Judgment :- 1. An extent of 0.93.0 hectares in survey No.13/5, Mathagupatti Village, originally belonged to one ST.Srinivasa Chettiar, the father of the petitioner. A Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, was issued by the first respondent, proposing to acquire land for the purpose of providing house sites to the Most Backward Class people of Mathagupatti Village. Accordingly, the said notification was pased in Government Order G.O.3D No.148, Backward Classes and Most Backward Classes Welfare Department dated 01.12.1993. A notice under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act was issued in favour of the petitioner on 25.02.1994. The petitioner gave his objection. Thereafter, a declaration was passed by the first respondent, which was followed by an award. 2. The petitioner's mother filed a writ petition in W.P.No.4333 of 1995 before this Honourable Court, challenging the declaration and the award passed. The Honourable High Court by holding that, inasmuch as the 3rd respondent has failed to issue notice to the legal heirs of the deceased ST.Srinivasa Chettiar, the declaration and the award cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the declaration passed under Section 6 was set aside, with liberty to the respondents to proceed further in accordance with law. In the meanwhile, the petitioner's brother S.Chidambaram also filed a writ petition in W.P.No.17166 of 1995, challenging G.O.3D No.117, Backward Classes and Most Backward Classes Welfare Department dated 30.12.1994. In W.P.No.17166 of 1995, this Honourable Court, taking note of the order passed in W.P.No.4333 of 1995 dated 31.07.2001, has allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner's brother, in an order dated 11.07.2002, by quashing the declaration passed under Section 6, with liberty to the respondent to proceed further from the stage of 4(1) Notification after giving an opportunity to the petitioner therein to participate in 5-A enquiry. The learned Judge of this Honourable Court has directed that, the above said exercise shall be commenced by the respondent within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of the order passed in W.P.No.17166 of 1995 dated 11.07.2002. 3. It is seen from the records that, the order passed by this Honourable Court dated 11.07.2002 in W.P.No.17166 of 1995 was communicated to the respondent on 22.08.2002. However, the 3rd respondent, in a proceedings dated 02.01.2003, has issued in Form No.3-A, requiring the petitioner to give his objection for the proposed acquisition. 3. It is seen from the records that, the order passed by this Honourable Court dated 11.07.2002 in W.P.No.17166 of 1995 was communicated to the respondent on 22.08.2002. However, the 3rd respondent, in a proceedings dated 02.01.2003, has issued in Form No.3-A, requiring the petitioner to give his objection for the proposed acquisition. Challenging the said notice on the ground that, the proceedings initiated have already lapsed in as much as the limitation of one year from the Notification issued under Section 4(1) of the declaration passed under Section 6 is already over, the petitioner has come forward to file the present writ petition. 4. Mr.ARL. Sundaresan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that, the Honourable Apex Court in Padmasundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. vs. State of T.N. & Ors. reported in 2002 (2) CTC 55, has considered the very same issue and held that, once declaration passed under Section 6 is quashed, the Court shall not extend the period of limitation. Further, it is submitted that, what can be excluded for the purpose of limitation is only the period of stay or injunction granted by the competent Court. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that, in any case, even as per the direction given by the learned single Judge of this Court, the period of one month is over long before the initiation of further proceedings by the third respondent. Therefore, the learned senior counsel submitted that, the writ petition will have to be allowed. 5. No counter has been filed by the respondents. However, the learned Additional Government Pleader based upon the records submitted that, the proceedings have been continued, considering the fact that the liberty has been given to the respondents to proceed from the stage of the notification issued under Section 4(1) and therefore, the period of one year will have to be recounted from the issuance of notice and not from the earlier notification issued under Section 4(1) as per the order of this Honourable Court passed between the parties. Hence, it is submitted that, the writ petition will have to be dismissed. 6. The facts involved in the present case on hand are not in dispute. On an earlier occasion, the petitioner's mother and brother filed the writ petition Nos.4333 of 1995 and 17166 of 1995 respectively, and this Honourable Court in W.P.No.4333 of 1995 has passed the following order: "9. 6. The facts involved in the present case on hand are not in dispute. On an earlier occasion, the petitioner's mother and brother filed the writ petition Nos.4333 of 1995 and 17166 of 1995 respectively, and this Honourable Court in W.P.No.4333 of 1995 has passed the following order: "9. Following the Principles laid down by the Full Bench as well as the Division Bench of this Court in the above cases, this Court holds that the Land Acquisition Officer is duty bound to issue notice to the legal heirs of the deceased Srinivasan Chettiar the original land owner. The non-compliance of the mandatory provision would naturally vitiate the acquisition proceedings. 10. When admittedly the names of the legal heirs of the deceased Srinivasan Chettiar had been shown as the persons interested in the Declaration under Section 6 of the said Act, it is for the third respondent to issue notice on them for the Award, Enquiry. When it is admitted that the legal heirs were not served with any notice in respect of the Award Enquiry, the Award, so far as they are concerned, cannot be said to be valid. Hence, the passing of the illegal Award cannot confer any right on the respondents to claim the vesting of the property. 11. Accordingly, the Declaration under Section 6 of the said Act only in respect of the land of the petitioner is quashed with liberty to the respondents to proceed further in accordance with law. When the Declaration is quashed, automatically, the Award is also set aside, since there is no need for any separate prayer or proceedings to quash the Award, because it is only consequential to the validity of the Declaration under Section 6 of the said Act. The writ petition is allowed. No costs. Hence, the above W.M.P. Is dismissed as unnecessary." Similarly, relying upon the said order in the writ petition filed by the petitioner's brother, this Honourable Court has passed the following order: "5. Following the said judgment in W.P.No.4333 of 1995 dated 31.07.2001, this writ petition is allowed and Section 6 Declaration is quashed giving opportunity to the respondents to proceed further from the stage of 4(1) Notification after giving opportunity to the petitioner to participate in the 5-A enquiry and proceed further with the land acquisition proceedings. Following the said judgment in W.P.No.4333 of 1995 dated 31.07.2001, this writ petition is allowed and Section 6 Declaration is quashed giving opportunity to the respondents to proceed further from the stage of 4(1) Notification after giving opportunity to the petitioner to participate in the 5-A enquiry and proceed further with the land acquisition proceedings. The above exercise shall be commenced by the respondents within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order." 7. It is no doubt true that in the first writ petition filed in W.P.No.4333 of 1995, a liberty was given to the respondents to proceed after quashing the declaration under Section 6. It is seen that, the Honourable High Court has only stated that, the respondent shall proceed further in accordance with law. Therefore, the Honourable High Court has not extended the period of limitation. However, in the order passed in W.P.No.17166 of 1995 filed at the instance of the petitioner's brother while relying upon the earlier order, this Honourable High Court has stated that, the respondent can proceed within a period of one month from the date of receipt of copy of the order. 8. Considering the very same issues, the Honourable Apex Court in Padmasundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. vs. State of T.N. & Ors., reported in 2002 (2) CTC 55, consisting of five Honourable Judges has held as follows: "14. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. See (Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd., 2000 (5) SCC 515 . 'The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah's case, 1996 (3) SCC 88 . In Nanjudaiah's case, 1996 (3) SCC 88 , the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah's case, 1996 (3) SCC 88 . In Nanjudaiah's case, 1996 (3) SCC 88 , the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent. 15. Two principles of construction – one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole – appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou, 1996 1 QB 878, "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid In Luke v. I.R.C., 1966 AC 557 where at p.577 he also observed: "this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges".] 16. The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principles is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K.Chinnathambi Gounder, (supra) was rendered on 22.06.1979 i.e. much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principles is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K.Chinnathambi Gounder, (supra) was rendered on 22.06.1979 i.e. much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. If the Legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim 'actus curia neminem gravibit' highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case." 9. It is seen that on a reading of the judgment referred supra, the issue involved in the present writ petition, no longer "res integra". The Honourable Apex Court has held that, the Judgment of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court is no longer a good law. Therefore, this court is of the view that the ratio laid down by the Honourable Apex Court is applicable to the present case on hand in all force. Therefore, once a declaration is quashed by this Honourable Court, then the consequent to the same, the notification issued under Section 4(1) also goes in as much as the limitation starts running from the date of the notification issued under Section 4(1). The period of limitation granted under the statute cannot be extended by the Court. Hence, unless there is available period after the quashing of the declaration under Section 6, then the limitation cannot start afresh from the date of the order passed by the Court. Applying the said ratio in the present case on hand, it is seen that after passing the declaration, only six days were available. Therefore, when the declaration was quashed the respondent ought to have passed a fresh declaration within six days after complying with the directions issued by this Honourable Court. Admittedly, the notice was issued after long period from the date of the expiry of the declaration. Therefore, when the declaration was quashed the respondent ought to have passed a fresh declaration within six days after complying with the directions issued by this Honourable Court. Admittedly, the notice was issued after long period from the date of the expiry of the declaration. Therefore, considering the fact admittedly, only six days were available for the respondents to proceed after quashing of the declaration and within the time proceedings, having not completed by passing the declaration under Section 6, this Court has got no other option to allow the writ petition by declaring that, the proceedings initiated by the first respondent in G.O.3D No.148, Backward Classes and Most Backward Classes Welfare Department dated 01.12.1993 is unenforceable as it has lapsed on the ground of limitation. 10. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.