JUDGMENT (1) This appeal is filed challenging the judgment and order dated 22nd December, 1999 passed by the IVth Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad in Sessions Case No. 351 of 1996. There are two appellants in this appeal. However, counsel appearing for appellants informs this Court that, the appellant No. 2 is no more and he died four years back during the pendency of this appeal. She has made this statement on the basis of instructions given by the appellant No. 1, who is present in the Court hall. This position is not disputed by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State. Therefore, so far as, the appellant No. 2 is concerned, the appeal stands abated. (2) The prosecution case is that: The daughter of the complainant Uttam Ganpat Chavan was married with accused No. 1 on 13th February, 1996. After the marriage she went to the house of accused for cohabitation. The original accused No. 2 and 3 are the parents and the accused No. 4 is the brother of the accused No. 1. All the accused resided jointly in one and same house. It is the case of the prosecution that, initially for a period of one month after marriage the deceased Meerabai was treated properly by the accused. However, subsequently all the accused persons started harassing her on the ground that she should bring money from her parents. The accused also threatened to do away with her life if she would not bring money. It is further case of the prosecution that, whenever Meera used to visit her parents home, she use to narrate about the harassment and ill-treatment meted out to her at the house of accused. The complainant had visited the house of accused persons with three/four respectable persons from his village and advised accused to give good treatment to Meerabai, however, accused did not listen. (3) On 01st September, 1996 accused No. 2 Kachru had come to village Kingaon at the house of complainant and he demanded Rs. 1,000/- from the complainant. The complainant showed inability to pay the amount. The accused Kachru then took away iron chain and neck rope (Jote) from the house of complainant. On the very next day i. e. on 03rd September, 1996 message was received by the complainant to the effect that his daughter Meerabai has consumed poison and she was admitted in Ghati Hospital. The complainant showed inability to pay the amount. The accused Kachru then took away iron chain and neck rope (Jote) from the house of complainant. On the very next day i. e. on 03rd September, 1996 message was received by the complainant to the effect that his daughter Meerabai has consumed poison and she was admitted in Ghati Hospital. Then they went to the Ghati Hospital and found that Meerabai was lying in unconscious condition. Subsequently on 05th September, 1996 Meerabai expired in hospital. On the above allegations report was lodged to Khultabai police station vide Exhibit 11 dated 06.09.1996. The police machinery was set in motion. The offence came to be registered vide Cr. No. I-170/1996 for the offence punishable U/Sec. 498A, 304B r/w Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The investigation was carried out. The postmortem examination was followed. The spot panchanama was drawn in the field of accused and one container of poisonous substance came to be seized from the spot. Statements of witnesses were recorded. The accused persons came to be arrested. Viscera and seized poisonous substance was sent to Chemical Analyser. On completion of investigation charge sheet came to be filed against the accused persons in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Aurangabad. The learned Magistrate on 20.11.1996 committed the case to the Court of Sessions as the alleged offence U/Sec. 304B of the Indian Penal Code is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. (4) After framing the necessary charge, and after the due Trial, the Sessions Court after framing the points for its determination and after appreciation of evidence brought on record and after hearing the parties convicted the appellants herein i. e. accused No. 1/Radhakisan Kachru Khandagale and original accused No. 2/Kachru Raghunath Khandagale for the offence punishable U/Sec. 498A of the Indian Penal Code and both of them were sentenced to suffer R. I. for a period of two years each and to pay fine of Rs. 500/-. In default further R. I. for three months. Both the accused/appellants further convicted for the offence punishable U/Sec. 306 of the I. P. Code and both of them were sentenced to suffer R. I. for a period of five years each and to pay fine of Rs. 500/- each. In default further R. I. for three months. The Trial Court also directed both the sentences to run concurrently. Both the accused/appellants further convicted for the offence punishable U/Sec. 306 of the I. P. Code and both of them were sentenced to suffer R. I. for a period of five years each and to pay fine of Rs. 500/- each. In default further R. I. for three months. The Trial Court also directed both the sentences to run concurrently. However, both the accused were acquitted from the offences punishable U/Sec. 304B of the Indian Penal Code. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 22.12.1999 passed by the IVth Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad in Sessions Case No. 351 of 1996 this appeal is preferred by two accused namely Radhakisan Kachru Khandagale and Kacharu Raghunath Khandagale. However, as stated earlier the appellant No. 2/Kachru Khandagale died during the pendency of this appeal. Therefore, this appeal stands abated, so far appellant No. 2 is concerned. (5) The learned counsel appearing for the appellant invited my attention to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and also medical evidence and other evidence brought on record by the prosecution and submitted that, the allegations in the statement of the prosecution witnesses about the harassment and cruelty to deceased are vague, general in nature and no specific allegations are leveled against each of the accused and statements of the prosecution witnesses suffer from contradictions, omissions and improvements and those are not trustworthy. The learned counsel further submitted that, there is no direct or circumstantial evidence available against the appellant to sustain the conviction U/Sec. 498A or 306 of the Indian Penal Code. THEre is no specific incident of ill-treatment or cruelty pointed out by any prosecution witness in their deposition before the Court. The prosecution has not examined any independent witness or neighbour of the adjoining field and, therefore, the prosecution case suffers from independent evidence. The prosecution witnesses 1 to 4 are close relatives of deceased. THEy are interested witnesses. No complaint was filed prior to funeral ceremony. The complaint is filed after one day. Said complaint was filed after thought as it appeared from the evidence of prosecution witnesses. The counsel further submitted that, the relations of the deceased, in laws and parents of deceased were cordial prior to filing of complaint. The possibility of deceased poisoned due to insecticide used for the cotton crops cannot be ruled out. The tin of poison were closed from inner side. The counsel further submitted that, the relations of the deceased, in laws and parents of deceased were cordial prior to filing of complaint. The possibility of deceased poisoned due to insecticide used for the cotton crops cannot be ruled out. The tin of poison were closed from inner side. THEre was no any abetement, instigation brought on record by the prosecution to prove its case beyond the reasonable doubt that, soon before the death of the deceased, appellant No. 1 has instigated her to commit suicide. THEre is no any suicidal note or dying declaration which supports the prosecution case. The C. A. report is negative. No essential ingredients of abetment as stated in Section 107 of I. P. Code has been proved by the prosecution. THEre is no evidence to establish ingredients of Sec. 498A and 306 r/w Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. THEre was no intention, no motive, no meeting of mind. THEre was no preplan. THErefore, the whole approach of the Trial Court to convict the appellant with the aid of Section 34 was wholly misplaced in the facts of the case. The prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The learned counsel further submitted that the appellants were instrumental in taking the deceased to hospital. The conduct of the appellants does show that they were not involved in the commission of any offence as alleged by the prosecution. (6) The learned counsel invited my attention to the contents of complaint and submitted that, on perusal of the contents of the complaint and deposition of P.W. 1 Uttam, it does appear that there is omission in the statement of the P.W. 1 Uttam. Though he has stated in the complaint that, the accused persons will not care for life of the deceased if amount is not brought from the parents. However, said portion is missing in the deposition of P.W. 1 before the Court. The learned counsel further submitted that, it has come in the evidence of complainant that, husband of the Meerabai i. e appellant herein came to the house of complainant and happily taken Meerabai along with him to matrimonial house. THEre was no demand of money. This indicates that there was no any incongenial atmosphere in the family or there was no demand such as stated by the prosecution. THEre was no demand of money. This indicates that there was no any incongenial atmosphere in the family or there was no demand such as stated by the prosecution. The learned counsel further submitted that, in original complaint allegation of demand of Rs. 1,000/- is stated by the complainant. However, there is no specific mention of the amount quo accused/appellant No. 1. The counsel further submitted that, in complaint it is stated that amount of Rs. 1,000/- was demanded. However, in the deposition before the Court, the complainant has stated that, Rs. 2,000/- was demanded by accused Kachru. It is further submitted that, in deposition P.W. 1 Uttam stated that dead body of Meerabai was taken to Yesgaon village of accused. Funeral is performed at Yesgaon by accused persons. It is admitted by P.W. 2 Narsing in his examination in chief that, funeral is performed by the accused. THErefore, the counsel for the appellant would submit that, the conduct of the accused to perform the funeral also indicates that they were not involved in any kind of activities or offence as alleged by the prosecution. It is further submitted that, the prosecution witnesses have stated in their deposition that the marriage was peacefully settled. THEre was no dispute in the marriage whatsoever. What was agreed was duly complied. THErefore, counsel would submit that, there was no reason for the appellant/accused to demand any money after the marriage from the parents of the deceased Meerabai. It is further submitted that, P.W. 1 in his statement before the Court has stated that in the additional month when they brought the husband i. e. appellant and in-laws of Meerabai to their house at Kingaon, at that time their relations were good. However, P.W. 2 in her examination in chief stated that at the time of Adhik month her daughter informed that, accused use to harass and beat her. The counsel would submit that, there are major contradictions between the version of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2. THErefore, the prosecution case is not trustworthy. The learned counsel further invited my attention to the cross examination of the P.W. 2 and contended that, the P.W. 2 has stated that the relations with the accused were good and entire programme in additional month is happily performed. THErefore, the prosecution case is not trustworthy. The learned counsel further invited my attention to the cross examination of the P.W. 2 and contended that, the P.W. 2 has stated that the relations with the accused were good and entire programme in additional month is happily performed. The learned counsel further submitted that, at the time of lodging the complaint not only the complainant went to the police station, but other persons namely Yeshwanta, Shivaji Chavan, Bhausaheb and complainant and also Kashinath went to the police station. The complaint was lodged after one day after thought as it appears from the version of the complainant. It is further submitted that, it was possible for the complainant to lodge the complaint immediately when he came to know that Meerabai consumed poison and hospitalized. However, no complaint was lodged. After the death of Meerabai, police did not go to the Ghati Hospital, no inquest panchanama was prepared. The learned counsel further submitted that, from the cross examination of the P.W. 2 it clearly appears that, P.W. 2 visited Yesgaon for removing black magic on her daughter i. e. deceased Meerabai. THErefore, relying on this portion from the cross examination, the counsel for the appellant would submit that, the defence taken by the appellant that, Meerabai was suffering from some mental problems is a probable defence and same is required to be accepted. It is further submitted that, at any point of time no complaint was lodged by the complainant either with the Sarpanch or police Patil or with the police station about ill-treatment or harassment meted by the appellant/accused prior to the date of incident. The learned counsel further submitted that, the evidence of P.W. 3 Shankar, uncle of the deceased that while going away from Kingaon, accused No. 2/Kachru Patil had taken iron chain, neck rope and a tin of poison with him. This witness has stated that, the tin of poison was carried by Kachru Patil. It is further submitted that, so far statement of P.W. 3 that the Kachru Patil also carried tin of poison is not corroborated by the evidence of any other witness. The learned counsel invited my attention to the deposition of P.W. 4 and contended that, when he saw Kachru/accused No. 2 in the house of Uttam before the day of incident, at that time their relations were cordial. The learned counsel invited my attention to the deposition of P.W. 4 and contended that, when he saw Kachru/accused No. 2 in the house of Uttam before the day of incident, at that time their relations were cordial. It is further submitted that, it is appearing in the evidence of P.W. 5 that at the time of postmortem examination none of the persons from the matrimonial house were present. P.W. 6 has admitted in his evidence that, he did not record statement of any neighbourer or independent witness. The counsel further submitted that, in spot field, there were standing crop of cotton. The seized container was closed by inner cover. The learned counsel further invited my attention to the medical evidence. P.W. 7 has stated that, there are no external injuries to the dead body. The C. A. report is negative. The complication must have developed after elimination of the poison. THErefore, the counsel would submit that, if C. A. report shows that no poison is detected, entire prosecution case has to fail. The counsel relying on various judgments of this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court vehemently argued that in order to prove offence U/Sec. 306 of I. P. Code, there should be clinching evidence. Ingredients of abetment as stated in Sec. 107 are required to be met. The learned counsel placed reliance on the reported judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) reported in 2010 All M. R. (Cri) 1331 and submitted that, to convict the accused for offence punishable U/Sec. 306, the prosecution should show that there is direct involvement of the accused by way of instigation or aid which led the victim to commit suicide. The learned counsel invited my attention to para 12 of the said judgment and submitted that, unless there is direct involvement demonstrated by the prosecution, no conviction can be given U/Sec. 498A or U/Sec. 306 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned counsel for the appellant also relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal reported in 2010 AIR (SC) 512, and submitted that, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, harassment must be coupled with some positive action proximate to time of occurrence. The learned counsel for the appellant also relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal reported in 2010 AIR (SC) 512, and submitted that, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, harassment must be coupled with some positive action proximate to time of occurrence. In absence of proof of such proximate positive action, on the part of the accused, accused cannot be convicted U/Sec. 306 of the Indian Penal Code. The counsel submitted that, in the instant case the prosecution has utterly failed to establish its case by bringing on record the positive evidence that the appellant herein had any positive act abating commission of suicide proximate to the time of occurrence. The counsel further invited my attention to the reported judgment of this Court in case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Harish Ramanna Shetty and others reported in 2008 All MR (Cri) 2711. Relying on the said judgment, the counsel would submit that on vague allegations without mentioning any specific incident or incidents no conviction can be given either U/Sec. 498A or U/Sec. 306 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned counsel has further placed reliance on various judgments of this Court in case of Vithal Sopanrao Kalbande Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2009(1) Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 13, Deepak S/o Bhimrao Bharne and others Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2004(2) Mh. L. J. 987, Ganesh Y. Bhutekar Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2005 Cri. L. J. 1221, Madhav Tukaram Kadam and another V. State of Maharashtra reported in 2010 Cri. L. J. 1464. Relying on all these judgments, the counsel for the appellant would submit that, when there is no convincing evidence available in the matter about ill-treatment or harassment in that case the Trial Court should not have convicted the appellants for the offences punishable U/Sec. 306, 498A r/w Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned counsel at the cost of repetition submitted that, there was no intention or motive attributed to the appellant, except mere allegations in the evidence of prosecution witnesses that there was demand of Rs. 1,000/- by the accused No. 2. (7) The learned counsel further submitted that, the appellant is acquitted for the offence punishable U/Sec. 304B of the Indian Penal Code. 1,000/- by the accused No. 2. (7) The learned counsel further submitted that, the appellant is acquitted for the offence punishable U/Sec. 304B of the Indian Penal Code. The learned counsel submitted that, presumption U/Sec. 113A of the Indian Evidence Act would arise when prosecution is able to show that (i) a woman has committed suicide (ii) the suicide has been committed within a period of seven years from the date of marriage (iii) the husband or his relatives have subjected her to cruelty, on availability of these circumstances, the Court may come to the conclusion that, the suicide has been abeted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. The learned counsel in support of her aforesaid contention placed reliance on the larger bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in AIR 2001 SC 3837 . The learned counsel also invited my attention to the statement of the appellant recorded U/Sec. 313 of the Cr. P. C. and submitted that the defence taken by the appellant is that, the deceased Meerabai was mentally retarded. Two witnesses were examined on behalf of defence i. e. D.W. 1 and D.W. 2. THEy have stated in their evidence that Meerabai was mentally retarded. The learned counsel further submitted that, the cross examination of P.W. 2/mother of the deceased Meerabai would show that Meerabai was mentally disturbed or retarded. THErefore, the learned counsel for the appellant would submit that, the prosecution has utterly failed to bring on record cogent evidence so as to meet the ingredients of Sec. 34, 107, 306 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The learned counsel therefore, would submit that, this appeal deserves to be allowed. (8) On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor invited my attention to the evidence of prosecution witnesses and in particular evidence of P.W. 1 to P.W. 4 and contended that, the prosecution witnesses in their evidence have specifically stated about the ill-treatment and harassment which resulted in commission of suicide by the deceased Meerabai. The learned A.P.P. submitted that, there was specific demand. The witnesses have stated that, the amount of Rs. 2,000/- was demanded by accused No. 2. There are also allegations of harassment and beating by the accused persons to the deceased Meerabai. The learned A.P.P. submitted that, there was specific demand. The witnesses have stated that, the amount of Rs. 2,000/- was demanded by accused No. 2. There are also allegations of harassment and beating by the accused persons to the deceased Meerabai. The medical evidence fully supports the prosecution case, as much as, the medical officer has stated that, the deceased Meerabai died due to poisoning. The learned A.P.P. further submitted that, the presumption U/Sec. 113A of the Indian Evidence Act would arise in the present case, since the deceased Meerabai died within seven months from the date of marriage. It is further submitted that, there was no reason for deceased Meerabai to commit suicide, when she was carrying pregnancy of 10 to 12 weeks. No woman ordinarily go for commission of suicide during such days. The learned A.P.P. therefore submitted that, if the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and also medical evidence and other evidence brought on record is read in its entirety, it would lead to only conclusion that the appellant was instrumental, instigated and intended commission of suicide by the deceased Meerabai. The learned A.P.P. further submitted that, there was ill-treatment and harassment to the Meerabai. Therefore, the Trial Court has also convicted the appellant for the offence punishable U/Sec. 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the learned A.P.P. would submit that, appeal is devoid of any merits and same deserves to be dismissed by confirming judgment and order of the Trial Court. I have given due consideration to the rival submissions. I have also perused entire material placed on record by the parties and also the original record and proceedings made available. It is not necessary to refer in detail the evidence of the prosecution witnesses on the point of cruelty and harassment. P.W. 1 Uttam Ganpat Chavan/complainant in his evidence has stated that, after two month of marriage his daughter came to his house. At that time she informed him about harassment by the accused. At that time she was alone. She informed that her husband has drove her out of the house for demand of money and so she has come to the house of complainant. This witness further in his examination in chief has stated that, in the next day morning, he took cup of tea with the accused Kachru, at that time accused Kachru demanded Rs. 2,000/- to the complainant. This witness further in his examination in chief has stated that, in the next day morning, he took cup of tea with the accused Kachru, at that time accused Kachru demanded Rs. 2,000/- to the complainant. The complainant told him that he had no money and his financial position is week. At that time Kachru took away the iron chain and neck rope (JOTE) along with him. (9) In his cross examination he has stated that, there was no dispute at the time of marriage and the marriage was happily performed. It was only decided to perform the marriage and nothing else was agreed. He has further stated in his examination in chief that, after two months Meerabai visited his house at that time she informed him about the harassment by the accused. He further stated that, accused used to harass her, however, he could not remember the date when Meerabai visited his house on second occasion. He has admitted in his cross examination that, he had no occasion to talk other neighbourers at Kingaon or police patil or any other person to tell about the harassment to his daughter from the accused. He has further admitted in his cross examination that, when Kachru demanded Rs. 2,000/- he could remember the date or month. Therefore, to the above extent the evidence of P.W. 1/complainant is relevant in the present case.(emphasis supplied) (10) So far P.W. 2 is concerned in her examination in chief, she stated that, the accused persons gave good treatment to Meerabai for about two months from the date of Marriage. Thereafter, all accused started harassing Meerabai. All the accused used to harass her. When the Meerabai visited the parental house at that time she stated about the ill-treatment by the appellant. It has come in the evidence of P.W. 2 that Meerabai told her that, all the accused asked her to bring money from the parents and they drove her out of the house. She has further stated that, father-in-law of Meerabai came to their house. It was Sunday. He demanded Rs. 1,000/-. At that time, Jaiwanta her brother-in-law and her husband were present. However, there was no money to pay. Therefore, they did not pay anything to accused Kachru. She has further stated that, father-in-law of Meerabai came to their house. It was Sunday. He demanded Rs. 1,000/-. At that time, Jaiwanta her brother-in-law and her husband were present. However, there was no money to pay. Therefore, they did not pay anything to accused Kachru. Upon perusal of the cross examination of this witness she has stated thus :, "On the first occasion I had visited Yesgaon for removing black magic of my daughter and on second occasion at the time of her funeral." She has further stated in her cross examination that, they invited all the accused at their house, presented cloths to them. Till then the relations with the accused were good. The entire programme in the additional month was happily performed and at that time Meerabai did not state that accused were demanding money. (emphasis supplied) The evidence of P.W. 3 shows that Meerabai came to village Kingaon after 15 days. At that time Meerabai told them that for bringing money from her parents, her husband assaulted and her father-in-law and mother-in-law also harassed her. However, this witness in his cross examination has admitted that, marriage was happily performed and there was no dispute of any matter in the marriage. In his cross examination has stated that, when Kachru came to his house, while going away from Kingaon Kachru Patil had iron chain, neck rope and a tin of poison. P.W. 4 in his evidence has stated that, accused Kachru asked Uttam to give him iron chain, neck ropes and cash of Rs. 1,000/- The evidence of P.W. 5 is not very material. The evidence of P.W. 6 is at Exhibit 19. He was the investigating officer in the said crime. He has stated about recovery of one plastic tin containing 50 gms insecticide Cildon was found on spot and it was seized under panchanama. Label of signatures of panchas was affixed on the tine and he has recorded the statements of witnesses including P.W. 2, 3 and 4. He stated that, in the spot field there was standing cotton crop. The container was closed by inner cover. (emphasis supplied). (11) The evidence of Medical Officer P.W. 7 is at Exhibit 22. Label of signatures of panchas was affixed on the tine and he has recorded the statements of witnesses including P.W. 2, 3 and 4. He stated that, in the spot field there was standing cotton crop. The container was closed by inner cover. (emphasis supplied). (11) The evidence of Medical Officer P.W. 7 is at Exhibit 22. In his examination in chief he has stated that, from treatment given as per case paper, he could say that poison must have eliminated due to treatment and so C. A. report was in the negative. However, he has stated that the patient was given treatment in respect of poisoning. In view of clinical/case papers finding in postmortem and in C.A. report patient had died due to cerebral and pulmonary oedema because of organo phosporous compound poisoning. This is the total evidence collected by the prosecution. (12) The perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court more particularly para 19 of the said judgment shows that, the Trial Court found that ample evidence is forthcoming on the record that accused Nos. 1 and 2 had wilfully harassed deceased Meerabai, so that she must have been compelled to end her life even though she was carrying about 10 to 12 weeks pregnancy. No sane woman would commit suicide unless she was harassed to great extent. THEre are circumstances forthcoming on record which clearly go to show that accused Nos. 1 and 2 are responsible for commission of suicide by the deceased and they have aided and abetted it and, therefore, the Trial Court held that the appellants accused Nos. 1 and 2 are responsible for the commission of suicide by the deceased Meerabai and, therefore, they were convicted for the offences punishable U/Sec. 306, 498A r/w Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. At this juncture it would be appropriate to refer to the provisions of Sec. 34, 107, 306 and 498A which are produced hereinbelow : Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code reads thus: "34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.- When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code reads thus: "107. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.- When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code reads thus: "107. Abetment of a thing.- A person abets the doing of a thing, who First.-- Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly,-- Engages with one or more other persons or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.-- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.-- A person who, by willful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing." Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code reads thus: "306. Abetment of suicide.--If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." Section 498A of the I. P. Code reads thus : 498A.-- Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means ? Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means ? (a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.] (13) It is also appropriate at this juncture to refer to some of the important judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In case of suicide how the evidence is required to be appreciated has been stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in number of judgments. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal (1994) 1 SCC 73 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has cautioned that the Court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it appears to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty. Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2009) 16 SCC 605 had an occasion to deal with this aspect of abetment. The Court dealt with the dictionary meaning of the words "instigation" and "goading". The Court opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person's suicidability pattern is different from the other. Each person has his own idea of self esteem and self respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straitjacket formula in dealing with such cases. The Court opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person's suicidability pattern is different from the other. Each person has his own idea of self esteem and self respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straitjacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances. (14) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal reported in 2010 AIR (SC) 512, after considering various earlier judgments in para 15 observed that, "15. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the Court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without their being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable." "16. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 of IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. THErefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC." The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab (2004) 13 SCC 129 has reiterated the legal position as regards Section 306 IPC which is long settled in para 12 and 13. Para 12 and 13 reads thus: "12. Para 12 and 13 reads thus: "12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigation a person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing. In cases of conspiracy also it would involve that mental process of entering into conspiracy for the doing of that thing. More active role which can be described as instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person can be said to be abetting the commission of offence under Section 306 IPC. 13. In State of W. B. v. Orilal Jaiswal this Court has observed that the courts should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive or ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belongs and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstances individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty." (15) Upon perusal of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited supra, it is required to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegations of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Sec. 306 of I. P. Code is not sustainable. Therefore, what is required is that, unless there is any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide conviction U/Sec. 306 is not sustainable. Therefore, what is required is that, unless there is any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide conviction U/Sec. 306 is not sustainable. (16) Therefore, in the light of provisions of Sec. 34, 107, 306 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code and also in the light of judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited supra, the evidence brought on record by the prosecution in this case will have to be carefully examined. Upon perusal of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses No. 1 to 4 it clearly emerges that except demand of Rs. 2,000/- or Rs. 1,000/- as stated by the prosecution witnesses by appellant No. 2/original accused No. 2, there is no any specific statement of the witnesses quo accused No. 1. None of the witnesses have stated in their statement that particular amount was demanded by the accused appellant from the complainant. It has also come in the evidence of prosecution witnesses that marriage was settled and performed peacefully. Nothing was agreed to be given to the accused persons except performing of the marriage. If the prosecution case is to be accepted and if the accused persons were to demand the amount, they should have insisted for amount or demand, even at the time of marriage. However, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is in the nature of omnibus statement without any specific instances and without mentioning any purpose or motive for which said amount was required by the accused persons. The harassment or ill-treatment is not stated specifically in the statement, nor there is any previous complaint or any medical evidence which would indicate or suggest that there was harassment or ill-treatment to the deceased Meerabai which led to commission of suicide. On plain reading of provisions of Sec. 107, 306 and 498A of the I. P. Code, would clearly demonstrate that unless the harassment or cruel treatment is of such a nature that it would force the woman to commit suicide, no conviction can be given U/Sec. 306 of the Indian Penal Code. The ingredients of Sec. 107 of the I. P. Code would be applicable if there is any instigation direct or indirect incitement or there is any aid or intentional aid by the accused which led for the commission of suicide by the deceased. The ingredients of Sec. 107 of the I. P. Code would be applicable if there is any instigation direct or indirect incitement or there is any aid or intentional aid by the accused which led for the commission of suicide by the deceased. In the instant case, the evidence brought on record by the prosecution does not fulfil ingredients of either section 34, 107, 306 or 498A of the I. P. Code. For invoking the provision of Sec. 34 it was incumbent on the prosecution to show the involvement or specific overt act attributed to the each of the accused. There are no specific allegations against each of the accused except allegations against original accused No. 2 that he demanded Rs. 2,000/- from the complainant. As stated earlier the appellant No. 2 is no more and this appeal already stands abeted against the appellant No. 2. THEREFORE, that part of the evidence is no use for the prosecution so far present appellant/accused is concerned. I find omnibus allegations in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. Not only this, but the evidence of the prosecution witnesses in examination in chief and in cross examination, contradicts with their own evidence. There are also contradictions in the evidence of other witnesses. If the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is read in its entirety it does not inspire confidence so as to sustain the conviction of the appellant U/Sec. 306 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Time and again the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reminded that, while entertaining the case for the offence punishable U/Sec. 306 of Indian Penal Code the Court's should be very careful in examining the evidence brought on record. Unless there is clinching, convincing and cogent evidence which would unequivocally indicate that accused alone is responsible for the act or had intention which lead the commission of suicide by the deceased, then only conviction U/Sec. 306 of I. P. Code can sustain. Nothing has been brought on record by the prosecution to connect the accused/appellant with the commission of suicide by the Meerabai. Even the C. A. report is in negative. Even if the medical evidence is accepted as it is, at the most it can be said that Meerabai committed suicide by consuming poison. However, question remains that, whether said commission of suicide was at the instance of appellant. Even the C. A. report is in negative. Even if the medical evidence is accepted as it is, at the most it can be said that Meerabai committed suicide by consuming poison. However, question remains that, whether said commission of suicide was at the instance of appellant. Whether the appellant instigated, aided or intended that Meerabai should commit the suicide. As stated earlier, there is no evidence available on record to show that soon before the commission of suicide, the appellant was instrumental in any way either directly or indirectly or he intended the commission of suicide of the deceased Meerabai. It is also relevant to refer to the statement of the accused U/Sec. 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The possible and probable defence has been taken by the accused/appellant that, Meerabai was suffering from some mental disturbance and she was mentally retarded. The two witnesses D. W. 1 and D. W. 2 have supported the defence story. That apart in the cross examination of the P.W. 2/mother of Meerabai she has specifically stated that, she went to the house of Meerabai at Yesgaon to remove black magic. This indicates that Meerabai was suffering from some mental disturbance. Even if the case of the prosecution against the appellant, for the offence punishable U/Sec. 498A of I. P. Code is tested on the basis of evidence on record, in my opinion, the evidence brought on record by the prosecution is too short to sustain the conviction U/Sec. 498A of the I. P. Code. The allegations of demand of Rs. 2,000/- are only against the appellant No. 2 who is died during the pendency of this appeal. The allegations in the evidence of prosecution are general in nature. All in all entire prosecution evidence does not inspired confidence to sustain the conviction of the accused/appellant for the offences punishable U/Sec. 306, 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, in my opinion, benefit of doubt should go to the accused. The prosecution utterly failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore, benefit of doubt should go to the appellant. In the result the impugned judgment and order passed by the IVth Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad in Sessions Case No. 351/1996 is quashed and set aside. The appellant/Radhakishan Kachru Khandagale is acquitted from all the charges leveled against him. His bail bond stands canceled. In the result the impugned judgment and order passed by the IVth Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad in Sessions Case No. 351/1996 is quashed and set aside. The appellant/Radhakishan Kachru Khandagale is acquitted from all the charges leveled against him. His bail bond stands canceled. The original record and proceedings should be sent back forthwith to the concerned Court. (17) This Court highly appreciates the efforts taken by the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor in effectively arguing the matter, and properly assisting this Court. The appeal is allowed and stands disposed of.