Order Mr. Sinha, appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner was granted lease of the Godown by the Market Committee in the year 1997 for eleven months but thereafter he was allowed to continue on accepting rent. The rent was also increased. In January, 2010 the rent till June, 2010 was deposited and accepted but a letter dated 3.6.2010 was issued asking him to vacate the Godown without taking recourse to law. He relied on paragraph 30 of the judgment, reported in (1989)2 SCC 50S-State of U.P. and Others vs. Maharaja Dharmender Prasad Singh, which reads as follows: A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression re-entry' in the lease deed does not authorise extra-judicial methods to resume possession. Under law, the- possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due "course of law. In •the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or" better position. On the contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that all actions of Government and governmental authorities should have a 'legal pedigree. In Bishan Das vs. State of Punjab this Court said :(SCR pp. 79-80) "We must, therefore, repel the argument based on the contention that the petitioners were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order. The argument is not only specious but highly dangerous by reason of its implications and impact on law and order.... Before we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers is destructive on the basic principle of the rule of law. He also relied on paragraphs 7 and 8 of the judgment reported in (2004)1 SCC 769 [: 2004(2) JLJR (SC)11]-Rame Gowda (dead) By Lrs. vs. M. Varadappa Naidu (Dead) By Lrs. 2. On the other hand, Mr. V.P. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that the local administration requested the Market Committee to provide storage space for keeping the food grains etc. vs. M. Varadappa Naidu (Dead) By Lrs. 2. On the other hand, Mr. V.P. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that the local administration requested the Market Committee to provide storage space for keeping the food grains etc. meant for distribution under various beneficial public schemes and therefore for the public purpose, the said Godown was required and accordingly the said notice was rightly issued and thereafter petitioner has got no right to continue. He further submitted that actually no lessee existed. He further -submitted that the said judgments relied by Mr. Sinha are not applicable in this case as the parties are governed by the special statute i.e. Agriculture Produce Markets Act & Rules framed there under. He also submitted that the power to allot includes power of cancellation, and that the power to evict is' contained in Section 18(2)(iii), which reads as follows:- 18. Powers and duties of the Market Committee.- [(1) .......….. (2) Without prejudice to the generality for the foregoing provision, a Market Committee may]:- ..................... (iii) to maintain and manage the principal market yard and sub-market yards and to control, regulate and run the market in the interest of the agriculturists and licenses in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules and the bye-laws made there under; 3. It is not disputed that initially a lease was granted to the petitioner in 1997for 11 months and thereafter the petitioner was allowed to continue in the leasehold property on accepting rent, which was increased also. Thus, the submission of Mr. Singh that lease did not exist, cannot be accepted. Further, Section 18(2)(iii) cannot be stretched to mean that the Committee had power to cancel the lease and evict the lessee. In such circumstances, and in. view of the judgments relied by Mr. Sinha, the only remedy available to the Market Committee was to take recourse to general law. Thus, it has to be held that the impugned notice is arbitrary, and illegal. It was informed that after issuance of the impugned notice, the Market Committee took partial possession of the Godown. In the result, the impugned notice is quashed and the respondents are directed to vacate the said portion within 15 days from today. However, this order will not stand in the way of the respondents in canceling the lease in accordance with law. In the result, the impugned notice is quashed and the respondents are directed to vacate the said portion within 15 days from today. However, this order will not stand in the way of the respondents in canceling the lease in accordance with law. With these observations and directions, this writ petition is allowed. However, no costs.