JUDGMENT : Shri S. A. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the petitioner. Shri Vishal Dhagat, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No. 3. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution has been preferred against the order dated 18th March, 2009 passed by M. P. State Co-operative Tribunal, Bhopal (for short 'Tribunal'), respondent No. 1. 2. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for respondent No. 3. 3. It appears that the respondent No. 3 while working on the post of Samiti Prabandhak with the petitioner-bank committed various financial irregularities pursuant to which he was placed under suspension vide order dated 13-3-2007 under Rule 60(3) of Jila Sahakari Kendriya Bank Karmachari Sewa Niyam (hereinafter referred to as "Rules"). Aggrieved respondent No. 3 challenged the aforesaid order of suspension before the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal, respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 2 allowed the application preferred by the respondent No. 3 vide order dated 5-12-2008 contained in Annexure P/8 and directed the petitioner-bank to revoke the order of suspension and make payment of subsistence allowance and other amounts payable to him in accordance with law. The petitioner-bank being dissatisfied with the order of the respondent No. 2 preferred Revision No. 16/2009 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal while considering Rule 60(8) of the Rules found that in the absence of extension of the period of suspension beyond the period of six months, the reinstatement of the respondent No. 3 is almost automatic and; therefore, dismissed the revision by the order dated 18-3-2009 contained in Annexure P/1. The petitioner-bank being aggrieved with the order Annexure P/1 has preferred this writ petition. 4. Shri S.A. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the reinstatement as has been held by the Tribunal is not automatic as per the rules and unless and until an order revoking the suspension is passed by the authority, a delinquent employee will continue under suspension. 5. We have considered the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. In order to appreciate the controversy, it would be appropriate to first consider the provision enshrined under sub-rule (8) of Rule 60 of the Rules as under: "60(8) An employee will be entitled to subsistence allowance equal to half of the admissible salary during the period of suspension. We have considered the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. In order to appreciate the controversy, it would be appropriate to first consider the provision enshrined under sub-rule (8) of Rule 60 of the Rules as under: "60(8) An employee will be entitled to subsistence allowance equal to half of the admissible salary during the period of suspension. The suspension period of an employee generally shall not be more than six months but the Chief Executive Officer can extend the period of suspension of an employee for a further period of six months and in the case of criminal prosecution this period shall continue till its decision." A careful reading of the aforesaid provision would reveal that the period of normal suspension is of six months, however, the Chief Executive Officer has been empowered to extend the same by a further period of six months and where a criminal prosecution is launched the same could be extended till its conclusion. In the case at hand, no criminal prosecution has been launched as has been stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The aforesaid rule does not suffer from any ambiguity and from the plain reading of the same it is apparent that the normal period of suspension is of six months only and in case it requires to be extended, in that event, the Chief Executive Officer is required to pass an order extending it for a further period of six months. Thereafter no power for further extension has been given. However, in the case of criminal prosecution that could be extended till its conclusion. 7. In the present case, the respondent No. 3 was placed under suspension on 13th March, 2007 and till date the departmental proceedings has not been concluded though a period of more than four years have passed. Nothing has been brought on record to justify this prolonged abnormal period of suspension. Besides that in view of the clear provision provided under sub-rule (8) of Rule 60 of the Rules, the suspension cannot be allowed to be continued beyond the period of six months unless it is extended by the Chief Executive Officer which is not the case herein. 8. We, therefore, do not find any error in the order of the Tribunal. The writ petition being devoid of merit is dismissed. Petition dismissed.