Hon’ble S.S. Chauhan, J.—This civil revision has been filed challenging the order passed by the District Judge, Lucknow dated 24.7.2006. In the aforesaid order, a direction was given that the revisionist is at liberty to move a separate application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. by filing a criminal complaint against the person concerned of the respondents for making manipulation in the record. 2. The proceedings emanated on account of initiation of arbitration proceedings before the arbitrator in respect of a dispute between the revisionist and the respondents. After the pleading of the parties and receiving the evidence, the award was given on 7.1.2006. The said award was served upon the respondents on 9.1.2006. The respondents moved an application under Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short “the Act”) for condoning the delay, inter alia, on the ground that the award dated 7.1.2006 was received in the office of Director, Amausi Airport, Lucknow on 10.1.2006 along with covering letter and after receipt of the award, the matter was referred to the New Delhi Office for advice and simultaneously an advice was also taken from the counsel at New Delhi. The consultation went on up till the end of March, 2006. It is stated that at later stage the file was given to Sri K.D. Nag, Advocate for study and for rendering his advice in the matter in the second week of April, 2006. Sri K.D. Nag, demanded relevant record and indulged into certain correspondence. The documents could be provided to Sri K.D. Nag in the third week of April, 2006. Sri K.D. Nag held three conferences on three different dates with the official of the Lucknow Airport and prepared the notes. The petition for setting aside the arbitral award could be dictated in the first week of May, 2006 and at last the same could be filed on 9.5.2006. The entire process of consultation, collection of documents and conferencing resulted in moving the application a little bit late for setting aside the award. The application was delayed by only 29 days. The delay in filing the application under Section 34 of the Act was liable to be condoned as it was beyond the control of the respondents to have preferred the application before the said date. 3. The application was delayed by only 29 days. The delay in filing the application under Section 34 of the Act was liable to be condoned as it was beyond the control of the respondents to have preferred the application before the said date. 3. An objection was filed against this application for condonation of delay on behalf of the revisionist and it was alleged that copy of the award was duly received by the competent authority of the respondents on 9.1.2006. It was also stated that as provided under Section 34 (3) of the Act, any application for setting aside an award may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making the application had received the arbitral award, provided that if the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months, it may, entertain the application with a further period of 30 days but not thereafter. The date of service of the award will be the starting point of limitation to challenge the award in the court. The period of 90 days and grace period of 30 days came to an end on 8.5.2006. The entire period came to an end on 8.5.2006. The respondents instituted the petition for setting aside the award on 9.5.2006. The court after expiry of limitation as provided under Section 34 of the Act had got no jurisdiction to condone the delay. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the revisionist on a decision rendered in the case of Union of India v. Polular Construction Company, AIR 2001 S.C. Page 4010. 4. Supplementary affidavit as well as rejoinder affidavit had also been filed by the parties before the learned District Judge. Learned District Judge heard the matter and came to the conclusion that there was manipulation in the record as certified copy was present for his perusal which was obtained on 20.5.2006 in which there was no over-cutting and 9.1.2006 was clearly mentioned therein whereas the court record indicated that on 9th January, 10th January was overwritten. Learned District Judge heard the matter and came to the conclusion that there was manipulation in the record as certified copy was present for his perusal which was obtained on 20.5.2006 in which there was no over-cutting and 9.1.2006 was clearly mentioned therein whereas the court record indicated that on 9th January, 10th January was overwritten. Learned District Judge, who was of the specific view that this manipulation has been made at the instance of the party, who wanted to be benefited of the said manipulation and there cannot be any other person except the respondents, who were to be benefited by the same. 5. Learned District Judge came to the conclusion that according to the Munsarim report, the petition was within time and therefore, the delay was liable to be condoned and for the said purpose, he took support of the Apex Court judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers and Contractors, (2005) 4 SCC 239 and proceeded to condone the delay on the finding that the award was served on the Director of the Airport Authority but he was not the person concerned to deal with the matter. Rather the Manager (Commercial) was the person concerned and when the copy of the award was received by the Director, then the same was marked to the Manager (Commercial), Lucknow Airport for the next day i.e. for 10.1.2006 and this fact has been mentioned on the top of the award. The award was served on the Director of the Airport Authority whereas the matter was to be dealt with by the Manager (Commercial). In support of his contention, the evidence in the nature of covering letter of the arbitral award was produced and learned District Judge found that 10.1.2006 has been mentioned over it and therefore, he came to the conclusion that the delay is liable to be condoned. 6. The revisionist has challenged the aforesaid order dated 24.7.2006 through this revision. 7. Submission of learned counsel for the revisionist is that the delay has illegally been condoned. 6. The revisionist has challenged the aforesaid order dated 24.7.2006 through this revision. 7. Submission of learned counsel for the revisionist is that the delay has illegally been condoned. The law propounded by the Apex Court is settled in this regard that no such latitude can be given by taking into consideration that the Manager (Commercial) was the person who was to deal with the matter and therefore, if the same was presented to him on 10.1.2006, then the limitation has to be counted from 10.1.2006. Manipulation has been made by the respondents in the record, which is fully proved and therefore, they do not deserve any sympathy from this Court and neither the Court should exercise any discretion in favour of them as they have not approached the Court with clean hand and rather have manipulated the record by making interpolation in it and in place of 9.1.2006, they have proceeded to overwrite 10.1.2006 in order to get limitation. Learned counsel submits that the limitation has to be counted from the date the award has been served upon the respondents and the authority who signed the agreement on behalf of the Government is the person concerned. In the present case, the Director, Airport Authority of India has received the award on 9.1.2006 and the Director, Airport Authority of India has challenged the aforesaid award by filing petition under Section 34 of the Act and he is the person concerned, who contested the proceedings before the arbitrator and signed the agreement. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the Manager (Commercial) was the person to deal with the matter, who has received the award on 10.1.2006. Manager (Commercial) is neither any decision taking authority nor has signed any agreement on behalf of the Airport Authority nor has filed application under Section 34 of the Act. Submission, therefore, is that the Director, Airport Authority was directly concerned with the matter and he was dealing with the same before the arbitrator as well as he also moved application for setting aside the award, therefore, liability of handling the matter cannot be shifted on the Manager (Commercial). The Manager (Commercial) is only responsible for doing pairvi of the case whereas the Director, Airport Authority was the person competent and connected with the arbitration proceedings. 8. The Manager (Commercial) is only responsible for doing pairvi of the case whereas the Director, Airport Authority was the person competent and connected with the arbitration proceedings. 8. Learned counsel for the revisionist has also submitted that the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is baseless in regard to the maintainability of the revision. The law in this regard is settled by the Apex Court and it has been held that in such situation, revision would be maintainable. The revisionist has not come before this Court against the order finally setting aside the award or refusing to set aside the award but in fact the revisionist has come against an order whereby the delay has been condoned. The matter has still to be adjudicated. The object as provided under Section 37 of the Act does not cover the issue in question. The appeal is not maintainable as contemplated under Section 37 of the Act but in fact the revision would be maintainable and has rightly been filed. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon a judgment rendered in the case of ITI Ltd. v. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd., (2002) 5 SCC 510 and an unreported judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Smt. Prem Lata Tewari and others v. The District Judge, Lucknow and another, Writ Petition No.5408 (M/S) of 2005. 9. Sri Prashant Chandra, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri K.D. Nag, learned counsel for the respondents submits that revision against the order condoning the delay is not maintainable and appeal would be maintainable and for that purpose, he has taken the aid of Section 37 of the Act. Apart from it, learned Senior Advocate has also submitted that it is a policy to condone the delay and has also submitted that the delay has rightly been condoned and reliance has rightly been placed by the learned District Judge on Union of India v. Tacco Trichy Engineers and Contractors (supra) and in fact the person concerned, who was dealing with the matter and who was in the know-how of everything was the Manager (Commercial) and therefore, the limitation has to be counted from 10.1.2006 and not from 9.1.2006. He has also submitted that the law in regard to the counting of limitation has been settled by the Apex Court in the latest judgment rendered in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh and another v. Himachal Techno Engineers and another, (2010) 12 SCC 210 and if limitation has to be calculated in accordance with the procedure provided in the aforesaid judgment, then the application for setting aside the award moved under Section 34 of the Act would be within limitation. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 11. The objection has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondents in regard to the maintainability of the revision. It has been submitted that the revision would not be maintainable and appeal as contemplated under Section 37 of the Act would be maintainable. Learned counsel for the respondents in this regard has drawn the attention of the Court towards the provisions of Section 37 of the Act, which read as under:- “37. Appealable orders. - (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely: - (a)granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9; (b) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34. (2) An appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral tribunal – (a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub- section (3) of Section 16 ; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under Section 17. (3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.” 12. If the provisions of Section 37 of the Act are taken into consideration, then it is evident that in sub-section (1), an appeal is to lie from the following orders:- “(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely: - (a)granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9; (b) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34.” 13. The Parliament has intentionally used the words (and from no others). Meaning thereby appeal has been confined only to the orders indicated in the said Section. Sub-section 1 (a) deals with granting or refusing to grant any interim measure under Section 9; (b) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34. Sub-section (2) provides that an appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral tribunal - (a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 16; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under Section 17. Second appeal has been barred under sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Act. 14. In the present case, the order has not been passed under sub-section 1(a) or 1(b) or 2 (a) or 2 (b) of Section 37 of the Act but in fact it has been passed under Section 34 of the Act condoning the delay. No remedy is provided under the Act in respect of the aforesaid order. The appeal in respect of other orders has specifically been barred by using the words (and from no others), it manifests the intention of the Parliament that in other cases, the appeal would not be maintainable. In case the appeal is not maintainable, then what is the remedy available with the revisionist. Learned counsel for the revisionist has placed reliance upon the decision rendered in the case of ITI Ltd. (supra). Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced as under:- “6. .....................He also argues that this question of availability of an alternate remedy by way of revision to the High Court is no more res integra because the same is concluded by a recent order of this Court though rendered at SLP stage in the case of Nirma Ltd. v. Lurgi Lentjes Energietechnik GMBH, (2002) 5 SCC 520 . 8. ................. “In our opinion, an efficacious alternate remedy is available to the petitioner by way of filing a revision in the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. ................. “In our opinion, an efficacious alternate remedy is available to the petitioner by way of filing a revision in the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Merely because a second appeal against an appellate order is barred by the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 37, the remedy of revision does not cease to be available to the petitioner, for the City Civil Court deciding an appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 37 remains a court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 CPC.” 21. Provisions of Section 37 of the Act of 1996 bar second appeal and not revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The power of appeal under Section 37 (2) of the Act against order of the Arbitral Tribunal granting or refusing to grant an interim measure is conferred on the court. “Court” is defined in Section 2 (e) meaning the “principal civil court of original jurisdiction” which has “jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of the suit”. The power of appeal having conferred on a civil court all procedural provisions contained in the Code would apply to the proceedings in appeal. Such proceedings in appeal are not open to second appeal as the same is clearly barred under sub-section (3) of Section 37. But I agree with the conclusion reached by Brother Hegde, J. that the supervisory and revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is neither expressly nor impliedly barred either by the provisions of Section 37 or Section 19 (1) of the Act. Section 19 (1) under Chapter V of Part I of the Act merely states that the Arbitral Tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure. The said action has no application to the proceedings before the civil court in exercise of powers in appeal under Section 39 (2) of the Act. 22. The supervisory jurisdiction to be exercised by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code is for the purpose of correcting jurisdictional error, if any, committed by a subordinate court in exercise of power in appeal under Section 37 (2) of the Act. 22. The supervisory jurisdiction to be exercised by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code is for the purpose of correcting jurisdictional error, if any, committed by a subordinate court in exercise of power in appeal under Section 37 (2) of the Act. The approach made to the revisional court under Section 115 of the Code is not a resort to remedy of appeal. In appeal, interference can be made both on facts and law whereas in revision only errors relating to jurisdiction can be corrected. Such revisional remedy is not expressly barred by the provisions of the Act. We have also not found any implied exclusion of the same on examination of the scheme and relevant provisions of the Act.” 15. This Court while dealing with an identical controversy in the case of Smt. Prem Lata Tewari (supra) also followed the same ratio of law and relegated the parties to avail the remedy of revision. Relevant portion of the said order is reproduced hereunder:- “A preliminary objection has been raised by learned counsel for the respondents that against the impugned order, revision shall lie in view of law laid down in a case reported in 2002 SAR (Civil) 666, ITI Limited v. Semon Ltd. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case referred hereinabove held in identical circumstances that revision shall lie under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has been held by Apex Court that when the Act under Section 37 provides for an appeal to Civil Court and the application of the Code of Civil Procedure has been not specifically barred the revisional jurisdiction shall be attracted. It has been further held by Apex Court that if there are two modes of invoking jurisdiction for High Court and one of the mode has been provided by the act or statute by filing of statutory revision then it shall be appropriate that an aggrieved party should adopt the statutory mode. In the present case, it has been admitted by parties’ counsel that statutory revision shall be maintainable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the impugned orders. In view of above, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order under extraordinary remedy of Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.” 16. In the present case, it has been admitted by parties’ counsel that statutory revision shall be maintainable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the impugned orders. In view of above, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order under extraordinary remedy of Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.” 16. I was persuaded to a great extent by the argument put forward by the learned counsel for the respondents but having given my anxious consideration to the law propounded by the Apex Court, I come to the conclusion that the remedy of revision is not barred because a second appeal against an appellate order is barred by provisions of sub-section 3 of Section 37 of the Act. The remedy of revision does not cease to be available to the parties concerned as the civil court remains a court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 C.P.C. The preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents is, therefore, rejected. 17. Argument of learned counsel for the respondents that the order condoning the delay is an administrative order and as such, revision would not be maintainable cannot be accepted in view of the nature of rights involved in the present case. The order condoning the delay goes to very root of the matter. Once the delay is condoned, the case proceeds and is decided after elaborate proceedings. The other side of the coin is that if the delay is not condoned, then right of the parties would stand crystallized. So, the order condoning the delay has trappings of finality as it could as start of the proceedings at one stage and allows the proceedings to go on the reverse side. In this respect the Apex Court while considering the issue in regard to the maintainability of special appeal as against an interlocutory order passed by learned Single Judge of a court came to the conclusion that an order which has trappings of finality in respect of the fact that it is an interlocutory order which decides the rights of the parties though interlocutory in nature substantially amounts to an order against which special appeal would be maintainable. In the case of Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben, AIR 1981 SC 1786 , the Apex Court ruled as under:- “The concept of judgment as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure seems to be rather narrow and the limitations engrafted by sub-section (2) of Section 2 cannot be physically imported into the definition of the word “judgment” as use in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent because the Letters Patent has advisedly not used the term ‘order’ or ‘decree’ anywhere. The intention, therefore, of the givers of the Letters Patent was that the word ‘judgment’ should receive a much wider and more liberal interpretation than the word ‘judgment’ used in the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time, it cannot be said that any order passed by a trial judge would amount to a judgment; otherwise there will be no end to the number of orders which would be appealable under the Letters Patent. It seems to us that the word ‘judgment’ has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader and not a narrower sense.” 18. The word ‘judgment’ was categorised in three kinds: (1)Final Judgment. - a judgment which decides all the questions or issue in controversy so far as the trial judge is concerned and leaves nothing also to be decided. (2) Preliminary Judgment - This kind of a judgment may take two forms - (a) where the trial Judge by an order dismisses the suit without going into the merits of the suit but only on a preliminary point ; (b) where the trial Judge passes an order after hearing preliminary objections raised by the defendant relating to maintainability of the suit, e.g., bar of jurisdiction, res judicata etc. (3) Intermediary or Interlocutory Judgment - Under the Civil Procedure Code most of the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in Clauses (a) to (w) of Order XLIII, Rule 1 but besides those orders such other orders which possess characteristic and trappings of finality in that, the orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x “(1) That the trial Judge being a senior court with vast experience of various branches of law occupying a very high status should be trusted to pass discretionary or interlocutory orders with due regard to the well settled principles of civil justice. Thus, any discretion exercised or routine orders passed by the trial Judge in the course of the suit which may cause some inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice one party or the other cannot be treated as judgment otherwise the appellate court (Division Bench) will be flooded with appeals from all kinds of orders passed by the trial Judge. The courts must give sufficient allowance to the trial Judge and raise a presumption that any discretionary order which he passes must be presumed to be correct unless it is ex facie legally erroneous or causes grave and substantial injustice. (2) That the interlocutory order in order to a judgment must contain the traits and trappings of finality either when the order decides the questions in controversy in an ancillary proceeding or in the suit itself or in a part of the proceedings.” x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x “(i) When the writ petition is entertained and interim order is passed without giving opportunity of hearing to the respondents or it time is given for submitting objections but before such objection could be filed the order is passed which has the trappings of finality the result the writ petition is practically decided ex facie. It is termed as “pre-hearing judgment”. (ii) When an interim matter is decided after taking into consideration the objections filed by the respondents or the affidavits submitted by the parties before the Court.” 19. The aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court goes to indicate that an order condoning the delay cannot be termed to be an administrative order and neither it can be said that revision would not be maintainable against the aforesaid order. The aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court goes to indicate that an order condoning the delay cannot be termed to be an administrative order and neither it can be said that revision would not be maintainable against the aforesaid order. The order condoning the delay has trappings of finality in one way or the other allowing the proceedings to go on or drop and so, in these circumstances, it cannot be said that the order condoning the delay is an administrative order. 20. The controversy arose in this Court in respect of objection filed under Rule 285-I of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Rules (for short “the Rules”) as to whether the order condoning or refusing to condone the delay would be administrative or judicial order and as to whether the proceedings refusing to condone the delay would be administrative as ruled by the courts below or would be judicial in nature. Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Swaroop v. Board of Revenue and others, 1990 (8) LCD 253 has ruled as under:- “13. A Tribunal may be court though it may have trapping of court but by law or by legal fiction the Tribunal can be deemed to be a ‘court’ and order passed by it will partake the nature of an order passed by a ‘court’ which can be subjected to appellate or revisional jurisdiction of superior court like any other order passed by a ‘court’. A legal fiction assumes the existence of a fact which does not really exist. It is a legal assumption that a thing is free which is either not free or which is probably as false as free. It is by legal fiction or deeming clause proceedings which are non-judicial could be taken as judicial and Tribunals or authorities before whom there is same lis and decide certain right, title or interest in property etc., could be ‘court’ for the purposes legal fiction makes it so even though it may not be ‘court’ as such. 17. ...............................................There is specific provision of revision before the Board of Revenue under section 333 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. As such revision and proceedings arising out of orders passed under U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act will lie before the Board of Revenue under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act and not under U.P. Land Revenue Act. 17. ...............................................There is specific provision of revision before the Board of Revenue under section 333 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. As such revision and proceedings arising out of orders passed under U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act will lie before the Board of Revenue under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act and not under U.P. Land Revenue Act. The Commissioner for the purposes of deciding objections under Section 173 and 174 is deemed to be acting as revenue court under Land Revenue Act and proceedings taken by him are judicial proceedings. The question will be whether the proceeding taken under U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules will be deemed judicial proceedings and the Commissioner will be deemed to be a Court when the proceedings in this behalf under both the Acts are judicial. 18. Rule 285-I as extracted above indicates that the Commissioner is to adjudicate certain rights and interest of the parties in respect of immovable property. The Commissioner is to decide as to whether there was any irregularity which was material in nature or there was mistake in publishing or conducting the sale for which purpose a procedure is prescribed and in case the Commissioner comes to the conclusion that such things existed, he is to set aside the sale. The order so passed by the Commissioner has been made final. Obviously the proceedings so taken by the Commissioner are judicial in nature. Though it could be said that the Commissioner is not sitting as a court to decide the same, and there is no specific provision in this behalf, the Commissioner will be deemed to be sitting in the court and the order passed by the Commissioner will be amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue under section 333 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act which is analogous to Section 219 of U.P. Land Revenue Act.” 21. After going through the aforesaid legal proposition, the objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents in regard to maintainability of the revision against an order condoning the delay to be administrative in nature cannot be accepted and is hereby rejected. 22. Now, I come to the second point in regard to the counting of limitation as to from which date the limitation has to be counted and who is the authority concerned on whom the award ought to have been served. 22. Now, I come to the second point in regard to the counting of limitation as to from which date the limitation has to be counted and who is the authority concerned on whom the award ought to have been served. Whether on whom the award was served at the first instance was dealing with the matter or the person to whom it was forwarded was the person concerned to deal with the same. 23. Learned counsel for the revisionist has specifically submitted that the agreement was entered into by the Director, Airport Authority of India and in fact he signed the agreement and the award was also received by the Director, Airport Authority of India on 9.1.2006 and he was the person concerned who challenged the award by filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act and he was the person concerned, who was contesting the proceedings before the arbitrator, therefore, the contention that the Manager (Commercial) has received the award on 10.1.2006 and limitation has to be counted from the said date is not correct. The Manager (Commercial) was doing pairvi in the case but in fact, the Director, Airport Authority of India was the party, he signed the contract and he has moved the application. So, it cannot be said that the Manager (Commercial) was the person concerned to deal with the matter. Even otherwise, the limitation has to be counted in accordance with the law propounded by the Apex Court. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondents upon Tacco Trichy Engineers (supra) is of no assistance to him in view of the finding recorded hereinabove. 24. Now, the only question remains to be considered as to in what manner the limitation has to be counted. The respondents have placed reliance upon judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh and another v. Himachal Techno Engineers and another, (2010) 12 SCC 210 . In Himachal Techno Engineers (supra), the Apex Court laid down the procedure for calculating the period of limitation in the matter arising out under Section 34 of the Act and the proviso contained therein. In Himachal Techno Engineers (supra), the Apex Court laid down the procedure for calculating the period of limitation in the matter arising out under Section 34 of the Act and the proviso contained therein. While making calculation, the first day on which the award has been served upon the party concerned has to be excluded and the Apex Court proceeded to consider the provisions contained in Section 12 (1) of the Limitation Act and Section 9 of the General Clauses Act and further held that the period of three months cannot be equated with 90 days but in fact the actual period of three months will be counted with a further condonable period of 30 days. The period has to be calculated in the aforesaid manner and actual months have to be taken into consideration. That being the position. The Apex Court in the case of Himachal Techno Engineers (supra) ruled as under:- “12. Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for exclusion of time in legal proceedings. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that in computing the period of limitation for any application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. The applicability of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to petitions under Section 34 of the Act is not excluded by the provisions of the Act. 14. The High Court has held that “three months” mentioned in Section 34 (3) of the Act refers to a period of 90 days. This is erroneous. A “month” does not refer to a period of thirty days, but refers to the actual period of a calendar month. If the months is April, June, September or November, the period of the month will be thirty days. If the month is January, March, May, July, August, October or December, the period of the month will be thirty-one days. If the month is February, the period will be twenty-nine days or twenty-eight days depending upon whether it is a leap year or not. 15. Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act and the proviso thereto significantly, do not express the periods of time mentioned therein in the same units. Sub-section (3) uses the words “three months” while prescribing the period of limitation and the proviso uses the words “thirty days” while referring to the outside limit of condonable delay. 15. Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act and the proviso thereto significantly, do not express the periods of time mentioned therein in the same units. Sub-section (3) uses the words “three months” while prescribing the period of limitation and the proviso uses the words “thirty days” while referring to the outside limit of condonable delay. The legislature had the choice of describing the periods of time in the same units, that is, to describe the periods as “three months” and “one month” respectively or by describing the periods as “ninety days” and “thirty days” respectively. It did not do so. Therefore, the legislature did not intend that the period of three months used in sub-section (3) to be equated to 90 days, nor intended that the period of thirty days to be taken as one month. 16. Section 3 (35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 defines a “month” as meaning a month reckoned according to the British calendar. 17. In Dodds v. Walker, (1981) 1 WLR 1027: (1981) 2 All ER 609 (HL) the House of Lords held that in calculating the period of a month or a specified number of months that had elapsed after the occurrence of a specified event, such as the giving of a notice, the general rule is that period ends on the corresponding date in the appropriate subsequent month irrespective of whether some months are longer than other. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Bibi Salma Khatoon v. State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 197 . 18. Therefore when the period prescribed is three months (as contrasted from 90 days) from a specified date, the said period would expire in the third month on the date corresponding to the date upon which the period starts. As a result, depending upon the months, it may mean 90 days or 91 days or 92 days or 89 days. 19. As the award was received by the Executive Engineer on 12-11-2007, for the purpose of calculating the three months period, the said date shall have to be excluded having regard to Section 12 (1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Consequently, the three months should be calculated from 13-11-2007 and would expire on 12-2-2008. Consequently, the three months should be calculated from 13-11-2007 and would expire on 12-2-2008. Thirty days from 12-2-2008 under the proviso should be calculated from 13-2-2008 and, having regard to the number of days in February, would expire on 13-3-2008. Therefore the petition filed on 11-3-2008 was well in time and was not barred by limitation.” 25. In paragraph 19 of the aforesaid decision, the mode of calculation has been provided and in the said case the award was deemed to be served upon the concerned party on 12.11.2007 and the limitation period was determined to start from 13.11.2007. Three months period was held to expire on 12.2.2008 and thereafter 30 days period was counted and the Apex Court came to the conclusion that 30 days period would expire on 13.3.2008. 26. In the present case, the award as averred by the parties was served on 9.1.2006. So the first day has to be excluded from calculation and thus, the limitation starts from 10.1.2006. If 10.1.2006 is to be taken into consideration the relevant date, then on 9.4.2006 the limitation of three months period would expire and the period of 30 days has to be counted from 10.4.2006 and 30 days period will come to an end on 10.5.2006. Thus, the limitation would continue up to the period of 10.5.2006 and according to the admitted case of both the parties, the award was served upon the respondents on 9.1.2006 and hence the respondents were entitled to move the application under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside the award up till 10.5.2006. The period of limitation thus calculated goes to indicate that the respondents have moved the application under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside the award within the period of limitation and I hold accordingly. 27. Learned counsel for the revisionist has cited various decisions to support his claim that the period of limitation cannot be extended beyond the period of 30 days. The said issue does not arise in the present case on account of the fact that according to the law propounded by the Apex Court, it has to be held that the application for setting aside the award was within limitation. 28. The said issue does not arise in the present case on account of the fact that according to the law propounded by the Apex Court, it has to be held that the application for setting aside the award was within limitation. 28. The order dated 24.7.2006 holding the award to be within limitation is upheld but for the reasons recorded in this judgment, this Court does not agree with the reasoning of the learned District Judge for condoning the delay and accepting the calculation presented by the Munsarim and proceeding on the assumption that the period of limitation was 90 days and thereafter 30 days period was to be calculated. 29. The revision, therefore, is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. _____________