1. Petitioners exercised their right of prior purchase under the Right of Prior Purchase Act, 1993 (for short "Act of 1993") in respect of land measuring two kanals covered by Survey No. 361/124 situated at Baghat Kanipura, Tehsil Chadoora, District Budgam by instituting a civil original suit against respondents 2 and 3 as the sale deed thereof was executed on 21-02-2005. The suit was instituted in the court of learned Principal District Judge, Budgam (for short "trial court"). Learned trial court vide its judgment dated 04-10-2006 passed an ex-parte decree in favour of petitioners and against respondents 2 & 3. In terms of decree, plaintiffs were held as vendees in the sale deed with further directions to respondent No. 2 to deliver possession of suit land to the petitioners. The execution petition was filed by the petitioners before trial court on 7th of June, 2008, seeking execution of the afore­mentioned decree passed by the trial court in their favour. Executing court passed an order on 10th of June, 2008 in the execution petition and directed the Nazir of the court to go on spot and deliver the possession of the suit scheduled immovable property to the decree holder. The Nazir was further directed to submit compliance report by next date. The decree could not be executed as respondent No. 1 ob­structed the execution of the decree and delivery of the possession. Petitioners filed an application before the executing-court on 12 of July, 2008 alleging therein that respondent No. 1 caused obstruction in the execution of the decree and request was made for proceeding in the matter in accordance with the mandate contained in order XXI Rule 97 of Code of Civil Procedure as also under other enabling provis­ions of Code of Civil Procedure (for short "Code"). Respondent No. 1 instituted Civil Original Suit for declaration and injunction before the trial court against the petitioners and defendants in the earlier suit instituted by the petitioners. The suit was instituted on the ground that respondent No. 1 is bonafide purchaser of the suit property which is subject matter of execution and he being not party in the earlier suit and decree, having been obtained in ex-parte and by practicing fraud, is not binding on him. Along with the suit, an application was also filed by respondent No. 1 seeking ad-interim injunction against the defendants which includes petition­ers as well. Along with the suit, an application was also filed by respondent No. 1 seeking ad-interim injunction against the defendants which includes petition­ers as well. Learned trial Judge vide order dated 2nd of July, 2008 passed an ex-parte interim order directing the Nazir of the court to stop further proceedings, which were initiated in the execution petition filed by the petitioners in terms of order dated 10th of June, 2008. 2. Petitioners filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code before the trial court and prayed for rejection of the plaint and dismissal of the suit instituted by respondent No. 1 against petitioners and respondents 2 and 3. Learned trial court after hearing the parties dismissed the aforementioned application vide its order dated 7th of September, 2009, thus holding the suit to be competent and the plaint not liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. Petitioners, being aggrieved of the said order, have challenged the same in this revision petition. 3. The court vide order dated 28th of February, 2011, after observing that respondents 2 and 3 despite service have not appeared, initiated ex-parte proceed­ings against them. The court also observed that the issue involved in this case is between petitioners and respondents No. 1 and directed listing of the case on 8th of March, 2011. The case was heard on 23rd of March, 2011. 4. Mr. Kuchay, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the suit instituted by respondent No. 1 is not competent and maintainable in view of mandate contained in order XXI Rule 101 of the Code. Learned counsel submitted that when an application was filed by the petitioners under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code, all the issues which could arise between the petitioners and respondent No. 1 were to be decided in accordance with the mandate contained in Rule 101 of Order XXI of Code and suit for same reliefs could not be instituted by respondent No. 1. Learned counsel in support of his contention referred to and relied upon cases titled Nooruddin v. Drf. K. L. Anand, reported in (1995) 1SCC 242; Smt. Usha Jain and ors. v. Manmohan Bajaj and ors., reported in AIR 1980 Madha Pradesh 146 (Full Bench) and Fathima Automobiles v. P. K. P. Nair and another reported in AIR 1985 Madras 318. 5. Mr. K. L. Anand, reported in (1995) 1SCC 242; Smt. Usha Jain and ors. v. Manmohan Bajaj and ors., reported in AIR 1980 Madha Pradesh 146 (Full Bench) and Fathima Automobiles v. P. K. P. Nair and another reported in AIR 1985 Madras 318. 5. Mr. J. Iqbal, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 submitted that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, suit for declaration and injunc­tion instituted by respondent No. 1, who is bonafide purchaser of the property, is maintainable. Learned counsel submitted that as respondent No. 1 was not party in the earlier suit which has been decreed in favour of the petitioners and which decree has been passed in ex-parte, the same will not bind him. Learned counsel submitted that the land has been purchased by respondent No. 1 after the decree was passed in the earlier suit though he was not having the knowledge of the same. Learned counsel submitted that the suit has been instituted by respondent No. 1 on 2nd of July, 2008, whereas application under Order XXI Rule 97 has been filed thereafter by the petitioners. Learned counsel accordingly submitted that the suit instituted by respondent No. 1 is competent and maintainable in law and the order impugned in this petition does not call for any interference. Learned counsel in support of his contention referred to and relied upon cases titled Tazmul Ali and ors. v. Md. Ulairaja, reported in AIR 1978 Gauhati 56 Full Bench; Bhagwat Narayan Dwivedi v. Kasturi D/o Ramdayal A. N. M., Civil Dispensary, Morena reported in AIR 1974 Madhya Pradesh 26; Shyam lal Bhat v. Ahmad Bhat and other reported in AIR 1957 J&K 23 and Golam Nabi Chapawala v. F. W. Ncedham and ors., reported in AIR 1925 Calcutta 1243. 6. Before proceeding with the matter, it may be placed on record that after the case was heard learned counsel for respondent No. 1 filed an application to place on record Xerox copy of order passed by the trial court on 2nd of July, 2008 passed in the suit which was instituted by respondent No. 1 and verified true copy of the application under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code filed by the petitioner before the executing court on 12th July, 2008. In the application it is stated that suit instituted by respondent No. 1 is maintainable under Order XXI Rule 104 of the Code. The application along with copies of the order has been taken on record. 7. In order to appreciate the controversy raised in its correct and proper legal perspective, Order XXI Rules 35,97 to 104 are reproduced as under: 35. Decree for immovable property (1) Where a decree is for the delivery of any immovable property, posses­sion thereof shall be delivered to the party to whom it has been adjudged, or to such person as he may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf, and, if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the property. (2) Where a decree is for the joint possession of immovable property, such possession shall be delivered by affixing a copy of the warrant in some conspicuous place on the property and proclaiming by beat of drum, or other customary mode, at some convenient place, the substance of the decree. (3) Where possession of any building or enclosure is to be delivered and the person in possession, being bound by the decree, does not afford free access, the Court through its officers, may after giving reasonable warning and facility to any woman not appearing in public according to the customs of the Country to withdraw, remove or open any lock or bolt or break open any door or do any other act necessary for putting the decree-holder in possession.' "97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property. (1) Where the holder of the decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the prop­erty, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resis­tance or obstruction. (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provis­ions herein contained. 98. (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provis­ions herein contained. 98. Order after adjudication (I) Upon the determination of the questions referred to in rule 101, the Court shall, in accordance with such determination and subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2)- (a) make an order allowing the application and directing that the applicant be put into the possession of the property or dismissing the application; or (b) pass such other order as in the circumstances of the case, it may deem fit. (2) Where, upon such determination, the Court is satisfied that the resis­tance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judg­ment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf, or by a transferee, where such transfer was made during the pendency of the suit or execution proceeding, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property, and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the Court may also, at the instance of the applicant, order the judgment-debtor, or any person acting at his instigation or on his behalf to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days. 99. Dispossession by decree-holder or purchaser (1) where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder, of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court com­plaining of such dispossession. (2) Where any such application is made, the Court shall proceed to adjudic­ate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein con­tained. 100. Order to be passed upon application complaining of dispossession. Upon the determination of the question referred to in rule 101, the Court shall, in accordance with such determination,- (a) make an order allowing the application and directing that the applicant be put into the possession of the property or dismissing the application; or (b) Pass such other order as, in the circumstances of the case, it may deem fit. 201. 201. Questions to be determined All questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force be deemed to have jurisdiction to decided such questions. 102. Rules not applicable to transferee pendent lite Nothing in rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the insti­tution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person. 103. Orders to be treated as decrees Where any application has been adjudicated upon under rule 98 or rule 100, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. 104. Order under rule 101 or rule 103 to be subject to the result of pending suit. Every order made under rule 101 or rule 103 shall be subject to the result of any suit that may be pending on the date of commencement of the proceeding in which such order is made, if in such suit the party against whom the order under rule 101 or rule 103 is made has sought to establish a right which he claims to the present possession of the property." These provisions have been substituted in terms of Section 66 of Act XI of 1983 with effect from 15th of August, 1983 in the Code. 8. The provisions of law which were on the Statute Book prior to Act of 1983 are reproduced as under: "97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property (1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the prop­erty, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resis­tance or obstruction. (2) the Court shall fix a day for investigating the matter and shall summon the party against whom the application is made to appear and answer the same. 98. Resistance or obstruction by judgment debtor Where the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occa­sioned without any just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property, and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the Court may also, at the instance of the applicant, order the judgment-debtor, or any person acting at his instigation, to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days. 99. Resistance or obstruction by bona fide claimant Where the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occa­sioned by any person (other than the judgment-debtor) claiming in good faith to be in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment debtor, the Court shall make an order dismissing the application. 100. Dispossession decree-holder purchasers (1) Where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court com­plaining of such dispossession. (2) The Court shall fix a day for investigating the matter and shall summon the party against whom the application is made to appear and answer the same. 101. Bonafide claimant to be restored to possession. Where the Court is satisfied that the applicant was in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property. 102. Rules not applicable to transferee lite pendente. Nothing in rules 99 and 101 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the insti­tution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person. 103. Orders conclusive subject to regular suit. 103. Orders conclusive subject to regular suit. Any party not being a judgment-debtor against whom an order is made under rule 98, rule 99 or rule 101 may institute a suit to establish the right which he claims to the present possession of the property; but, subject to the result of such suit (if any), the order shall be conclusive." 9. A comparative, close and in-depth perusal of the provisions of the Code before and after the Act of XI of 1983 brings forth a drastic change that has been brought by the Legislature in the aforementioned provisions of the Code. The Civil Suit for variety of reasons takes time for being concluded and from being brought to the logical conclusion. Years are spent by the parties in the Court precincts to seek adjudication of their rights instituted in the civil court. In an honest attempt to shorten the litigations and to enable the litigating parties to enjoy the fruits of bonafide litigation within a short span of time, the Legislature in their wisdom have made many changes in the Code of Civil Procedure which is a procedural law. 10. Procedural laws are meant for the Court to arrive at a just and lawful conclusion while adjudicating upon substantive rights of the people. The proce­dural laws provide a mechanism to the adjudicating authorities to be fair, transpar­ent and impartial, while considering and deciding the substantive rights of the people. The procedural laws are, thus, means to administer justice to the parties, who invoke the jurisdiction of the Court for getting their dispute settled and rights adjudicated upon. The Court of law cannot and should not allow any litigating party to use the procedural laws to circumvent the Court's jurisdiction and power to decide the lis brought before it. The disputes brought before the Court for their resolution are required to be settled within a reasonable time. As the procedural laws are in essence remedial laws, inasmuch as, they provide for a remedy to a litigating party, this remedial right is to be exercised bonafidely. On the experience of the Courts, the legislature found that the procedural laws in certain cases are causing immense hardships to one or other litigating party and accordingly sub­jected the procedural laws to major changes. 11. On the experience of the Courts, the legislature found that the procedural laws in certain cases are causing immense hardships to one or other litigating party and accordingly sub­jected the procedural laws to major changes. 11. A decree passed by the Court of law, unless challenged in accordance with law, is to be enthused with life by translating it into reality instead of allowing it to remain paper tiger alone. If the decree of the Court was to be executed and implemented in terms of un-amended provisions of Code the same could be resisted through many modes which were provided by Code and one such mode was by instituting a civil original suit. In order to ensure that a decree passed by the Court which has attained finality is executed, the legislature has now provided complete and comprehensive procedure for its execution and if the same is resisted on the grounds relating to right, title or interest in the property which is subject matter of execution between the parties to a proceeding or their representative on an appli­cation filed under Rules 97 and 99, same is to be determined by the Court in terms of Rule 101 and not by separate suit. The Rule 101 which authorizes the executing Court to decided the questions relating to right, title or interest in the property, if upon adjudication of these questions which are to be determined summarily, comes to a conclusion that resistance or obstructions was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf, or by a transferee, where such transfer was made during the pendency of the suit or execution proceedings, executing court shall direct the applicant to be put in the possession of the property and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the Court may also, at the instance of the applicant, order the judgment-debtor or any person acting at his instigation or on his behalf to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty day. Every order made under Rule 101 or Rule 103 has to be subject to the result of any suit that may be pending on the commencement of the proceedings in which such order is made, as provided under Rule 104, if in such suit the party against whom the order under rule 101 or rule 103 is made has sought to establish a right which he claims to the present possession of the property. 12. In the scheme of the Order XXI Rule 97 to 104 what is logically deduced is that when an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 is made and question relating to right, title or interest in the property are raised, then these questions are to be determined by the executing Court and not by separate suit. Upon determination of such questions order under Rule 98 and/or Rule 100 as the case may be, are to be passed by the executing Court. If the questions determined under Rule 101 provide for allowing of application filed under Rule 97 the executing Court is duty bound to pass orders under Rule 98 for putting the applicant into possession of the property and this order has not to be passed only against judgment-debtor who has caused resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree but even against some other persons who acts at the instance or on behalf of judgment-debtor and such order can be passed even against a transferee who resists the execution of decree where such transfer was made during the pendency of the suit or execution proceedings. The executing Court has thus jurisdictional power to put into possession the decree holder when he files application under Rule 97 and such order as stated herein above in view of the mandate contained in Rule 98 can be passed even against transferee. 13. In this case, order was passed by the executing court on 10.06.2008 directing the Nazir of the Court to hand over the possession of the suit property to the petitioners. Petitioners filed an application on 12.07.2008 in terms of Rule 97. That application is pending on the files of the executing Court. The suit for declaration and injunction has been instituted by respondent No. 1 on 02.07.2008. Petitioners filed an application on 12.07.2008 in terms of Rule 97. That application is pending on the files of the executing Court. The suit for declaration and injunction has been instituted by respondent No. 1 on 02.07.2008. The pendency of the suit would not prevent the executing court to consider the application of the petitioners filed under Rule 97 of the Order XXI of the Code. The executing Court is duty bound to determine the questions referred to in the Rule 101, when raised by the parties. The pendency of the suit instituted by respondent No. 1 will neither oust the jurisdiction of the executing court nor debar it to put the petitioners into possession of the suit property in accordance with law. The purpose of substituting the Rules 97 to 104 in terms of Act of XI of 1983 would be defeated and executing court would fail to exercise its jurisdiction to summarily decide the questions if raised in terms of Rule 101, if it relegates the parties to a suit. The Rule 101 is specific by providing that questions referred to therein if raised, are to be determined by the executing court summarily and these questions cannot be determined by separate suit and executing court by virtue of said Rule is possessed of jurisdiction to decide such questions. In terms of Rule 104 every order made under Rule 101 or Rule 103 has to be subject to the result of any suit that may be pending on the date of commencement of the proceeding in which such order is made. Rule 104 thus makes orders passed under Rule 101 or Rule 103 subject to result of any suit, which in other words would mean that order made under Rule 101 or Rule 103 though concludes the lis, however, will remain subject to result of any suit which was pending on the date of commencement of such proceedings. 14. For the above stated discussion, it is held that when an application under Rule 97 of Order XXI of Code is filed and if questions as referred to in Rule 101 are raised then same are to be determined by the executing court summarily and not by separate suit and executing court has to pass orders in terms of Rule 98 or Rule 100 as the case may be. A separate suit for determination of such questions as are referred to in Rule 101 is not competent. It is further held that the order passed under Rule 101 or 103 in view of the mandate contained in Rule 104 would be subject to the result of pending suit, which otherwise would mean final adjudication of the said suit. It is further held that after determination of the questions referred to in Rule 101, executing court is duty bound to pass orders in accordance with the mandate of Rule 98 and put the decree holder in possession of the suit property or under Rule 100 by putting dispossessed person back into possession notwithstand­ing the mandate contained in Rule 104. Any other interpretation placed on these Rules would render the legislative amendments meaningless and purpose sought to be achieved by such amendments would be defeated. The Rule 103 amplifies this legal position. 15. In Nooruddin's case (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that issues are to be determined in terms of order 21 Rule 97,101 and not by separate suit. In Usha Jain's case (supra), Hon'ble Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that Rule 97 of Order XXI is permissive and not mandatory. It is further held that the rule is permissive and it does not per-se force the decree holder to file application under Rule 97 when obstruction is caused in execution of the decree. It is held that the decree holder can ask for fresh warrant for delivery of the possession in terms of Rule 35 of Order XXI of the Code. In Fathima Automobiles's case (Supra), issue before the Hon'ble Madrass High Court was about the order passed on an application filed under Rule 97 of Order XXI, the order was held to be appealable and it was further held that no separate suit would lie. In Sham Lai's Case (supra), this court on the basis of un-amended Section 47 of Code has held that a decree holder can maintain suit for possession if the delivery of the possession is resisted by third party. On the reasoning of the judgment, it cannot be said that a third party can institute suit. In Sham Lai's Case (supra), this court on the basis of un-amended Section 47 of Code has held that a decree holder can maintain suit for possession if the delivery of the possession is resisted by third party. On the reasoning of the judgment, it cannot be said that a third party can institute suit. In Tazmul Ali's case (supra), Hon'ble Full Bench of Guhatti High Court has held that a suit is competent to challenge decree when same is impeached on the ground of fraud and temporary injunction can be granted. In Bhagwat Narayan Dwivedi's case (supra), Hon'ble MP High Court has held that the execut­ing Court need not to defer the execution of the decree in the event resistance thereto is offered and the application under Rule 97 of Order XXI of Code is to be decided. In Golam Nabi Chapawala's case (supra), Hon'ble Calcutta High Court held that the purchase pendante lite is bound by the decree as a judgment debtor. None of these cases thus permitted institution of the suit and raising questions which are required to be determined in terms of Rule 101 of Order XXI of the Code by the executing Court. 16. In view of the above discussion, the order impugned in this petition requires to be set aside. The order is accordingly set aside. 17. As to whether in view of the mandate contained in Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, the plaint of the respondent No. 1 requires to be rejected and suit dismissed would require further consideration in view of the mandate of Rule 104 of Order XXI of the Code. 18. The questions as to whether the plaint of respondent No. 1 is to be rejected or not under Order VII Rule 11 would still require to be considered by the trial court by having reference to Order XXI Rule 104. The Order XXI Rule 104 of Code having not been pressed into service before the trial Court and arguments having not been addressed before the Court, it will not be appropriate to return a finding in these proceedings about same. It will be appropriate to allow the parties to raise this issue before the trial court and trial court will consider and take a decision thereon. This question is thus left open to be decided by the trial court. It will be appropriate to allow the parties to raise this issue before the trial court and trial court will consider and take a decision thereon. This question is thus left open to be decided by the trial court. Parties are directed to appear before the trial court on April 21, 2011. Learned trial court will hear the arguments within week's time and take a decision on the application of the peti­tioners filed under order VII Rule 11 of the Code and in light of the observations made in this judgment as also by considering the purport of order XXI of Rule 104 of the Code. Record be send back.