Judgment :- 1. Pursuant to a disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Superintendent of Police, Ramanathapuram, the 2nd respondent herein in PR.No.70/96/u/r 3(b) dated 11.11.2000, the enquiry officer has found the charges as proved. On consideration of the enquiry report and the defense put up by the writ petitioner, the Superintendent of Police, Ramanathapuram, the 2nd respondent herein by his letter dated 11.11.2000 has imposed a punishment of reduction in the time-scale of pay by two stages for two years with cumulative effect. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has filed an appeal dated 10.01.2001 to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ramanathapuram, the 1st respondent herein. But vide letter dated 07.03.2001, the punishment has been confirmed. Challenging both the orders, the petitioner has filed the Original Application before the Tamilnadu Administrative Tribunal, Chennai, which has been transferred to this Court and re-numbered as writ petition. 2. Assailing the correctness of the orders, Mr.R.N.Amarnath, learned counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that in respect of the very same allegations of involvement of the petitioner, as an accused in a dacoity case in Crime No.1142 of 1992 under Section 395 IPC, on the file of Kenikkarai Police Station, the petitioner was subjected to trial in S.C.No.10 of 1995 and the learned Assistant Sessions Judge of Ramanathapuram, vide judgment dated 13.04.1996 has acquitted the petitioner and others. He therefore, submitted that when the same set of facts have already been enquired into by a Court of competent jurisdiction and the finding of not guilty is recorded, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ramanathapuram, the 1st respondent has erred in holding the charge as proved. 3. According to the learned counsel, the Superintendent of Police, Ramanathapuram and the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ought to have considered the objections raised by the writ petitioner in the appeal, in proper perspective and dropped further action. 4. Referring to the oral testimony of the departmental witnesses 1 to 5 and 7 that they did not give any evidence against the writ petitioner and were treated as hostile, the learned counsel submitted that the enquiry officer solely based on the testimony of PW6, Head Constable, who had registered FIR on the complaint received by PW1 and PW8, the investigating officer, who had failed to appear before the Sessions Court, inspite of several intimation, had come to a conclusion that the petitioner had committed the misconduct as alleged. 5. 5. According to the petitioner, when there is no direct evidence, against the petitioner by PW1, the complainant and other supporting witnesses, both the enquiry officer as well as the respondents ought to have considered the case, as of no evidence, but erred in recording an adverse finding. It is the further submission of the learned counsel that the punishment of reduction in the time-scale of pay by two stages for two years with cumulative effect, is disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. In the light of the evidence on record, learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the appellate authority has failed to advert to the various issues raised in the appeal and prayed for interference. 6. On the basis of the counter affidavit, filed by the Superintendent of Police, Ramanathapuram, Mr.LSM. Hasan Fizal, learned Government Advocate submitted that the petitioner was dealt with a charge in P.R.No.70/96 under Rule 3(b) of Tamilnadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules 1955 for "unbecoming conducted in having involved himself as an accused in a dacoity case in Kenikkarai Police Station Cr.No.1144/92 under Section 395 IPC which was registered on 16.08.1992 and thereby spoiled the decorum of the Police Force". 7. He further submitted that on 16.08.1992, at 06.30 hrs, on the complaint of L.S.Sahubar Sadig, S/o. Semala Maraikayar, Haziar Complex 1/138 – A Block, Bharathinagar, Ramanathapuram, F.I.R., was registered in Kenikarai Police Station in Cr.No.1142/92 under Section 395 IPC and an investigation was taken up by the Inspector of Police, Kenikarai Police Station. As the car number mentioned in the FIR was TCA.2660, the car was intercepted near Thiruppuvanam Police Station and when the inmates of the car were checked, the Inspector of Police and party found the petitioner along with (1) Mr.Thennaarasu, (2) Mr.Kotteswaran, (3) Mr.Kannaiah (4) Mr.Shajakhan. When the above said persons were interrogated, a sum of Rs.30,000/-from Mr.Thennaarasu, a sum of Rs.470/- from Mr.Kotteswaran and a sum of Rs.490/-from the petitioner were seized in the presence of witnesses (1) Mr.Muthuvelu and (2) Mr.P.Nagalingam. The said Mr.Thennaarasu also confessed that the petitioner and others had conspired and prepared for committing dacoity, sharing of the booty and escape. When the above said persons were interrogated, a sum of Rs.30,000/-from Mr.Thennaarasu, a sum of Rs.470/- from Mr.Kotteswaran and a sum of Rs.490/-from the petitioner were seized in the presence of witnesses (1) Mr.Muthuvelu and (2) Mr.P.Nagalingam. The said Mr.Thennaarasu also confessed that the petitioner and others had conspired and prepared for committing dacoity, sharing of the booty and escape. An identification parade was also conducted on 21.08.1992 at Central prison, Madurai by learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, in which witnesses (1) Mr.Sahubur Sadiq (2) Mr.Allapitchai (3) Mr.Sams Thprose (4) Mr.Hidayadullah (5) Mr.Haridos, identified the petitioner as one of the persons who had participated in the offence of dacoity. 8. In view of the above, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner in P.R.No.70/96 under Rule 3(b) of Tamilnadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules 1955 for "unbecoming conducted in having involved himself as an accused in a dacoity case in Kenikkarai Police Station Cr.No.1144/92 under Section 395 IPC which was registered on 16.08.1992 and thereby spoiled the decorum of the Police Force". 9. Learned Government Advocate further submitted that the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ramanathapuram, the 2nd respondent who conducted the oral enquiry examined 8 witnesses on behalf of the prosecution and marked 18 prosecution documents. The petitioner neither examined any witness on his side nor filed any document. The Enquiry officer held the charges as proved. The disciplinary authority after perusing the records and further explanation of the petitioner, came to the conclusion that there is no procedural irregularity and as much as PW6 and 8 have categorically deposed about the involvement of the petitioner along with others, imposed a punishment of reduction in time scale of pay by two stages for two years with cumulative effect. 10. Repelling the contentions of the writ petitioner, that as much as prosecution witnesses 1 to 5 and 7 were treated as hostile by the enquiry officer, the findings are perverse and it is a case of no evidence, learned Government Advocate submitted that such contentions cannot be countenanced for the reason that the standard of proof required in departmental proceedings is not that of strict proof, but based on the well acceptable principles of preponderance of probability. 11. 11. According to the learned Government Counsel, the arrest, seizure of money and the identification parade, conducted on 21.08.1992 at Central prison, Madurai by learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, in which witnesses have identified the petitioner, as one of the persons who had participated in the offence of dacoity, are more than sufficient to hold the charge as proved. He also submitted that the acquittal of the petitioner in the trial is due to the hostility of the prosecution witnesses and on the ground that the Investigating Officer, PW8, had failed to appear despite repeated summons. He also drew the attention of this Court to the findings recorded by the enquiry officer that though, witnesses 1 to 5 and 7 have turned hostile, all of them have not categorically stated that the petitioner was not involved in the offence. 12. In these circumstances, he submitted that there is some evidence leading to a fair conclusion on the principles of preponderance of probability and adequacy of evidence in arriving at the conclusion cannot be assailed by way of judicial review. He also submitted that Courts have consistently held that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible and therefore submitted that there is no perversity. 13. As regards simultaneous proceeding against the petitioner, departmentally as well as in the Court of law, he submitted that such course is always open to the disciplinary authority and the impugned proceedings cannot be set at naught, on that ground. 14. Taking this Court to the order passed by the appellate authority, the learned Government Advocate submitted that the appellate authority has considered the appeal memorandum in proper perspective and adverted to the points alleged and passed a reasoned order. He further submitted that when the appellate authority is in agreement with the report and the orders passed by the disciplinary authority, there is no need that he must write a detailed order like a judgment and it is suffice, the materials reflect application of mind on the points adverted to in the appeal. In such a view of the matter, he submitted that the appellate authority cannot be found fault with. For the above said reasons he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 15. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 16. In such a view of the matter, he submitted that the appellate authority cannot be found fault with. For the above said reasons he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 15. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 16. The charges framed against the writ petitioner in P.R.No.70/96 under Rule 3(b) of Tamilnadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules 1955 vide Charge Memo dated 04.11.1996, is as follows: "unbecoming conducted in having involved himself as an accused in a dacoity case in Kenikkarai Police Station Cr.No.1144/92 under Section 395 IPC which was registered on 16.08.1992 and thereby spoiled the decorum of the Police Force". Though 10 witnesses were sought to be examined, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Kamudhi have examined only 8 witnesses. Pws.1 to 6 are private witnesses. P.W.7 is an Head Constable, who registered the case in Crime No.1144/92 under Section 395 IPC and PW8, Mr.Narayanasamy, is the Inspector of Police, who took up the investigation and filed the charge sheet before the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Ramanathapuram. 17. Perusal of the Enquiry Officer's report, shows that prosecution witnesses 1 to 6 have deposed that after five years from the date of the incident, they could not recollect as to whether the petitioner was involved in the criminal case. Even the Mahazar witness, who seized the money from the petitioner, have deposed that they could not recollect the incident. Further, the above said Head Constable, who had registered the crime against the writ petitioner and the investigating officer, have categorically deposed that the petitioner was involved in the criminal case. 18. On analysing the oral and documentary evidence, with reference to the facts sought to be established, the Enquiry officer has found that the petitioner was one among the inmates in the car bearing Regn. No. TCA.2660, which has intercepted on 16.08.1992 and that the petitioner was also arrested. He has further observed that subsequently on 21.08.1992, when the identification parade was conducted at Central prison, Madurai by learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, the witnesses have categorically identified the petitioner as one of the persons, who was involved in criminal act of dacoity. No. TCA.2660, which has intercepted on 16.08.1992 and that the petitioner was also arrested. He has further observed that subsequently on 21.08.1992, when the identification parade was conducted at Central prison, Madurai by learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, the witnesses have categorically identified the petitioner as one of the persons, who was involved in criminal act of dacoity. As rightly observed by the enquiry officer that though, witnesses PW1 to 5 have deposed that they were not able to recollect as to whether the petitioner was involved, they have not denied that he was not an accused in the Sessions case on the file of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge of Ramanathapuram. Even the criminal case has ended in acquittal in favour of the petitioner and others, only on the ground that the investigating officer has failed to appear despite repeated summons. 19. Therefore, as rightly contended by the learned Government Advocate, mere acquittal in a criminal case on benefit of doubt or due to the fault of the investigating officer to let in evidence would not clothe any right to the writ petitioner to contend that the disciplinary action and the punishment have to be quashed. It is too late in the day to contend that simultaneous disciplinary proceedings cannot be taken. It is relevant to extract few decisions of the Supreme Court on the issue as to whether the department is empowered to take disciplinary proceedings, when the criminal case is pending on the same set of facts. (i) The principles underlined in Capt M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and another, reported in 1999 (3) SCC 679 , at Paragraph 22, are extracted hereunder: "(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately. (ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. (ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. (iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge sheet. (iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the Departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed. (v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest." (ii) In Ajay Kumar Nag v. G.M.(PJ) Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., reported in 2005 (7) SCC 764 , where the Supreme Court has explained the relative scope of departmental enquiry and criminal trial, the objectives, procedure and proof which are required in the proceedings before the Court and domestic enquiry, "11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”." (iii) Legal position has been made clear by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in 2004 (7) Supreme Court Cases 27 [State Bank of India and others v. R.B.Sharma]. In paragraph 8,the Supreme Court held as follows:- "8.The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. Criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty the offender owes to the society, or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public duty, as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Evidence Act"). Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceeding relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer, to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances." (iv). The above said principle has been reiterated in a subsequent decision reported in 2005 (10) Supreme Court Cases 471 [Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., and others v. Sarvesh Berry]. (v). It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances." (iv). The above said principle has been reiterated in a subsequent decision reported in 2005 (10) Supreme Court Cases 471 [Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., and others v. Sarvesh Berry]. (v). After considering a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court, a Division Bench of this Court in the Superintending Engineer, Chennai Electrical Distribution Circle, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Valluvarkottam, Chennai-600 034 and another v. N.Rangaraj reported in 2009(3) MLJ 833 , at Paragraph 14, held as follows: "It is trite law that the purpose of departmental enquiry is to adjudge the government servant/employee's conduct under the relevant conduct or discipline and appeal rules and to maintain discipline and efficiency in Public service, whereas a criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of public duty which he owes, or for breach of law, which entails punishment provided under the penal laws. It is also well settled that the standard of proof to hold a person guilty of offence, is based on strict evidence, as prosecution has to be prove the case beyond all reasonable doubt and what is required in departmental enquiry, is preponderance of probability. In view of the difference and distinction, the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above referred cases, when applied to the facts of the present case do not warrant deferment of departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case registered against the respondent. In view of the above, the contention of the respondent that his defence would be exposed cannot be countenanced." 20. The attempt on the part of the writ petitioner to assail the finding by re-appreciating the evidence and testing its adequacy, for arriving at a conclusion of guilt, is untenable in view of the settled position that the High Court sitting in Article 226 of Constitution of India cannot re-appreciate the evidence, except to the extent to find out as to whether there is any perversity and the finding recorded in a disciplinary proceedings cannot be interfered, unless it is shown to be a case of no evidence. Now let we consider some of the decisions of the Supreme Court as to whether, the Tribunal/Court can re-appreciate the evidence and set aside the penalty on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove charges and the scope of the Judicial Review. (i). In Government of T.N. v. A.Rajapandian reported in 1995 (1) SCC 216 , the Supreme Court, while considering the above issue, in Paragraphs 9 and 10, held as follows: "9. This Court in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur reported in 1972(4) SCC 618 , held as under: "A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that Nand Kumar was a person beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings, with the respondent was one which reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the case, the High Court cannot sit as a Court of appeal over a decision based on it. Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy of reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court." 10. In Union of India v. Parma Nanda reported in 1989 (2) SCC 177 , this Court observed as under: "We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority." (ii) In Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bhola Nath Singh and others reported in 1997 (3) SCC 657 , the Supreme Court at Paragraph 6 of the judgment, answered a question as to whether the High Court would be correct in law to appreciate the evidence, the manner in which the evidence was recorded and record a finding in that behalf. The Court held as follows: "The judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. The High Court, in the proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within the limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice." (iii) The Supreme Court in Commissioner and Secretary to the Government v. C.Shanmugam, reported in 1998(2) SCC 394 , considered the case of compulsory retirement, which was interfered by the Tribunal on the ground of absence of evidence. The Apex Court, after dealing with the various judgments on the point and held that only in the absence of any evidence, i.e., no evidence or if there was any perversity, the Court can interfere. At Paragraph 2 of the judgment, the Supreme Court held as follows: "It is seen from the order of the Tribunal that at the regular departmental enquiry held, the employees who were present at the time of the incident in the office on 02.08.1980 were examined and they all supported the charges (misbehaviour with the superior officer) levelled against the respondent/delinquent. The Tribunal on a re-appreciation of evidence, in judicial review, was of the view that the enquiry report based on such evidence cannot be totally accepted as free from bias and an order passed on such reports cannot be accepted as a fair and just one. The Tribunal on a re-appreciation of evidence, in judicial review, was of the view that the enquiry report based on such evidence cannot be totally accepted as free from bias and an order passed on such reports cannot be accepted as a fair and just one. Assailing this view of the Tribunal, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants brought to our notice three judgments of this Court reported as State of T.N.v. Subramaniam, Govt. Of T.N. v. A.Rajapandian and State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh. In State of T.N. v. Suibramaniam, a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed as follows: (SCC.pp.511-12, para 5) "The only question is: Whether the Tribunal was right in its conclusion to appreciate the evidence to reach its own finding that the charge has not been proved. The Tribunal is not a Court of appeal. The power of judicial review of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was taken away by the power under Article 323-A and invested the same in the Tribunal by the Central Administrative Tribunals Act. It is settled law that the Tribunal has only power of judicial review of the administrative action of the appellant on complaints relating to service conditions of employees. It is the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority to consider the evidence on record and to record the findings whether the charge has been proved or not. It is equally settled law that technical rules of evidence have no application for the disciplinary proceedings and the authority is to consider the material on record. In judicial review, it is settled law that the Court or the Tribunal has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the delinquent receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the view of the Court or Tribunal. When the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence, Tribunal is devoid of power to re-appreciate the evidence and would (sic) come to its own conclusions on the proof of the charge. When the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence, Tribunal is devoid of power to re-appreciate the evidence and would (sic) come to its own conclusions on the proof of the charge. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its judicial review is to consider whether the conclusion is based on evidence on record and supports the finding or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence." (iv) In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K.Chopra reported in 1999 (1) SCC 759 , the Supreme Court at Paragraphs 16 and 17 held as follows: "16. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over he factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well-settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the Court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of the fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Lord Hailsham in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans reported in 1982 (3) ALL. ER 141 HL observed: "The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches, on a matter which it is authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court." "17. Judicial review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the Court, while exercising the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority." (v) The above position was reiterated in Commandant v. D.Paul reported in 1999 SCC (L&S) 789, and at Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment, the Supreme Court held as follows: "4. .........It is not the function of the Tribunal to review the decision and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence and that if there be some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or the reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Tribunal." "5. ............ It is settled law that the Tribunal, while exercising its power of judicial review in respect of disciplinary action taken against the a government servant, cannot re-appreciate the evidence adduced to prove the charges in the disciplinary proceedings." (vi) In High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil reported in 2000 (1) SCC 416 , while considering the scope of Judicial Review of the decision of the Disciplinary Authority in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court at Paragraph 16, held as follows: "16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by consideration extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution." (vii) In State of A.P. v. S.Sree Rama Rao reported in AIR 1963 SC 1723 , the Supreme Court, considering the scope of the Judicial Review, held that, "The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution as a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Whether there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a Writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence." (viii) The above position was once again reiterated by the Supreme Court in Sub-Divisional Officer, Konch v. Maharaj Singh reported in 2003(9) SCC 191 . In Paragraph 5 of the judgment, the Court held as follows, "It has been stated by this Court on a number of occasion that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is a supervisory one and not an appellate one, and as such the Court would not be justified in re-appreciating the evidence adduced in a disciplinary proceeding to alter the findings of the enquiring authority." 21. In the case on hand, FIR dated 16.08.1992 in Crime No.1142 of 1992 under Section 395 IPC, on the file of Kenikkarai Police Station, the petitioner has been arrested and lodged in Central Prison for the offence of dacoity and that in identification parade, he has been identified as an accused. In the case on hand, FIR dated 16.08.1992 in Crime No.1142 of 1992 under Section 395 IPC, on the file of Kenikkarai Police Station, the petitioner has been arrested and lodged in Central Prison for the offence of dacoity and that in identification parade, he has been identified as an accused. In addition to the above, the investigating officer, who has laid the charge against the petitioner, has also deposed regarding the involvement of the writ petitioner in the crime. In such a view of the matter, the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer cannot be said to be perverse or as a case of no evidence warranting any interference. 22. Both the disciplinary as well as the appellate authorities have considered the points raised by the delinquent in his further representation and after discussing the same, have passed orders imposing the punishment of reduction in the time-scale of pay by two stages for two years with cumulative effect. Perusal of the appellate authority's order also reflects, proper consideration. (i) In Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1987 SC 2043 , at Paragraph 8, after extracting the operative portion of the order of the Punishment Authority, held that when the Punishing Authority agrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and accepts the reasons given by him in support of such findings, it is not necessary for the punishing authority to again discuss the evidence and come to the same findings, as that of the Enquiry Officer and give the same reasons for the findings. 11. At thus juncture, it would be relevant to extract the operative portion of the order of the punishing authority in the above reported judgment, "I have considered the charge-sheet, the reply filed to the charge-sheet, the statements made during the enquiry, the report of the Enquiry Officer, the show cause notice, the reply filed by the delinquent and other papers and that no reason is available to me on the basis of which reliance may not be placed on the report of the Enquiry Officer. Therefore, keeping these circumstances in view, I terminate his service with effect from the date of issue of this order." 12. Therefore, keeping these circumstances in view, I terminate his service with effect from the date of issue of this order." 12. While upholding the said order, the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 8, observed as follows: "In view of the contents of the impugned order, it is difficult to say that the punishing authority had not applied his mind to the case before terminating the services of the appellant. The punishing authority has placed reliance upon the report of the Enquiry Officer which means that he has not only agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, but also has accepted the reasons given by him for the findings. In our opinion, when the punishing authority agrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and accepts the reasons given by him in support of such findings, it is not necessary for the punishing authority to again discuss evidence and come to the same findings as that of the Enquiry Officer and give the same reasons for the findings. We are unable to accept the contention made on behalf of the appellant that the impugned order of termination is vitiated as it is a non-speaking order and does not contain any reason. When by the impugned order the punishing authority has accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the reasons given by him, the question of non-compliance with the principles of natural justice does not arise. It is also incorrect to say that the impugned order is not a speaking order." (ii) The Supreme Court in G.M.(P.W.), Canara Bank v. M.Raja Rao reported in 2001 (II) LLJ 819 , had an occasion to consider as to whether the appellate authority is required to pass a detailed order, while concurring with the decision of the disciplinary authority. In the above reported judgment, a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court did not find any infirmity with the disciplinary Proceedings and dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the delinquent. On appeal, the Division bench came to the conclusion that the disciplinary Authority, while agreeing with the report of the Enquiry Officer, is required to give reasons and the appellate authority has to consider the appeal in accordance with the Banking Regulations and set aside the order of removal from service. On appeal, the Division bench came to the conclusion that the disciplinary Authority, while agreeing with the report of the Enquiry Officer, is required to give reasons and the appellate authority has to consider the appeal in accordance with the Banking Regulations and set aside the order of removal from service. Agreeing with the contentions raised in the appeal preferred by the Bank, the Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 held as follows: "4. ...........The order of the Disciplinary Authority unequivocally indicates that he has gone into the findings of the Enquiring Authority and agreed with the same. When a Disciplinary Authority agrees with the findings and conclusions of the Enquiring Authority, it is not necessary in law to give any detailed reasons as to why he intends to agree with the findings of the Enquiring Authority. It is of course true that in the matter of award of punishing if Disciplinary Authority considers materials other than the materials which had been produced before the EO then the delinquent must be given a notice thereof or else the conclusions of the Disciplinary Authority would get vitiated. 5. So far as the order of the Appellate Authority is concerned, it is undoubtedly true that as provided in the Regulation, the Appellate Authority is required to pass a reasoned order. The question further arises for consideration is even though the order may be a reasoned order, can it be held to have suffered from any infirmity because all the contentions raised as alleged by the counsel for the delinquent, have not been dealt with? 6. On examining the order of the Appellate Authority, we are of the considered opinion that the Appellate Authority not only afforded opportunity of hearing to the delinquent, but also considered the contentions raised and then taking a totality of the entire circumstances agreed with the order of the Disciplinary Authority and dismissed the appeal. In that view of the matter, we do not think that any infirmity has been committed by the Appellate Authority in not giving detailed reasons on the contentions raised by the delinquent. In that view of the matter, we do not think that any infirmity has been committed by the Appellate Authority in not giving detailed reasons on the contentions raised by the delinquent. In this view of the matter, the Division Bench also committed error in holding that the Appellate Authority committed a serious infirmity in dismissal of the appeal in question." (iii) In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in 2008 (1) Supreme Today 617, (Divisional Forest Officer, Kottagudem's case) one of the contention was that the appellate/revisional authorities have failed to consider the grounds raised before them and that the orders passed thereto are cryptic without any detailed reasons. While dealing with the above said contention, the Supreme Court re-affirmed the decisions rendered earlier in R.P.Bhatt's case cited supra and Ram Chander v. Union of India reported in 1986 (3) SCC 103 and at Paragraph 19 of the judgment, held as follows: "19. It is no doubt also true that an appellate or revisional authority is not required to give detailed reasons for agreeing and confirming an order passed by the lower forum, but in our view, in the interests of justice, the delinquent officer is entitled to know atleast the mind of the appellate or revisional authority in dismissing his appeal and/or revision. It is true that no detailed reasons are required to be given, but some brief reasons should be indicated even in an order affirming the views of the lower forum." 23. As rightly contended by the learned Government Counsel, when disciplinary as well as appellate authorities, agree with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, based on evidence, there is no need to write a lengthy order as that of a judgment and suffice that the order reflects application of mind and reasons for conclusion. Upon perusal of the orders passed by the above said statutory authorities, this Court is of the considered view that there is no procedural irregularity. There is no serious allegations of violation of principles of natural justice. The impugned order stands the test of fairness, reasonableness and that there is no perversity. The punishment of reduction in the time-scale of pay by two stages for two years with cumulative effect, imposed on the petitioner, for the charge, cannot be said to be disproportionate considering its gravity. 24. The impugned order stands the test of fairness, reasonableness and that there is no perversity. The punishment of reduction in the time-scale of pay by two stages for two years with cumulative effect, imposed on the petitioner, for the charge, cannot be said to be disproportionate considering its gravity. 24. In such a view of the matter, this Court is of the view that no interference is called for. On the aspect of proportionality of punishment, this Court is of the view that the quantum of punishment is commensurate with the charges and does not requires any modification. Hence, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.