ORAL ORDER : R.M. Doshit, J. This Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is filed by the elected councilors of the Patna Municipal Corporation to challenge the constitutional validity of the second proviso of Section 41 of the Bihar Municipal Act 2007 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) as violative of Article 243P(e) of the Constitution. 2. Article 243-P of the Constitution incorporates definitions. Clause (e) thereof defines ‘Municipality’ to mean “an institution of self-government constituted under article 243-Q”. Section 41 of the Act provides for appointment of officers of the State Government for municipalities. The said Section empowers the State Government to appoint the officers of the Government as executive officers of the Municipal Corporation or class of municipal councils or Nagar Panchayats. The proviso thereto provides that the officers so appointed shall be under the administrative control of the Empowered Standing Committee. The said proviso also empowers the State Government to withdraw such officers suo motu or if a resolution to that effect is passed by the Councilors at a meeting called for that purpose by a 2/3rd majority of the total number of councilors holding office for the time being. The impugned proviso has been added under Section 17 of the Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Act, 2011. The impugned proviso added under the aforesaid 2011 Act reads as under:- “Provided further that resolution regarding withdrawal of the officer shall not be taken within one year of the posting of the officer.” 3. Thus, the above proviso curtails the power of the councilors of the Municipality/Municipal Corporation to pass a resolution for withdrawal of the Municipal Officer for one year from the date such officer assumes charge. It is the aforesaid proviso which is under challenge before us. 4. Learned advocate Mr. S.B.K. Mangalam has appeared for the writ petitioners. He has submitted that the Municipal Corporation is an institution of self-governance. The officers of the State are posted in the Corporation as its executive officers. By virtue of the first proviso to Section 41 of the Act, they are under the administrative control of the Standing Committee. If such officers do not perform the duties as directed by the Standing Committee of the Municipal Corporation, the Municipal Corporation cannot function. The Corporation, therefore, should have the power to enforce removal of such officers. That power is conferred by first proviso to Section 41 of the Act. If such officers do not perform the duties as directed by the Standing Committee of the Municipal Corporation, the Municipal Corporation cannot function. The Corporation, therefore, should have the power to enforce removal of such officers. That power is conferred by first proviso to Section 41 of the Act. The said power conferred by the first proviso has now been curtailed under the aforesaid second proviso inserted in the Act. The curtailment of the power under second proviso to Section 41 of the Act defeats the purpose of self-governance of the Municipal Corporation. Thus, violates Article 243-P(e) of the Constitution. 5. In course of his submission Mr. Mangalam has cited instances of insubordination by the respondent No. 5, the Municipal Commissioner. He has submitted that the resolution passed by the Councilors of the Municipal Corporation to request the Government to withdraw respondent No. 5 has been turned down by the State Government under its communication dated 28th July 2011. Mr. Mangalam has also taken us to Section 36 of the Act. In support of his argument, he has relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and others v. The State of Punjab, [ AIR 1955 SC 549 ]; and in the matter of Afjal Imam v. State of Bihar and others, [ (2011) 5 SCC 729 ] [: 2011(3) PLJR (SC) 290] particularly paragraph 48, (Ed.-Para 28 of PLJR) thereof. 6. The Petition is contested by the learned Additional Advocate General-1 Mr. Lalit Kishore. He has submitted that no provision of an enactment can be held ultra vires unless it contravenes any of the provisions of the Constitution or it is beyond the legislative competence of the State. In the present case, it is not the allegation of the petitioners that the impugned proviso has been inserted without the authority of law. He has submitted that Article 243-P(e) contains the definition of the ‘Municipality’. The impugned proviso in no manner contravenes the definition of the word ‘Municipality’ incorporated in the aforesaid Article 243P-(e). In absence of any other challenge, the challenge to the constitutional validity of the impugned proviso inserted under Section 17 of the 2007 Act shall fail. He has further submitted that the legislative wisdom of the State cannot be questioned. The impugned proviso in no manner contravenes the definition of the word ‘Municipality’ incorporated in the aforesaid Article 243P-(e). In absence of any other challenge, the challenge to the constitutional validity of the impugned proviso inserted under Section 17 of the 2007 Act shall fail. He has further submitted that the legislative wisdom of the State cannot be questioned. In support thereof he has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sardar Sarup Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, [ AIR 1959 SC 860 ], particularly paragraph 5 thereof. 7. In the matter of Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and others v. The State of Punjab, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider the executive order made by the State of Punjab in respect of printing and publishing the text-books. The order was challenged as being violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. While considering the constitutional validity of the said executive order the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the nature of our Constitution thus, “Our Constitution, though federal in its structure, is modelled on the British Parliamentary system where the executive is deemed to have the primary responsibility for the formulation of governmental policy and its transmission into law though the condition precedent to the exercise of this responsibility is its retaining the confidence of the legislative branch of the State. The executive function comprises both the determination of the policy as well as carrying it into execution. This evidently includes the initiation of legislation, the maintenance of order, the promotion of social and economic welfare, the direction of foreign policy, in fact the carrying on or supervision of the general administration of the State.” 8. In the matter of Afjal Imam v. State of Bihar and other (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the constitutional validity of Section 7 of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007. In paragraph 48 of the judgment the Hon’ble Court has discussed the concept of executive power and Article 14. The Hon’ble Court has followed the aforesaid judgment in the matter of Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and others v. The State of Punjab (supra) to hold that, “the executive function comprises both the determination of policy as well as carrying it into execution”. 9. The Hon’ble Court has followed the aforesaid judgment in the matter of Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and others v. The State of Punjab (supra) to hold that, “the executive function comprises both the determination of policy as well as carrying it into execution”. 9. In the matter of Sardar Sarup Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the constitutional validity of Section 148-B of the Punjab Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 inserted by the amending Act of 1959 observed, “… … this Court cannot be called to embark on an enquiry into public policy or investigate into questions of political wisdom or even to pronounce upon motives of the legislature in enacting a law which it is otherwise competent to make.” 10. We have considered the extensive arguments advanced by Mr. Mangalam. We do agree with the learned Additional Advocate General-1 Mr. Lalit Kishore that the impugned proviso does not in any manner contravene any of the provisions of the Constitution much less Article 243-P(e) of the Constitution. 11. We see no substance in the challenge to the constitutional validity of the impugned proviso. The challenge is rejected. 12. Writ petition is dismissed in limine.