Judgment H.K. Rathod, J.—Heard Learned Advocate Mr. HS Munshaw for petitioner Sabarkantha District Panchayat through its Deputy Executive Engineer and Executive Engineer, Irrigation Division, Sabarkantha District Panchayat in these two petitions. 2. In Special Civil Application No. 2765 of 2011 filed by petitioner against respondent Somaji Kankaji Damor, petitioner District Panchayat has challenged award passed by Labour Court, Himatnagar in Reference (LCH) No. 58 of 2000 Exh. 28 dated 12th January, 2011 wherein order of termination has been set aside by Labour Court while granting relief of reinstatement with continuity of service without back wages for interim period. 3. In Special Civil Application No. 2838 of 2011 filed by petitioner against respondent Sababhai Mathurbhai Damor, petitioner District Panchayat has challenged award passed by Labour Court, Himatnagar in Reference (LCH) No. 54 of 2000 Exh. 43 dated 12th January, 2011 wherein order of termination has been set aside by Labour Court while granting relief of reinstatement with continuity of service without back wages for interim period. 4. Brief facts of Special Civil Application No. 2838 of 2011 are as under: Respondent was employed as daily wager with effect from 1.7.1981 and was appointed without following recruitment procedure. As per Circular of Government dated 29.11.1994, respondent was not provided work with effect from 30.11.1999. 5. Simlarly, brief facts of Special Civil Application No. 2765 of 2011 are as under: Respondent was employed as daily wager with effect from 1.7.1979 and was appointed without following recruitment procedure. As per Circular of Government dated 29.11.1994, respondent was not provided work with effect from 30.11.1999. 6. Learned Advocate Mr. H.S. Munshaw appearing for petitioner has raised following common contentions in these petitions: In the year 1994, upon Irrigation Tank, respondent herein were working as watchman and according to statement produced by petitioner before Labour Court, none of respondent has completed continuous service of 240 days in preceding twelve months from date of termination. Therefore, he submitted that it was a seasonal work and work was available with petitioner for period from July to September and thereafter, work was not made available, therefore, in both cases, workman are not entitled for any relief from Labour Court which aspect has not been properly considered by Labour Court. Therefore, he submitted that it was a seasonal work and work was available with petitioner for period from July to September and thereafter, work was not made available, therefore, in both cases, workman are not entitled for any relief from Labour Court which aspect has not been properly considered by Labour Court. He also submitted that it ought to have been appreciated by Labour Court that workmen have not produced sufficient evidence before Labour Court for establishing completion of 240 days continuous service in preceding twelve months from date of termination. He also submitted that Labour Court has not given any finding whether workmen have completed continuous service of 240 days in preceding 12 months or not. He submitted that from date of termination, about more than 12 years have passed and, therefore, in such cases, relief of reinstatement should not be granted by Labour Court even if such termination is held to be violative of Section 25F of ID Act, 1947 but only compensation can be awarded by Labour Court. As per his submission, respondent workmen has not produced any documentary evidence and Labour Court has also not positively decided whether Section 25F of ID Act, 1947 has been violated, on the ground that workmen have completed continuous service of 240 days in preceding 12 months from date of termination or not. In support of his submission, Learned Advocate Mr. HS Munshaw for petitioner panchayat has relied upon decision given by Apex Court in case of Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic) Bhopal vs. Santosh Kumar Seal and others, (2010) 6 SCC 773 . Relevant discussion made by Apex Court in Paras 9,10 and 11 is quoted as under: “9. In last few years it has been consistently held by this Court that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic even if termination of an employee is found to be illegal or is in contravention of the prescribed procedure and that monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages in cases of such nature may be appropriate, (See U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Uday Narain Pandey (2006) 1 SCC 479 ; Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. vs. M.C. Joshi (2007) 9 SCC 353 ; State of M.P. & Ors. vs. Lalit Kumar Verma (2007) 1 SCC 575; Madhya Pradesh Administration vs. Tribhuban (2007) 9 SCC 748 ; Sita Ram & Ors. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Uday Narain Pandey (2006) 1 SCC 479 ; Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. vs. M.C. Joshi (2007) 9 SCC 353 ; State of M.P. & Ors. vs. Lalit Kumar Verma (2007) 1 SCC 575; Madhya Pradesh Administration vs. Tribhuban (2007) 9 SCC 748 ; Sita Ram & Ors. vs. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute (2008) 5 SCC 75 ; Jaipur Development Authority vs. Ramsahai & Anr. (2006) 11 SCC 684 ; Ghaziabad Development Authority & Anr. vs. Ashok Kumar & Anr . (2008) 4 SCC 261 ; and Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula & Anr. (2008) 1 SCC 575 ). 10. In a recent judgment authored by one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) in the case of Jagbir Singh vs. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board and Anr., (2009) 15 SCC 327 ; the aforesaid decisions were noticed and it was stated: “7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. * * * * * * * * 14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee”. 11. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee”. 11. In view of the aforesaid legal position and the fact that the workmen were engaged as daily wagers about 25 years back and they worked hardly for 2 or 3 years, relief of reinstatement and back wages to them cannot be said to be justified and instead monetary compensation would subserve the ends of justice. In our considered view, the compensation of Rs. 40,000/- to each of the workmen (Respondent Nos. 1 to 14) shall meet the ends of justice. We order accordingly. Such payment shall be made within 6 weeks from today failing which the same shall carry interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum.” Learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw for petitioner District Panchayat has also submitted that aforesaid decision of Hon’ble Apex Court has been relied upon by this Court (Coram : Hon’ble Mr. Justice MR Shah,J.) in case of New Ambika Sahkari Mandali Ltd. (IBP) Dealers) vs. Charansinh Shivnarayansinh Rajput, 2011-I CLR page 29 [Special Civil Application No. 11427 of 2010, decided on October 14, 2010]. Relevant discussion made by this Court in Para 4 of said decision is quoted as under: “4. Heard the Learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. Considering the impugned judgement and award, it prima facie appears that the finding given by the Labour Court that the respondent-workman had worked for one year is based on no evidence. It appears that as such the respondent has failed to establish and prove that he had worked for more than 240 days in the last preceding year. However, assuming that the respondent-workman had worked for more than 240 days in the last preceding year and that there was no breach of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, in that case, considering the total tenure of service of the respondent-workman of 9 ? months only and considering the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic), Bhopal (Supra), the respondent-workman can be compensated in terms of lumpsum monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages. It appears to the Court that considering the total service tenure of the respondent of 9 ? months if Rs. months only and considering the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic), Bhopal (Supra), the respondent-workman can be compensated in terms of lumpsum monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages. It appears to the Court that considering the total service tenure of the respondent of 9 ? months if Rs. 25,000/- is awarded by way of lumpsum compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages and continuity of service it would sub-serve the ends of justice.” Learned Advocate Mr. HS Munshaw for petitioner also relied upon decision of Apex Court in case of Incharge Officer and another vs. Shankar Shetty (2010) 9 SCC 126 decided on 31st August, 2010. Relevant Paragraphs 2 to 7 of said decision are quoted as under: “2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement of a daily wager has been brought to end in violation of Section 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short `ID Act’)? The course of decisions of this Court in recent years has been uniform on the above question. 3. In the case of Jagbir Singh vs. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board and Anr. (2009) 15 SCC 327 ; delivering the judgment of this Court, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court - namely, U.P. State Brassware Corporation Ltd. & Anr. vs. Uday Narain Pandey (2006) 1 SCC 479 ; Uttranchal Forest Development Corporation vs. M.C. Joshi (2007) 9 SCC 353 ; State of M.P. & Ors. vs. Lalit Kumar Verma (2007) 1 SCC 575; Madhya Pradesh Admn vs. Tribhuban (2007) 9 SCC 748 ; Sita Ram & Ors. vs. Motil Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute (2008) 5 SCC 75 ; Jaipur Development Authority vs. Ramasahai & Anr. (2006) 11 SCC 684 ; Ghaziabad Development Authority & Anr. vs. Ashok Kumar & Anr (2008) 4 SCC 261 and Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula & Anr. [2008] 1 SCC 575 and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, (2009) 15 SCC 327 ; “It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. [2008] 1 SCC 575 and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, (2009) 15 SCC 327 ; “It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. * * * * * * * * * * * It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee”. 4. Jagbir Singh (2009) 15 SCC 327 has been applied very recently in the case of Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic) Bhopal vs. Santosh Kumar Seal & Ors. (2010) 6 SCC 773 ; wherein this Court stated: (SCC p. 777, Para 11) “11. In view of the aforesaid legal position and the fact that the workmen were engage as daily wagers about 25 years back and they worked hardly for 2 or 3 years, relief of reinstatement and back wages to them cannot be said to be justified and instead monetary compensation would subserve the ends of justice”. 5. Shankar Shetty - the respondent was initially engaged as daily wager by the appellants in 1978. He worked for 57 days in that year. 5. Shankar Shetty - the respondent was initially engaged as daily wager by the appellants in 1978. He worked for 57 days in that year. The respondent had also worked for 316= days in 1979, 335=days in 1980, 242= days in 1981, 33= days in 1982, 10= days in 1983, 103 days in 1984 and 50 days in 1985. According to him he was terminated from service on September 6, 1985 without following the procedure prescribed in Section 25 F of the ID Act . He raised industrial dispute relating to his retrenchment which was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court, Mysore but later on the dispute was transferred to the Labour Court, Chickmagalur. The Labour Court, Chickmagalur by its award on December 21, 1994 rejected the respondent’s claim. The Labour Court held that Section 25 F of the ID Act was not attracted since the workman failed to prove that he had worked continuously for 240 days in the calendar year preceding his termination on September 6, 1985. 6. The respondent challenged the award passed by the Labour Court by filing a writ petition before the Karnataka High Court. The Single Judge of the High Court overturned the finding of the Labour Court about non-applicability of Section 25 F and held that Section 25 F of the ID Act was attracted and the procedure provided therein having not been followed, the termination of respondent (petitioner therein) was illegal. The Single Judge, accordingly, vide his judgment and order dated August 13, 2001 directed reinstatement of the respondent into service but without back wages and continuity of service. The present appellants challenged the judgment and order of the Single Judge in writ appeal before Division Bench but without any success. On December 9, 2004, the writ appeal preferred by the present appellants was dismissed by the Division Bench. 7. We think that if the principles stated in Jagbir Singh1 and the decisions of this Court referred to therein are kept in mind, it will be found that the High Court erred in granting relief of reinstatement to the respondent. The respondent was engaged as daily wager in 1978 and his engagement continued for about 7 years intermittently upto September 6, 1985 i.e. about 25 years back. The respondent was engaged as daily wager in 1978 and his engagement continued for about 7 years intermittently upto September 6, 1985 i.e. about 25 years back. In a case such as the present one, it appears to us that relief of reinstatement cannot be justified and instead monetary compensation would meet the ends of justice. In our considered opinion, the compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees Onc lac) in lieu of reinstatement shall be appropriate, just and equitable. We order accordingly. Such payment shall be made within 6 weeks from today failing which the same shall carry interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum.” Except above referred submissions, no other submission is made by Learned Advocate Mr. HS Munshaw and no other decision has been cited by Learned Advocate Mr. HS Munshaw on behalf of petitioner District Panchayat. In short, his submission is that in such case of termination of service in breach of Section 25F of ID Act, workman is not entitled for relief of reinstatement and in such cases, compensation can be awarded by Labour Court as has been held by Apex Court in aforesaid cases and accepted by this Court in above referred decision. 7. I have considered submissions made by Learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw on behalf of petitioner in both petitions. I have also perused impugned award made by Labour Court, Himatnagar in both petitions. 8. In these petitions, workmen were appointed with effect from 1.7.79/1.7.81 in the post of watchman in fixed salary of Rs. 450.00 per month. In both cases, date of termination is 30th November, 1999. Statement of claim was filed by workmen before Labour Court vide Exh. 5/Exh. 6 against which written statement was filed by petitioner vide Exh. 17/19. Facts stated by workmen in statement of claim were denied by petitioner District Panchayat. Before Labour Court, certain documents were produced by both workmen vide Exh. 14/Exh.20 and thereafter, in case of Somaji Kankaji, he was examined vide Exh. 18 and in case of Sabaji Mathurji, he was examined vide Exh. 22. It is necessary to note that in both cases, petitioner District Panchayat has cross examined concerned workman. In both cases, vide Exh. 23 and Exh. 33, certain documents were demanded by workman from petitioner in respect to original presence register, pay register etc. 18 and in case of Sabaji Mathurji, he was examined vide Exh. 22. It is necessary to note that in both cases, petitioner District Panchayat has cross examined concerned workman. In both cases, vide Exh. 23 and Exh. 33, certain documents were demanded by workman from petitioner in respect to original presence register, pay register etc. for the period from January, 1979 to December, 2000 and original musters showing details as to which workman has worked in absence of respondents herein were demanded and how many workmen have been made permanent and on what basis they have been made permanent and what was the qualification and how many workmen are working with petitioner district panchayat, with details. After receiving aforesaid application from workmen, Labour Court directed petitioner district panchayat to produce record which has been demanded by workmen before Labour Court. Vide Exh. 36 in Reference No. 54 of 2000, request was made on behalf of petitioner that deposition of witness for petitioner has been recorded in reference no. 54 of 2000 which may be considered as evidence in both reference cases. Before Labour Court, certain documents were produced by petitioner District Panchayat Exh. 25 and Exh. 38 and thereafter, witness Damor Punamchand Masurbhai, Deputy Executive Engineer was examined as witness for petitioner at Exh. 26 and Exh. 39. In support of demand of certain documents, affidavit was filed by workman at Exh. 24. One witness Babubhai Hirabhai was examined before Labour Court vide Exh. 30 and thereafter, one affidavit was filed by Damor Punamchand Masurbhai, Deputy Executive Engineer in respect to order passed by Labour Court to produce certain documents as demanded by workmen, who was cross-examined by Learned Advocate for workmen before Labour Court. Then, Labour Court has considered evidence on record and certin documents which are produced by both parties. It was not in dispute between both parties that both workmen were remained in service as Chokidar/watchman with petitioner District Panchayat. Thereafter, issues were framed by Labour Court. Labour Court has come to conclusion that workman in both cases were appointed on 1st July,1979/1st July, 1981 and both workman had remained in continuous service upto 30th November, 1999. It was not in dispute between both parties that both workmen were remained in service as Chokidar/watchman with petitioner District Panchayat. Thereafter, issues were framed by Labour Court. Labour Court has come to conclusion that workman in both cases were appointed on 1st July,1979/1st July, 1981 and both workman had remained in continuous service upto 30th November, 1999. Statement showing presence of workmen which was produced on record established fact that workmen remained in continuous service from date of their joining till date of termination, in-between, service of workman in both cases was not terminated by petitioner District Panchayat. Though documents demanded by workmen were available with petitioner District Panchayat because on that basis, payments were made to workmen in respect to salary, yet, intentionally, such record was not produced by petitioner District Panchayat before Labour Court. Therefore, Labour Court has drawn adverse inference against present petitioner District Panchayat. Record which has been demanded by workman in both cases was not destroyed by petitioner panchayat and it was also not a case of petitioner that such record has been destroyed. Thus, after considering deposition of workman and also deposition of witness for petitioner, Labour Court has come to conclusion that the workmen in both cases were not provided any document during employment in respect of his presence card, salary slip and identity card that fact has been proved by workman in both cases. Labour Court has also considered that in cross examination of witness for petitioner, it was stated by witness that all such record is available with their establishment. Considering it, Labour Court has held that if the documentary evidence in respect of presence is in custody of petitioner, then, petitioner should have produced such documentary evidence before Labour Court. For that, Labour Court has considered decision of Apex Court in case of RM Yellati vs. The Assistant Executive Engineer reported in 2006 SCC L/S page 1 wherein it has been held that once evidence has been recorded before Labour Court in respect of workman and when employer has not provided any documentary evidence to workman during employment period and no documents are produced by employer, then, oral evidence of workman must have to be accepted. In such circumstances, Labour Court, after considering decision of Apex Court and also considering admission of witness for petitioner that such documents are in custody of petitioner establishment, relied upon oral evidence of workman by drawing adverse inference against petitioner. Labour Court also considered decision of this Court on said issue which is reported in 2002 (93) FLR page 1050 in case of Sunil Balchandra Jani vs. Gujarat Electricity Board and also considered provisions of Section 25-B(1) and (2) of ID Act and held that according to Section 25B(1) and (2), workman has completed continuous service of 240 days in preceding twelve months from date of termination. Considering Head Note (B) of decision reported in 2002(93) FLR page 1050, it was held that as per Section 25B(1), it is not necessary that workman should have to complete 240 days service in each year. It was also case of petitioner that in 1982, workmen had completed 240 days service and, therefore, in such circumstances, as per aforesaid decision, workmen can be considered to be entitled for protection of Section 25F of ID Act, 1947 and in such circumstances, when petitioner has not followed Section 25F of ID Act,1947 while terminating services of workmen herein and accordingly granted relief of reinstatement in favour of workmen herein. District Panchayat has not made it clear before Labour Court that under which rules, service of both workman has been terminated. They were not engaged by petitioner panchayat for any specific work or for any specified period and, therefore, considering all these aspects, Labour Court has, in terms, come to conclusion that workmen were not in gainful employment during interim period but considering decision of Apex Court in case of GM Haryana Roadways vs. Rudhn Singh, AIR 2005 SC 1965, wherein it has been held that before passing orders as regards back wages for interim period, it should be taken into consideration that in which circumstances, appointment of workman was made and his nature of employment also should be taken into consideration. Therefore, considering that respondents workmen were performing duties as daily wager watchman in petitioner-panchayat and their appointment was not made in accordance with Government Rules and Regulations and also considering deposition given by workman at Exh. Therefore, considering that respondents workmen were performing duties as daily wager watchman in petitioner-panchayat and their appointment was not made in accordance with Government Rules and Regulations and also considering deposition given by workman at Exh. 18 which was given in the year 2008, Labour Court not passed any orders in respect to back wages for interim period and accordingly passed award of reinstatement with continuity of service but without back wages for interim period in favour of both workman which is under challenge in these petitions filed by petitioner District Panchayat. 9. I have considered submissions made by Learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw. I have also perused award passed by Labour Court in both cases. Considering award passed by Labour Court in both cases, documents were demanded by workmen before Labour Court from employer and on such application of workmen in these petitions, order was passed by Labour Court and no satisfactory explanation has been given by petitioner and during course of employment, it is not in dispute that pay slip, identity card and muster card were not supplied to workmen and, therefore, workmen may not be having any documentary evidence to prove completion of 240 days continuous service and therefore, oral evidence of workman was recorded before Labour Court which was cross examined by advocate for petitioner district panchayt. It is not a case of petitioner district panchayat before Labour Court that right from date of joining 1979/1981 till date of termination 30th November, 1999, in-between, services of workmen were terminated by district panchayat, therefore, it is proving continuous service of both workmen during aforesaid period that meanwhile they completed 240 days continuous service which fact has been established on the basis of evidence of workman that at the time when order of termination was passed by employer, workman in both cases were remained in continuous service of petitioner and completed 240 days continuous service within twelve months preceding date of termination. 10. This aspect has been examined by this Court in detail in case of State of Gujarat vs. Indrakumar Phakiraji Bhil, Special Civil Application No. 8426 of 2009 decided on 18.3.2010. 10. This aspect has been examined by this Court in detail in case of State of Gujarat vs. Indrakumar Phakiraji Bhil, Special Civil Application No. 8426 of 2009 decided on 18.3.2010. In Para 6 of said decision, this Court has considered decision of Apex Court dated 12th March, 2010 in case of Krishan Singh vs. Executive Engineer, Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board, Rohtak (Haryana) in Civil Appeal No. 2335 of 2010 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 11487 of 2009) as well as another decision of Apex Court in case of Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation JT 2010 (1) SC 598 = 2010 (1) LLJ 348. Therefore, relevant observations made by this Court in Para 6 and 7 of said decision are quoted as under: “6. In respect to working days, respondent was appointed in 1989 as daily wager and his service has been terminated on 20.9.1991 and aspect of working days has been examined by Labour Court as per statement produced by petitioner Exh. 31 being statement of presence of workman discussed in Paragraph 13 and looking to period March, 1990 to September, 1991 and from October, 1990 to September, 1991, as per presence statement produced by petitioner Exh. 31, workman has worked for 27 days in October 1990, 26 days in November, 1990, 26 days in December, 1990, 17 days in January, 1991, 24 days in February, 1991, 26 days in March, 1991 and 18 days in April, 1991, 12 days in June, 1991, 24 days in July 1991, 18 days in August, 1991 and 16 days in September, 1991, and 17 days in October, 1991 and total of these days comes to 251 days, therefore, within 12 months preceding date of termination, workman has completed 240 days continuous service on the basis of document at Exh. 31 and there was no evidence on record to show that petitioner has complied with section25F of ID Act, 1947. 31 and there was no evidence on record to show that petitioner has complied with section25F of ID Act, 1947. Therefore, once, workman has proved before Labour Court that he remained continue in service as required under Section 25B sub Section (1) and (2), then, mandatory provisions of Section 25F of ID Act, 1947 must have to be complied with and if that has not been complied with, then, order of termination becomes void, ab initio and due to that, workman is entitled for normal relief of reinstatement in service as recently decided by Hon’ble Apex Court (Coram : Hon’ble Mr. Justice Harjit Singh Bedi and Hon’ble Mr. Justice A.K. Patnaik, JJ.) on 12th March, 2010 in case of Krishan Singh vs. Executive Engineer, Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board, Rohtak (Haryana) in Civil Appeal No. 2335 of 2010 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 11487 of 2009). Relevant observations made by Apex Court in Para 4 to 12 of said decision are reproduced as under: “4. Shri Shekhar Prit Jha, Learned Counsel for the appellant, submitted that the High Court has relied on the decisions of this Court in Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula & Anr. [ (2008) 1 SCC 575 ] and Ghaziabad Development Authority & Anr. vs. Ashok Kumar & Anr. [ (2008) 4 SCC 261 ] for setting aside the Award of the Labour Court. He submitted that in Mahboob Deepak’s case, the workman was removed for financial irregularities, but the appellant in the present case was not removed for financial irregularities. He submitted that Ghaziabad Development Authority & Anr. vs. Ashok Kumar & Anr. (Supra)was not a case of violation of Section 25F of the Act as in the present case. He submitted that the two decisions on which the High Court has relied upon to set aside the Award of the Labour Court therefore do not apply to the facts of the present case. He submitted that it is now well-settled that if pre-conditions for retrenchment of a workman who has worked for more than a year stipulated in Section 25F of the Act are not complied with, the termination of the service of the workman is illegal. He submitted that the Labour Court having found that these pre-conditions had not been complied with in the case had rightly directed re-instatement of the appellant with 50% back wages. 5. He submitted that the Labour Court having found that these pre-conditions had not been complied with in the case had rightly directed re-instatement of the appellant with 50% back wages. 5. Shri Randhir Badhram, the Learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the High Court has rightly set aside the Award of the Labour Court relying on the decisions of this Court in Ghaziabad Development Authority and Another vs. Ashok Kumar & Anr. (Supra) and Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula & Anr. (Supra). He also relied on Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. Umadevi (3) & Ors. [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] in support of his submission that this is not a fit case where the appellant could be regularized in service. 6. The only question that we have to decide in this case is whether the High Court was right in setting aside the Award dated 18.07.2006 of the Labour Court directing reinstatement of the appellant with 50% back wages and directing instead payment of compensation of Rs. 50,000/- to the appellant. We find that the dispute that was referred to by the State Government under Section 10 of the Act to the Labour Court was: “whether the termination of the services of the appellant was justified and if not, to what relief he was entitled to?” As per the claim-statement filed by the appellant before the Labour Court, he was appointed by the respondent as a daily wager against a regular post on 01.06.1988 under the Junior Engineer at Meham and the appellant worked there for different periods until the respondent terminated his services in December, 1993 without any notice and without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The respondent in its objections did not take a plea that the engagement of the appellant was either against a post which was not sanctioned or contrary to the statutory rules and admitted in the objections that the services of the appellant were engaged for different periods during 1988-1989, 1989-1990, 1990-1991 and 1992-1993. The respondent also furnished a statement of the works in which the appellant was engaged during the years 1988-1989 and 1989-1990, which was marked as Exb. MW-1. Taking into consideration Exb. The respondent also furnished a statement of the works in which the appellant was engaged during the years 1988-1989 and 1989-1990, which was marked as Exb. MW-1. Taking into consideration Exb. MW-1, the Labour Court held that the appellant has completed 267 days from 1.6.1988 to 30.4.1989 and without any notice or notice pay and without retrenchment compensation. In the relief portion of the Award, the Labour Court held that as the services of the appellant had been terminated illegally, he was entitled to be re-instated in his previous post with continuity of service and 50% back wages from the date of demand notice, i.e. 31.12.1997. 7. In a recent judgment of this Court in Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation [JT 2010 (1) SC 598], the Labour Court, Gurdaspur, by its Award directed re-instatement of the workman with 50% back wages, but the Award of the Labour Court was modified by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the writ petition and this Court has held that the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court was liable to be set aside only on the ground that while interfering with the Award of the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge did not keep in view the parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution. Learned Brother G.S. Singhvi, J., in his opinion, has observed that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV of the Constitution including Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43A thereof. Learned Brother Asok Kumar Ganguly, J. agreeing with learned Brother G. S. Singhvi, J., has also observed that this Court has a duty to interpret statutes with social welfare benefits in such a way as to further the statutory goal and not to frustrate it. 8. Learned Brother Asok Kumar Ganguly, J. agreeing with learned Brother G. S. Singhvi, J., has also observed that this Court has a duty to interpret statutes with social welfare benefits in such a way as to further the statutory goal and not to frustrate it. 8. Section 11A of the Act clearly provides that where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct re-instatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. Wide discretion is, therefore, vested in the Labour Court while adjudicating an industrial dispute relating to discharge or dismissal of a workman and if the Labour Court has exercised its jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the case to direct re-instatement of a workman with 50% back wages taking into consideration the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record, the High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India will not interfere with the same, except on well-settled principles laid down by this Court for a writ of certiorari against an order passed by a Court or a Tribunal. 9. The High Court, however, has relied on the decision of this Court in Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula & Anr. 9. The High Court, however, has relied on the decision of this Court in Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula & Anr. (Supra) and on reading of the aforesaid decision, we find that this Court in the aforesaid decision has mentioned the following factors, which are relevant for determining whether an award of re-instatement should or should not be passed:—(i) whether in making the appointment, the statutory rules, if any, had complied with; (ii) the period he had worked; (iii) whether there existed any vacancy; and (iv) whether he obtained some other employment on the date of termination or passing of the award.” This Court further held in the aforesaid decision that in the light of these principles the relief of re-instatement granted by the Labour Court in that case was wholly unsustainable and has accordingly directed payment of a sum of Rs. 50,000/- by way of damages to the workman with interest at the rate of 9% per annum. 10. The High Court has also relied on the decision of this Court in Ghaziabad Development Authority & Anr. vs. Ashok Kumar & Anr. (Supra) and on reading of the aforesaid decision we find that the contention of the management before the Labour Court was that the post, in which the workman was working in that case, was not sanctioned after 31.03.1990 and this was not disputed by the workman and this Court held that if there did not exist any post, the Labour Court should not have directed re-instatement of the workman in service. 11. The aforesaid two decisions of this Court in Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula & Anr. (Supra) and Ghaziabad Development Authority & Anr. vs. Ashok Kumar & Anr. (Supra) have no application to the facts in this case. In the present case, the respondent has not taken any stand before the Labour Court in his objections that the post in which the workman was working was not sanctioned or that his engagement was contrary to statutory rules or that he was employed elsewhere or that there was no vacancy. In the absence of any pleadings, evidence or findings on any of these aspects, the High Court should not have modified the Award of the Labour Court directing re-instatement of the appellant with 50% back wages and instead directed payment of compensation of Rs. 50,000/- to the appellant. 12. In the absence of any pleadings, evidence or findings on any of these aspects, the High Court should not have modified the Award of the Labour Court directing re-instatement of the appellant with 50% back wages and instead directed payment of compensation of Rs. 50,000/- to the appellant. 12. The decision of this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. Umadevi (3) & Ors. (Supra) cited by the counsel for the respondent relates to regularization in public employment and has no relevance to an Award for re-instatement of a discharged workman passed by the Labour Court under Section 11A of the Act without any direction for regularization of his services.” [See : 2010(1) Scale Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Ltd.; 2010-I-LLJ-348 (Mad) Ramesh S. & Ors. vs. Commissioner of Labour, DMC Complex, Chennai 6 and others; 2010 AIR SCW page 542 in case of Director, Fisheries Terminal Division vs. Bhikubhai Meghjibhai Chavda]. “ 11. Aforesaid decision given by this Court on 18.3.2010 while considering decision of Hon’ble Apex Court dated 12th March, 2010 in case of Krishan Singh vs. Executive Engineer (Supra) was challenged by State of Gujarat before Hon’ble Apex Court and it came to be dismissed by Hon’ble Apex Court on 21.2.2011 in a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) CC 2668/2011 on ground of delay as well as on merits. Order passed by Apex Court is quoted as under: “The Special Leave Petition is dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits.” 12. In case of RM Yellatti vs. Asstt. Executive Engineer reported in 2006 SCC (L&S) 1, Apex Court observed as under in Paras 17 to 19: “17. Analyzing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workmen stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. This burden is discharged only upon the workmen stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the Court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workmen will not be the ground for the tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down basic principle, namely, that the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon facts of each case. 18. Now applying the above decision to the facts of the present case, we find that the workman herein had stepped in the witness box. He had called upon the management to produce the nominal muster rolls for the period commnencing from 22/11/1988 to 20/6/1994. This period is the period borne out the certificate (Ex. W1) issued by the former Asstt. Executive Engineer the evidence in rebuttal from the side of the management produce five nominal muster rolls (NMRs), out of which 3 NMRs, Ex.M1, Ex.M2 and Ex.M3, did not even relate to the concerned period. The relevant NMRs produced by the management were Ex. M4 and Ex. M5, which indicated that the workmen had worked for 43 days during the period 21/1/1994 to 20/2/1994 respectively. There is no explanation from the side of the management as to why for the remaining period the nominal muster rolls were not produced. The relevant NMRs produced by the management were Ex. M4 and Ex. M5, which indicated that the workmen had worked for 43 days during the period 21/1/1994 to 20/2/1994 respectively. There is no explanation from the side of the management as to why for the remaining period the nominal muster rolls were not produced. The Labour Court has rightly held that there is nothing to disbelieve the certificate (Ex.W1). The High Court in its impugned judgment has not given reasons for discarding the said certificate. In the circumstance, we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court ought not to have interfered with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court and confirmed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 7/6/2000 in writ petition No. 17636 of 2000. This is not, therefore, a case where the allegations of the workmen are founded merely on an affidavit. He has produced cogent evidence in support of his case. The workmen was working in SD 1, Athani and Ex. W1 was issued by the former Asstt. Executive Engineer, Hipparagi Dam Construction Division No. 1, Athani-591304. In the present case, the defence of the management was that although Ex. W1 refers to the period 22/11/1988 to 20/6/1994, the workmen had not worked as a daily wager on all days during that period. If so, the management was duty bound to produce before the Labour Court the nominal muster rolls for the relevant period, particularly when it was summoned to do so. We are not placing this judgment on the shifting of the burden. We are not placing this case on drawing of adverse inference. In the present case, we are of the view that the workmen had stepped in the witness box and his case that he had worked for 240 days in a given year was supported by the certificate (Ex.W1). In the circumstances, the Division Bench of the High Court had erred in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. 19. Before the concluding, we would like to make an observation with regard to cases concerning retrenchment/termination of services of daily waged earner, particularly those who are appointed to work in Government departments. Daily waged earners are not regular employees. They are not given letters of appointments. They are not given letters of terminations. 19. Before the concluding, we would like to make an observation with regard to cases concerning retrenchment/termination of services of daily waged earner, particularly those who are appointed to work in Government departments. Daily waged earners are not regular employees. They are not given letters of appointments. They are not given letters of terminations. They are not given any written document which they could produce as proof of receipt of wages. Their muster rolls are maintained in loose sheets. Even in cases, where registers are maintained by the Government departments, the officers/clerks making entries do not put their signatures. Even where signatures of clerks appear, the entries are not countersigned or certified by the appointing authorities. In such cases, we are of the view that the State Governments should take steps to maintain proper record of the services rendered by the daily wagers; that these records should be signed by the competent designated officers and that at the time of termination, the concerned designated officers should give certificates of the number of days which the labourer/daily wager has worked. This system will obviate litigations and procuniary liability for the Government.” 13. Therefore, considering award made by Labour Court which are under challenge in these petitions and also considering decision of Apex Court in case of RM Yellatti vs. Asstt. Executive Engineer reported in 2006 SCC (L&S) 1 and also considering decision of this Court in case of State of Gujarat vs. Indrakumar Phakiraji Bhil, Special Civil Application No. 8426 of 2009 decided on 18.3.2010 which has been confirmed by Apex Court on 21.2.2011, contentions raised by Learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw on behalf of petitioner District Panchayat cannot be accepted because facts which are found from record are otherwise and there is no explanation given to this Court by Learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw for petitioner that in response to demand made by workmen before Labour Court, why relevant and necessary documents were not produced by petitioner before Labour Court though same were in custody of petitioner as admitted by witness for petitioner in his cross examination. Therefore, according to my opinion, Labour Court has rightly drawn adverse inference against petitioner that if petitioner would make available such documents as demanded by workmen, then, same would go against petitioner and that is why petitioner is not producing such documents before Labour Court. Therefore, contentions raised by Learned Advocate Mr. Therefore, according to my opinion, Labour Court has rightly drawn adverse inference against petitioner that if petitioner would make available such documents as demanded by workmen, then, same would go against petitioner and that is why petitioner is not producing such documents before Labour Court. Therefore, contentions raised by Learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw cannot be accepted and hence same are rejected. Labour Court has not committed any error which would require interference of this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of India. 14. As regards contention raised by Learned Advocate Mr. HS Munshaw on behalf of petitioner panchayat relying upon decision of Apex Court as referred to above, that in such cases involving violation of Section 25F of ID Act, instead of granting reinstatement of service, some reasonable amount of compensation can be awarded by Labour Court in lieu of reinstatement and back wages for interim period, this aspect has been considered by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation reported in 2010 (1) SCALE page 613 and relevant discussion has been made by Hon’ble Apex Court in an identical situation that when termination order is found to be illegal and violative of Section 25F, G and H of ID Act, 1947, then, relief of reinstatement must have to be granted and in lieu thereof, no compensation can be awarded. For that, Apex Court in aforesaid decision has considered Mandate of Constitution of India, Social Justice, Welfare Legislation and right to life in Paras 16 to 24. Therefore, Paras 16 to 24 of said judgment are quoted as under: “16. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the learned Single Judge of the High Court committed serious jurisdictional error and unjustifiably interfered with the award of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court with compensation of Rs. 87,582/- by entertaining a wholly unfounded plea that the appellant was appointed in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the regulations. 17. 87,582/- by entertaining a wholly unfounded plea that the appellant was appointed in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the regulations. 17. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J, opined that “the concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State”-State of Mysore vs. Workers of Gold Mines AIR 1958 SC 923 . 18. In Y.A. Mamarde vs. Authority under the Minimum Wages Act (1972) 2 SCC 108 , this Court, while interpreting the provisions of Minimum Wages Act, 1948, observed: “The anxiety on the part of the society for improving the general economic condition of some of its less favoured members appears to be in supersession of the old principle of absolute freedom of contract and the doctrine of laissez faire and in recognition of the new principles of social welfare and common good. Prior to our Constitution this principle was advocated by the movement for liberal employment in civilised countries and the Act which is a pre-constitution measure was the offspring of that movement. Under our present Constitution the State is now expressly directed to endeavour to secure to all workers (whether agricultural, industrial or otherwise) not only bare physical subsistence but a living wage and conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure. Under our present Constitution the State is now expressly directed to endeavour to secure to all workers (whether agricultural, industrial or otherwise) not only bare physical subsistence but a living wage and conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure. This Directive Principle of State Policy being conducive to the general interest of the nation as a whole, merely lays down the foundation for appropriate social structure in which the labour will find its place of dignity, legitimately due to it in lieu of its contribution to the progress of national economic prosperity.” 19. The preamble and various Articles contained in Part IV of the Constitution promote social justice so that life of every individual becomes meaningful and he is able to live with human dignity. The concept of social justice engrafted in the Constitution consists of diverse principles essentially for the orderly growth and development of personality of every citizen. Social justice is thus an integral part of justice in the generic sense. Justice is the genus, of which social justice is one of its species. Social justice is a dynamic devise to mitigate the sufferings of the poor, weak, dalits, tribals and deprived sections of the society and to elevate them to the level of equality to live a life with dignity of person. In other words, the aim of social justice is to attain substantial degree of social, economic and political equality, which is the legitimate expectation of every Section of the society. In a developing society like ours which is full of unbridgeable and ever widening gaps of inequality in status and of opportunity, law is a catalyst to reach the ladder of justice. The philosophy of welfare State and social justice is amply reflected in large number of judgments of this Court, various High Courts, National and State Industrial Tribunals involving interpretation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, Indian Factories Act, Payment of Wages Act, Minimum Wages Act, Payment of Bonus Act, Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Employees Insurance Act, the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act and the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act enacted by different States. 20. In Ramon Services (P) Ltd. vs. Subhash Kapoor (2001) 1 SCC 118 , R.P. Sethi, J. observed : “that after independence the concept of social justice has become a part of our legal system. 20. In Ramon Services (P) Ltd. vs. Subhash Kapoor (2001) 1 SCC 118 , R.P. Sethi, J. observed : “that after independence the concept of social justice has become a part of our legal system. This concept gives meaning and significance to the democratic ways of life and of making the life dynamic. The concept of welfare State would remain in oblivion unless social justice is dispensed. Dispensation of social justice and achieving the goals set forth in the Constitution are not possible without the active, concerted and dynamic efforts made by the persons concerned with the justice dispensation system. In L.I.C. of India vs. Consumer Education and Research Centre and Others (1995) 5 SCC 482 , K. Ramaswamy, J. observed that social Justice is a device to ensure life to be meaningful and liveable with human dignity. The State is obliged to provide to workmen facilities to reach minimum standard of health, economic security and civilized living. The principle laid down by this law requires courts to ensure that a workman who has not been found guilty can not be deprived of what he is entitled to get. Obviously when a workman has been illegally deprived of his device then that is misconduct on the part of the employer and employer can not possibly be permitted to deprive a person of what is due to him. 21. In 70s, 80s and early 90s, the courts repeatedly negated the doctrine of laissez faire and the theory of hire and fire. In his treaties: Democracy, Equality and Freedom, Justice Mathew wrote: “The original concept of employment was that of master and servant. It was therefore held that a Court will not specifically enforce a contract of employment. The law has adhered to the age-old rule that an employer may dismiss the employee at will. Certainly, an employee can never expect to be completely free to do what he likes to do. He must face the prospect of discharge for failing or refusing to do his work in accordance with his employer’s directions. Such control by the employer over the employee is fundamental to the employment relationship. But there are innumerable facets of the employee’s life that have little or no relevance to the employment relationship and over which the employer should not be allowed to exercise control. Such control by the employer over the employee is fundamental to the employment relationship. But there are innumerable facets of the employee’s life that have little or no relevance to the employment relationship and over which the employer should not be allowed to exercise control. It is no doubt difficult to draw a line between reasonable demands of an employer and those which are unreasonable as having no relation to the employment itself. The rule that an employer can arbitrarily discharge an employee with or without regard to the actuating motive is a rule settled beyond doubt. But the rule became settled at a time when the words `master’ and `servant’ were taken more literally than they are now and when, as in early Roman Law, the rights of the servant, like the rights of any other member of the household, were not his own, but those of his pater familias. The overtones of this ancient doctrine are discernible in the judicial opinionwhich rationalised the employer’s absolute right discharge the employee. Such a philosophy of the employer’s dominion over his employee may have been in tune with the rustic simplicity of bygone days. But that philosophy is incompatible with these days of large, impersonal, corporate employers. The conditions have now vastly changed and it is difficult to regard the contract of employment with large scale industries and government enterprises conducted by bodies which are created under special statutes as mere contract of personal service. Where large number of people are unemployed and it is extremely difficult to find employment, an employee who is discharged from service might have to remain without means of subsistence for a considerably long time and damages in the shape of wages for a certain period may not be an adequate compensation to the employee for non-employment. In other words, damages would be a poor substitute for reinstatement. The traditional rule has survived because of the sustenance it received from the law of contracts. From the contractual principle of mutuality of obligation, it was reasoned that if the employee can quit his job at will, then so too must the employer have the right to terminate the relationship for any or no reason. And there are a number of cases in which even contracts for permanent employment, i.e. for indefinite terms, have been held unenforceable on the ground that they lack mutuality of obligation. And there are a number of cases in which even contracts for permanent employment, i.e. for indefinite terms, have been held unenforceable on the ground that they lack mutuality of obligation. But these case demonstrate that mutuality is a high-sounding phrase of little use as an analytical tool and it would seem clear that mutuality of obligation is not an inexorable requirement and that lack of mutuality is simply, as many courts have come to recognize, an imperfect way of referring to the real obstacle to enforcing any kind of contractual limitation on the employer’s right of discharge, i.e. lack of consideration. If there is anything in contract law which seems likely to advance the present inquiry, it is the growing tendency to protect individuals from contracts of adhesion from over-reaching terms often found in standard forms of contract used by large commercial establishments. Judicial disfavour of contracts of adhesion has been said to reflect the assumed need to protect the weaker contracting part against the harshness of the common law and the abuses of freedom of contract. The same philosophy seems to provide an appropriate answer to the argument, which still seems to have some vitality, that “the servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered to him.” [emphasis added) 22. In Government Branch Press vs. D.B. Belliappa (1979) 1 SCC 477 , the employer invoked the theory of hire and fire by contending that the respondent’s appointment was purely temporary and his service could be terminated at any time in accordance with the terms and conditions of appointment which he had voluntarily accepted. While rejecting this plea as wholly misconceived, the Court observed: “It is borrowed from the archaic common law concept that employment was a matter between the master and servant only. In the first place, this rule in its original absolute form is not applicable to government servants. Secondly, even with regard to private employment, much of it has passed into the fossils of time. “This rule held the field at the time when the master and servant were taken more literally than they are now and when, as in early Roman Law, the rights of the servant, like the rights of any other member of the household, were not his own, but those of his pater familias”. “This rule held the field at the time when the master and servant were taken more literally than they are now and when, as in early Roman Law, the rights of the servant, like the rights of any other member of the household, were not his own, but those of his pater familias”. The overtones of this ancient doctrine are discernible in the Anglo-American jurisprudence of the 18th century and the first half of the 20th century, which rationalised the employer’s absolute right to discharge the employee. “Such a philosophy”, as pointed out by K.K. Mathew, J. (vide his treatise: “Democracy, Equality and Freedom”, p. 326), “of the employer’s dominion over his employee may have been in tune with the rustic simplicity of bygone days. But that philosophy is incompatible with these days of large, impersonal, corporate employers”. To bring it in tune with vastly changed and changing socio-economic conditions and mores of the day, much of this old, antiquated and unjust doctrine has been eroded by judicial decisions and legislation, particularly in its application to persons in public employment, to whom the Constitutional protection of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 is available. The argument is therefore overruled. The doctrine of laissez faire was again rejected in Glaxo Labotratories (India) Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer (1984) 1 SCC 1 , in the following words: “In the days of laissez-faire when industrial relation was governed by the harsh weighted law of hire and fire the management was the supreme master, the relationship being referable to contract between unequals and the action of the management treated almost sacrosanct. The developing notions of social justice and the expanding horizon of socio-economic justice necessitated statutory protection to the unequal partner in the industry namely, those who invest blood and flesh against those who bring in capital. Moving from the days when whim of the employer was suprema lex, the Act took a modest step to compel by statute the employer to prescribe minimum conditions of service subject to which employment is given. The Act was enacted as its long title shows to require employers in industrial establishments to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to workmen employed by them. The movement was from status to contract, the contract being not left to be negotiated by two unequal persons but statutorily imposed. The Act was enacted as its long title shows to require employers in industrial establishments to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to workmen employed by them. The movement was from status to contract, the contract being not left to be negotiated by two unequal persons but statutorily imposed. If this socially beneficial Act was enacted for ameliorating the conditions of the weaker partner, conditions of service prescribed thereunder must receive such interpretation as to advance the intendment underlying the Act and defeat the mischief.” 23. Of late, there has been a visible shift in the courts approach in dealing with the cases involving the interpretation of social welfare legislations. The attractive mantras of globalization and liberalisation are fast becoming the raison d’etre of the judicial process and an impression has been created that the constitutional courts are no longer sympathetic towards the plight of industrial and unorganized workers. In large number of cases like the present one, relief has been denied to the employees falling in the category of workmen, who are illegally retrenched from service by creating by-lanes and side-lanes in the jurisprudence developed by this Court in three decades. The stock plea raised by the public employer in such cases is that the initial employment/engagement of the workman-employee was contrary to some or the other statute or that reinstatement of the workman will put unbearable burden on the financial health of the establishment. The courts have readily accepted such plea unmindful of the accountability of the wrong doer and indirectly punished the tiny beneficiary of the wrong ignoring the fact that he may have continued in the employment for years together and that micro wages earned by him may be the only source of his livelihood. It need no emphasis that if a man is deprived of his livelihood, he is deprived of all his fundamental and constitutional rights and for him the goal of social and economic justice, equality of status and of opportunity, the freedoms enshrined in the Constitution remain illusory. Therefore, the approach of the courts must be compatible with the constitutional philosophy of which the Directive Principles of State Policy constitute an integral part and justice due to the workman should not be denied by entertaining the specious and untenable grounds put forward by the employer - public or private. 24. Therefore, the approach of the courts must be compatible with the constitutional philosophy of which the Directive Principles of State Policy constitute an integral part and justice due to the workman should not be denied by entertaining the specious and untenable grounds put forward by the employer - public or private. 24. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the award passed by the Labour Court is restored. The appellant shall get cost of Rs. 25,000/- from the corporation.” 15. In case of Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Haryana, 2010 (1) Scale page 432 decided on January 5, 2010, reported in 2010 (1) 432, Apex Court has considered identical circumstances as contended by Learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw on behlf of petitioner herein. Therefore, relevant Paragraph 12 and 13 therepf are quoted as under: “12. The perusal of all these details clearly shows that the appellant alone was singled out and discriminated. We have already noted the specific finding of the Labour Court that the appellant had fulfilled 240 days in a calendar year before the order of termination. The appellant has also highlighted that he is the sole bread earner of his family and his family consists of his old mother, wife and two minor sons and a minor daughter. The above-mentioned chart also shows that identical awards passed in the case of Mast Ram, Rajesh, Paramjit and Amarjit was upheld by the High Court and the award in favour of the appellant alone was quashed by the High Court in the second round of litigation. Though, it was contended that the initial appointment of the appellant was contrary to the recruitment rules and constitutional scheme of employment, admittedly, the said objection was not raised by the Department either before the Labour Court or before the High Court at the first instance. It was only for the first time that they raised the said issue before the High Court when the matter was remitted to it that too the same was raised only during the arguments. In such circumstances, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the factual finding rendered by the Labour Court and in view of the different treatment to other similarly placed workmen the Department ought not to have challenged the order of the Labour Court. In such circumstances, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the factual finding rendered by the Labour Court and in view of the different treatment to other similarly placed workmen the Department ought not to have challenged the order of the Labour Court. In addition to the above infirmities, the appellant has also pointed out that one Gurbax Singh who was engaged subsequent to the appellant on casual basis has challenged his termination order, which was quashed by the Labour Court; interestingly the Department did not challenge the award of the Labour Court by filing writ petition. It was also highlighted by the appellant that on the basis of the award, Gurbax Singh was not only taken back in service but his services were regularized w.e.f. 01.07.2004. 13. We are conscious of the fact that an appointment on public post cannot be made in contravention of recruitment rules and constitutional scheme of employment. However, in view of the materials placed before the Labour Court and in this Court, we are satisfied that the said principle would not apply in the case on hand. As rightly pointed out, the appellant has not prayed for regularization but only for reinstatement with continuity of service for which he is legally entitled to. It is to be noted in the case of termination of casual employee what is required to be seen is whether a workman has completed 240 days in the preceding 12 months or not. If sufficient materials are shown that workman has completed 240 days then his service cannot be terminated without giving notice or compensation in lieu of it in terms of Section 25F. The High Court failed to appreciate that in the present case appellant has completed 240 days in the preceding 12 months and no notice or compensation in lieu of it was given to him, in such circumstances his termination was illegal. All the decisions relied on by the High Court are not applicable to the case on hand more particularly, in view of the specific factual finding by the Labour Court.” 16. Recently, in case of Krishan Singh vs. Executive Engineer, Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board, Rohtak (Haryan), 2010 (2) Scale 848. Hon’ble Apex Court has considered a case wherein termination was found to be without notice and without payment of retrenchment compensation. Recently, in case of Krishan Singh vs. Executive Engineer, Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board, Rohtak (Haryan), 2010 (2) Scale 848. Hon’ble Apex Court has considered a case wherein termination was found to be without notice and without payment of retrenchment compensation. Reinstatement was ordered by Labour Court with 50% back wages for interim period. High Court set aside award of Labour Court and directed payment of compensation. Apex Court also considered earlier decision in case of Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, 2010(1) Scale 613. Relevant observations made by Apex Court in Paras 6 to 12 are quoted as under: “6. The only question that we have to decide in this case is whether the High Court was right in setting aside the Award dated 18.07.2006 of the Labour Court directing reinstatement of the appellant with 50% back wages and directing instead payment of compensation of Rs. 50,000/- to the appellant. We find that the dispute that was referred to by the State Government under Section 10 of the Act to the Labour Court was: “whether the termination of the services of the appellant was justified and if not, to what relief he was entitled to?” As per the claim-statement filed by the appellant before the Labour Court, he was appointed by the respondent as a daily wager against a regular post on 01.06.1988 under the Junior Engineer at Meham and the appellant worked there for different periods until the respondent terminated his services in December, 1993 without any notice and without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The respondent in its objections did not take a plea that the engagement of the appellant was either against a post which was not sanctioned or contrary to the statutory rules and admitted in the objections that the services of the appellant were engaged for different periods during 1988-1989, 1989-1990, 1990-1991 and 1992-1993. The respondent also furnished a statement of the works in which the appellant was engaged during the years 1988-1989 and 1989-1990, which was marked as Exb. MW-1. Taking into consideration Exb. MW-1, the Labour Court held that the appellant has completed 267 days from 1.6.1988 to 30.4.1989 and without any notice or notice pay and without retrenchment compensation. The respondent also furnished a statement of the works in which the appellant was engaged during the years 1988-1989 and 1989-1990, which was marked as Exb. MW-1. Taking into consideration Exb. MW-1, the Labour Court held that the appellant has completed 267 days from 1.6.1988 to 30.4.1989 and without any notice or notice pay and without retrenchment compensation. In the relief portion of the Award, the Labour Court held that as the services of the appellant had been terminated illegally, he was entitled to be re-instated in his previous post with continuity of service and 50% back wages from the date of demand notice, i.e. 31.12.1997. 7. In a recent judgment of this Court in Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation [JT 2010 (1) SC 598], the Labour Court, Gurdaspur, by its Award directed re-instatement of the workman with 50% back wages, but the Award of the Labour Court was modified by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the writ petition and this Court has held that the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court was liable to be set aside only on the ground that while interfering with the Award of the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge did not keep in view the parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution. Learned Brother G.S. Singhvi, J., in his opinion, has observed that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV of the Constitution including Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43A thereof. Learned Brother Asok Kumar Ganguly, J. agreeing with learned Brother G. S. Singhvi, J., has also observed that this Court has a duty to interpret statutes with social welfare benefits in such a way as to further the statutory goal and not to frustrate it. 8. Learned Brother Asok Kumar Ganguly, J. agreeing with learned Brother G. S. Singhvi, J., has also observed that this Court has a duty to interpret statutes with social welfare benefits in such a way as to further the statutory goal and not to frustrate it. 8. Section 11A of the Act clearly provides that where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct re-instatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. Wide discretion is, therefore, vested in the Labour Court while adjudicating an industrial dispute relating to discharge or dismissal of a workman and if the Labour Court has exercised its jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the case to direct re-instatement of a workman with 50% back wages taking into consideration the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record, the High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India will not interfere with the same, except on well-settled principles laid down by this Court for a writ of certiorari against an order passed by a Court or a Tribunal. 9. The High Court, however, has relied on the decision of this Court in Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula & Anr. 9. The High Court, however, has relied on the decision of this Court in Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula & Anr. (Supra) and on reading of the aforesaid decision, we find that this Court in the aforesaid decision has mentioned the following factors, which are relevant for determining whether an award of re-instatement should or should not be passed:— (i) whether in making the appointment, the statutory rules, if any, had complied with; (ii) the period he had worked; (iii) whether there existed any vacancy; and (iv) whether he obtained some other employment on the date of termination or passing of the award.” This Court further held in the aforesaid decision that in the light of these principles the relief of re-instatement granted by the Labour Court in that case was wholly unsustainable and has accordingly directed payment of a sum of Rs. 50,000/- by way of damages to the workman with interest at the rate of 9% per annum. 10. The High Court has also relied on the decision of this Court in Ghaziabad Development Authority & Anr. vs. Ashok Kumar & Anr. (Supra) and on reading of the aforesaid decision we find that the contention of the management before the Labour Court was that the post, in which the workman was working in that case, was not sanctioned after 31.03.1990 and this was not disputed by the workman and this Court held that if there did not exist any post, the Labour Court should not have directed re-instatement of the workman in service. 11. The aforesaid two decisions of this Court in Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula & Anr. (Supra) and Ghaziabad Development Authority & Anr. vs. Ashok Kumar & Anr. (Supra) have no application to the facts in this case. In the present case, the respondent has not taken any stand before the Labour Court in his objections that the post in which the workman was working was not sanctioned or that his engagement was contrary to statutory rules or that he was employed elsewhere or that there was no vacancy. In the absence of any pleadings, evidence or findings on any of these aspects, the High Court should not have modified the Award of the Labour Court directing re-instatement of the appellant with 50% back wages and instead directed payment of compensation of Rs. 50,000/- to the appellant. 12. In the absence of any pleadings, evidence or findings on any of these aspects, the High Court should not have modified the Award of the Labour Court directing re-instatement of the appellant with 50% back wages and instead directed payment of compensation of Rs. 50,000/- to the appellant. 12. The decision of this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. Umadevi (3) & Ors. (Supra) cited by the counsel for the respondent relates to regularization in public employment and has no relevance to an Award for re-instatement of a discharged workman passed by the Labour Court under Section 11A of the Act without any direction for regularization of his services.” 17. Subsequent to case of Krishan Singh as referred above, this very identical situation where termination order is found to be violative of Sec. 25F of ID Act, 1947, then, in place of reinstatement and back wages, whether compensation awarded by Labour Court is legal and valid or not, that has been examined in case of Anoop Sharma vs. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division No. 1, Panipat (Haryana) reported in (2010) 5 SCC page 497. Relevant discussion made by Hon’ble Apex Court while considering number of decisions on subject in Paras 15 to 25 is quoted as under: “15. Section 25-B, which defines the term `continuous service’ and Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Act, which mandates giving of one month’s notice or pay in lieu thereof and retrenchment compensation to the workman whose service is sought to be terminated otherwise than by way of punishment or in accordance with the express terms incorporated in the order of appointment, read as under: 25B. Definition of continuous service.—For the purposes of this Chapter,— (1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman; (2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of Clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer (a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than— (i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case; (b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than - (i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case. Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (2), the number of days on which a workman has actually worked under an employer shall include the days on which— (i) he has been laid-off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under this Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment; (ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous years; (iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; and (iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so, however, that the total period of such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks. 25F. 25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until— (a) the workman has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. 16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are satisfied. In terms of Clause (a), the employer is required to give to the workman one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu of the notice. Clause (b) casts a duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. 17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Act is mandatory and non-compliance thereof renders the retrenchment of an employee nullity - State of Bombay vs. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610 , Bombay Union of Journalists vs. State of Bombay (1964) 6 SCR 22 , State Bank of India vs. N. Sundara Money (1976) 1 SCC 822 , Santosh Gupta vs. State Bank of Patiala (1980) 3 SCC 340 , Mohan Lal vs. Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd. (1981) 3 SCC 225 , L. Robert D’Souza vs. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway (1982) 1 SCC 645 , Surendra Kumar Verma vs. Industrial Tribunal (1980) 4 SCC 443 , Gammon India Ltd. vs. Niranjan Das (1984) 1 SCC 509 , Gurmail Singh vs. State of Punjab (1991) 1 SCC 189 and Pramod Jha vs. State of Bihar (2003) 4 SCC 619 . 18. 18. This Court has used different expressions for describing the consequence of terminating a workman’s service/employment/engagement by way of retrenchment without complying with the mandate of Section 25-F of the Act. Sometimes it has been termed as ab initio void,sometimes as illegal per se, sometimes as nullity and sometimes as non est. Leaving aside the legal semantics, we have no hesitation to hold that termination of service of an employee by way of retrenchment without complying with the requirement of giving one month’s notice or pay in lieu thereof and compensation in terms of Section 25-F(a) and (b) has the effect of rendering the action of the employer as nullity and the employee is entitled to continue in employment as if his service was not terminated. 19. The question whether the offer to pay wages in lieu of one month’s notice and retrenchment compensation in terms of Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F must accompany the letter of termination of service by way of retrenchment or it is sufficient that the employer should make a tangible offer to pay the amount of wages and compensation to the workman before he ask to go was considered in National Iron and Steel Company Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal (1967) 2 SCR 391. The facts of that case were that the workman was given notice dated 15.11.1958 for termination of his service with effect from 17.11.1958. In the notice, it was mentioned that the workman would get one month’s wages in lieu of notice and he was asked to collect his dues from the cash office on 20.11.1958 or thereafter during the working hours. The argument of the Additional Solicitor General that there was sufficient compliance of Section 25-F was rejected by this Court by making the following observations: “The third point raised by the Additional Solicitor-General is also not one of substance. According to him, retrenchment could only be struck down if it was mala fide or if it was shown that there was victimisation of the workman etc. Learned Counsel further argued that the Tribunal had gone wrong in holding that the retrenchment was illegal as Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with. According to him, retrenchment could only be struck down if it was mala fide or if it was shown that there was victimisation of the workman etc. Learned Counsel further argued that the Tribunal had gone wrong in holding that the retrenchment was illegal as Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with. Under that section, a workman employed in any industry should not be retrenched until he had been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice had expired, or the workman had been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice. The notice in this case bears the date November 15, 1958. It is to the effect that the addressee’s services were terminated with effect from 17th November and that he would get one month’s wages in lieu of notice of termination of his service. The workman was further asked to collect his dues from the cash office on November 20, 1958 or thereafter during the working hours. Manifestly, Section 25-F, had not been complied with under which it was incumbent on the employer to pay the workman, the wages for the period of the notice in lieu of the notice. That is to say, if he was asked to go forthwith he had to be paid at the time when he was asked to go and could not be asked to collect his dues afterwards. As there was no compliance with Section 25-F, we need not consider the other points raised by the learned counsel.” 20. In State Bank of India vs. N. Sundara Money (Supra), the Court emphasised that the workman cannot be retrenched without payment, at the time of retrenchment, compensation computed in terms of Section 25-F(b). 21. The legal position has been beautifully summed up in Pramod Jha vs. State of Bihar (Supra) in the following words: (SCC pp. 624-25, Para 10) “10. The underlying object of Section 25-F is twofold. Firstly, a retrenched employee must have one month’s time available at his disposal to search for alternate employment, and so, either he should be given one month’s notice of the proposed termination or he should be paid wages for the notice period. 624-25, Para 10) “10. The underlying object of Section 25-F is twofold. Firstly, a retrenched employee must have one month’s time available at his disposal to search for alternate employment, and so, either he should be given one month’s notice of the proposed termination or he should be paid wages for the notice period. Secondly, the workman must be paid retrenchment compensation at the time of retrenchment, or before, so that once having been retrenched there should be no need for him to go to his employer demanding retrenchment compensation and the compensation so paid is not only a reward earned for his previous services rendered to the employer but is also a sustenance to the worker for the period which may be spent in searching for another employment. Section 25-F nowhere speaks of the retrenchment compensation being paid or tendered to the worker along with one month’s notice; on the contrary, Clause (b) expressly provides for the payment of compensation being made at the time of retrenchment and by implication it would be permissible to pay the same before retrenchment. Payment or tender of compensation after the time when the retrenchment has taken effect would vitiate the retrenchment and non-compliance with the mandatory provision which has a beneficial purpose and a public policy behind it would result in nullifying the retrenchment.” 22. If the workman is retrenched by an oral order or communication or he is simply asked not to come for duty, the employer will be required to lead tangible and substantive evidence to prove compliance of Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act. 23. The stage is now set for considering whether the respondent had offered compensation to the appellant before discontinuing his engagement/employment, which amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act. In his statement, the appellant categorically stated that before discontinuing his service, the respondent did not give him notice pay and retrenchment compensation. Shri Ram Chander, who appeared as the sole witness on behalf of the respondent stated that the compensation amounting to Rs. 5,491/- was offered to the appellant along with letter Ext. M-1, but he refused to accept the same. The respondent did not examine any other witness to corroborate the testimony of Ram Chander and no contemporaneous document was produced to prove that the compensation was offered to the appellant on 25.4.1998. 5,491/- was offered to the appellant along with letter Ext. M-1, but he refused to accept the same. The respondent did not examine any other witness to corroborate the testimony of Ram Chander and no contemporaneous document was produced to prove that the compensation was offered to the appellant on 25.4.1998. Not only this, the respondent did not explain as to why the demand draft was sent to the appellant after more than three months of his alleged refusal to accept the compensation on 25.4.1998. 24. If there was any grain of truth in the respondent’s assertion that the compensation was offered to the appellant on 25.4.1998 and he refused to accept the same, there could be no justification for not sending the demand draft by post immediately after the appellant’s refusal to accept the offer of compensation. The minimum which the respondent ought to have done was to produce the letter with which draft was sent at the appellant’s residence. The contents of that letter would have shown whether the offer of compensation was made to the appellant on 25.4.1998 and he refused to accept the same. However, the fact of the matter is that no such document was produced. Therefore, we are convinced that the finding recorded by the Labour Court on the issue of non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Act was based on correct appreciation of the pleadings and evidence of the parties and the High Court committed serious error by setting aside the award of reinstatement. 25. The judgment of the Constitution Bench in Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi (Supra) and other decisions in which this Court considered the right of casual, daily wage, temporary and ad hoc employees to be regularised/continued in service or paid salary in the regular time scale, appears to have unduly influenced the High Court’s approach in dealing with the appellant’s challenge to the award of the Labour Court. In our view, none of those judgments has any bearing on the interpretation of Section 25-F of the Act and employer’s obligation to comply with the conditions enumerated in that section.” 18. In case of Executive Engineer and another vs. Pandya Ashokkumar Ramniklal decided by this Court on 6.4.2010 in Special Civil Application No. 223 of 2010, this Court has considered decision of Apex Court in case of Director of Fisheries reported in 2010 AIR SCW page 542. In case of Executive Engineer and another vs. Pandya Ashokkumar Ramniklal decided by this Court on 6.4.2010 in Special Civil Application No. 223 of 2010, this Court has considered decision of Apex Court in case of Director of Fisheries reported in 2010 AIR SCW page 542. case of R.M. Yellatti, 2006 AIR SC 385, Harjinder Singh, 2010 (1) Scale 613 have been considered by this Court and relief of reinstatement with 10 per cent back wages for interim period granted by Labour Court has been confirmed by this Court. Relevant observations made by this Court in Para 5 of judgment are quoted as under: “5. I have considered submissions made by both earned Advocates. I have also perused impugned award made by Labour Court. Period from which workman was remaining in service was, as per workman from 1983 to 1988 and his service was terminated on 15th February, 1988 and reference was made on 29th November, 1988. Labour Court considered documents as mentioned in Para 4 of award. Labour Court has considered certain decisions of this Court as well as Apex Court and issues have been framed in Paragraph 6 of award. Labour Court has come to conclusion that the dispute raised by workman is covered by Section 2(k) of ID Act, 1947. Workman was examined before Labour Court and witness Mohanbhai was examined before Labour Court at Exh. 67. Record from 1985 to 1988 was produced before Labour Court. In those documents, name of workman was found but according to workman, he was in service from 1983 to 1988 and witness Mohanbhai for petitioner admitted in his cross examination that other work was also being given to workman and, therefore, petitioner has not produced complete record of msuter roll, pay register, telephone, inward and outward register, wireless etc. Vide Exh. 65, workman has produced evidence to the effect that after retrenchment of workman, new workmen were engaged in 1988. Shri LV Nakiya was engaged on 31.10.1988 and made permanent from 1.4.2000, despite that, workman was not called by petitioner before engaging fresh workmen and no evidence contrary to such evidence of workman was produced by petitioner and, therefore, Labour Court has come to the conclusion that Section 25-H of the ID Act, 1947 has been violated by petitioner. At Exh. At Exh. 67, witness for petitioner, Shri Mohanbhai has admitted that in November-December, 1987 and January, 1988, work of flood cell was not available and workman has remained continue in service and no record has been produced for period subsequent to 13.1.1988. Labour Court has also considered that while workman was in service, petitioner has not supplied any documents to workman such as identity card, pay slip, copy of muster card and orders of appointment and termination and before Labour Court also, relevant documents demanded by workman have not been produced by petitioner. Therefore, Labour Court has considered oral evidence of workman against which no rebuttal evidence was produced by petitioner for controverting say of workman that he has completed continuous service of 240 days in 12 months preceding date of termination. Initially, it is the burden upon the workman to prove that he has completed 240 days continuous service within 12 months preceding date of termination or not. In this case, such burden has been discharged by workman by giving oral evidence that he remained in continuous service from 1983 to 1988 and completed 240 days continuous service and his service was terminated by petitioner in breach of Section 25F of ID Act. Such evidence of workman had remained unchallenged and uncontroverted because there is no rebuttal evidence produced by petitioner before Labour Court that workman has not completed 240 days continuous service as per his deposition before Labour Court. Petitioner was directed by Labour Court to make production of entire record from 1983 to 1988 but that record was not produced by petitioner before Labour Court, therefore, Labour Court has drawn adverse inference and come to conclusion that workman has completed 240 days continuous service and undisputedly Section 25F has not been complied with by petitioner but petitioner was contending that petitioner is not required to comply with such provision as workman has not completed 240 days continuous service. As against evidence produced by workman that after his retrenchment, new workmen were engaged, Shri LV Nakiya was engaged on 31.10.1988 and made permanent from 1.4.2000, no evidence was produced by petitioner to controvert such evidence and, therefore, Labour Court has come to conclusion that Section 25H is violated by petitioner. As against evidence produced by workman that after his retrenchment, new workmen were engaged, Shri LV Nakiya was engaged on 31.10.1988 and made permanent from 1.4.2000, no evidence was produced by petitioner to controvert such evidence and, therefore, Labour Court has come to conclusion that Section 25H is violated by petitioner. Labour Court has considered termination of 1988, reference made in 1988 and evidence given by workman on 27.8.2008.Therefore, Labour Court has granted relief of reinstatement with only 10 per cent back wages for interim period. Therefore, according to my opinion, Labour Court has not committed any error which would require interference of this Court in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. [See : Director, Fisheries Terminal Department vs. Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavda, 2010 AIR SCW 542; RM Yellatti vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, AIR 2006 SC 355; Rameshkumar vs. State of Haryana, 2010 (1) SCALE 432; Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, 2010 (1) Scale page 613].” 19. Aforesaid decision given by this Court was challenged by employer before Hon’ble Apex Court and Hon’ble Apex Court in SLP (Civil) CC No. 19248 of 2010, dismissed the SLP on 3.1.2011. Order passed by Apex Court on 3.1.2011 is quoted as under: “We find no ground to interfere with the impugned order. The Special Leave petition is dismissed both on the ground of delay as also on merit.” 20. This Court decided group of petitions being Special Civil Application No. 2861 of 2010 to 2868 of 2010 filed by State challenging award of Labour Court, Bhavnagar wherein relief of reinstatement was granted in view of breach of Section 25F of ID Act, 1947. Said petitions have been decided by this Court on 4.3.2010 considering decisions of Apex Court as referred above and this Court confirmed the relief of reinstatement granted by Labour Court. Said decision of this Court dated 4.3.2010 in aforesaid petitions was challenged by State of Gujarat before Hon’ble Apex Court by filing petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) CC No. 3873-3880/2011 wherein Apex Court passed following order on 7.3.2011: “The Special leave petition is dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits.” 21. In light of aforesaid decisions which have been relied upon by this Court and also considering decisions referred to and relied upon by Learned Advocate Mr. In light of aforesaid decisions which have been relied upon by this Court and also considering decisions referred to and relied upon by Learned Advocate Mr. HS Munshaw on behalf of petitioner panchayat, question is that in case of termination in breach of Section 25F, without following condition precedent, then, order of termination becomes void ab initio. In such circumstances, as per decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Mohan Lal vs. The Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd., AIR 1981 SC 1253 , workman is deemed to be in continuous service for all purposes and, therefore, denial of relief of reinstatement in such case amounts to denial of legal right to a workman to have reinstatement in service either with back wages or without back wages. Learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw is heavily relying upon decision of Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic) Bhopal vs. Santosh Kumar Seal and others, (2010) 6 SCC 773 but in said decision, decided by Apex Court on 26.4.2010, earlier decision of coordinate bench in case of Harjinder Singh decided on 5th January, 2010 has not been considered and even decision of Apex Court in case of Krishan Singh (Supra) has also not been considered. Relevant observations made by Apex Court in Paras 16 and 17 in case of Mohan Lal vs. The Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd., AIR 1981 SC 1253 are quoted as under: “16. Appellant has thus satisfied both the eligibility qualifications prescribed in Section 25F for claiming retrenchment compensation. He has satisfactorily established that his case is not covered by any of the excepted or excluded categories and he has rendered continuous service for one year. Therefore, termination of his service would constitute retrenchment. As precondition for a valid retrenchment has not been satisfied the termination of service is ab initio void, invalid and inoperative. He must, therefore, be deemed to be in continuous service. 17. The last submission was that looking to the record of the appellant this Court should not grant reinstatement but award compensation. If the termination of service is ab initio void and inoperative, there is no question of granting reinstatement because there is no cessation of service and a mere declaration follows that he continues to be in service with all consequential benefits. Undoubtedly, in some decisions of this Court such as Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. P. P. Chopra. If the termination of service is ab initio void and inoperative, there is no question of granting reinstatement because there is no cessation of service and a mere declaration follows that he continues to be in service with all consequential benefits. Undoubtedly, in some decisions of this Court such as Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. P. P. Chopra. (1970) 1 Lab LJ 63 and Hindustan Steel Ltd., Rourkela vs. A. K. Roy, (1970) 3 SCR 343 : ( AIR 1970 SC 1401 ) it was held that the Court before granting reinstatement must weigh all the facts and exercise discretion property whether to grant reinstatement or to award compensation. But there is a catena of decisions which rule that where the termination is illegal especially where there is an ineffective order of retrenchment, there is neither termination nor cessation of service and a declaration follows that the workman concerned continues to be in service with all consequential benefits. No case is made out for departure from this normally accepted approach of the Courts in the field of social justice and we do not propose to depart in this case.” Therefore, looking to facts of cases before hand, both workmen have remained in continuous service for about more than 20 years and in between, their services were never terminated by petitioner panchayat and thereafter at the time of terminating their services on 30.11.1999, admittedly, Section 25F of ID Act, 1947 has not been followed and it was violated by petitioner and since condition precedent has not been followed by petitioner panchayat while terminating their services, such termination of their services being void ab initio, relief of reinstatement was rightly granted by Labour Court and both workmen are deemed to be in continuous service and, therefore, question of awarding compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages because of delay in deciding reference does not arise. If reference is decided belatedly, after number of years, because of such delay relief of reinstatement cannot be decided to a workman. If reference is decided belatedly, after number of years, because of such delay relief of reinstatement cannot be decided to a workman. This aspect has been examined by this Court in case of Gujarat Maritime Board vs. KH Kharva 2010(3) GLR page 2121 where this Court has considered decision of Apex Court in case of PVK Distilleries, 2009 AIR SCW 2904, State of Haryana vs. Manoj Kumar, 2010 AIR SCW 1990 and it was observed that long pendency of litigation in Court is not a ground to deny relief of back wages otherwise employee would suffer double jeopardy of losing back wages and delay in reinstatement. Therefore, contention raised by Learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw relying upon aforesaid decision of Apex Court cannot be accepted because in that decision of apex court, other earlier decisions of co-ordinate bench of Apex Court on very same subject have not been considered which are relevant and, therefore, contention raised by Learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw is rejected. It is necessary to note that even petitioner has not established departure from normal rule of reinstatement with full back wages. It is not case of petitioner that they do not have any post/work with them and no material has been placed on record by petitioner panchayat before Labour Court or even before this Court to show that work is not available with them and, therefore, respondents cannot be reinstated in service and, therefore, they should be paid compensation in lieu of reinstatement. Therefore, in absence of such material, relief of reinstatement granted by Labour Court in favour of workmen in view of breach of mandatory provisions of sec. 25F of ID Act, 1947 cannot be interfered by this Court and such relief has been rightly granted by Labour Court. Departure to normal Rule is required to be substantiated by panchayat before Labour Court by producing material that now there is no scope to provide work to concerned workmen. Before Labour Court, no such contention or pleading was raised by petitioner district panchayat that work is not available and, therefore, in lieu of reinstatement, compensation may be awarded to workmen and, therefore, it is clear that such plea has been raised by petitioner district panchayat before this Court for the first time which cannot be considered by this Court in absence of any material and pleading in support of such plea. 22. 22. In this case, from evidence which are produced Exh. 25/2 letter of petitioner Engineer, junior daily wager watchman made permanent. One Shri RG Bhatti and Shri PK Chauhan both are junior to present respondents. It shows termination which is violative of Section 25F of ID Act and it amounts to unfair labour practice adopted by petitioner. 23. It is duty of petitioner panchayat to first must raise such plea in written statement and giving details that no work is available and no persons are employed after termination of such workman - respondent. The Panchayat ought to have produced relevant record and documents and same is required to be proved by oral evidence and also to cross examine workman on this point, then producing satisfactory evidence which can justify departure from a normal relief of reinstatement, otherwise, in absence of such materials and evidence, merely relying on one or two decisions of apex court, such contentions cannot be permitted to be raised for first time before this Court to deny right to life which includes Right to Livelhood means relief of reinstatement with or without back wages to workman. 24. It is settled proposition of law that party has to plead case and produce sufficient evidence to substantiate his submission made in petition or written statement and in case if pleadings are not complete, this Court is under no obligation to entertain pleas which are raised subsequently. This aspect has been examined by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Bharat Singh and others vs. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1988 SC 2181 . Relevant Paragraph 13 is quoted as under: “13. As has been already noticed, although the point as to profiteering by the State was pleaded in the writ petitions before the High Court as an abstract point of law, there was no reference to any material in support thereof nor was the point argued at the hearing of the writ petitions. Before us also, no particulars and no facts have been given in the special leave petitions or in the writ petitions or in any affidavit, but the point has been sought to be substantiated at the time of hearing by referring to certain facts stated in the said application by HSIDC. Before us also, no particulars and no facts have been given in the special leave petitions or in the writ petitions or in any affidavit, but the point has been sought to be substantiated at the time of hearing by referring to certain facts stated in the said application by HSIDC. In our opinion, when a point which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter-affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter, affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not entertain the point. In this context, it will not be out of place to point out that in this regard there is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter-affidavit. While in a pleading, that is, aplaint or a written statement, the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition or in the counter-affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it. So, the point that has been raised before us PG NO 1060 by the appellants is not entertainable. But, in spite of that, we have entertained it to show that it is devoid of any merit.” 25. Recently, in State of Orissa & Anr. vs. Mmata Mohanty, reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1332, Apex Court observed as under in Para 35: “35. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the Court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus,the pleadings are more to help the Court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is a settled legal proposition that ‘as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted.’ Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. It is a settled legal proposition that ‘as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted.’ Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. (Vide : Sri Mahant Govind Rao vs. Sita Ram Kesho, (1898) 25 Ind. App. 195; M/s. Trojan& Co. vs. RM.N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235 ; Ishwar Dutt vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 3165 ; and State of Maharashtra vs. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd., (2010) 4 SCC 518 . (2010 AIR SCW 2265).” 26. The relevant observations made by Apex Court creating such legal inconsistency has been highlighted in decision reported in JT 2011 (1) SC 49, in case of Shankar Raju vs. Union of India decided on 4.1.2011. Relelvant Paras 14, 14(1), 15, 16 and 17 are quoted as under: ———— “14 In Union of India & Anr. vs. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd., (1990) 4 SCC 453 at pg. 457, this Court observed as under :— “9. It is true that a bench of two members must not lightly disregard the decision of another bench of the same Tribunal on an identical question. This is particularly true when the earlier decision is rendered by a larger bench. The rationale of this rule is the need for continuity, certainty and predictability in the administration of justice. Persons affected by decisions of tribunals or courts have a right to expect that those exercising judicial functions will follow the reason or ground of the judicial decision in the earlier cases on identical matters”. 14.1 It has been opined that in the absence of a strict rule of precedent, litigants would take every case to the highest Court, in spite of a ruling to the contrary, in the hope that the decision may be overruled. 15 In Hari Singh vs. State of Haryana, (1993) 3 SCC 114 , at page 120, this Court stated the importance of consistent opinions in achieving harmony in Judicial System: “10. 15 In Hari Singh vs. State of Haryana, (1993) 3 SCC 114 , at page 120, this Court stated the importance of consistent opinions in achieving harmony in Judicial System: “10. It is true that in the system of justice which is being administered by the courts, one of the basic principles which has to be kept in view, is that courts of coordinate jurisdiction, should have consistent opinions in respect of an identical set of facts or on a question of law. If courts express different opinions on the identical sets of facts or question of law while exercising the same jurisdiction, then instead of achieving harmony in the judicial system, it will lead to judicial anarchy.” 16 In Tiverton Estates Ltd. vs. Wearwell Ltd., (1975) Ch 146 at page 371, Sorman L. J., while not agreeing with the view of Lord Denning, M.R. about desirability of not accepting previous decisions, said as follows: “I decline to accept his lead only because I think it damaging to the law to the long term—though it would undoubtedly do justice in the present case. To some it will appear that justice is being denied by a timid, conservative adherence to judicial precedent. They would be wrong. Consistency is necessary to certainty—one of great objectives of law.” 17 The second observation we wish to make is, the doctrine of binding precedent has the merit of promoting certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. The pronouncement of law by a larger Bench of the this Court is binding on a Division Bench of this court, especially where the particular determination by this Court not only disposes of the case, but also decides a principle of law. We further add that it would be inappropriate to reagitate the very issue or a particular provision, which this Court had already considered and upheld.” 27. It is necessary to note date of decisions in reported case which are considered by this Court, of Coordinate Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court. (1) Harjinder Singh vs,. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation reported in 2010 (1) SCALE page 613 is decided by Apex Court on 5th January, 2010 (2) Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Haryana, 2010 (1) Scale page 432, is decided by Apex Court on January 13, 2010. (1) Harjinder Singh vs,. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation reported in 2010 (1) SCALE page 613 is decided by Apex Court on 5th January, 2010 (2) Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Haryana, 2010 (1) Scale page 432, is decided by Apex Court on January 13, 2010. (3) Krishan Singh vs. Executive Engineer Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board, Rohtak (Haryana) reported in 2010 (2) Scale 848 is decided by Apex Court on March 12, 2010. (4) Anoop Sharma vs. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division No. 1, Panipat (Haryana) reported in (2010) 5 SCC page 497 is decided by Apex Court on April 9, 2010. (5) Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic) Bhopal vs. Santosh Kumar Seal and others, (2010) 6 SCC 773 is decided by Apex Court on April 26, 2010. (6) Incharge Officer and Another vs. Shankar Shetty (2010) 9 SCC page 126 decided by Apex Court on August 31,2010. The Apex Court Coordinate Bench in case of Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic) Bhopal vs. Santosh Kumar Seal and others (2010) 6 SCC 773 decided on 26.4.2010 and Incharge Officer and anotehr vs. Shankar Shetty (2010) 9 SCC 126 decided on 31st August, 2010, not considered cases of other coordinate bench deciding same question of law at prior point of time as referred to above in case of Harjinder Singh, Ramesh Kumar, Krishan, Anoop Sharma, in subsequent decision of coordinate bench. That lead to confusion, complication and chaos in implementing the decision of Apex Court as Binding Precedent. 28. It is not a law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court that in case of each daily wager, if Section 25-F of ID Act, 1947 is violated,then, no relief of reinstatement with or without back wages for interim period can be granted and only compensation can be granted in lieu of reinstatement and back wages. No such ratio has been decided by Apex Court but when employer is able to justify or establish departure from normal rule based on proved facts, then, Court can exercise discretionary jurisdiction and mould relief otherwise, in absence of it, in breach of Section 25F of ID Act, 1947, condition precedent, workman is entitled for normal relief of reinstatement with or without back wages for interim period. In respect to such contentions raised by Learned Advocate Mr. In respect to such contentions raised by Learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw, the ratio laid down by Apex Court in case of Harjinder Singh (Supra) and in case of Anoop Sharma (Supra), constitutional philosophy in detail discussed which applied to facts of this case. This Court cannot ignore ratio laid down by Apex Court in above referred two decisions reported in 2010-5-SCC 497 and JT 2010 (1) SC 598. 29. This Court is having limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of India while considering award in question. This Court can interfere with award while exercising power under Article 227 of Constitution of India if serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice and grave injustice remained incorrected. This Court cannot exercise powers as an appellate Court or substitute its own opinion in place of that of subordinate Court for correcting error which is not apparent on the face of record. This Court cannot disturb finding of fact as examined by Labour Court. This view has been taken by Apex Court in case of Jai Singh & Ors. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Anr. With Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Sh. Jai Singh and Ors., 2010 AIR SCW pg. 5968. Relevant Para 25 of said judgment is quoted as under: “25. Undoubtedly, the High Court has the power to reach injustice whenever, wherever found. The scope and ambit of Article 227 of the Constitution of India had been discussed in the case of The Estralla Rubber vs. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., [ (2001) 8 SCC 97 ] wherein it was observed as follows: “The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate Court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate Court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior Court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the Court or tribunal has come to.” In our opinion, the High Court committed a serious error of jurisdiction in entertaining the writ petition filed by MCD under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the peculiar circumstances of this case. The decision to exercise jurisdiction had to be taken in accordance with the accepted norms of care, caution, circumspection. The issue herein only related to a tenancy and subletting. There was no lis relating to the ownership of the land on which the superstructure or the demised premises had been constructed. The whole issue of ownership of plot of land No : 2, Block-B, transport area of Jhandewalan Estate, Desh Bandhu Gupta Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi is the subject matter of a civil suit being Suit No: 361 of 1980 in the High Court of Delhi. The High Court, therefore, ought not to have given any opinion on the question of ownership.” In MA Azim vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, 2011-I-CLR 283, it has been observed by Bombay High Court as under in Paras 11 and 12: “11. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to few important judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court laying down therein the scope to entertain petition under of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to few important judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court laying down therein the scope to entertain petition under of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case of ‘Nagendra Nath Bora and Anr. vs. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam & Ors., reported in AIR 1958 SC 398 ’ in Para No. 30 held thus:— “30. the powers of judicial interference under Art. 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Under Art. 226, the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Art. 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. “ Yet in another case, in a case of ‘Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai, reported in AIR 2003 SC 3044 ’ the Hon’ble Supreme in its conclusion held :— (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (iii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate Court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate Court and error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. And in a case of Babulal S/o. Navalmal Pipada vs. Dropadbai W/o. Manohar Gore & Others reported in 2010 (5) Mh. LJ, this Court has held thus: “One cannot be oblivious of the parameters required to be observed for the purpose of exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Unless it is demonstrated that the impugned judgment suffers from vice of perversity, arbitrariness or is rendered without considering material evidence or is rendered on the basis of no material interference with the finding of Courts/Tribunals is impermissible. The writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked for reappreciating of the evidence or for the purpose of rectification of minor errors committed by the Tribunals. Unless it is demonstrated that the view taken by the MRT is per se against the settled principles of law, it is difficult to interfere with the findings recorded by the Tribunals below. 12. The writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked for reappreciating of the evidence or for the purpose of rectification of minor errors committed by the Tribunals. Unless it is demonstrated that the view taken by the MRT is per se against the settled principles of law, it is difficult to interfere with the findings recorded by the Tribunals below. 12. Therefore, it is clear from the pronouncements of Supreme Court and this Court which are referred Supra that the Writ Jurisdiction cannot be invoked for reappreciating the evidence or for the purpose of rectification a minor errors committed by the Tribunals. Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be invoked unless it is demonstrated that the impugned judgments suffers from the vice of perversity, arbitrariness or is rendered without considering material evidence or is rendered on the basis of no material evidence or is rendered on the basis of no material, interference with the findings of Courts/Tribunals is impermissible. Therefore, in light of above, it is relevant to summarized here in below the findings recorded by the Labour Court on the basis of evidence brought on record by the parties.” 30. In Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, 2010(1) Scale page 613, in Paras 10 and 11, Apex Court has observed as under: “10. We have considered the respective submissions. In our opinion, the impugned order is liable to be set aside only on the ground that while interfering with the award of the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge did not keep in view the parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution - Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 and Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and others 2003 (6) SCC 675 . In Syed Yakoob’s case, this Court delineated the scope of the writ of certiorari in the following words: “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. In Syed Yakoob’s case, this Court delineated the scope of the writ of certiorari in the following words: “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque 1955 (1) SCR 1104 , Nagandra Nath Bora vs. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam 1958 SCR 1240 and Kaushalya Devi vs. Bachittar Singh AIR 1960 SC 1168 ). It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; hut it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened.” 11. In Surya Dev Rai’s case, a two-Judge Bench, after threadbare analysis of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and considering large number of judicial precedents, recorded the following conclusions: “(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction I.e. when a subordinate Court is found to have acted (I) without jurisdiction-by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross Zfailure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident I.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate Court has chosento take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate Court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.” A reading of the impugned order shows that the learned Single Judge did not find any jurisdictional error in the award of the Labour Court. He also did not find that the award was vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record or that there was violation of rules of natural justice. As a matter of fact, the learned Single Judge rejected the argument of the corporation that termination of the appellant’s service falls within the ambit of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, and expressed unequivocal agreement with the Labour Court that the action taken by the Managing Director of corporation was contrary to Section 25G of the Act which embodies the rule of last come first go. Notwithstanding this, the learned Single Judge substituted the award of reinstatement of the appellant with compensation of Rs. 87,582/- by assuming that appellant was initially appointed without complying with the equality clause enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and the relevant regulations. While doing so, the learned Single Judge failed to notice that in the reply filed on behalf of the corporation before the Labour Court, the appellant’s claim for reinstatement with back wages was not resisted on the ground that his initial appointment was illegal or unconstitutional and that neither any evidence was produced nor any argument was advanced in that regard. Therefore, the Labour Court did not get any opportunity to consider the issue whether reinstatement should be denied to the appellant by applying the new jurisprudence developed by the superior courts in recent years that the Court should not pass an award which may result in perpetuation of illegality. Therefore, the Labour Court did not get any opportunity to consider the issue whether reinstatement should be denied to the appellant by applying the new jurisprudence developed by the superior courts in recent years that the Court should not pass an award which may result in perpetuation of illegality. This being the position, the learned Single Judge was not at all justified in entertaining the new plea raised on behalf of the corporation for the first time during the course of arguments and over turn an otherwise well reasoned award passed by the Labour Court and deprive the appellant of what may be the only source of his own sustenance and that of his family.” 31. Considering entire matter as a whole, Labour Court has rightly examined matter based on record and finding given by Labour Court cannot be considered to be baseless and perverse. On the contrary, Labour Court has taken sufficient care while not granting any amount of back wages for entire interim period and merely granted reinstatement with continuity of service in favour of workman in both cases. It is not necessary that in each and every case of delay in deciding reference, relief of reinstatement cannot be granted. When order of termination is found to be violative of Section 25F of ID Act, 1947, then, such termination is void ab initio and then natural consequence is that the workman in such case is entitled for relief of reinstatement and in such case, no compensation can mitigate hardships and miseries suffered by such a workman during the period of his unemployment who was out of job since more than ten to fifteen years and therefor merely delay in deciding reference that itself would not disentitle workman from being reinstated on his original post and in such case, reinstatement cannot be denied as per view taken by Apex Court in case of Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation reported in 2010 (1) Scale 613 and in case of Anoop Shrma reported in 2010-5-SCC 497as considered by this Court in case of State of Gujarat vs. Indrakumar Phakiraji Bhil, Special Civil Application No. 8426 of 2009 decided on 18.3.2010. 32. Therefore, in view of above discussion, there is no substance in these petitions filed by petitioner District Panchayat and same are therefore dismissed. P P P P P