Judgment :- (V. PERIYA KARUPPIAH, J.) 1. O.S.A.No.116 of 2010 is directed against the order dated 11.12.2009 passed in O.A.No.696 of 2009 in C.S.No.568 of 2009 granting injunction restraining the appellant and respondents 2 to 5 from using the face of a single lion in their manufacturing and marketing products. 2. O.S.A.No.58 of 2010 is directed against a portion of the order dated 11.12.2009 passed in O.A.No.696/2009 in C.S.No.568 of 2009 granting liberty to 2nd to 4th defendants to use the face of more than one lion as their trade mark in their products. 3. On receipt of the notice in O.S.A.No.58/2010, the third respondent therein has filed Cross Objection No.78 of 2010 against the order dated 11.12.2009 passed in O.A.No.696 of 2009 in C.S.No.568 of 2009. 4. Brief facts of the case are as follows: The suit, C.S.No.568 of 2009 was filed by the plaintiff/appellant in OSA.No.58/2010 against the respondents for the relief of injunction restraining the defendants/respondents from using the trade mark 'Lion' as well as the device, namely, ' face of a single lion. The same plaintiff filed an application in OA.No.696 of 2009 with the following prayer: To grant a permanent injunction restraining the respondents, by themselves, their servants, agents, distributors, or anyone claiming through them from manufacturing, selling, advertising and offering for sale using same or similar get up, and colour scheme used by the respondents/defendants shown in Document Nos.3,4,5,6,7 and 8 and trade mark LION BRAND or TIGER BRAND or any other similar Trade Mark or in any media and use the same in invoices, letter heads and visiting cards or by using any other trade mark which is in anyway visually or deceptively or phonetically similar to the petitioner's Trade Mark 'LION BRAND PAPPAD' and 'LION BRAND TAPICOWAFERS' as shown in suit Document Nos.1 & 2 or in relation to any pappad items and use the same pouches, packets or use the mark in invoices, letter heads and visiting cards or any other trade literature or by using any other trade marks which is in any way visually, or phonetically similar to the petitioner/plaintiff's pending Trade Mark Registration application Nos.1372651 and 1127490 or in any manner infringe the petitioner/plaintiff's pending registration Trade Mark. 5. 5. The plaintiff has filed the suit stating that the plaintiff had commenced business in the year 1971 as a proprietory concern and has been manufacturing and marketing various goods including the goods of tapioca wafers, appalams etc. carrying the trade mark 'Lion Brand' and in the label, 'the face of a single lion' is found depicted and their product gained popularity in the market as they maintain quality for four decades. The plaintiff has stated that with an intention to pass off the plaintiff's product, the defendants copied the very same trade mark, the configuration, the printing pattern, colour combination etc., of the plaintiff's label and trade mark thereby causing confusion and deception in the market. The plaintiff has further stated that in order to make money on the reputation of the plaintiff, the defendants were acting so. Hence, the suit seeking permanent injunction restraining the defendants from using the plaintiffs trade mark 'Lion Brand' and the label ' the face of a single lion'. The plaintiff has also sought for interim injunction. Earlier this Court granted interim injunction on 17.7.2009, against which, the defendants filed the application No.3639 of 2009, with the following prayer: "To vacate the order of interim injunction granted in O.A.No.696 of 2009 in C.S.No.568 of 2009 on 17.7.2009 and dismiss the O.A.o.696 of 2009." 6. Counter affidavit has been filed by the 3rd and 4th defendants, denying the averments in the affidavit, accompanying the application, as well as the plaint stating that the plaintiff cannot claim monopoly over the device, namely, 'the face of a lion' and the word 'lion'. It is a common principle that lion is something known to everybody and the word 'lion' also is being used by everybody and in such a case, the plaintiff alone cannot claim exclusive right over it and simply because the plaintiff has been using it for a long time, it would not enure to his benefit. In Salem area there are number of manufactures of pappad (appallam) and they are doing it as a cottage industry under the common brand of "Lion" for several years and all of a sudden, the plaintiff cannot claim exclusive right over the common trade name and mark and in such a case, the injunction application should be dismissed. 7. In Salem area there are number of manufactures of pappad (appallam) and they are doing it as a cottage industry under the common brand of "Lion" for several years and all of a sudden, the plaintiff cannot claim exclusive right over the common trade name and mark and in such a case, the injunction application should be dismissed. 7. The learned single Judge on finding that by using a lion device with the name ' New Lion Brand' would certainly make a common man not to distinguish the defendants product with the plaintiff's product, allowed O.A.No.696 of 2009 and dismissed Application No.3639 of 2009 on 11.12.2009. Hence, OSA.No.116 of 2010 was filed by second defendant against the order of injunction made in O.A.No.696/2009, OSA.58 of 2010 was filed by the plaintiff against a portion of the order in O.A.No.696/2009 granting liberty to 2nd to 4th defendants/respondents to use the face of more than one lion as their trade mark in their products and the Cross Objection was filed by the fourth defendant/3rd respondent in OSA.58/2010 against the order of injunction made in O.A.No.696/2009. 8. Heard, Mr.Sai Krishnan learned counsel appearing for the appellant in O.S.A.No.116 of 2010 and for the Cross Objector in Cross Objection No.78 of 2010 and Mr.K.Rajasekaran, learned counsel appearing for the second and fourth respondents in O.S.A.No.58 of 2010 and for the first respondent in OSA.No.116 of 2010 and Cross Objection No.78 of 2010. 9. For convenience sake, the rank of the parties in the suit is maintained in this judgment. 10. Learned counsel for the second defendant/appellant in O.S.A.No.116/2010 and for the second and fourth respondents in O.S.A.No.58 of 2010 would submit in his arguments that the learned Single Judge has come to a wrong conclusion for grant of temporary injunction against the defendants when the learned Single Judge had come to the conclusion to permit the defendants 2 to 4 to have an additional lion face in the existing usage of a single lion face. He would further submit in his arguments that the product namely tapioca wafer has been produced in cottage industries in and around Namagiripettai and the plaintiff herself is also producing the said tapioca wafer from there only and all the products are being sent to North India and are sold there only and almost all the entrepreneurs at Namagiripettai are using the name 'lion brand' and the plaintiff, all of a sudden claims exclusive right over the common trade name and mark which is not maintainable. He would further submit that the plaintiff had filed a suit before the learned Single Judge of this Court suppressing the fact that all the business transactions are only done at Namagiripettai and the products are sold in North India and there was no business transaction held at Chennai. He would further submit that the plaintiff had given a fake address at Chennai in order to file a suit whereas she had given her address only at Namagiripettai in all the covers or packages in which the trade name has been printed. He would therefore submit that the suit filed before this Court is not correct and it has to be filed before the correct jurisdiction. The second defendant had used the name lion brand from 1980 onwards since it was a common trade name used by the manufactures in Namagiripettai and the plaintiff did not object to the same at any point of time. He would also submit that the word ' lion' is a generic word and it cannot be exclusively used by the plaintiff as hers and the word ' lion' is referring to an animal which is used honestly and concurrently by various traders for various products. He would further submit that it is not an invented mark of the plaintiff to claim the proprietory right over the said mark and the plaintiffs are using the said mark honestly for several decades. He would further submit that the plaintiff was aware of the said usage of the mark 'lion brand' by the second defendant and other defendants but she did not take any action against the second defendant or others. He would further submit that the plaintiff was aware of the said usage of the mark 'lion brand' by the second defendant and other defendants but she did not take any action against the second defendant or others. It is further submitted that the plaintiff had issued a legal notice in the year 2003 and the same was replied by the second defendant and on receipt of the reply notice, the plaintiff kept quiet and he did not object thereafter. However, after a long delay, the plaintiff had come forward with a suit as if the second defendant and other defendants have infringed the mark of the plaintiff. He would further submit that the plaintiff had acquiesced to the use of the defendants in respect of the lion brand mark to sell their products also. Such acquiescence would estop the plaintiff from claiming any right over the mark. He would also submit that the second defendant has spent huge money for advertising the trade mark 'lion' and the plaintiff had applied for injunction against the single face lion and they have been injuncted which caused much prejudice and hardship. He would further emphasis in his argument that the word 'lion' is a publici juris and the usage of the word 'lion' as well as the picture of the lion in the brand need not be injuncted. He would further submit in his arguments that the plaintiff had issued notice to the defendants for which they have replied in the year 2003 itself. The said factum of exchange of notice have not been disclosed by the plaintiff and therefore, she is guilty of committing fraud for suppression of facts. 11. The learned counsel would draw the attention of the Court to a judgment reported in AIR 1979 Madras 157 (National Match Works V. S.T.Karuppanna) for the principle of laches committed by the plaintiff who is asking for relief. He would further cite the judgment of this Court reported in 2004(1) CTC 418 (USV Limited v. Systopic Laboratories Limited) for the principle that the words used in public affecting the community at large could be a common property and any one can make use of it who likes to use the same and the said word would become publici juris. He would also cite the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (1994)1 SCC 1 (S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. He would also cite the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (1994)1 SCC 1 (S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. vs. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. and others) for the principle that one who comes to the Court must come with clean hands without suppressing any facts had in between the parties. For the similar proposition of law yet another judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in 2010(2) SCC 114 (Dalip Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others) has been cited. He would further submit that there would not be any confusion to a common man who is purchasing the tapioca wafer or pappad containing lion brand sachet with the distinct name and address of the parties. He would also submit in his arguments that the second defendant, as per the directions of the learned Single Judge has introduced the entire patterns of sachet and other trade mark with the inclusion of another lion and the said change of pattern of the sachet as well as the other label would not in any way infringe the said trade mark of the plaintiff and therefore, the plaintiff cannot have any grievance over the defendants. He would also submit in his arguments that even otherwise the suppression of facts and the act of omission committed by the plaintiff would disentitle the plaintiff from getting any discretionary relief of injunction from the hands of the learned Single Judge. Therefore, the injunction order passed against the defendants 2 to 4 has to be vacated and the petition for injunction may be dismissed and the appeal be thus, allowed. 12. He would further submit on behalf of the 4th defendant who has preferred the cross appeal in No.78 of 2010 that the fourth defendant had used the name 'sher brand' with the face of a tiger in his label and it would not infringe the mark of the plaintiff. He would also submit that the mark of lion is being used with two more lions in order to distinguish the single face lion used by the plaintiff. Therefore, the injunction order granted by the learned Single Judge has to be set aside. He would also adopt the arguments advanced in OSA.No.116 of 2010 in respect of the other aspects. He would also submit that the mark of lion is being used with two more lions in order to distinguish the single face lion used by the plaintiff. Therefore, the injunction order granted by the learned Single Judge has to be set aside. He would also adopt the arguments advanced in OSA.No.116 of 2010 in respect of the other aspects. Therefore, he would request the court to allow both appeal in OSA.No.116/2010 as well as the Cross Appeal and to dismiss the appeal preferred by the plaintiff in O.S.A.No.58 of 2010 13. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/appellant in OSA.No.58 of 2010 and for the first respondent in O.SA.No.116/2010 and Cross Objection No.78/2010 would submit in his arguments that the plaintiff had commenced the business in manufacturing tapioca wafer under the name and style of 'lion brand' in the year 1971 and she has commenced the using of the brand name as 'lion brand' with a single face lion and has been using throughout in her business and acquired reputation in the said name. He would further submit in his arguments that the said mark 'lion' with a device of lion in the sachet as well as the labels with two wheels on either side are the specific features of the plaintiff and the plaintiff had applied for the registration of the trade mark and her application has been submitted before the Registrar of Trade Mark and it is pending registration. He would further submit that a publication was effected by the plaintiff in the newspaper even during 2005. He would further submit that the second defendant has used the mark as 'Murugan brand' and 'Anil brand' but had clandestinely used the lion brand belonging to the plaintiff in order to earn unlawful profits by passing off the goods produced by him. He would further submit in his arguments that the plaintiff had applied for registration of copy right with the artistic work with a single face lion accompanying two wheels on either side with colours in the year 2008 and the application was received by the Registrar of Copy Rights Office and it was registered in Nos. A.82860/2008 and A.82857/2008. He would further submit in his arguments that the plaintiff had applied for registration of copy right with the artistic work with a single face lion accompanying two wheels on either side with colours in the year 2008 and the application was received by the Registrar of Copy Rights Office and it was registered in Nos. A.82860/2008 and A.82857/2008. He would further submit that the defendants cannot infringe the copy rights of using the single face lion with artistic work under the title, lion brand tapioca wafer (in English and Tamil) with the device of lion's face and two wheels. He would further submit that any usage of any single face lion with artistic work under the name of lion brand would certainly infringe the copy right of the plaintiff. He would also submit that the registration of the trade mark is still pending with the single face lion with the lion brand tapioca wafer and therefore, the defendants cannot use the said name as well as the artistic work of lion face with different colours as registered by the copy rights office as their trade name. 14. He would draw the attention of the Court to the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court and High Court of Delhi and this Court in support of his arguments. He would submit that since his label has been registered under the Copy Rights Act, the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the defendants would not apply to the present case. He would further submit that if injunction has not been granted against the defendants, there is likelihood of passing off the goods of the defendants as that of the plaintiff in the name of lion brand with a single face lion with the same artistic work on the labels and sachets. He would further submit that the balance of convenience is in favour of plaintiff for granting injunction. He would also submit that the learned Single Judge has erred in permitting the defendants 2 to 4 to use another face of lion in trade mark along with the existing single lion with the changes in the colours and artistic work in the sachets and that would not change the circumstances, it would be amounting to permitting the defendants to use the mark of the plaintiff. He would cite the judgment of the Delhi High Court reported in 2009(39) PTC 142 (Kirorimal Kashiram Marketing & Agencies Private Limited Vs. Sachdeva and Sons Industries Private Limited) in support of his arguments that whether it is one deer or 'double' found on the label, it would change the character of the label and both are resembling each other. He would also cite the judgment of this Court reported in 2008(37) PTC 536 Madras (B. Kishore Jain vs. Navaratna Khazana Jewellers), in support of his case that several persons should not use the same word and it would create confusion in respect of the goods. He would further cite the judgment of this court reported in 2006(2) MLJ 839 (Bala Arichandra Tex vs. Bharath Arichandra Tex) for the principle that the use of the word 'Archindra' by two persons cannot be permitted. He would also draw the attention of this Court stating that the Delhi High Court has come to a conclusion that the word 'Panna' is also similar to 'Panda' a polar bear in its judgement reported in 1994(14) PTC 250 (WWF International vs. Mahavir Spinning Mills Limited). He would once again cite the judgment of Delhi High Court reported in 1997(17) PTC 651 (Madanlal Arora Vs. Soni Udhyog) for the proposition that in respect of the words Tiger, Lion are Sher, even unwary customers cannot identify the device Tiger or Lion or Sher if it is used by different persons. He would therefore, request the Court that the use of the name lion brand with a single lion cannot be permitted to the defendants 2 to 4 nor any lion with the existing single lion may be permitted to be included with the change of various colours and change of artistic work and it will not in any way change the trade name of the plaintiff but would resemble the same and the unwary purchasers would be carried away with confusion and the defendants products would be sold under the name of plaintiff's trade mark and artistic work and their goods would be passing off as that of the plaintiff. Therefore, he would request the Court to confirm the injunction order granted in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants and to set aside the permission granted to the defendants 2 to 4 by the learned Single Judge to use the face of more than one lion device as their trade mark with different configuration, colour, combination and the pattern of printing. He would therefore, request the Court to allow the Appeal in O.S.A.No.58 of 2010 and dismiss the appeal preferred by the second defendant in O.S.A.No.2010 and the Cross Objection preferred by the fourth defendant in Cross Objection No.78/2010. 15. We have given anxious consideration to the arguments advanced on either side. 16. The undisputable facts are that the plaintiff and the defendants are doing tapioca appallam or pappad, wafer manufacturing within the precinct of Namagiripettai. It is also an admitted fact that the defendants 1 to 4 are the members of the Society namely the 5th defendant . The averments that the plaintiff is also one of the members of the 5th defendant has not been denied by the plaintiff. The said business are being done by the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 4 as cottage industry and they are selling their products in the North India and there is a overwhelming demand in the North Indian States for these products. 17. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendants 1 to 4 have adopted the mark 'lion brand' with a single face lion in their sachet, labels and small pockets even though the plaintiff had the right of exclusive user of the single face lion in the pockets, sachets and other labels. According to the defendants, the word 'lion' is a generic word and is being used through out from the date of inception of their business and the said usage of the name lion brand with a single face of lion was not questioned by the plaintiff for a long period and the plaintiff was acquiesced by the use of the defendants. For that, the defendants 2 and 4 have relied upon the judgment of this Court reported in AIR 1979 Madras 157 (National Match Works V. S.T.Karuppanna). The judgment of the Division Bench has been relied upon. For that, the defendants 2 and 4 have relied upon the judgment of this Court reported in AIR 1979 Madras 157 (National Match Works V. S.T.Karuppanna). The judgment of the Division Bench has been relied upon. The relevant passage applicable to the present case would be as follows: "Delay by itself after knowledge of the infringement will not deprive a registered proprietor of a trade mark of his statutory rights to sue for infringement and obtain the appropriate remedies in respect thereof. However, owners of trademarks should not adopt a sort of Rip Van Winkle policy of going to sleep and not watching what their rivals and competitors in the same line of business are doing. Inordinate delay on part of the plaintiff, without more, may bar the plaintiff's claim." The appellant has committed inordinate delay in taking action against the first respondent for the infringement of his trademark and is, therefore, estopped from contending that the first respondent is not entitled to have his trade mark registered under the provisions of S.12(3) of the Act." 18. In yet another judgment of this Court reported in 2004(1) CTC 418 (USV Limited v. Systopic Laboratories Limited) the explanation regarding the generic word has been referred. The relevant passage in paragraphs 24 and 25 would read thus: "24. Before we go into the question, we have to know what is meant by publici juris. It is a Latin word and deals with public right. The word "public" in this sense means pertaining to the people, or affecting the community at large; that which concerns a multitude of people; and the word "right," as so used, means a well-founded claim; an interest; concern; advantage; benefit. This term, as applied to a thing or right, means that it is open to or exercisable by all persons. It designates things which are owned by "the public", that is, the entire state or community, and not by any private person. When a thing is common property, so that any one can make use of it who likes, it is said to be publici juris; as in the case of light, air and public water (vide Black's Law Dictionary – 5th Edn.). 25. When a thing is common property, so that any one can make use of it who likes, it is said to be publici juris; as in the case of light, air and public water (vide Black's Law Dictionary – 5th Edn.). 25. Kerley in his book "Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names" (13th Edn._ states that names, which once carried a distinctive reference to a particular trader may, in consequence of successful piracies, or of their use by the trader himself for goods which are the goods of others, or are put forward as such, or for other reasons, lose it and fall into common use and become publici juris, in the same way as trade marks may be lost or abandoned. The proper test whether an exclusive right has become publici juris is whether the use of the trade mark by other persons has ceased to deceive the public as to the maker of the article and that piracy, which exceeds in volume the genuine goods may fail to destroy the reputation of a mark, if it remains surreptitious, so that the ultimate consumer never appreciates the true position." 19. On the basis of the judgment of this Court whether the word lion can be considered as a generic word and it would be attracted under the term publici juris is the question. Insofar as the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the Delhi High Court had come to a conclusion that Sher, Lion and Tiger are one and the same and it would cause confusion in the mind of unwary purchasers is concerned, no doubt, it is true that the Tiger and Lion are belonging to one family with different species, but merely because they are called under the common name 'Sher' it cannot be categorised either under the name Lion or Tiger. However, the persons including a common man could understand which is lion and which is tiger. The word 'lion' is certainly a common name and it can be used by anybody. However, the said usage of lion can be regulated by proper restriction which can be imposed by the registration of the trade marks as well as the registration of copy rights. As far as this case is concerned, the usage of the word 'lion brand' with single face of lion has been done by all the parties. However, the said usage of lion can be regulated by proper restriction which can be imposed by the registration of the trade marks as well as the registration of copy rights. As far as this case is concerned, the usage of the word 'lion brand' with single face of lion has been done by all the parties. The case of the plaintiff would be that she is using the label with the face of a single lion and the lion brand from 1981 onwards. The second defendant had putforth the claim that he is using the said name lion brand as well as the single face lion from the date of inception of his business in the year 1980. It is evident that the plaintiff had sent a notice in the year 2008 and on sending the reply by the second defendant, the plaintiff did not take any action against the second defendant. After a quite long time, the plaintiff has filed the suit against the defendants along with the 5th defendant Society for the reliefs in the plaint. There is no explanation for not taking any action immediately after the issuance of notice nor the said factum of sending notice to the defendants had been disclosed in the plaint nor in the application. In the said circumstances, the plaintiff cannot bar or restrict the defendants from using the word lion' as well as the use of single face lion on the label, sachet and small pockets. 20. It has been shown to the Court that the plaintiff had applied for registration of the trade mark before the Registrar of Trade Marks and it is still pending. It could be seen that the defendants have also used the same mark with honest intention and it was not restrained by the plaintiff for quite a long period. In the meantime, the plaintiff applied for Copy Rights with the Registrar of Copy Rights and the application filed by the plaintiff has been ordered and registered in Copy Right Serial No.A.82860/2008 and Copy Right Registration No.A.82857/2008. The said registered Copy Rights and the name of lion brand with artistic work with colours have been produced by the plaintiff in the typed set of papers at Page Nos.30 and 32. The said registered Copy Rights and the name of lion brand with artistic work with colours have been produced by the plaintiff in the typed set of papers at Page Nos.30 and 32. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled for injunction against the defendants under the Copy Rights Act in respect of the registered copy right produced in page Nos. 30 and 32. However, it has been contended by the defendants 2 to 4 that the plaintiff had suppressed the facts and he is not entitled for discretionary relief of injunction as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court of this Court. The judgments reported in (1994)1 SCC 1 (S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. vs. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. and others) and 2010 (2) SCC 114 (Dalip Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others) for the principle that any suppression of material or twisted facts cannot be justified to grant any discretionary relief of injunction when the person is expected to approach the Court with clean hands . It has also been laid down in other words that he owes duty to the Court to bring out all the facts and refrain from concealing or suppressing any material fact within the knowledge or which he could have known by exercising diligence expected of a person of ordinary prudence. If he is found guilty of concealment of material facts or making an attempt to pollute the pure stream of justice, the court not only has the right but a duty to deny relief to such person. 21. In such circumstances, whether the suppression of fact of issuance of notice could be taken as material suppression so as to deny the discretionary relief of injunction, is the question. Admittedly, we could see that the Copy Rights have been obtained by the plaintiff and he is entitled for the protection under the statute namely the Copy Rights Act. The suppression of facts would certainly disentitle the discretionary relief of granting injunction in favour of the plaintiff. However, the learned Single Judge had granted liberty to the defendants 2 to 4 to use the face of more than one lion device as their trade mark with different configuration, colour combination and pattern of printing along with the existing name and other indication as to the name and address of the defendants. However, the learned Single Judge had granted liberty to the defendants 2 to 4 to use the face of more than one lion device as their trade mark with different configuration, colour combination and pattern of printing along with the existing name and other indication as to the name and address of the defendants. During the course of submission, it has been pointed out that by virtue of the registration of the Copy Right, the plaintiff wanted to monopolise the business by using the lion brand with single face of lion as her own and such monopoly is not entertained under the Trade Marks Act as well as the Copy Rights Act. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion to confirm the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 22. In the said circumstances, the said permission granted to the defendants 2 to 4 for using such trade name with the change of configuration, colour combination, pattern of printing with the inclusion of one more lion face would be sufficient for maintaining the order of injunction. 23. As regards the 4th defendant who is the cross objector in Cross Objection No.78/2010 is concerned, he is using a different trade name viz., Tiger brand with tiger's face with different colours. Therefore, the 4th defendant shall also be permitted to use the said mark as produced in the typed set of papers in O.S.A.No.58 of 2010 at page No.46. 24. For the foregoing discussions, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge was correct in granting an order of injunction against the defendants 2 to 4 and with liberty to defendants 2 to 4 to use the face of more than one lion device as their trade mark with different configuration, colour combination and pattern of printing. 25. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge and accordingly, the appeals in O.S.A.No.116 of 2010 and O.S.A.No.58 of 2010 preferred by the second defendant and the plaintiff respectively are dismissed. Consequently, the Cross Objection No.78 of 2010 preferred by the 4th defendant is also dismissed confirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. In the peculiar circumstances, there is no order as to costs.