JUDGMENT 1. - This judgment will govern the disposal of two appeals bearing D.B. Criminal Appeal Nos. 606/2004 and 673/2004 preferred by appellants Mahendra Singh and Shimla Devi respectively. Both these appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment for the reason that both the appeals have arisen out of same judgment passed by learned District and Sessions Judge, Hanumangarh in Sessions Case No. 44/2004 on 23.4.2004, by which both the appellants have been convicted for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C. and 2011 I.P.C. and sentenced as under:- Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C. : Life term imprisonment alongwith a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, further to undergo two months rigorous imprisonment. Section 201 I.P.C. : Two years' rigorous imprisonment alongwith a fine of Rs. 250/- and in default of payment of fine, further to undergo fifteen days' rigorous imprisonment. Further both sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2. The brief facts giving rise to these appeals are that investigation was initiated on a written report submitted by PW-1 Jaswant Singh on 23.12.2002 in Police Station Hanumangarh Junction, on which F.I.R. No. 833/2002 was registered and the investigation commenced. In the written report, Jaswant Singh stated that his uncle Nakshatra Singh was Conductor in the Roadways. At the time of submitting the written report, his uncle's duty was on the routes Hanumangarh to Pilibanga and Hanumangarh to Rawla. At the relevant time, Laduram was the driver of the bus. One day before the lodging of the F.I.R., i.e. on 22.12.2002 at about 3.00 p.m., Driver Laduram and Nakshatra Singh (deceased) reached Hanumangarh from Pilibanga. After that they had to go to Rawla at 4.30 p.m., but at 5.00 p.m. Raghuveer Singh Conductor came and informed that Nakshatra Singh is not present on duty and his vehicle is also standing at the depot. The complainant further submitted that on the day of lodging the F.I.R., i.e. on 23.12.2002, at about 10.00 a.m. he enquired from Kaluram about his uncle and he informed that on the day before at about 3.15 p.m. Nakshatra Singh came to him and handed over his ticket bag. The complainant further submitted that on the day of lodging the F.I.R., i.e. on 23.12.2002, at about 10.00 a.m. he enquired from Kaluram about his uncle and he informed that on the day before at about 3.15 p.m. Nakshatra Singh came to him and handed over his ticket bag. After this the complainant met with Laduram who told that on the day before in the evening when they were coming from Pilianga, as the railway crossing was closed, therefore, at 3.15 p.m. Nakshatra Singh had gone by saying that he was going to depot. He also told that appellant Shimla Devi, who was also employed at the depot, was talking to Nakshatra Singh at the Bus Stand. In the second round of the bus, she had travelled in the same bus boarding from near the Jail and she alongwith Nakshatra Singh got down form the bus near the railway crossing. He further told that appellant Mahendra Singh told him that he was having relations with Shimla since long and he also asked him to stop Nakshatra Singh from keeping relations with Shimla. Therefore, the complainant suspected that Mahendra Singh and Shimla have murdered his uncle Nakshatra Singh and thrown his body near the petrol pump, which he has identified. 3. During the course of the investigation, both the accused-appellants were arrested and on the basis of the information recorded under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, blood-stained cloths, weapon of offence and other articles were recovered, the statements of the witnesses were recorded and after due investigation, a charge-sheet under Sections 302 and 201 I.P.C. was filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hanumangarh from where the case was committed to the Court of Sessions Judge, Hanumangarh as the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. The learned District and Sessions Judge transferred the case to the Court of Additional District Judge (Fast Track), Hanumangarh Junction, but later on w.e.f. 5.3.2004, the case was again transferred to the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Hanumangarh. 4. Both the accused-appellants were charged for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. in the alternative Section 302/34 I.P.C. and Section 2011 I.P.C., to which both the accused did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. Both the accused-appellants were charged for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. in the alternative Section 302/34 I.P.C. and Section 2011 I.P.C., to which both the accused did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution examined as many as 23 witnesses, namely, PW-1 Jaswant Singh, PW-2 Tulsiram, PW-3 Gaurishankar, PW-4 Devi Lal, PW-5 Rahul Yadav, PW-6 Laduram, PW-7 Kherati Lal, PW-8 Gurjeet Singh, PW-9 Ravindra Singh, PW-10 Omprakash, PW-11 Kishore, PW-12 Surrendra Kumar, PW-13 Gangaram, PW-14 Devendra Singh, PW-15 Ghanshyam Sharma, PW-16 Shiv Prakash Soni, PW-17 Dr. Vijay Bhatnagar, PW-18 Shrinarayan, PW-19 Mahesh Kumar, PW-20 Abdul Kayyam, PW-21 Amreek Singh, PW-22 Maghar Singh and PW-23 Narendra Kumar and exhibited 117 documents from Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-117. The incriminating evidence adduced by the prosecution was put to the accused-appellants for their explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The accused in their defence examined one witness DW-1 Jaspal Kaur. 5. After hearing both the paries, the learned trial Court vide the impugned judgment dated 23.4.2004 held both the accused-appellants guilty for the commission of the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C. and 201 I.P.C. and sentenced them as indicated in the earlier para. 6. The learned counsel for the accused-appellants while impeaching the judgment of he learned trial Court contended that the present case is based only on the circumstantial evidence and the learned trial Court erred in convicting the present appellants for the offences charged for the reason that the case against them based on circumstantial evidence cannot be said to be fully established because the circumstances on which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn have not been fully established by the prosecution and the evidence as adduced by the prosecution is not consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not of conclusive nature and tendency ans it cannot be said from the evidence on record that it excludes every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. The learned counsel further contended that the chain of the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not complete so as to leave no reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. 7. The learned counsel for the accused-appellants also contended that the learned trial Court has not held the accused-appellant guilty on the basis of any certain ans explicit evidence. 7. The learned counsel for the accused-appellants also contended that the learned trial Court has not held the accused-appellant guilty on the basis of any certain ans explicit evidence. He contended that the learned trial Court relied upon three circumstantial evidence on the basis of which the present accused-appellants have been held guilty for the commission of the offence under Sections 302/34 and 201 I.P.C., which are:- (1) Deceased Nakshatra Singh was last seen alive with the present appellants; (2) Motive as attributed by the prosecution to the present accused-appellants regarding the illicit relations between deceased Nakshatra Singh and accused Shimla: and (3) The recovery of the blood-stained clothes, weapon of offence and other articles at the instance of the accused-appellants and further blood-stained pant of the deceased and the appellant Mahendra Singh were found to have the same B+ blood group. 8. While coming to the first set of circumstance relied upon by the learned trial Court, the learned counsel for the accused-appellants vehemently contended that the learned trial Court has erred in believing the evidence of PW-1 Jaswant Singh, PW-6 Laduram, PW-7 Kherati Lal and PW-8 Gurjeet Singh. The learned counsel contended that PW-1 Jaswant Singh is an interested witness because he is the nephew of deceased Nakshatra Singh and the evidence of PW-6 Laduram cannot be believed to be the evidence of last seen because after 3.00-3.30 p.m., the deceased was seen alive with both the appellants by PW-7 Kherati Lal. He further contended that the evidence of PW-7 Kherati Lal is wholly unreliable because he is a chance witness and there was no opportunity for him to visit the house of accused-appellant Mehendra Singh and further he is a concocted witness because he did not depose the fact that Shimla Devi or Mahendra Singh purchased any vegetable from him and he deposed that Shimla Devi directed him to give vegetable to her son at her residence at Housing Board, therefore, the evidence of PW-7 Kherati Lal cannot be believed. The learned counsel further stressed to the evidence of PW-1 Jaswant Singh wherein he deposed that Kaluram Rehdiwala told him that on 22.12.2002, Nakshatra Singh had left his ticket bag with him. Thus, in these circumstances, the last seen theory as adduced by the prosecution cannot be relied upon and the evidence of Kherati Lal becomes unreliable. The learned counsel further stressed to the evidence of PW-1 Jaswant Singh wherein he deposed that Kaluram Rehdiwala told him that on 22.12.2002, Nakshatra Singh had left his ticket bag with him. Thus, in these circumstances, the last seen theory as adduced by the prosecution cannot be relied upon and the evidence of Kherati Lal becomes unreliable. The learned counsel further contended that the statement of PW-7 Kherati Lal is unreliable in view of the site memo Ex.P-29 prepared by the Investigating Officer because PW-7 Kherati Lal deposed that he used to see Mahendra Singh had Shimla in the room of Mehendra Singh while passing through the way, whereas it is not possible to see the persons sitting in the room by a visitor who is passing through the road as there is only one gate D4 as shown in the Ex.P-29. As per the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants, in view of the facts mentioned in Ex.P-29, the evidence of PW-7 Kherati Lal is totally unreliable and concocted to falsely implicate the present appellants. 9. So far as the factual aspects as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants are concerned, it is correct that in the noon at about 3.00 or 3.30 p.m. after reaching Hanumangarh when Shimla and deceased Nakshatra Singh left the bus, it was not he last opportunity to see the deceased alive with the two accused-appellants because PW-7 Kherati Lal deposed that in the evening about 4.00 p.m. when he was passing near the house of Mahendra Singh, then near the shop of Purushottam, Shimla came out from the residence of Mehendra Singh and on hearing her call, he went upto the residence of Mahendra Singh and he saw Mahendra Singh, Shimla and Nakshatra Singh, therefore, the witness who had last seen the deceased alive with the present appellants is PW-7 Kherati Lal. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants that Kaluram Rehdi Wala was the witness who had last seen the deceased alive cannot be said to be correct set of circumstances because PW-1 Jaswant Singh deposed about the fact that Kaluram Rehdi Wala told him that deceased Nakshatra Singh left his ticket bag with him on 22.12.2002, whereas PW-7 Kherati Lal deposed the presence of the two accused-appellant alongwith the deceased alive at about 4.00 or 4.30 p.m. on the same day. In view of this fact, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants that Kaluram was the person who had last seen the deceased alive with the two accused-appellants, but he was not examined by the prosecution, does not carry any force. 10. Now we have to scrutinise the evidence of PW-7 Kherati Lal that whether the evidence deposed by this witness inspire any faith regarding the circumstantial evidence that he saw the present appellants with the deceased alive in the room of Mahendra Singh. It is a settled position of law that principle of last seen alive applied only when the time can be so small that the possibility of any other person being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It is for the accused to explain how and when he parted company with the deceased, i.e. there must be proximity of time and place. In the present case, the chain of evidence clearly suggests when Shimla Devi and the deceased got down from the bus at the railway crossing, the time was about 3.00 of 3.15 p.m. After that about 4.00 p.m., all the three persons, i.e. the two accused-appellants and the deceased were seen alive in the room of accused Mahendra Singh by PW-7 Kherati Lal and after that deceased Nakshatra Singh was found missing and the First Information Report Ex.P2 was filed by PW-1 Jaswant Singh on 23.12.2002 simply for the reason that Nakshatra Singh did not report on duty on 23.12.20002. 11. The learned counsel for the appellants drew out attention towards the minor contradictions between the evidence of PW-7 Kherati Lal vis-a-vis PW-1 Jaswant Singh, PW-6 Laduram and PW-8 Gurjeet Singh and further contended that Jaswant Singh is an interested witness. We have considered the contradictions towards which our attention was drawn. It is settled principle of law that fringe variations, discrepancies in details, contradictions in narration and embellishments in non-essential parts cannot militate against veracity of the core of testimony, if there is an impress of truth and conformity to probability in substantial fabric of prosecution story. It the statement of PW-7 Kherati Lal is appreciated in the light of the above principle, his testimony inspire faith and confidence and there is no material contradictions vis-a-vis the deposition of other witnesses and he has not deposed anything even in the cross-examination which makes his statement unreliable. 12. It the statement of PW-7 Kherati Lal is appreciated in the light of the above principle, his testimony inspire faith and confidence and there is no material contradictions vis-a-vis the deposition of other witnesses and he has not deposed anything even in the cross-examination which makes his statement unreliable. 12. Now we are coming to the point of movies for the commission of the offence. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that so far as the motive for the commission of the offence is concerned, it has not been proved by the prosecution and a simple deposition by some witness that the present accused-appellant Mahendra Singh told any person to warn Nakshatra Singh not to have any relations with Shimla, cannot be said to be a proved motive for the commission of such a heinous crime. He further contended that it is totally unreliable that DW-1 Jaspal Kaur who has been examined as defence witness may allow her husband to live in her residence at Hanumangarh while residing herself at Ganganagar, therefore, the evidence in this regard submitted by the prosecution cannot be said to be reliable. 13. The learned counsel for the appellants further contended that P.W.1 Jaswant Singh and P.W.3 Gaurishankar are the witnesses who deposed regarding the motive for the commission of the offence and P.W.1 Jaswant Singh being an interested witness, his statement cannot be believed and P.W.3 Gaurishankar did not depose on which date, place and time the accused asked him to instruct deceased Nakshatra Singh not to visit the place of Shimla. 14. We have perused the statement of P.W.1 Jaswant Singh and P.W.3 Gaurishankar in the light of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. P.W.3 Gaurishankar deposed that he is working as a Driver in the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation. He stated that one year earlier to recording of his statement, he used to live in the house of accused-appellant Mahendra Singh on rent. There were two rooms in his house, one was occupied by Mahendra Singh himself and in the other room he alongwith Sukhdev Singh Conductor used to live as tenant. He deposed that Shimla who is peon in his department also used to visit the room of Mahendra Singh. There were two rooms in his house, one was occupied by Mahendra Singh himself and in the other room he alongwith Sukhdev Singh Conductor used to live as tenant. He deposed that Shimla who is peon in his department also used to visit the room of Mahendra Singh. Earlier to the death of Nakshatra Singh, Mahendra Singh told him to warn Nakshatra Singh that he should not have any relations with Shimla and he should stop visiting Shimla. 15. The learned counsel for the appellants while drawing our attention to the cross-examination of this witness regarding the variations of the locations of the gates in his statement vis-a-vis Ex.P.29 contended that looking to the facts mentioned in the Ex.P.29, site memo, the statement of this witness cannot be relied upon regarding the fact that he used to reside in that house. The learned counsel contended that the number of rooms and the number of gates and the locations in which the gates were opening are contradictory and these contradictions are sufficient to disbelieve the evidence of this witness. 16. In our view the contradictions as pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants are of very minor nature and where the witnesses are rustic persons, their behavioural patterns, perceptions and habits must be taken into consideration and appreciated. Approaches that are too sophisticated, based on assumptions about human conduct cannot be applied to people accustomed to ways of life, as they may not have kept sense of time, place and other minor things. Simply on the basis of the fact that P.W.3 Gaurishankar in his cross-examination stated that the main gate of the house in which Mahendra Singh used to reside opens in west cannot be a sole ground to disbelieve the evidence of P.W.3 Gaurishankar. On the other hand, residing on rent in the house of a person of his own department is most natural. The statement of P.W.3 Gaurishankar also stands corroborated by P.W.1 Jaswant Singh. Accordingly, the motive for the commission of the crime also stands proved against the present accused-appellants from the evidence on record. 17. Coming to the question whether there was any intention on the part of both the accused-appellants to cause death of deceased Nakshatra Singh, if we come to the evidence of P.W.17 Dr. Accordingly, the motive for the commission of the crime also stands proved against the present accused-appellants from the evidence on record. 17. Coming to the question whether there was any intention on the part of both the accused-appellants to cause death of deceased Nakshatra Singh, if we come to the evidence of P.W.17 Dr. Vijay Bhatnagar, it is well-established that there were three abrasions on the Anterio lateral part of the neck and as per the opinion of the Board, the cause of death of the deceased was asphyxia due to throttling and the Board further opined that the injuries found on the body of the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. From the evidence of P.W.17 Dr. Vijay Bhatnagar, it is well-proved that the death of the deceased was caused by throttling and it is well-established that just before the death, deceased was last seen alive with the two accused-appellants. 18. The third question is regarding the recovery of the blood-stained clothes, weapon of offence and other articles in pursuance to the information recorded under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that Ex.P.3 to Ex.P.22 are the various memos by which the incriminating articles were recovered and the Fard Surat Haal and other memos were prepared and the common witness of these memos are P.W.2 Tulsiram and one Krishan Kumar, who has been dropped by the prosecution and to prove some other memos, P.W.1 Jaswant Singh has been examined, who happens to be a close relative of the deceased, therefore, the recovery of the blood-stained clothes, bloodstained other articles like Rassi, Safa, Niwar and blood-stained Chhuri cannot be believed. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that when on 23.12.2002 the First Information Report was registered on the basis of the written report of P.W.1 Jaswant Singh, and accused persons were arrested on 24/25.12.2002, the recoveries made after 5 days cannot be believed. He further contended that the witnesses of recovery of Thela Rehdi P.W.9 Ravindra Singh, P.W.10 Omprakash and P.W.11 Kishore did not corroborate the prosecution story and the presence of the common witnesses at all the places of recovery makes their statements unreliable and untrustworthy. 19. He further contended that the witnesses of recovery of Thela Rehdi P.W.9 Ravindra Singh, P.W.10 Omprakash and P.W.11 Kishore did not corroborate the prosecution story and the presence of the common witnesses at all the places of recovery makes their statements unreliable and untrustworthy. 19. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor contended that the statements of motbirs cannot be disbelieved merely on the ground that they are common witnesses of all the search memos and recovery memos and their statements require to be appreciated more cautiously. He further contended that if the statements of both the witnesses are appreciated cautiously, they inspire faith and even in the cross-examination no such fact came out so as to disbelieve their statements. 20. We have perused the statements of P.W.1 Jaswant Singh and P.W.2 Tulsiram and other witnesses also. A crossexamination at length was conducted of each witness and from their statements it cannot be said that their presence at the place of the recovery is doubtful. All the witnesses of recovery admitted their signatures on the recovery memos and merely on the ground that the witnesses are the relative of the complainant party or they are common witnesses of each and every memo, their evidence cannot be disbelieved. 21. The learned counsel for the appellants while impeaching the judgment of conviction also contended that the compliance of Section 157 Cr PC has not been made and the copy of the FIR reached to the court on the next day. 22. The delay in sending the copy of the FIR to the area Magistrate is not material where the FIR is shown to have been lodged promptly and investigation had started on that basis. In the present case the incident took place on 22.12.2002 and the matter was reported to the police on 23.12.2002 at about 12.45 p.m. and the copy of the FIR reached the area Magistrate on 24.12.2002, which cannot be said to be such a substantial delay in sending the copy of the FIR to the area Magistrate so as to disbelieve the entire prosecution story. 23. Another incriminating evidence against the accused-appellants is regarding the recovery of the bloodstained pant of accused Mahendra Singh and blood stained pant of deceased Nakshatra Singh and blood-stained Chhuri having the same blood group on the articles. 23. Another incriminating evidence against the accused-appellants is regarding the recovery of the bloodstained pant of accused Mahendra Singh and blood stained pant of deceased Nakshatra Singh and blood-stained Chhuri having the same blood group on the articles. Regarding this evidence, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that the blood group of the accused has not been got tested by the prosecution agency, therefore, this piece of evidence does not help the prosecution to connect the accused with the crime. 24. We are unable to accept this argument of the learned counsel for the appellants because no such defence has ever been taken by the accused-appellants in their defence and no such evidence as come on record so as to create any doubt regarding sending of the blood-stained articles to the Forensic Science Laboratory in sealed condition. 25. The learned counsel for the appellants further contended that the evidence of P.W.8 Gurjeet Singh cannot be believed that he saw both the accused-appellants while bringing the dead body of the deceased and throwing the same into dirty water because the presence of P.W.8 Gurjeet Singh at the time and place as stated in his statement is unnatural and he is a chance witness and in the month of December at about 11.30 p.m., presence of the witness at such a remote place cannot be said to be natural one. 26. We have considered this aspect and perused the statement of P.W.8 Gurjeet Singh. He categorically stated that after closing his shop, he alongwith his brother were going on scooter from their shop to their residence and in the way near Katewa Petrol Pump they saw two persons namely Mahendra Singh and Shimla. Even in the cross-examination of this witness does not show any improbability regarding his presence at the relevant time and the ground that at about 11.30 in the winter season his presence cannot be believed, does not carry any force. Witness may be stunned, speechless, confused, hysterical or run away. Each person acts in a special way and there are no set rules of natural reactions, therefore, only on the account that Gurjeet Singh while taking a long route for reaching his house saw the accused-appellants or there was no reason to close the shop at 11.30 p.m. in the winter season, the testimony of the witness cannot be disbelieved. 27. 27. The learned counsel for the appellants in support of his arguments relied upon the following judgments:- (1) 1984 Crl J SC 1738 : AIR 1984 SC 1622 (Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra) (2) AIR 2010 SC 762 (Musheer Khan @ Badshah Khan & Anr. v. State of M.P.) (3) AIR 2003 SC 801 (State of U.P. v. Arun Kumar Gupta) (4) 2002 SCC (Cri) 1718 (Ashish Batham v. State of M.P.) (5) 1997 SCC (Cri) 857 (Vijender v. State of Delhi) (6) 2002 SCC (Cri) 256 (Subhash Chand v. State of Rajasthan) (7) JT 2010 (4) SC 467 (C. Magesh & Ors. v. State of Karnataka) 28. We have perused the above judgments. So far as the judgment in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1622 is concerned, five principles have been established by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for proving a case against the accused in the case of circumstantial evidence. The learned counsel for the appellants has tried to impeach the judgment of the learned trial court on the same principles and we will also follow the above principles. So far as other citations are concerned, it is settled principle of law that decided cases are of no use in appreciating the evidence. Each case depends on its own facts. A close similarity between one case and another is not enough to warrant like treatment because a significant detail may alter the entire picture. One should avoid the temptation to decide cases by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. The broad resemblance between two cases is not at all decisive. The facts of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellants are different from the present case and we have examined the present case in the light of the evidence adduced by the prosecution in the case. 29. The broad resemblance between two cases is not at all decisive. The facts of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellants are different from the present case and we have examined the present case in the light of the evidence adduced by the prosecution in the case. 29. While applying the ratio of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (supra), if we come to the nature and character of the circumstantial evidence, it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was last seen alive with the two accused-appellants and further when both the accused were carrying the dead body of the deceased from the place of the occurrence to some lonely place, they were seen by P.W.8 Gurjeet Singh and further when the site was inspected by the Investigating Officer, blood-stains were found on the floor of the room and on clothes also. Further the recovered bloodstained pant of the deceased as well as that of accused Mahendra Singh were found to have the same blood group. The Hathora was also recovered at the instance of the accused-appellant Mahendra Singh in pursuance to the information recorded under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, thus, the evidence as adduced by the prosecution during the course of trial clearly show that from the circumstances available on record conclusion of guilt is fully established and the circumstances or the facts proved are consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused-appellants and they are conclusive in nature and tendency and the circumstances exclude every possible hypothesis except that of the guilt of the accused-appellants and the chain of evidence produced by the prosecution does not leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused-appellants and clearly show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused-appellants and there is certain and explicit evidence to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants. 30. Some more arguments were advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants, but they do not carry any force so as to have effect on the merits of the case. 31. 30. Some more arguments were advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants, but they do not carry any force so as to have effect on the merits of the case. 31. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the considered view that the learned trial court has discussed in his judgment the evidence of each and every witness and also taken into consideration all the aspects while convicting the accused appellants for the commission of the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 201 IPC. We find no error in the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial court. So far as the order of sentence is concerned, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and the offence committed, the sentences awarded by the learned trial court are proper and called for no interference by this court. Both the appeals do not carry any force and deserve to be dismissed. 32. Resultantly both the appeals filed by Mahendra Singh and Shimla Devi are hereby dismissed and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 23.04.2004 passed by learned District and Sessions Judge, Hanumangarh in Sessions Case No. 44/2004 is affirmed. 33. Accused-appellant Shimla is on bail. She is directed to surrender before the trial court to serve the sentence as awarded by the trial court and if she fails to surrender immediately before the trial court, then the trial court shall be at liberty to compel her surrender in accordance with law.Appeals dismissed. *******