considerable significance. The Court affirmed that it is not merely a procedural formality but is essentially a matter of substance and considerable significance. In giving description of a party, it would be useful to remember the distinction between misdescription or misnomer of a party and mis-joinder or non-joinder of a party suing or being sued. The Court was of the opinion that misdescription of a party would not be fatal to the maintainability of the proceeding. In the two writ petitions, the Kakatiya University, Warangal, is named as a respondent and it is shown to be represented by its Vice-Chancellor. Section 3(3) of the Act of 1991 reads to the effect that a University shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal and shall sue and be sued by the said corporate name. Sub-section (4) of Section 3 states that in all suits and other legal proceedings by or against the University, the pleadings shall be signed and verified by the Registrar and all processes in such suits and legal proceedings shall be issued to and served on the Registrar. There is thus no stipulation in either sub-section to the effect that the University must only be sued through the Registrar. As long as it is sued in its corporate name and all processes in such proceedings are issued to and served on the Registrar, there is no violation of the statutory provision. In the two writ petitions, the Kakatiya University, Warangal, was sued in its corporate name and the Registrar is independently made a party. There is thus no violation of the statutory provision. The contention urged by Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel, as to the maintainability of these two writ petitions is therefore rejected. 2) Evaluation of the comparative merits of the candidates by the Selection Committee. Though arguments were advanced at length on either side as to the merits of the selection, touching upon the award of marks by the Selection Committee under the heads of assessment pertaining to teaching experience, publications and interview performance, this Court is not inclined to venture into an examination of the marks awarded and the correctness thereof. Trite to state, this Court would not sit in appeal over the deliberations of a Selection Committee. All the more so while dealing with complaints against appointments made by academic bodies. Trite to state, this Court would not sit in appeal over the deliberations of a Selection Committee. All the more so while dealing with complaints against appointments made by academic bodies. In UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE v. C.D.GOVINDA RAO AIR 1965 SC 491 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed: “13.……… Boards of Appointments are nominated by the Universities and when recommendations made by them and the appointments following on them are challenged before courts, normally the courts should be slow to interfere with the opinions expressed by the experts. There is no allegation about mala fides against the experts who constituted the present Board; and so, we think, it would normally be wise and safe for the courts to leave the decisions of academic matters to experts who are more familiar with the problems they face than the courts generally can be. ……… In this connection, the High Court has failed to notice one significant fact that when the Board considered the claims of the respective applicants, it examined them very carefully and actually came to the conclusion that none of them deserved to be appointed a Professor. These recommendations made by the Board clearly show that they considered the relevant factors carefully and ultimately came to the conclusion that appellant No. 2 should be recommended for the post of Reader. Therefore, we are satisfied that the criticism made by the High Court against the Board and its deliberations is not justified.” Similar was the view taken in DR.M.C.GUPTA v. DR.ARUN KUMAR GUPTA (1979) 2 SCC 339 where the Supreme Court was dealing with the appointment of a Professor in Medicine in the State Government Medical College upon selection by the Public Service Commission. The Court observed that when selection was made by the Commission, aided and advised by experts having technical experience and high academic qualifications in the specialist field, the Courts should be slow to interfere with the opinion expressed by such experts unless there are allegations of mala fides against them. The Court was of the opinion that it would normally be prudent and safe for the Courts to leave the decision of academic matters to experts who are more familiar with the problems they face. The Court was of the opinion that it would normally be prudent and safe for the Courts to leave the decision of academic matters to experts who are more familiar with the problems they face. The Court was however quick to add that if such a body were to contravene rules and regulations binding upon it in making the selection and recommending selectees for appointment, the Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction in a writ petition may interfere. In DR.J.P.KULSHRESTHA v. CHANCELLOR, ALLAHABAD UNIVERSITY (1980) 3 SCC 418 = AIR 1980 SC 2141 , the Supreme Court, while observing that any administrative or quasi-judicial body clothed with powers and left unfettered by procedure is free to devise its own pragmatic, flexible and functionally viable processes of transacting business, added that the same would be subject to the basics of natural justice, fair play in action, reasonableness in collecting decisional materials, avoidance of arbitrariness and extraneous considerations and otherwise keeping within the leading strings of law. Dealing with the contention that Courts should not substitute their judgment for that of academicians when a dispute relates to educational affairs, the Supreme Court observed that while there was no absolute ban, it is a rule of prudence that Courts should hesitate to dislodge decisions of academic bodies but added that University organs are also bound by rule of law and cannot be a law unto themselves. The Court went on to enunciate that to respect an authority is not to worship it unquestioningly. In short, while dealing with legal affairs which had an impact on academic bodies, the Court held that the views of educational experts are entitled to great consideration but not exclusive wisdom. DALPAT ABASAHEB SOLUNKE v. DR.B.S.MAHAJAN (1990) 1 SCC 305 upheld the proposition that it is not the function of the Court to hear appeals over the decisions of Selection Committees and to scrutinize the relative merits of the candidates. It is however to be noticed that the Court again pointed out that the decision of a Selection Committee can be interfered with on limited grounds, such as illegality or patent material irregularity in the constitution of the Committee or its procedure vitiating the selection or proved mala fides affecting the selection etc. It is however to be noticed that the Court again pointed out that the decision of a Selection Committee can be interfered with on limited grounds, such as illegality or patent material irregularity in the constitution of the Committee or its procedure vitiating the selection or proved mala fides affecting the selection etc. In NEELIMA MISRA v. HARINDER KAUR PAINTAL (1990) 2 SCC 746 , the Supreme Court was dealing with the appointment of a Reader in the Department of Psychology, Lucknow University. The Court observed that when appointments are based on recommendation of experts nominated by the Universities, the High Court has only got to see whether the appointment had contravened any statutory or binding rule or ordinance and that due regard had to be shown to the opinion expressed by the experts constituting the Selection Committee and their recommendation on which the Chancellor had acted. In B.C.MYLARAPPA v. DR.R.VENKATASUBBAIAH (2008) 14 SCC 306 , the post of a Professor in Bangalore University was the bone of contention. The High Court set aside the appointment made by the University on the ground that the appointee did not have the requisite qualifications. The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court holding that once the Board of Appointment, comprising experts in the field, considered the candidature of the appointee and came to hold that he was the candidate who could satisfy the conditions for appointment to the post of Professor, the High Court ought not to have interfered with it when there were no mala fides attributed to the members of the expert body which selected the appointee. The Court observed that such selection was made by the assessment of relative merit of rival candidates determined in the course of the interview of the candidates and after thoroughly verifying their experience and service. In BASAVAIAH (DR.) v. DR.H.L.RAMESH (2010) 8 SCC 372 , the Supreme Court was dealing with appointment to the post of Readers in Sericulture in the University of Mysore. The Court found that the Selection Committee appointed by the University thoroughly scrutinized the qualification, experience and published works of the candidates and made its recommendations. In BASAVAIAH (DR.) v. DR.H.L.RAMESH (2010) 8 SCC 372 , the Supreme Court was dealing with appointment to the post of Readers in Sericulture in the University of Mysore. The Court found that the Selection Committee appointed by the University thoroughly scrutinized the qualification, experience and published works of the candidates and made its recommendations. That being so, the Court was of the opinion that as the Committee, comprising experts, had evaluated the qualification, experience and published works of the candidates and thereafter made recommendations, the Division Bench of the High Court ought not to have sat as an appellate body on such recommendations. Referring to case law on this aspect, the Supreme Court concluded that Courts have a very limited role to play in academic matters, all the more so when no mala fides are alleged against the experts constituting the Selection Committee. In BHUSHAN UTTAM KHARE v. DEAN, B.J.MEDICAL COLLEGE (1992) 2 SCC 220 , the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that in dealing with orders passed by the authorities of educational institutions, the Court should normally be slow to interfere with matters falling within the jurisdiction of educational authorities which should normally be left to their decision and the Court should interfere only when it thinks that it must do so in the interest of justice. By and large, as laid down in the above decisions, it would be wise for this Court to leave the decisions in academic matters to experts in the field who would be more familiar with the problems they face than this Court can be. The scope of judicial review would therefore not extend to evaluation of the comparative merits of the candidates who aspired for appointment in the present case. However, as spelt out by the Supreme Court in DR.J.P.KULSHRESTHA (Supra), the functional freedom allowed to academic bodies in such matters would be subject to the basics of natural justice, fair play in action, reasonableness in collecting decisional material and avoidance of arbitrariness and extraneous consideration and otherwise keeping within the leading strings of law. Thus, within these parameters, this Court would not be chary of treading this hallowed territory. It is in the context of this legal environment that the rival contentions of the parties will have to be considered. Thus, within these parameters, this Court would not be chary of treading this hallowed territory. It is in the context of this legal environment that the rival contentions of the parties will have to be considered. Voluble arguments were advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the defeated and the successful job aspirants as to the demerits and merits of the evaluation by the Selection Committee under the various heads of assessment. Sri Ghanshyamdas Mandhani, learned counsel for Dr. Damayanthi, contended that marks were not awarded as per the prescribed procedure in so far as the head ‘publications’ is concerned. The learned counsel pointed out that the University Grants Commission (UGC), New Delhi, communicated its Regulations on ‘Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education’ on 23.09.2009 (for brevity, ‘the UGC Regulations of 2009’) and that Notification No.2/2009 dated 31.12.2009 issued by the Kakatiya University categorically referred to the applicability of the said Regulations to the subject selection. He further pointed out that as per these Regulations, specific norms on ‘Academic Performance Indicators’ (APIs) were set out, including as to how marks were to be awarded for publications, depending upon the impact factor of the journal, the nature of the journal and the number of authors. Applying these norms, learned counsel argued that the award of marks under this head of assessment in the present case was unsustainable. He relied upon Clause 6.2.0 of the UGC Regulations of 2009 in support of his contention that the APIs under Tables I to III of the said Regulations would be applicable not only to career advancement promotions but also direct recruitments. Refuting these contentions, Sri Deepak Bhattacharjee, learned standing counsel, and Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel, pointed out that the letter dated 23.09.2009 addressed by the UGC itself made it clear that the Regulations communicated were only the recommendations of the Expert Committee constituted by the UGC. They relied upon the letter dated 19.02.2010 addressed by the UGC to the Kakatiya University clarifying that it may go ahead with the recruitment and promotion of teachers as per the UGC Regulations of 2000 as amended from time to time and that the Universities would be required to follow the new Regulations upon notification in the Gazette of India. They relied upon the letter dated 19.02.2010 addressed by the UGC to the Kakatiya University clarifying that it may go ahead with the recruitment and promotion of teachers as per the UGC Regulations of 2000 as amended from time to time and that the Universities would be required to follow the new Regulations upon notification in the Gazette of India. They pointed out that the new Regulations came into effect only from 28.06.2010 upon publication in the Gazette of India as ‘The University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2010’. They therefore contended that the Regulations of 2009 had no application to the subject selection which was set in motion prior to the supersession of the UGC Regulations of 2000. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel, advanced the alternate argument that even if the UGC Regulations of 2009 were taken to be applicable to the subject selection, Notification No.2/2009 dated 31.12.2009 made it clear that the said Regulations were adopted only to the extent of the qualifications prescribed therein for the posts advertised and no further. Learned senior counsel submitted that the selection procedures relating to APIs relied upon by Sri Ghanshyamdas Mandhani, learned counsel, were not made applicable as was clear from the Notification itself and therefore, the norms relating to evaluation of publications stipulated in such Regulations had no role to play in the subject selection. This Court finds merit in this contention. The subject selection commenced with the issuance of the Notification on 31.12.2009. As is clear from the UGC’s own letter, by that time the new Regulations had not superseded the existing UGC Regulations of 2000. The new Regulations were therefore merely recommendatory in nature. The Notification made it clear that these recommendatory Regulations were adopted only for a limited purpose. The subject selection commenced with the issuance of the Notification on 31.12.2009. As is clear from the UGC’s own letter, by that time the new Regulations had not superseded the existing UGC Regulations of 2000. The new Regulations were therefore merely recommendatory in nature. The Notification made it clear that these recommendatory Regulations were adopted only for a limited purpose. Clause (3) of the Information Brochure appended to the Notification reads as under: “3.The qualifications prescribed for the posts advertised are as per the UGC (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations-2009/A.I.C.T.E. The relevant documents available on the websites of UGC (www.ugc.ac.in) and AICTE (www.aicte.ernet.in) may be referred for any additional information on qualifications and other conditions.” Thus, the selection procedures specified from Clause 6 onwards in the new Regulations did not have any role to play in the subject selection. To that extent, the old UGC Regulations of 2000 continued to prevail. That being so, the APIs introduced under the new Regulations with regard to evaluation of publications had no relevance or applicability in the subject selection. It appears that the Government of Andhra Pradesh, while implementing the UGC Revised Pay Scales, 2006 for the Teaching Staff in Universities and Colleges under G.O.Ms.No.14, (UE.II) Department, dated 20.02.2010, took note of the recommendatory UGC Regulations of 2009 dated 23.09.2009 and provided therein that the service conditions of the Teachers, including recruitment and qualifications, selection procedure, etc., shall be as indicated in the said regulations. The G.O. therefore includes extracts from the recommendatory UGC Regulations of 2009. The Universities were directed to implement the same within a time frame of 3 months from the date of issuance of the G.O. by duly amending their Statutes, Ordinances, etc. Relevant to note, this G.O. was also issued after the commencement of the subject selection process under Notification No.2 dated 31.12.2009. Therefore, this G.O. could have had no retrospective application in so far as the subjection selection was concerned. The argument of Sri Ghanshyamdas Mandhani, learned counsel, in this regard must therefore fail. Crystallized by the weight of judicial precedent, the scope of judicial review in matters of this nature would empower this Court to verify whether fair play in action and avoidance of arbitrariness and extraneous consideration has been maintained during the process of selection. The argument of Sri Ghanshyamdas Mandhani, learned counsel, in this regard must therefore fail. Crystallized by the weight of judicial precedent, the scope of judicial review in matters of this nature would empower this Court to verify whether fair play in action and avoidance of arbitrariness and extraneous consideration has been maintained during the process of selection. The requirement of fair play in action would enjoin this Court to examine whether the process of selection was vitiated by any infraction of rules or settled norms. Sri Deepak Bhattacharjee, learned standing counsel for the University, produced the records pertaining to the subject selection for perusal of the Court. The file reflects that a single consolidated assessment sheet signed by all the members of the Selection Committee is the only record of the proceedings of the selection for both posts. Upon a query from the Court, the learned standing counsel submitted that there was no separate individual assessment by each of the six members of the Selection Committee. He further submitted that except for this consolidated assessment sheet, there was no other record of the deliberations of the Selection Committee during the process of selection. He stated that upon a group discussion, the members of the Committee decided upon the marks to be allotted to each candidate. No other record was maintained to indicate as to how much time was spent with each of the candidates and as to whether the allotment of marks was done at a single time or after each candidate was interviewed. The learned standing counsel stated that under the UGC Regulations of 2000 there was no necessity for the Selection Committee to maintain a record or give reasons during the process of selection. It is however to be noticed that the UGC Regulations of 2000, after specifying the details of Selection Committees under clauses 3.1.0. to 3.4.0., postulate that it may be ensured that the process of selection in every case is transparent and credible. The Regulations further specify that the process of selection should involve assessment of aptitude for teaching and research, ability to communicate clearly and effectively, and ability to analyze and discuss. Learned standing counsel also produced the Statutes and Ordinances framed by the Kakatiya University, Warangal, under the Kakatiya University Act, 1976. The Regulations further specify that the process of selection should involve assessment of aptitude for teaching and research, ability to communicate clearly and effectively, and ability to analyze and discuss. Learned standing counsel also produced the Statutes and Ordinances framed by the Kakatiya University, Warangal, under the Kakatiya University Act, 1976. Relevant to note, under Section 57 of the Act of 1991, while repealing the Kakatiya University Act, 1976, the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations framed thereunder were saved. Section 57(k) reads to the effect that the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations made under the relevant University Act shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act of 1991, continue to be in force and be deemed to have been made under the provisions of the Act of 1991 unless they were superseded or modified under the Act of 1991. Ordinance No.II framed by the Kakatiya University under Section 29(1) of the Kakatiya University Act, 1976 thus continues to be in force by virtue of Section 57(k) of the Act of 1991. It deals with the procedure to be followed by Selection Committees for teaching posts. Relevant clauses are extracted hereunder: “7.All the members of the Selection Committee and the Heads of the Departments shall interview the candidates and express their opinions. 8. The experts shall state their opinion on the qualifications, research experience and ability of the candidates. Keeping in view the opinions of the experts, the candidate shall be selected as per the opinion of the majority of the members of the Selection Committee; and in the case of the opinion being evenly divided, the opinion of the Vice-Chancellor be the deciding factor. 9. The candidate shall not be selected if in the opinion of the experts he or she is below standard. 10. The selection of a candidate by the Committee shall be recommendatory in character and shall not be final until selection is ratified or confirmed by the Syndicate, which shall have power to reject the selection made by the Committee. 11. The candidate shall not be selected if in the opinion of the experts he or she is below standard. 10. The selection of a candidate by the Committee shall be recommendatory in character and shall not be final until selection is ratified or confirmed by the Syndicate, which shall have power to reject the selection made by the Committee. 11. The proceedings of the Selection Committee regarding each individual candidate shall be privileged and confidential and they shall be kept in the custody of the Registrar.” The Ordinance therefore makes it clear that the ‘expression of opinion’ by the members of the Selection Committee has to be in the context of ‘each’ individual candidate and has to be reduced to writing, so as to be retained in the custody of the Registrar. Reference in this regard may also be made to THE CHANCELLOR v. DR.BIJAYANANDA KAR (1994) 1 SCC 169 , wherein the Supreme Court observed that every member of the Selection Committee had a right to give his independent, unbiased and considered opinion in respect of each candidate appearing before the Committee. The Court frowned upon the action of one of the members of the Selection Committee in that case in saying, after the selection was over, that he had signed the proceedings overlooking certain qualifications of the candidates. The Court pointed out that sanctity of the process of selection had to be maintained and that it would be a travesty of the selection process if the candidates were encouraged to meet members of the Selection Committee and obtain letters from them attempting to renege the selection made. In the present case, it is admitted that there was no individual and separate assessment of the comparative merits of the candidates by each of the Selection Committee members. Further, there is no written record of the opinions, if any, expressed by them with regard to each candidate. There is thus a clear violation of the mandatory procedure prescribed under the above Ordinance. In the absence of a written record of the deliberations of the Selection Committee, more so when they admittedly exercised wide discretion while awarding marks within a range of 1 to 5 marks for ‘publications’ and a range of 1 to 10 marks for ‘teaching experience’, the scope for arbitrariness cannot be ruled out. In the absence of a written record of the deliberations of the Selection Committee, more so when they admittedly exercised wide discretion while awarding marks within a range of 1 to 5 marks for ‘publications’ and a range of 1 to 10 marks for ‘teaching experience’, the scope for arbitrariness cannot be ruled out. In D.V.BAKSHI v. UNION OF INDIA (1993) 3 SCC 663 , the Supreme Court observed that if an oral test is conducted a heavy responsibility is cast on the examiners to maintain proper record of the oral test in respect of each candidate and marks must preferably be assigned under each head considered relevant to evaluate the candidate. The Court pointed out that once this care is taken, the element of subjectivity will be largely checked and the marks assigned under different heads at the oral test will more or less faithfully reflect the fitness of the candidate. In the event of any allegation of nepotism or favouritism, the same can be checked with reference to the record so maintained. If such allegation is supported by some dependable proof, the Court would satisfy itself whether or not the charges are well-founded. That is why a heavy responsibility lies on those examining the candidates at the interview to ensure that proper record is maintained so that there is no room for suspicion in the minds of the unsuccessful candidates that the result of the oral test is tainted with bias for or against any candidate because even light proof in support of the charge may upset the result of the oral test as a whole or qua a candidate, as the case may be. Thus, a written record was a must for discharging the heavy responsibility resting upon the Selection Committee when it based its selection on its deliberations at the interview. There is however no record as to how the Selection Committee went about awarding marks under the heads where it exercised discretion such as ‘publications’ and ‘teaching experience’. No doubt, this Court would not sit in appeal over the award of such marks or substitute its view there for, but the same would possibly have been indicative of the objective functioning of the Selection Committee and the lack of extraneous consideration in the unfettered exercise of discretion by the members of the Selection Committee. No doubt, this Court would not sit in appeal over the award of such marks or substitute its view there for, but the same would possibly have been indicative of the objective functioning of the Selection Committee and the lack of extraneous consideration in the unfettered exercise of discretion by the members of the Selection Committee. However, except the ipse dixit of the learned standing counsel that the members of the Selection Committee, being experts in the field, deliberated over the candidature of competing candidates and awarded marks, there is no indication whatsoever as to how the Committee exercised discretion while awarding such marks. Pertinent to note, in the cases cited supra, the Court found on examination that there was a proper examination and evaluation of the candidature of the candidates by the Selection Committees and therefore refused to interfere. The present case, however, does not fall in that genre. This aspect becomes all the more relevant as candidates with more teaching experience were awarded lower marks as compared to those with lesser teaching experience. Further, teaching experience garnered during pursuit of Ph.D. course was also considered by the Committee, which as per the UGC Regulations of 2009 could not have been taken into account. This aspect is mentioned under Clause 3.9.0. of the UGC Regulations of 2009 and being included in the Part dealing with qualifications, it would be a ‘condition’ which would have applicability as per the Information Brochure appended to the Notification dated 31.12.2009. In the absence of the written record of the selection proceedings in proof of objective and impartial assessment of the comparative merits of competing candidates, this Court must necessarily hold that the procedure adopted was not only in violation of the prescribed binding norms contained in Ordinance No.II but was also far from being fair and transparent. Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned senior counsel, and Sri G. Vidya Sagar, learned counsel, appearing for Dr. Vinatha Naini and Dr. M. Radha Krishna respectively, contended that the assessment sheet provided to the members of the Selection Committee by the Kakatiya University specifically indicated that 5 marks were to be awarded for each publication. It is their case that once this was the parameter set by the University, the Selection Committee ought not to have exercised its discretion and awarded less than 5 marks for each publication. It is their case that once this was the parameter set by the University, the Selection Committee ought not to have exercised its discretion and awarded less than 5 marks for each publication. Refuting this contention, the opposing counsel submitted that publications in different journals could not be put on par or equated and that the Selection Committee was necessarily vested with the discretion of assessing the publications in the context of the importance of the journal and its subject content. They therefore submitted that the Selection Committee could award upto 5 marks for each publication and that it was not necessary that the full 5 marks be awarded to each and every publication. Though the assessment sheet provided to the Selection Committee does not mention that ‘upto 5 marks’ could be awarded, there is merit in the submission that each and every publication cannot stand on par and commend equal marks irrespective of the nature of the publication and the importance of the journal carrying it. In its counter, the Kakatiya University stated that the Selection Committee, while awarding marks for each publication, examined the quality of the research area in which the article was written, quality of the journal in which the same was published, impact factor of the journal/article, citation, index, etc. and thereafter exercised its discretion in awarding upto a maximum of 5 marks for each publication. Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned senior counsel, however contested this statement arguing that sufficient time would not have been available to the Selection Committee to undertake such an extensive analysis of the publications produced by the candidates during the limited interview time allocated to each candidate. As no written record or proceedings were maintained by the Selection Committee of its deliberations during the interview process, this Court has no material to judge these rival contentions one way or other. In any event, this Court is not equipped to deal with the issue as to which of the publications of these contesting candidates warranted better marks. This Court would then be sitting in appeal and as stated supra, such exercise is not within its province while undertaking judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is however to be noticed that the application form furnished to the candidates did not require them to enclose the articles or books published by them. This Court would then be sitting in appeal and as stated supra, such exercise is not within its province while undertaking judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is however to be noticed that the application form furnished to the candidates did not require them to enclose the articles or books published by them. The relevant clauses in the application form read as follows: “(11) State No. of articles published: (a separate list should be enclosed) (12) State No. of books published: (a separate list should be enclosed)” It is a different matter that most of the candidates seem to have enclosed copies of the articles published by them. There is however no indication that there was any prior evaluation of such articles before the interviews were conducted on 20.04.2010 by the Selection Committee. The call letters issued to the candidates reflect that they were required to produce reprints of publications and books for verification before the interview. This indicates that no prior exercise was undertaken on the basis of the copies supplied by candidates along with the application forms. In this situation, when the Selection Committee, as per the counter of the University, undertook an evaluation of the published articles of each of the candidates during the interview itself on the basis of various parameters, it was incumbent upon the Committee to maintain a written record of such evaluation so as to obviate any scope for arbitrary exercise of such discretion. There is, as stated supra, surprisingly no record whatsoever. Further, it is difficult to believe that the Selection Committee would have had sufficient time to undertake such an exercise during the interview as the records placed before this Court show that some of the candidates produced voluminous publications which could not have been assessed during the brief time available to the Selection Committee while interviewing such candidates. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, though this Court would not sit in appeal over the opinions expressed by the experts in the field, the woefully lacking feature in the present case is that there is no record of any such ‘expression of opinion’ by any member of the Selection Committee. Notwithstanding the wide discretion allowed to academic bodies and educational institutions in this regard, such bodies and institutions are not given carte blanche to do whatsoever they choose as per their whims and fancies. Notwithstanding the wide discretion allowed to academic bodies and educational institutions in this regard, such bodies and institutions are not given carte blanche to do whatsoever they choose as per their whims and fancies. Exercise of unfettered discretion by the Selection Committee bereft of reason and record can lead to blatant blunders as is demonstrated in the case of Dr. Gowda Rajender. There is no dispute that the Selection Committee was bound to follow the marks allocation provided in the assessment sheet in so far as the head ‘educational qualifications’ was concerned. The assessment sheet reads to the effect that 10, 8, 6 and 4 marks respectively were to be awarded for Distinction, I Division, II Division and Pass (UG only). Dr. Gowda Rajender, as is evident from the consolidated memorandum of marks issued by the Kakatiya University, Warangal, in respect of his under graduate course in B.Sc. was given a ‘pass division’ owing to his having passed through supplemental examinations. Once the marks memorandum itself indicated that he was given a ‘pass division’, the Selection Committee clearly ought not to have awarded him 6 marks treating him as having passed B.Sc in II Division. This is yet another instance to indicate the lack of ‘fair play in action’ occasioned by the procedure adopted by the Selection Committee in the present case. The absence of a written record in addition to being in violation of the University’s own Ordinance leaves this Court with no option but to conclude that the process of selection was arbitrary and far from being above board. 3) Bias and/or mala fides, if any, of the Committee in the process of selection: It is the case of Dr. Damayanthi and Dr. Vinatha Naini that the selection and appointment of Dr.Ch. Sravanthy was tainted by bias as her father, Ch.Sammaiah, was the Chairman of the Board of Studies, Zoology in Kakatiya University. Though allegations of mala fides are made by Dr. Damayanthi against the members of the Selection Committee, the same are not borne out by material proof. In MADHYA PRADESH SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT v. STATE OF M.P. AIR 2005 SC 325 , the Supreme Court held that in so far as the plea of malice is concerned, it has to be attributed personally against the person concerned and not collectively. Damayanthi against the members of the Selection Committee, the same are not borne out by material proof. In MADHYA PRADESH SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT v. STATE OF M.P. AIR 2005 SC 325 , the Supreme Court held that in so far as the plea of malice is concerned, it has to be attributed personally against the person concerned and not collectively. Relying on this Judgment, Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel, submitted that no personal allegations were made against any of the members of the Selection Committee though mala fides were alleged against them. The learned senior counsel pointed out that the mere averment of the petitioner that the possibility cannot be ruled out that the members of the Selection Committee abused and misused the oral interview to favour Dr.Ch. Sravanthy, would not be sufficient to maintain a plea of mala fides. This Court finds merit in the submissions made. In any event, as no serious arguments were advanced on this aspect, the same is eschewed from consideration. However, as regards the charge of ‘bias’, it cannot be doubted that in view of the relationship between the parties, the University was under that much more responsibility to maintain a clear and transparent selection process. No doubt, there is no embargo that the son/daughter of a teacher in the University cannot aspire to secure employment in the same University. However, in such a case, the necessity to maintain a clear, transparent and above board process of selection would be paramount. In DR.S.A.HAKEEM v. THE N.T.R.UNIVERSITY OF HEALTH SCIENCES AIR 2001 AP 57 , a learned Judge of this Court took the view that when a body of persons take a decision resulting in collectivity of opinion, the aggrieved person cannot complain of bias or malice. The learned Judge held that ordinarily it cannot be heard that the Board of Examiners acted with bias or malice. This decision was relied upon by Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel, to support his contention that bias or mala fides could not be attributed to the Selection Committee, a body of individuals. However, as pointed out by the learned Judge himself, the principle laid down was applicable only ‘ordinarily’ and the facts of a given case may indicate otherwise. However, as pointed out by the learned Judge himself, the principle laid down was applicable only ‘ordinarily’ and the facts of a given case may indicate otherwise. It would thus depend upon the individual case and its own peculiar facts as to whether bias could be inferred even against a collectivity or a body of persons. There is no escaping the fact that the candidate appointed, Dr.Ch. Sravanthy, was no other than the daughter of Dr.Ch. Sammaiah, the Chairman, Board of Studies, Zoology, of the University, who would have wielded considerable influence within the University. In such a situation, the University ought to have ensured that the selection process involving the candidature of his daughter was utmost transparent and above board in all respects. The University and Dr.Ch. Sammaiah referred to the first proviso to Section 43 (1) of the Act of 1991 which states to the effect that no person shall participate in the meetings of the Selection Committee for any appointment, if he or his near relation is a candidate for that appointment. It was pointed out that Dr.Ch. Sammaiah was not a member of the Selection Committee which conducted the interviews for the subject post and therefore, there was no infraction of the above statutory provision. It is however to be noticed that Dr.Ch. Sammaiah is not correct in stating in his counter affidavit that he did not participate in the selection process at all. The records placed before this Court reflect that Dr.Ch. Sammaiah was the scrutinizer of the 25 applications submitted for these two posts and he himself certified that three of the candidates were not eligible at the preliminary stage. He therefore did play a role in the selection process, though he was not a member of the actual Selection Committee which undertook the interviews of these candidates. The allegation however is that the said Selection Committee was biased in favour of Dr.Ch. Sravanthy owing to her relationship with Dr.Ch. Sammaiah. Reference in this regard may be made to judicial pronouncements on the aspect of bias: In RATTAN LAL SHARMA v. MANAGING COMMITTEE, DR.HARI RAM (COEDUCATION) HIGHER SECONDARY SCHOOL (1993) 4 SCC 10 , the Supreme Court observed that for appreciating a case of personal bias or bias to the subject matter, the test is whether there was a real likelihood of a bias even though such bias has not in fact taken place. Reference was made to De Smith in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, (1980) at page 262, wherein the learned author observed that a real likelihood of bias means at least substantial possibility of bias. In R. v. SUSSEX JUSTICES 1923 All ER Rep.233, it was indicated that the answer to the question whether there was a real likelihood of bias depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might appear to be done. In STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. SHIVANANDA PATHAK (1998) 5 SCC 513 , the Supreme Court observed that it may not always be possible to furnish actual proof of bias, a condition of mind, but was quick to point out that for this reason, Courts are not in a crippled state as there are many ways to discover bias; for example, by evaluating the facts and circumstances of the case or applying the tests of ‘real likelihood of bias’ or ‘reasonable suspicion of bias’. The material placed before this Court by Dr. Vinatha Naini along with her reply affidavit reveals that Dr.Ch. Sammaiah was a member of the Selection Committee which undertook interviews for effecting promotions under the ‘Career Advancement Scheme’ in Zoology during the forenoon of 20.04.2010. Significantly, all the members of the Selection Committee which interviewed his daughter in the afternoon session were his colleagues in the said Selection Committee. The possibility of influence being wielded by Dr.Ch. Sammaiah upon the said members during his interaction with them as a member of the Selection Committee in the morning session cannot therefore be ruled out. The principle underlying the first proviso to Section 43(1) of the Act of 1991 is that an employee of the University who is interested in one of the candidates should not have any exposure to the members of the Selection Committee. That principle was obviously given a go-by in the present case as Dr.Ch. Sammaiah had more than ample opportunity to interact with and influence the members of the Selection Committee which interviewed his daughter for the post. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, mere likelihood of bias beyond a reasonable doubt would be sufficient to taint the process and set it at naught. As regards Dr. Sammaiah had more than ample opportunity to interact with and influence the members of the Selection Committee which interviewed his daughter for the post. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, mere likelihood of bias beyond a reasonable doubt would be sufficient to taint the process and set it at naught. As regards Dr. Damayanthi’s contention that the Selection Committee was not validly constituted, no material is placed before this Court in support of the said allegation and no arguments were advanced by her counsel on this aspect. Therefore, this ground is eschewed from consideration. (4) Invalidity of the appointments owing to the alleged lack of requisite quorum in the Executive Council meeting held on 30.04.2010: There remains yet another point to be considered, a point which may prove to be the ultimate Waterloo of the impugned appointments. This point, raised by Dr. M. Radha Krishna, pertains to the very validity of the appointment of Dr. Gowda Rajender by the Executive Council at its meeting held on 30.04.2010. Though this point was not urged by the other two petitioners in their pleadings, it would be equally applicable to the appointment of Dr. Ch. Sravanthy also. It is the case of Dr. M. Radha Krishna that the Executive Council in its 87th Meeting held on 30.04.2010 lacked the requisite quorum as per Section 18(6) of the Act of 1991 and therefore, its approval of the recommendations made by the Selection Committee leading to the impugned appointment was vitiated on this count. Sri G. Vidya Sagar, learned counsel, argued that the statutory provision mandatorily required a quorum of one-third of the total number of members or 6 persons, whichever is less, and that the meeting of the Council held on 30.04.2010 with a quorum of 4 members fell short of the required minimum. He therefore submitted that the appointments which resulted on the basis of this approval were illegal and unsustainable. There is no dispute that the proceedings of the Selection Committee are only recommendatory in nature and that the Executive Council of the University is the authority to appoint Teachers of the University upon such recommendations. This is borne out by Section 18(5)(ii) of the Act of 1991 and also Ordinance No.II of Kakatiya University. Section 18(1) of the Act of 1991 deals with the constitution of the Executive Council and reads as under: “EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 18. This is borne out by Section 18(5)(ii) of the Act of 1991 and also Ordinance No.II of Kakatiya University. Section 18(1) of the Act of 1991 deals with the constitution of the Executive Council and reads as under: “EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 18. 1)The Executive Council shall consist of the following persons, namely: CLASS-I-EX.OFFICIO MEMBERS (i) the Vice-Chancellor; (ii) the Rector; (iii) the Secretary to Government in the Education Department or an Officer in the Education Department nominated by the Government; (iv) the Secretary to Government in the Finance and Planning (Finance Wing) Department or an officer in the Finance and Planning (Finance Wing) Department nominated by the Government; (v) the Director of Higher Education/the Commissioner of Collegiate Education: Provided that in the case of Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupathi, the Executive Officer, Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams shall also be the EX.OFFICIO MEMBER. Class-II-OTHER MEMBERS (i) one senior professor of the University Colleges to be nominated by the Government; (ii) one Principal of the University Colleges to be nominated by the Government; (iii) one Principal of affiliated Colleges to be nominated by the Government; (iv) one teacher from among the teachers of the University Colleges to be nominated by the Government; (v) one teacher from among the teachers of the affiliated Colleges to be nominated by the Government; (vi) four eminent persons representing industry, agriculture, trade, commerce, education, public life, legal profession, social work, etc., to be nominated by the Government.” Section 18(6) of the Act of 1991 deals with the quorum for a meeting of the Executive Council and reads thus: “(6) The quorum for a meeting of the Executive Council shall be one-third of the total number of members or six persons, whichever is less.” Earlier, eight members were nominated by the Government under Class-II of Section 18 (1) to the Executive Council of Kakatiya University. However, their appointment was terminated under G.O.Ms.No.30, Higher Education (UE.I) Department, dated 09.04.2010. Thereby, the Executive Council of the University was reduced to the members specified under Class-I alone. Pertinent to note, the post of Rector under Class-I in Kakatiya University is vacant. Therefore, there were only 4 Class-I members in the Executive Council of the University after 09.04.2010. Section 18(6) of the Act of 1991 mandatorily requires a minimum quorum of one-third of the total number of members or 6, whichever figure is lower. Pertinent to note, the post of Rector under Class-I in Kakatiya University is vacant. Therefore, there were only 4 Class-I members in the Executive Council of the University after 09.04.2010. Section 18(6) of the Act of 1991 mandatorily requires a minimum quorum of one-third of the total number of members or 6, whichever figure is lower. The total number of members under Class-I and Class-II put together would aggregate to 14. The minimum quorum taking this figure into account would be 4.66, being one-third of 14, and would necessarily have to be rounded off as 5. An attempt was made by Sri Deepak Bhattacharjee, learned standing counsel, to interpret the phrase ‘total number of members’ in Section 18(6) to mean only the ‘existing total number of members’. This argument is however found to be specious. It is no doubt true that as the total strength of the Executive Council as per Section 18(1), taking into account Class-I and Class-II members stipulated therein, would not be above 14 and one-third thereof would invariably be 5. That being so, the latter part of Section 18(6) providing for an alternate figure of 6 persons would be rendered superfluous as preference is to be given to the lesser figure and the option of one-third of the total number of members, that is 14, would always be lesser than 6. However, the same would be the case even if the phrase ‘total number of members’ is interpreted to mean only the existing number of members. If the existing members are less than the total strength of 14, one-third thereof would also be invariably less than the figure of 5 and would thus render the alternate option of 6 members in the latter portion of the Section otiose. This interpretation would also lead to dangerous consequences, as demonstrable in the present case. In the event the strength of members in the Council falls to 4, as is now obtaining, and the ‘total number of members’ is interpreted to mean ‘existing members only’, the required quorum would be one-third of 4, or 6 persons, whichever is lesser. One-third of 4 members would be 1.3 which would have to be reduced to 1 and would mean that the Executive Council could function with the quorum of one single member. One-third of 4 members would be 1.3 which would have to be reduced to 1 and would mean that the Executive Council could function with the quorum of one single member. This, obviously, could not have been the intention of the legislature as the entire control of the University would then be vested in one single individual. In any event, it is not for this Court to introduce words into the statute. The Court would not interpret a statutory provision in such a manner as to render part of the provision superfluous or otiose. But, in the present case, either interpretation of the phrase ‘total number of members’ leads to the same result, that of making the latter part of Section 18(6) superfluous. There is thus an inbuilt anomaly in Section 18(6) in so far as ‘or 6 persons, whichever is less’, is concerned. It is however not for this Court to mull over why the legislature chose the figure 6 in the second limb of this provision. Perhaps, keeping in mind a future eventuality when the total number of members in the Executive Council would grow, the legislature introduced the said figure so as to see that minimum representation is maintained in the Council. The Section, as it presently reads, requires the quorum to be worked out in the context of the total number of members and there is no indication therein to limit it to the existing members only. That being so, this Court is not inclined to accept that the phrase ‘total number of members’ should be interpreted to mean the existing members and not the full strength of the Executive Council. Consequently, the required quorum would be one-third of the total strength of 14 which would work out to 4.66. In the normal scheme of things 4.66 would be rounded off as 5. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in STATE OF U.P. v. PAWAN KUMAR TIWARI (2005) 2 SCC 10 , if part is one-half or more, its value shall be increased to one and if part is less than half then its value shall be ignored. That was a case dealing with reservations and the issue was whether 46.50 should be rounded off as 47 or reduced to 46. The Supreme Court concurred with the High Court’s view that it would have to be rounded off to 47. That was a case dealing with reservations and the issue was whether 46.50 should be rounded off as 47 or reduced to 46. The Supreme Court concurred with the High Court’s view that it would have to be rounded off to 47. Reference was made by Sri Deepak Bhattacharjee, learned standing counsel, and Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel, to G.O.Ms.No.30 dated 09.04.2010 which states to the effect that during the intervening period the Executive Council of Kakatiya University may function with the ex officio members under Class-I till re-constitution of the Council. Reliance placed by Sri Deepak Bhattacharjee, learned standing counsel, on Section 18 (7) of the Act of 1991 is misplaced as the said provision is merely a transitional provision and had application only at the time of the commencement of the Act. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel, on the other hand, strenuously contended that the Government had the power under Section 56 of the Act of 1991 to remove any difficulty in the context of constitution or appointment of any Authority of the University and therefore the stipulation under G.O.Ms.No.30 dated 09.04.2010 must be taken to mean that the Government permitted the Executive Council of the University to function with less than the stipulated quorum as per Section 18(6) of the Act of 1991. Section 56 of the Act of 1991 reads as follows: “56.Power to remove difficulties:- If any difficulty arises as to the constitution or reconstitution or appointment of any Authority or officer of the University or otherwise in first giving effect to the provisions of this Act, or at the time of establishing a new University, the Government, as occasion may require, may, by order, do anything which appears to them necessary for the purpose of removing the difficulty.” Voluble and contentious arguments were advanced on either side as to the scope and import of this Section and its applicability to the present case. This Court is however of the opinion that the present case does not turn upon Section 56 of the Act of 1991 at all. It may be noticed that G.O.Ms.No.30 dated 09.04.2010 in so far as this aspect is concerned stated as follows: “3. This Court is however of the opinion that the present case does not turn upon Section 56 of the Act of 1991 at all. It may be noticed that G.O.Ms.No.30 dated 09.04.2010 in so far as this aspect is concerned stated as follows: “3. During the intervening period, the Executive Council of Kakatiya University, Warangal may function with the Ex-officio Members as mentioned under Class-I in Section 18(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Universities Act, 1991 till the reconstitution of the Executive Council.” Class-I in Section 18(1) of the Act of 1991 consists of 5 persons which would satisfy the required minimum quorum as per Section 18(6). There is no indication that the Government was apprised of the fact that the post of Rector in Class-I category was vacant in the Kakatiya University and that the existing Class-I members would fall short of the required quorum as per the statute. Therefore, the stipulation in G.O.Ms.No.30 dated 09.04.2010 that the Executive Council may function in the interregnum with Class-I members till re-constitution of the Council, does not indicate that any permission was granted by the Government to act in violation of Section 18(6). The G.O. merely reads to the effect that the Council should function with Class-I members, who in the normal circumstances, would have satisfied the minimum requirement of the quorum stipulated in Section 18(6) of the Act of 1991. The argument advanced that it permitted the University to act in violation of Section 18(6) with regard to the minimum quorum does not follow or flow from the language used therein. There was thus no exercise by the Government to remove any difficulty as stipulated in Section 56 of the Act of 1991, even if the same was permissible. Viewed thus, the inescapable and irresistible conclusion is that the 87th Meeting of the Executive Council held on 30.04.2010 fell short of the required minimum quorum as stipulated under Section 18(6) of the Act of 1991. The approval accorded by the Executive Council at the said meeting, resulting in the appointments of Dr.Ch. Sravanthy and Dr. Gowda Rajender, is thus irreparably tainted on this count. This Court therefore finds that the selection and appointment of Dr.Ch. Sravanthy and Dr. Gowda Rajender suffer from illegality and are vitiated on counts more than one. The Writ Petitions are accordingly allowed setting aside the selection and appointment of Dr.Ch. Sravanthy and Dr. Gowda Rajender, is thus irreparably tainted on this count. This Court therefore finds that the selection and appointment of Dr.Ch. Sravanthy and Dr. Gowda Rajender suffer from illegality and are vitiated on counts more than one. The Writ Petitions are accordingly allowed setting aside the selection and appointment of Dr.Ch. Sravanthy and Dr.Gowda Rajender as Assistant Professors in Zoology in Kakatiya University, Warangal. In the light of the final orders passed in the writ petitions, WPMP No.15818 of 2010 in W.P.No.12563 of 2010; WPMP Nos.19076, 26534 and 26535 of 2010 in W.P.No.15138 of 2010; and WPMP Nos.31643 of 2010 and 2775 of 2011 in W.P.No.24732 of 2010 are dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.