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2011 DIGILAW 1719 (RAJ)

Ladu v. Rent Tribunal

2011-08-16

MAHESH BHAGWATI

body2011
JUDGMENT 1. - By way of the instant writ petition, the petitioner Ladu has beseeched to quash and set-aside the judgment dated 4th November, 2008 (Annexure-4) and 7th April, 2011 (Annexure-6), rendered by the Rent Tribunal Tonk and Appellate Rent Tribunal, Tonk respectively. 2. The nub of the appellant's story is that the respondent-applicant Kishan Lal filed an application for eviction under Section 9 of the Rent Control Act, 2001 against the petitioner-non applicant on the ground of denial of title, personal necessity and default in payment of rent. 3. Having recorded the evidence led by both the parties and carefully perused the entire material on record, the learned Rent Tribunal decreed the suit of eviction in favour of the respondent-applicant and against the petitioner-non applicant. Aggrieved with the impugned judgment dated 4th November, 2008, the petitioner-non applicant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Rent Tribunal and the appeal filed by the petitioner non applicant also stood dismissed. Hence, this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner assailed both the judgments of the courts below on the ground that the Rent Tribunal, Tonk had wrongly closed the right of cross-examination of the petitioner on 23rd February, 2007 and 18th April, 2007. Thereafter the learned Rent Tribunal passed one more interlocutory order on 18th November, 2007 and he challenged all these interlocutory orders in appeal before the Appellate Rent Tribunal, but the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal did not give any finding on these issues. Similarly, he also raised the issue of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and contended that on account of there being no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the application for eviction of premises filed under Section 9 of the Rent Control Act, 2001 was not maintainable. The learned appellate court did not give any finding on this issue also. Thus, the impugned orders rendered by both the courts below being contrary to provisions of law, are perse illegal and deserve to be set-aside. 5. Learned counsel also canvassed that the interlocutory orders rendered by learned Rent Tribunal could be assailed in the appeal before the Appellate Court and he has cited the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court delivered in the case of Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi reported in AIR 1981 Supreme Court 707 (1). 6. 5. Learned counsel also canvassed that the interlocutory orders rendered by learned Rent Tribunal could be assailed in the appeal before the Appellate Court and he has cited the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court delivered in the case of Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi reported in AIR 1981 Supreme Court 707 (1). 6. E Converso, the learned counsel for the respondent-applicant defended the impugned judgments and stated the same to be just and proper and contended that they did not warrant any intervention. 7. At the very out-set, the learned counsel for the petitioner canvassed that the interlocutory order passed by the Rent Tribunal could be assailed in the appeal before the Appellate Rent Tribunal and there were umpteen cases of the Hon'ble Apex court to be cited in this regard. One judgment of Kshitiesh Chandra Bose (supra) has been cited by the learned counsel in support of his argument, but there is not a whisper of this fact in the whole judgment that the interlocutory order passed by the learned trial court could be impugned or challenged in the appeal before the appellate court. Having perused the judgment of Kshitish Chandra Bose (supra) delivered by the Full Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court, it is found that the whole judgment runs against the petitioner of this case. 8. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, it is found that the learned Rent Tribunal in all framed 11 issues and issues no. 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11 were found to have been proved in favour of the respondent-applicant and against the petitioner non applicant. The learned Rent Tribunal also found the relationship of landlord and tenant between both the parties and having found all the material issues proved in favour of the respondent-applicant, the learned Tribunal decreed the application of eviction in favour of the respondent-applicant and against the petitioner-non applicant. The learned Appellate Rent Tribunal also critically analyzed the entire evidence and having discussed the entire evidence and all the issues ad-longum found that the learned Rent Tribunal rightly decreed the suit in favour of the respondent-applicant and dismissed the appeal of the petitioner- non applicant. 9. The learned Appellate Rent Tribunal also critically analyzed the entire evidence and having discussed the entire evidence and all the issues ad-longum found that the learned Rent Tribunal rightly decreed the suit in favour of the respondent-applicant and dismissed the appeal of the petitioner- non applicant. 9. Having carefully perused the judgment of Kshitish Chandra Bose (supra), it is revealed that there was not even a whisper of this fact that the interlocutory orders rendered by the learned Rent Tribunal could be challenged in appeal against the judgment before the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal. Hence, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even the interlocutory orders can be assailed in appeal against the judgments of the trial court is not found to be tenable at all. There has been a concurrent finding on all the material issues of both the courts below. 10. The Full Bench of the Hon'ble Apex court in the case of Kshitish Chandra Bose (supra) categorically observed that the Patna High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in reversing the pure concurrent findings of fact given by the trial court and the then appellate court. 11. In the case of Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v. Jangbahadur Rai, (1963) 1 SCR 456 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain second appeal on findings of fact even if it was erroneous. In this connection, the Apex court observed as follows: "It is settled law that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact. As the two Courts, approached the evidence from a correct perspective and gave a concurrent finding of fact, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the said finding." 12. To the same effect is another decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of R. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam, Chettiar reported in (1963) 3 SCR 604 , where the Court observed as follows: "But the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the lower Appellate Court, however erroneous the said conclusions may appear to be to the High Court, because as the Privy Council observed, however, gross or inexcusably the error may seem to be there is no jurisdiction under Section 100 to correct that error." 13. The same view was taken in two earlier decisions of the Hon'ble Apex court in the case of D. Pattabhiramaswamy v. Hanymayya reported in AIR 1959 SC 57 and Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh reported in AIR 1961 SC 1097 . 14. In this case, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the High Court had no jurisdiction after reversing the concurrent findings of fact of the courts below and remand the case to the Additional Judicial Commissioner. 15. The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that this Court should not invoke extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to upset the pure findings of fact of two courts below. The scope of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited. This extraordinary jurisdiction can be invoked only when the judgment of the court below is found to be perverse or contrary to material or it results in manifesting injustice. It is found that both the courts below having appreciated the evidence emerging on record in right perspective and dealt with all the issues ad-longum found all the material issues to have been proved in favour of the respondent-applicant and against the petitioner-non applicant, finally decreed the suit in favour of the respondent, which stood affirmed by the learned Rent Appellate Tribunal. I do not find any ground to upset the pure findings of fact and thus, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed as the impugned judgments rendered by both the courts below do not warrant any intervention. 16. For these reasons, the writ petition fails and the same being bereft of any merit stands dismissed. 17. Consequent upon the dismissal of writ petition, the stay application, filed therewith, does not survive and that also stands dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******