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2011 DIGILAW 1729 (RAJ)

Mumtaj Khan Munsi v. Aslam

2011-08-16

SANDEEP MEHTA

body2011
Hon'ble MEHTA, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioners by way of this misc. petition are seeking quashing of the F.I.R. No. 361/2005 of the Police Station, Nagaur for the offences under Sections 143, 447, 336 and 323 I.P.C. 3. Briefly stated facts of the case are that the complainant/respondent Mohd. Aslam lodged a report at the Police Station, Nagaur alleging inter alia that on 27.8.2005, he after taking police aid went to repair and clean the house and land allegedly owned by his father located near Sindhalon-ki-Masjid. When the labourers started to remove stones from the land, Munmtaz Khan (petitioner/accused) along with other accused named in the F.I.R. started throwing stones on the members of the complainant party from the roof of his house. The police personnel and the complainant took shelter to save themselves from the stone pelting. After that, the accused party entered into the land owned by the complainant. When resistance was given to the illegal entries of the accused, Mumtaz and Dildar gave beating to Mohd. Asfaque, brother of the complainant. The neighbourers and the complainant intervened on which the accused threatened them of more beating. The aforementioned report of this incident which took place in the afternoon was lodged by the complainant by way of written report at the Police Station, Nagaur on 27.8.2005 at 8.00 p.m. On this, F.I.R. No. 361/2005 was registered and investi-gation commenced against the accused for the aforementioned offences. 4. The accused persons have approached this Court for quashing of the impugned F.I.R. by way of this misc. petition on the ground that the same is motivated with malafides and also on the ground that the proceedings were instigated by the police officers themselves. 5. Pressing for quashing of the impugned F.I.R., learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the respondent No.2 Sabir Hussain in the brother of the complainant Mohd. Alsam and is a clerk posted in the office of Superintendent of Police, Nagaur for the last 15 years and the whole action in this case was aided and abetted by the police at Sabir Hussain's instance wherein the police officers of the police station, Nagaur convicted with the complainant party in an attempt to dispossess the petitioners from their lawful owned property. Certain documents have been produced along with this petition to canvass the fact that the police officers of police station, Nagaur accompanied the complainant party in order to dispossess the petitioners from the property and as such, the whole of the F.I.R. registered against the petitioners was nothing but a tool of oppression intended to abuse the powers of police for taking illegal action of dispossession of the petitioners. The petitioners have arrayed the S.P., Dy. S.P., S.H.O., Police Station, Nagaur, by name as respondents No.3 to 5. Reliance in support of the arguments have been placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 and it has been submitted that if the criminal proceedings are actuated with malice and where the allegations made in the F.I.R. are absurd, then the High Court can exercise its powers to quash the investigation as well. 6. When the petition came up for consideration before this Court, this Court by order dated 18.4.2006 ordered as below : "It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that he is in possession of the disputed land under a sale deed in his favour. It is further contended that the complainant party has no title over the said land and the non-petitioner No.2 is a force clerk in the office of Supdt. of Police, Nagaur, therefore at the behest of non-petitioner No.2, the police officials viz. Vishna Ram Bishnoi, Dy. S.P., Nagaur and Veer Singh, SHO, Nagaur came on the spot to dispossess the petitioner. There is no power left with the police to dispossess a person like the petitioner and to give any possession to the complainant without any legal authority. Though, they came on the spot and tried to dispossess the petitioner. It is further submitted that he has also challenged the FIR No.361/2005 P.S. Nagaur and made a prayer for investigation by the C.B.I. Issue notices to the non-petitioners. Notices are made returnable within a period of two weeks. Mr. Ashok Upadhyay, learned Public Prosecutor accepts notice on behalf of the State, therefore notice need not be issued to State. Let a copy of this petition be supplied to learned Public Prosecutor. The non-petitioner Nos. Notices are made returnable within a period of two weeks. Mr. Ashok Upadhyay, learned Public Prosecutor accepts notice on behalf of the State, therefore notice need not be issued to State. Let a copy of this petition be supplied to learned Public Prosecutor. The non-petitioner Nos. 4 and 5 are directed to explain as to under what authority of law, they went on the spot for dispossessing the petitioner. List after two weeks." 7. In pursuance to the order issued by this Court on 18.4.2006, an explanation was furnished by the respondents No.5 and 5. In the explanation, the respondents No.4 and 5 have admitted that the father of the respondent No.1 submitted an application to the Dy. S.P., Nagaur on 26.8.2005 for being provided police protection. On this, the Dy. S.P. directed S.H.O., Kotwali, Nagaur to provide protection to the respondents' father and thereupon, the officers of the police station, Nagaur accompanied the members of the complainant party for providing them aid in regards to the plot of Mumtaz Khan S/o Akbar Khan. Rojnamcha entry was made regarding the departure of the police party wherein as many as nine constables, one sub-inspector and one assistant sub-inspector accompanied the complainant party towards the plot in question. This rojnamcha entry No.1159 has been entered in the rojnamcha of police station, Nagaur at 11.15 a.m. The entry reads as below : RR No. oä fnukad etewu fjiksVZ [kqyklk fjiksVZ vkns'k RR No. 1159 oä 11-15 a.m. fn- 27-8-05 bl le; SI jke/ku] jkenso ASI, FC lqjs'kpUn 656] eks- jkehe 130] cLrhjke 171] Hkojflag 1061] jktkjke] Qrsgjke] edcwy [kk] rstkjke 1023] jkeLo:i FC 630 ds eqrkfcd funsZ'k Jheku~ CO lk- ds lfdZy gktk ds okLrs djus benkn vtesjh xsV flUnyks dh efLtn ds ikl IykV Jh eqerkt [kka S/o vdcj [kka ds jokuk fd;k liV vafdr dh xbZA jokuxh SI e; tkIrk funsZ'k CO lk- Thereafter the police party returned back and an entry regarding the same has also been made. The entry No.1165 reads as follows : RR No. oä fnukad etewu fjiksVZ [kqyklk fjiksVZ vkns'k RR No. 1159 oä 3-15 AM fn- 27-8-05 bl le; RRN1159 dk SI jke/ku e; tkIrk ds benkn fM;wVh gsrq x;k gqvk gkftj vk;k gkykr bl izdkj ls gS fd ekSds ij oknh o izfroknh equqlh eqerkt ds vkil esa xekZ xehZ gksus ij le>kb'k dj ds gkftj Fkkuk vk;s gkykr SHO lkgc] Jheku~~ CO lk- dks vken SI e; tkIrk It is noteworthy to mention here that in the rojnamcha entry No. 1165 registered at 3.15 p.m. all that has been mentioned is that on the spot, there were some heated exchange of words between Munsi Mumtaz and com-plainant. There is no mention of stone throwing or injuries being caused etc. 8. The respondent No.1/complainant has also filed a reply to the petition and in the reply, it has been pleaded that the plot in question was not that of the accused. It has further been submitted that the sale deed by virtue of which the accused claimed possession and title was a forged sale deed and it was the complainant who was holding the title of the plot in question. The factum regarding the request for the police aid and the same being provided to the complainant is admitted. 9. As regards the merits of the petition, it has been submitted in both the replies that the document by virtue thereof, the accused petitioners were claiming possession was a forged document and thus, the accused did not have any right or title over the property in question. 10. Shri G.R. Punia, AAG and Sr. Adv. appearing on behalf of the State and Shri Mahaveer Bishnoi appearing on behalf of the complainant have submitted that in this case, the impugned F.I.R. discloses the commission of a cognizable offence and as such, the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised for the purpose of quashing of the F.I.R. Reliance has been placed on a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra & Ors. vs. Arun Gulab Gawali & Ors. reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6462 and a judgment of this Court in the case of Gulam Farid vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. reported in 2004(1) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 706. 11. vs. Arun Gulab Gawali & Ors. reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6462 and a judgment of this Court in the case of Gulam Farid vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. reported in 2004(1) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 706. 11. I have heard the arguments advanced at bar and have perused the impugned F.I.R., documents attached with the misc. petition, replies submitted by the respondents along with the documents attached thereto and the case diary of the case. 12. At the outset, it may be observed that in this case the allegations of the petitioners regarding the action of the police being mala fide used at the instance of the respondent No.2 who is working in the S.P. Office, Nagaur has not been disputed, though a specific allegation was made in this regard in the misc. petition. It is in that background that the petition for quashing of the F.I.R. has to be considered. 13. It may be mentioned here that the allegation made in the petition regarding the whole action of the police being under the influence of Shabir Hussain, respondent No.2, has not been denied either in the submissions on behalf of the respondent No.1/complainant or in the reply submitted on behalf of the respondents No.3 and 5. Thus, the averments made in the petition regarding the whole police action being initiated at the instance of Shabir Hussain virtually stands admitted. 14. The situation as has been revealed from the F.I.R. and the documents filed with the reply which can said to be admitted documents because reliance thereon has been placed by the complainant as well as investigating agency, is that admittedly, there was a dispute regarding possession of the property between the complainant and the accused petitioners. The complainant was apprehending resistance if he went to the property unaided. The highest case of the prosecution is that the accused petitioners were trespassers on the property in question and since the complainant apprehended resistance, he took aid of the police assembly for the purpose of dispossessing the accused. 15 . At this juncture, certain provisions of law need to be taken into account. Whenever there arises a dispute about the consideration of a right to defend oneself or ones property, then the right can be extended only if it is shown that the person who claims the right exercises the same in a bona fide fashion or not. 15 . At this juncture, certain provisions of law need to be taken into account. Whenever there arises a dispute about the consideration of a right to defend oneself or ones property, then the right can be extended only if it is shown that the person who claims the right exercises the same in a bona fide fashion or not. If it is revealed that the person claiming right had the time to take recourse to the public authorities, then any violence committed in exercise of the purported right without taking recourse to the authorities as mentioned above, would be an offence and could not be said to be covered by the right to private defence. The law is also well settled that even a trespasser cannot be dispossessed from the property in which he has trespassed except in accordance with law and by use of force. Reference in this regard may be head to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Munshi Ram & Ors. vs. State of Delhi reported in AIR 1968 SC 702 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under : "14. It is true that no one including the true owner has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is evicted in due course of law he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. But stray or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be a settled possession extending over a sufficiently long period and acquiesced in by the true owner. A casual act of possession would not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. The rightful owner may re-enter and reinstate himself provided he does not use more force than necessary. Such entry will be viewed only as a resistance to an intrusion upon possession which has never been lost. The persons in possession by a stray act of trespass, a possession which has not matured into settled possession, constitute an unlawful assembly, giving right to the true owner, though not in actual possession at the time to remove the obstruction even by using necessary force. 17. The persons in possession by a stray act of trespass, a possession which has not matured into settled possession, constitute an unlawful assembly, giving right to the true owner, though not in actual possession at the time to remove the obstruction even by using necessary force. 17. The law relating to defence of property is set out in Sec. 97, I.P.C., which says that every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in Section 99, to defend -First his own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body: Secondly.-the property whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass. Section 99 of the Code lays down that there is no right of private defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities. It further lays down that the right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence. 18...............Law does not require a person whose property is forcibly tried to be occupied by trespassers to run away and seek the protection of the authorities. The right of private defence serves a social purpose and that right should be liberally construed. Such a right not only will be a restraining influence on bad characters but it will encourage the right spirit in a free citizen. There is nothing more degrading to the human spirit than to run away in the face of peril." 16. The law is also well settled that the police has no powers to dispossess a person from his property except when acting under direction issued under Section 145/146(1) Cr.P.C. and where a valid order of dispossession/appointment of receiver has been made by the competent executive Magistrate. The power to dispossession/appointment of receiver has been made by the competent executive Magistrate. The law is also well settled that the police has no powers to dispossess a person from his property except when acting under direction issued under Section 145/146(1) Cr.P.C. and where a valid order of dispossession/appointment of receiver has been made by the competent executive Magistrate. The power to dispossession/appointment of receiver has been made by the competent executive Magistrate. The power to dispossess a person from immovable property can only be exercised by the police under the directions of a Court's order, may be it under the civil law or under the provisions of Sec. 145/146(1) or under Section 456 Cr.P.C. This Court had an occasion to consider the legal situation regarding powers of the police to take possession of the immovable properties in the case of Amrit Lal Kumawat & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. reported in 1998 Cr.L.J. 3032 = RLW 1998(2) Raj. 975, wherein it has been observed as below :- "11. So far as the right of the police to take property in its custody is concerned, section 102 of the Criminal Procedure code empowers the police officer to seize certain properties. Sub-section (1) of Section 102 provides that any splice officer may seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence. Sub-section (2) of Section 102 provides that such police officer, if subordinate to the officer in charge of a police station, shall forthwith report the seizure to that officer. Sub-section (3) of Section 102 provides that every police officer acting under sub-section (1) shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction and where the property seized is such as it cannot be conveniently transported to the Court, he may give custody thereof to any person on his executing a bond undertaking to produce the property before the Court as and when required and to give effect to the further orders of the Court as to the disposal of the same. 12. On a careful reading of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code; it is difficult to hold that this section empowers a police officer to seize immovable property like plots of land, residential houses, mountains, rivers streets or similar properties. There are several reasons for arriving at the aforesaid conclusion. 12. On a careful reading of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code; it is difficult to hold that this section empowers a police officer to seize immovable property like plots of land, residential houses, mountains, rivers streets or similar properties. There are several reasons for arriving at the aforesaid conclusion. The first is that no useful purpose is going to be served by the seizure of the immovable property of the above kind so far as the object of investigation is concerned; Therefore, it cannot be inferred that for the purpose of facilitating investigation, inquiry or trial seizure of immovable property of above kind is permissible. So far as the title to immovable property is concerned it is the competent civil court or revenue Court which is empowered by law to adjudicate the disputed questions relating to title. The investigation by the police has nothing to do with the disputes relating to title to any immovable property. So far as the possession of immovable property is concerned, in case of dispute, the Executive Magistrate may take appropriate action under Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code; if the conditions laid down for exercise of power under Section 146(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code are satisfied. The Executive Magistrate may attach the disputed property subject to the provisions of that section seizure by the police of immovable properties, even if there is a dispute about the possession thereof, cannot be inferred in view of the provisions of Section 145 and 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The rule that if there are special provisions in the statute to deal with a certain matter then the general provisions do not apply to that matter, is applicable in the case. Therefore, even if there are disputes about immovable property and attachment of the property is necessary for preventing the breach, of peace it is the Executive Magistrate who is specialty empowered under Section 145 and 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code to pass suitable orders for attachment. The power of police to seize immovable property, in cases in which there is a dispute about the possession cannot, therefore, be inferred from provisions of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 13. Immovable property cannot be stolen because it is incapable of being removed from the possession of any, person. The power of police to seize immovable property, in cases in which there is a dispute about the possession cannot, therefore, be inferred from provisions of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 13. Immovable property cannot be stolen because it is incapable of being removed from the possession of any, person. Even in those cases where a person who was in possession of immovable property has been deprived of his possession by a trespasser and it is considered necessary to restore possession of the property to the complainant, it is Section 456 of the Criminal Procedure Code which gives a limited jurisdiction to the Court in which the trial is conducted. Sub-section (1) of Section 456 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that when a person is convicted of an offence attended by criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation and if appears to the Court that, by such force, or show of force or intimidation, any person has been dispossessed of any immovable property, the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that possession f the same be restored to that person after evicting by force, if necessary, any person who may be in possession of the property. The proviso given in sub-section (1) of Section 456 provides that no such order shall be made by the Court more than one month shall be made by the Court more than one month after the date of the conviction. Sub-section (2) of Section 456 provides that where the Court trying the offence has not made an order under sub-section (1), the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision may, if it thinks fit, make such order while disposing of the appeal, reference or revision, as the case may be; and, Sub-section (3) of Section 456 provides that where an order has been made under sub-section (1), the provisions of Section 454 shall apply in relation thereto as they apply in relation to an order under Section 453. The cases in which a person has been deprived of the possession of his immovable property by sue of force or show of force or by intimidation are covered by Section 456 of the Criminal Procedure Code and, in such cases, the jurisdiction to restore possession is vested in the Court which tried and convicted the accused or in the Court of appeal or revision and the aforesaid jurisdiction can be exercised only in the even of the conviction on the offender. There is no mention in Section 456 of the criminal Procedure code about the seizure of the property under Section 102 or about the passing of order by Court under Section 451 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is, therefore, proper to infer that the legislature does not contemplate that the property in respect of which the trial Court, appellate Court, or revisional Court may pass an order of restoration of property under Section 456 of the Criminal Procedure Code, may be seized by the police during investigation or may be dealt with by the Magistral under Section 451 of the Criminal Procedure code. If the legislature had intended that such property should be seized by the police officer there was nothing to prevent the legislature from indicating in Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code that immovable property can also be seized by the police officer. If the legislature had intended that a Magistrate would be competent under Section 451 to pas orders regarding the immovable property the legislature would not have required the production of the property in the court because immovable property is incapable of being produced in the court and, in any case, in Section 456 of the Criminal Procedure Code the legislature must have referred to the seizure of the property by the police under Section 102 and the orders passed by the legislature under Section 451 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 14. For reasons mentioned above, I am of the opinion that immovable property like lands, houses, mountains, rivers, roads and streets and similar properties cannot be seized by a police officer under Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code nor the Magistrate can pass any order under Section 451, Cr.P.C. in respect of such properties. 14. For reasons mentioned above, I am of the opinion that immovable property like lands, houses, mountains, rivers, roads and streets and similar properties cannot be seized by a police officer under Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code nor the Magistrate can pass any order under Section 451, Cr.P.C. in respect of such properties. If there is a dispute regarding the title to any immovable property it is the competent civil Court which alone can exercise jurisdiction by adjudicating disputed question of title. If a person has been deprived of the possession of immovable property, generally it is the civil Court which alone has the jurisdiction to restore the possession to the person entitled thereto. An exception to the general rule is laid down in Section 456 of the Criminal Procedure Code which provides that when a person is convicted of an offence attended; by criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation and it appears to the Court that sucre force or show of force or intimidation, any person has been dispossessed of any immovable property, the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that the possession of the same be restored to that person. The power, under Section 156 may be exercised by the trial Court, appellate Court, or the revisional Court. The power conferred by Section 456 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be exercised during the period the investigation, inquiry, of trial is in progress. This power can be exercised after the conclusion of the trial and only in those cases in which the court convicts the accused and the offence alleged is an offence attended by criminal force, show of force, or criminal intimidation in dispossession and dispossession by criminal force, show of force or intimidation is proved beyond reasonable doubt. If there are disputes about the possession over any immovable property and there is an apprehension of breach of peace, the proceedings may be instituted in the Court of the Executive Magistrate under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code and order of attachment maybe passed by the Executive Magistrate under sub-section (1) of Section 146 of the Criminal Procedure code if the conditions laid down in that section are satisfied. The police investigating the case does not appear to be entitled to seize the immovable properties of the above-mentioned description in exercise of the powers under Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code nor the Magistrate appears to be empowered under Section 451 of the Criminal Procedure Code to make any order regarding the immovable properties of the above-mentioned description." 17. In view of the above legal situation, if the case at hand is viewed, then it becomes apparent that the complainant party was apprehending some trouble from the accused if they went to the property unaided. The recourse to which the complainant party adopted by taking the aid of police was not a legal act because the police had no right or power to interfere in the possession/enjoyment of the property even of a trespasser. 18. The police had gone to the spot under the influence of the respondent No.2 who is himself a police employee and lastly but not the least, the rojnamcha entry No. 1165 clearly discloses that only hot headed talks took place between the parties in the incident. Now the question would be whether these rojnamcha entries could be utilized for the purpose of stifling the prosecution of the accused on the strength of the impugned F.I.R. in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Arun Gulab Gawali (supra). The Hon'ble Apex court had the occasion to consider this situation in a recent decision in the case of Harshendra Kumar D. vs. Rebatilata Koley etc. reported in 2011 Cri.L.J. 1626 = 2011(2) RLW 1724 (SC), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held : "20. In Awadh Kishore Gupta ( AIR 2004 SC 517 ), this Court while dealing with the scope of power under Section 482 of the Code observed : "13. It is to be noted that the investigation was not completed and at that stage it was impermissible for the High Court to look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it was a trial Judge...." "21. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it was a trial Judge...." "21. In our judgment, that above observations cannot be read to mean that in a criminal case where the trial is yet to take place and the matter is at the stage of issuance of summons or taking cognizance, materials relied upon by the accused which are in the nature of public documents or the materials which are beyond suspicion or doubt, in no circumstance, can be looked into by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 or for that matter in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. It is fairly settled now that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 or revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code in a case where complaint is sought to be quashed, it is not proper for the High Court to consider the defence of the accused or embark upon an enquiry in respect of merits of the accusations. However, in an appropriate case, if on the face of the documents - which are beyond suspicion or doubt - placed by accused, the accusations against him cannot stand, it would be travesty of justice if accused is relegated to trial and he is asked to prove his defence before the trial Court. In such a matter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the matter at prima facie stage." 19. While exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the F.I.R., the documents which are undisputed documents/public documents, a bare reading whereof would lead to a conclusion that the prosecution against the petitioners was clearly covered by the grounds for quashing the F.I.R. or criminal prosecution as set out in Bhajan Lal's case (supra), then such documents can be and have to be relied so that abuse of process may be prevented. 20. In view of the above legal situation, if the facts of the present case are tested, it is seen that the case of the complainant is that he had gone to the plot in question with labourers for the purposes of removing of stones of a house alleged to have been purchased by him. 20. In view of the above legal situation, if the facts of the present case are tested, it is seen that the case of the complainant is that he had gone to the plot in question with labourers for the purposes of removing of stones of a house alleged to have been purchased by him. It is admitted position that the complainant apprehended that the accused would resist the act of the complainant and, therefore, the complainant took the aid of the police which was by no means legal. If at all the complainant had any cause by virtue whereof he wanted to unsettle the possession of the accused, then he should have taken recourse to the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. or he should have filed a civil suit seeking possession of the property. He did neither and instead took the law into his owns hands and went to dispossess the accused with the illegal help of the police and if in that process, the accused resisted and some minor injuries were caused in the process of resistance, the act of the accused would not be an offence covered by any of the allegations made in the F.I.R. That apart, as has already been stated above, the F.I.R. by itself is noting but a bundle of lies. The F.I.R. has been registered at 8.00 p.m. The rojnamcha entry No. 1165 was already entered into the rojnamcha of the police station, Nagaur at 3.15 p.m. and they only detail of the incident which is given in the said entry is the hot talks between the parties. Thus, it can very well be concluded that no such incident as alleged in the F.I.R. took place and the F.I.R. is a result of mala fide exercise of powers of the Police Officers in connivance with the complaint and his brother, respondent No.2 Sabir Hussain, who is a force clerk in the S.P. Office, Nagaur and as such, the impugned F.I.R. cannot stand to scrutiny in view of the mandate as issued in Bhajanlal's case referred to supra. 21. The upshot of the above discussion is the present misc. petition is allowed. The impugned F.I.R. No. 361/2005 and all proceedings taken pursuant to the impugned F.I.R. against the petitioners are quashed. 22. Stay petition also stands disposed of.