JUDGMENT Hon’ble Pradeep Kant, J.—Heard petitioner Sri Man Mohan Singh Jaggi appearing in person and Ms. Alka Verma appearing for the Respondents. 2. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the order of dismissal from service dated 8/10.11.1994 and the order dated 20.3.1995 passed by the appellate authority Respondent No. 1, namely the Managing Director, Food Corporation of India, New Delhi, confirming the aforesaid order of dismissal. The petitioner has further prayed that the enquiry proceedings initiated under the directions of Respondent No. 3 namely, Senior Regional Manager, Food Corporation of India, Lucknow and held by the enquiry officer Respondent No. 4 Sri A.A. Kazmi (Respondent No. 4 herein) be quashed and the respondents be directed to reinstate him in service with all consequential benefits. 3. The grievance of the petitioner is that the enquiry proceedings against him were conducted by Respondent No. 4 in a prejudicial manner, inasmuch as he was denied the inspection of some of the relevant documents on which the prosecution has relied upon to prove the charges against him. He also stated that respondent No. 4, who was earlier appointed as presenting officer, was subsequently made the enquiry officer, did not afford any opportunity even after the orders passed by the respondent No. 3 and he intentionally did not supply essential documents, required by the petitioner to put his defence, although according to the respondents, Mr. Kazmi did not conduct any proceedings. His further grievance is that he was also not allowed to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, therefore, the enquiry proceedings stood vitiated in law, as principles of natural justice were violated. 4. The case of the petitioner has a long chequered history. So to say briefly, the petitioner, in the year 1986 was served with Memorandum of Articles of Charges dated 6.10.1986 by the respondent No. 3, accusing him (1) for misappropriation of wheat stock and gunny bags; (2) incitement of labourers against District Manager, Bareilly; and (3) non-compliance with the order of the department to join at Agra by the date prescribed while he was placed under suspension. The petitioner was compelled to submit his reply against the aforesaid articles of charge without allowing him to peruse the documents included in the aforesaid charge-sheet. The petitioner was compelled to submit his reply against the aforesaid articles of charge without allowing him to peruse the documents included in the aforesaid charge-sheet. Subsequently, this memorandum was withdrawn vide order dated 21/22.1.1987 and fresh memorandum was issued that very day in pursuance of which enquiry proceedings were commenced against the petitioner. 5. From the date of commencement of the enquiry proceeding in 1987 until its culmination in 1994, enquiry officers were changed four times at the instance of the respondent Nos. 2 to 3. Apparently, the petitioner had been suffering from volley of orders of the enquiry officers refusing to supply prosecution documents and not allowing him to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. In this reference the petitioner had earlier preferred a writ petition in this Court (Manmohan Singh Jaggi v. Food Corporation of India, W.P.No. 7886 of 1990) during the time Shri K.K. Tiwari, Retired Director of Prosecution, Government of UP, who was fourth in number, was conducting the enquiry as enquiry officer. The petitioner had prayed for cancellation of the charge-sheet dated 21/22.1.1987 and for quashing of the entire enquiry proceedings conducted in pursuance thereof. 6. The learned single judge vide his order dated 8.8.1991 did not quash the enquiry proceedings but disposed of the writ petition finally with the direction that all the relevant documents mentioned in the charge-sheet or on which the prosecution relies, should be furnished to the petitioner before the enquiry proceedings were concluded and that he should be given opportunity to produce his own documents or other evidence in his defence. Thus, he directed that reasonable opportunity of being heard must be given to the petitioner according to principles of natural justice. 7. In compliance with the aforesaid of this Court, the enquiry proceedings were commenced afresh. Respondent No. 4 was appointed as enquiry officer, who was fifth in number, to conduct the proceedings. The preliminary enquiry was held on 22.1.1992. The petitioner was required to inspect the documents mentioned in the charge-sheet and also to supply list of defence documents to Respondent No. 4. The petitioner submitted three lists of defence documents containing 64 documents in first list, 36 in second list and 13 in third list, total 113 documents in number, vide his representation dated 28.1.1992. The hearing was fixed on day to day basis from 25.2.1992 to 29.2.1992. The petitioner submitted three lists of defence documents containing 64 documents in first list, 36 in second list and 13 in third list, total 113 documents in number, vide his representation dated 28.1.1992. The hearing was fixed on day to day basis from 25.2.1992 to 29.2.1992. By order dated 23.1.1992, the Respondent No. 4 required the presence of the parties daily during the course of hearing, in default of which, the enquiry would proceed ex parte. Respondent No. 4 also sent telegram dated 12.2.1992 to District Manager, Bareilly to relieve the petitioner for hearing. However, the District Manager expressed his inability to relieve the petitioner and thus replied by telegram: “Pl. inform Kazmi vide telegram that SRM had already been requested to defer the date of enquiry as Sri Jaggi may not be spared at present.” 8. Meanwhile, the Respondent No. 4, without recording any reason declared 84 documents mentioned in the defence list submitted by the petitioner as not relevant. The petitioner then submitted another representation dated 15.2.1992 requesting for reconsideration of relevancy of the aforesaid 84 documents. He pointed out in the representation that the earlier enquiry officers had not considered the said documents as irrelevant and that they had issued directions for the production of all 113 documents. The Respondent No. 4 did not accede to the request of the petitioner and by his order dated 30.1.1992 issued directions to the custodians to produce the documents for inspection of the petitioner, except those documents which were stated by him as not relevant. 9. The enquiry proceedings scheduled on 25.2.1992 to 29.2.1992 were conducted ex parte as the petitioner was not relieved by District Manager, Bareilly. Prosecution documents were examined by the enquiry officer and statements of prosecution witnesses were recorded. The date of defence hearing was fixed for 8.4.1992 to 10.4.1992. 10. Aggrieved, the petitioner made a detailed representation dated 25.3.1992 requesting the Respondent No. 4 to allow him to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and referred to the aforesaid telegram of District Manager, Bareilly sent to the Respondent No. 4 by means of which request was made for deferral of the proceedings. 11. The defence hearing was conducted as scheduled on 8/10.4.1992. The petitioner participated in the hearing. The Respondent No. 4 by orders dated 8.4.1992, 9.4.1992, 10.4.1992 refused the request of the petitioner for cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. 11. The defence hearing was conducted as scheduled on 8/10.4.1992. The petitioner participated in the hearing. The Respondent No. 4 by orders dated 8.4.1992, 9.4.1992, 10.4.1992 refused the request of the petitioner for cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. He also refused to acknowledge the receipt of aforesaid telegram. 12. Thereafter, the petitioner made several representations. By his representation dated 9.4.1992, he requested the Respondent No. 4 for consideration of earlier representations dated 15.2.1992 and 25.3.1992 before proceeding with the enquiry. He then submitted another representation dated 10.4.1992 to Respondent No. 2, namely, the Senior Regional Manager, FCI Lucknow bringing to his notice the irregularities committed by the Respondent No. 4 in the enquiry proceedings and his actions being contemptuous of the order of this Court dated 8.8.1991 by means of which the respondents were directed to provide the petitioner opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and inspection of relevant prosecution and defence documents. The petitioner also requested for changing the enquiry officer. 13. The Respondent No. 2 vide his memorandum dated 5/6.5.1992 informed the petitioner that Respondent No. 4 was directed to provide all documents for inspection and give reasonable opportunity of defence in accordance with the principles of natural justice but the petitioner’s request of changing the enquiry officer was not acceded to. 14. On 19.5.1992, the Dy. Manager (Vig.) sent the enquiry report of Respondent No. 4 submitted to the Respondent No. 2 to the petitioner. The petitioner oppressed with the actions of Respondent No. 4 wrote to Respondent No. 2 again on 21.7.1992 brining to his notice that his directions were not complied with and that Respondent No. 4 submitted his enquiry report without affording opportunity to the petitioner. The petitioner requested that enquiry proceedings be started afresh and all documents mentioned in the lists be provided to him. 15. The Respondent No. 2 finding that the Respondent No. 4 had submitted his enquiry report ignoring the directions given vide Memorandum dated 5/6.5.1992, which expressly provided to conduct the enquiry proceedings in accordance with principles of natural justice, remanded the case to Respondent No. 4 for further enquiry vide order dated 6/7.8.1993 16. Thus, the enquiry was re-opened. The Respondent No. 4 required the petitioner to submit list of defence documents and defence witnesses vide aforesaid order dated 6/7.8.1993. Hearing was fixed on 20.8.1993. Thus, the enquiry was re-opened. The Respondent No. 4 required the petitioner to submit list of defence documents and defence witnesses vide aforesaid order dated 6/7.8.1993. Hearing was fixed on 20.8.1993. On the date of hearing, the petitioner submitted the list of defence documents which was rejected by Respondent No. 4, stating that he was not bound by the orders of the earlier enquiry officers. 17. On the next dates of hearing (i.e. 2-3.5.1994) the petitioner was informed that documents mentioned at Serial No. 3, 10, 13 and 15 were not available. The petitioner expressed his inability to prepare his defence in the absence of relevant documents, which had not been shown to the petitioner. The Respondent No. 4, however, did not pay any heed to repeated requests of the petitioner and treating the defence case as closed, concluded the departmental enquiry and submitted his report to Respondent No. 2. The petitioner was issued a show-cause notice, to which he submitted a detailed reply vide representation dated 5.7.1994, but it did not find favour of the punishing authority, who passed the impugned order of dismissal against him. 18. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid order of dismissal from service before this Court in Manmohan Singh Jaggi v. Food Corporation of India, W.P. No. 36 (S/B) of 1995 which was dismissed in limine on the ground of alternate remedy of appeal being available to the petitioner, vide order dated 13.1.1995. 19. The petitioner then filed an appeal against the impugned order of dismissal dated 8/10.11.94 under Rule 68 of the FCI (Staff) Regulations, 1971 which was dismissed by the appellate authority Respondent No. 1 vide order dated 20.3.95, hence this petition. 20. In response to the petitioner’s submissions as aforesaid, Ms. Alkar Verma submitted that effective opportunity was given to the petitioner but he intentionally used delaying tactics to obstruct the enquiry proceedings. To buttress her submissions, she has placed reliance on Nagar Palika Nataur v. U.P. Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow and others, (1998) 3 UPLBEC 2044: JT 1993 (6) SC 1, wherein the order of dismissal of service was passed on the basis of departmental enquiry in which the employee did not participate inspite of several opportunities given to him. To buttress her submissions, she has placed reliance on Nagar Palika Nataur v. U.P. Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow and others, (1998) 3 UPLBEC 2044: JT 1993 (6) SC 1, wherein the order of dismissal of service was passed on the basis of departmental enquiry in which the employee did not participate inspite of several opportunities given to him. The Tribunal and also the High Court, in the opinion of the Apex Court, concluded wrongly that the principles of natural justice were violated and while setting aside the orders of the Tribunal and the High Court held that the circumstances show that the full opportunity of hearing was given to the employee. 21. Non-arbitrariness, natural justice and audi alteram partem are facets of the concept of equality protected by Article 14 of the Constitution (see Basudeo Tiwary v. Sido Kanhu University, (1998) 8 SCC 194 ). The administrative action is per se bad, illegal, and unconstitutional if it abridges, defies, infringes, violates or contravenes any of the aforesaid three principles. Violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness, which is the same as discrimination and where the discrimination is the result of State action, it is a violation of Article 14 (See Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 298). The whole edifice of natural justice is based on two pillars: (i) nobody shall be condemned without hearing; and (ii) nobody shall be a judge in his own cause (See State of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava, (2006) 3 SCC 276 ; see also Mangilal v. State of M.P., (2004) 2 SCC 447 ). 22. It is settled that there cannot be uniform standpoint to test the administrative action. The legality of administrative action is subject to facts and circumstances of each case (See U.P.S.R.T.C v. Ram Chandra Yadav, (2000) 9 SCC 237 ). Applying the principle, the reliance placed on Nagar Palika Nataur (supra) by the learned counsel for the Corporation does not offer any guidance because the facts in the present matter do not relate to a situation where the petitioner was not willing to participate in the enquiry proceedings as was the situation in Nagar Palika Nataur (supra) but where the petitioner had been denied effective opportunity to lay his defence before the enquiry officer Respondent No. 4. 23. 23. The petitioner challenged the impugned order of dismissal from service on various grounds including the principal ground that proper and effective opportunity was not provided, as also the Respondent No. 4 was biased against the petitioner. The petitioner also contended that the physical verification report, which is the leading evidence in deciding the charges framed against him, was not shown to him. An additional plea was also raised that the enquiry was not initiated by the competent authority, namely, the Respondent No. 2. 24. Thus, what arises for consideration is whether the enquiry was conducted in a manner prejudicial to the petitioner inasmuch as the proceedings were conducted in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. If so, then whether this Court can exercise power of judicial review to quash the enquiry proceedings and thus the impugned order of dismissal from service alongwith the appellate order confirming the order of dismissal. 25. Reasonable opportunity as has been observed this Court in Avtar Singh v. State of U.P., 1989 (7) LCD 199, is a term of well-known legal significance, and includes an opportunity given to the employee to cross-examine the witnesses and to lead defence in support of his version. Also, the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman, AIR 1961 SC 1623 after noting the decision in Union of India v. T.R. Verma, (1958) IILLJ 259 SC, observed, that the departmental enquiry should observe rules of natural justice, which in fact is the settled law. 26. The learned counsel for the Respondents has submitted that it is within the discretion of the enquiry officer to decide whether documents sought by the delinquent are relevant to order their supply and therefore, where the enquiry officer opines that particular document is not relevant, does not ipso facto prejudice the whole enquiry proceeding. She has placed reliance on State of Rajasthan v. S. K. Dutt Sharma, 1993 (Supp.) 4 SCC 61, wherein disallowing of inspection of documents not relevant to the charges was held not to vitiate the enquiry. She also submits that the Apex Court in State of T.N. v. Thiru K.V. Perumal (1996) 5 SCC 474 , has laid down that the duty of the authorities is to supply only relevant documents. 27. On the other hand, the petitioner vehemently contested the submissions of the learned counsel for the Respondents. She also submits that the Apex Court in State of T.N. v. Thiru K.V. Perumal (1996) 5 SCC 474 , has laid down that the duty of the authorities is to supply only relevant documents. 27. On the other hand, the petitioner vehemently contested the submissions of the learned counsel for the Respondents. Placing reliance on a catena of decisions, namely, State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal and another, (1998) 6 SCC 651 , P.N.Srivastava v. State of U.P. and others, 1999 (17) LCD 24, State Bank of India and others v. D.C.Aggarwal and another, (1993) 1 SCC 13 , Chandrama Tiwari v. Union of India through General Manager, Eastern Railways, AIR 1988 SC 117 , State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) and Ashok Kumar v. State of U.P. and others, (1987) 3 ATC 581, wherein the Courts have taken consistent view that non-supply of copies of statements and the documents relied upon by the prosecution in the charge-sheet constitute violation of principles of natural justice, the petitioner submitted that the refusal of Respondent No. 4 to grant the petitioner permission to inspect essential documents, such as the physical verification report as also recording the statements of the prosecution witnesses in the absence of the petitioner and even refusing to allow the petitioner to cross-examine those witnesses, is a manifest violation of principles of natural justice. He further submitted that the conduct of Respondent No. 4 to proceed with the enquiry when the petitioner was not relieved by his In-charge to attend the hearing, which in fact was duly communicated to Respondent No. 4 by telegram, speaks volumes that the enquiry officer was prejudiced and acted with malice and with biased mind. 28. It is the admitted case of the Respondents that an essential document, such as physical verification report, was not supplied to the petitioner. In their counter-affidavit also the Respondents do not deny the significance of the document. This itself shows that the punishment has been awarded without giving effective opportunity to the petitioner. The submission of learned counsel for the Respondent Ms. Alka Verma that the non-supply of physical verification report is not violative of principles of natural justice is not acceptable. The physical verification report is a relevant document and the leading evidence in considering whether the petitioner misappropriated the wheat and gunny bags. The submission of learned counsel for the Respondent Ms. Alka Verma that the non-supply of physical verification report is not violative of principles of natural justice is not acceptable. The physical verification report is a relevant document and the leading evidence in considering whether the petitioner misappropriated the wheat and gunny bags. The fact that the physical verification was conducted in the presence of petitioner Sri M. S. Jaggi will not ipso facto obliterate or undermine the necessity of furnishing the report to the petitioner. Other than the non-supply of physical verification report, the petitioner had also submitted that the enquiry officer declared 84 documents out of 113 documents mentioned in the three lists of defence documents submitted to him as irrelevant, without recording any reason. The petitioner, although made repeated efforts for reconsideration of his request, but to no avail. The documents listed at serial Nos. 3, 10, 13 and 15 in the aforesaid First List were declared as not available; also supplements the petitioner’s contention that the enquiry officer did not co-operate with the petitioner. The Apex Court has reiterated the settled principle in G. Vallikumari v. Andhra Education Society, (2010) 2 SCC 497 , the necessity of recording reasons by every quasi-judicial or an administrative authority entrusted with the task of passing orders that adversely affects an individual (See also Vasant D. Bhavsar v. Bar Council of India, (1991) 1 SCC 45). This is a recognized facet of principles of natural justice and violation thereof has the effect of vitiating the impugned order. 29. The Apex Court in Oryx Fisheries (P) Limited v. Union of India, (2010) 13 SCC 427 , reiterated the test of bias as laid down in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and others, (2001) 1 SCC 182 , wherein the Apex Court had held that if on collating the surrounding circumstances necessary conclusion is that there is real danger and not mere apprehension, of bias, the administrative action would stand vitiated. 30. 30. In Natwar Singh v. Director of Enforcement, (2010) 13 SCC 255 , the Supreme Court has laid down that the applicability of principles of natural justice and concept of fairness depends upon “the circumstances of the case, the statutory framework, the subject-matter to be dealt with, the nature of enquiry, the consequences that may visit a person after such enquiry from out of the decision pursuant to such enquiry and so far.” For the application of the doctrine of fair play there must be, in the opinion of the Apex Court, ‘’real flexibility’; there is no technical infringement of natural justice, as such and therefore the complainant must show that some real prejudice was caused to him. 31. The facts and circumstances of the present case reveal that the Respondent No. 4 did not act with a judicious mind. The petitioner did not only apprehend the biased attitude of Respondent No. 4, but also vide his representation dated 10.4.1992 requested the Respondent No. 2 to change the enquiry officer, which was although not accepted. 32. Learned counsel for the Respondents Ms. Alka Verma then submitted that no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is permissible against punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. In support of her submission, she relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Director General, R.P.F and others v. Ch. Sai Babu, (2003) 4 SCC 331 , wherein the Apex Court observed that the scope of judicial review of the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority should not be fettered unless after examining all relevant factors found that the punishment imposed is grossly, shockingly disproportionate. She also places reliance on Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and others v. P.C.Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364 , wherein it has been laid down that the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority must not be interfered with unless it is shocking to the conscience of the Court. Additionally, she places reliance on Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and others, 2003 (2) UPLBEC 1673: AIR 2003 SC 1796 , wherein it has been observed that procedural errors or violations of principles of natural justice cannot be brought within the purview of judicial review. Additionally, she places reliance on Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and others, 2003 (2) UPLBEC 1673: AIR 2003 SC 1796 , wherein it has been observed that procedural errors or violations of principles of natural justice cannot be brought within the purview of judicial review. Alternatively, she also placed reliance on Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S.Gandhi and others, (1991) 2 SCC 716 , wherein the Supreme Court observed that where conclusion of the enquiry officer is supported by evidence on record, no interference is called for by the Court. The question raised by the learned counsel does not really arise for consideration in view of the conclusion reached above. 33. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case I am of the view that the enquiry proceedings were conducted in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and also not in conformity with the orders passed by this Court on 8.8.1991 in writ petition No. 7886 of 1990 (S/S) filed by the petitioner, wherein it was expressly directed that all documents on which the prosecution relies must be supplied to the petitioner and the petitioner must be given the liberty to produce his own documents or other evidence in defence. The Respondents acted in a manner most prejudicial to the petitioner and proper and effective opportunity to the petitioner to present his defence was not given. The very fact that respondent No. 4 Sri A.A.Kazmi, did not afford opportunity to the petitioner and did not supply the documents asked for by the petitioner despite the orders issued twice by the disciplinary authority respondent No. 2 fortifies the stand taken by the petitioner that Sri Kazmi was acting in a prejudicial manner. The impugned order of dismissal from service is, therefore, per se bad, illegal, arbitrary, suffers with malice and also the appellate order is liable to be set aside. 34. The facts and circumstances of the present case show that the Respondents have caused irreparable injury to the petitioner by conducting the whole proceedings in an arbitrary, discriminatory and illegal manner. Thus, the objection of the learned counsel for the Respondents that the Court must not exercise its power of judicial review must fail. 35. 34. The facts and circumstances of the present case show that the Respondents have caused irreparable injury to the petitioner by conducting the whole proceedings in an arbitrary, discriminatory and illegal manner. Thus, the objection of the learned counsel for the Respondents that the Court must not exercise its power of judicial review must fail. 35. Since I have already found that the impugned order of dismissal is per se bad in law; therefore, there is no need of deciding the alternative pleas raised by the petitioner. 36. Having come to the conclusion that the impugned orders are per se illegal and bad in law and cannot be sustained, a question arises as to what relief be granted to the petitioner. The order of dismissal from service is being quashed by this Court on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice and not by exonerating the petitioner of charges levelled against him. The petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation, therefore, it is provided that he shall be deemed to be in continuous service from the date of passing of the order of dismissal dated 8/10.11.1994 till the date he attained the age of superannuation. He shall be entitled to only 50% of the salary for the period he remained out of employment due to passing of the dismissal order. This period shall not be treated as break in service but the same shall be treated as period in continuity of service for all other consequential and post-retiral benefits. 37. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of dismissal dated 8/10.11.1994 and the appellate order dated 20.3.1995 are hereby quashed. 38. The benefits accrued to the petitioner in pursuance of this order shall be provided to the petitioner within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order. Costs easy. —————