JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. This appeal filed under Section 173, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by the Union of India and another is directed against the judgment and award dated 13.6.2008 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Shillong in MAC No. 58 of 2000 awarding a compensation of Rs. 5,40,754/- together with interest in favour of the Respondent. 2. The original claimant, the father of the claimant-Respondent herein, was working as Lineman under the Meghalaya State Electricity Board when the accident took place. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that on 17.11.1998, the original claimant was on duty at Pynursla and was walking along the main road on 17.11.1998 at about 1.30 PM when a Mini Truck bearing No. AS-01/4290 belonging to the Appellants, driven in a rash and negligent manner, and while trying to turn it on the main road, knocked down the original claimant. This resulted in causing serious injuries on his thigh bone as well as the hip bone. He was immediately taken to the Dispensary at Pongkang for first aid, but was transferred to the Civil Hospital, Shillong. Though he was discharged from the Civil Hospital, he was not cured and had to be taken to patna and thence to Hajipur. He was then brought back to Shillong where he was admitted to Woodjand Hospital and got discharged therefrom on 9.11.2001 for reference to International Hospital, Guwahati, where he was admitted on 10.11.2001. He died on 11.11.2001. The case of the claimant-Respondent is that his father died due to the accident as it had affected his left thigh bone resulting in abnormal gait. At this stage, it may be noted that the original claimant had filed the claim petition for compensation causing the aforesaid injuries to him. After his death, he was substituted by the claimant-Respondent, who, as already indicated, is his son. The Appellants contested the claim petition and filed their written statement whereupon the Tribunal framed the following issues: 1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable in its present form? 2. Whether the injuries were caused as a result of rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle? 3. Whether the injuries sustained by the claimant are serious and permanent in nature? 4. Whether he Opposite party is liable for compensation? 5. Whether the claimant is entitled to compensation and, if so, to what extent? 3. 2. Whether the injuries were caused as a result of rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle? 3. Whether the injuries sustained by the claimant are serious and permanent in nature? 4. Whether he Opposite party is liable for compensation? 5. Whether the claimant is entitled to compensation and, if so, to what extent? 3. At the conclusion of the trial, the Tribunal awarded the compensation to the Respondent as already noticed. Aggrieved by this, this appeal has been preferred by the Appellants. The first contention of Mr. S.C. Shyam, the learned CGC is that there is no evidence to establish the nexus between the accident and the death of the deceased-claimant ("the deceased" for short): whereas the deceased met the accident on 17.11,1998, he died on 11.11.2001 i.e. after nearly three years of the occurrence of the accident. It is the submission of the learned CGC that the fracture suffered by the deceased on his thigh is curable if proper treatment and precaution had been taken by him during the post operation period. Drawing my attention to the evidence of CW 3 that the victim soon after his discharge from the Civil Hospital, Shillong had taken extensive tour by bus, rail, etc. to various places like Guwahati, Patna, Hajipur, etc. and had neglected medical advice thereby aggravating his wound, he submits that the death of the deceased could not, therefore, be attributed to the injuries sustained by him in the accident, and the conclusion to the contrary made by the Tribunal cannot obviously be sustained in law. It is contended by the learned CGC that keeping in mind the fact that the deceased died about three years after the accident and the complete absence of medical evidence to establish the nexus between the injuries sustained by him in the accident and his death, the Tribunal has completely gone overboard in awarding the compensation. The learned CGC lastly contends mat the interest awarded @ 7% per annum is also on the high side and needs to be interfered with. On the other hand, Mr. R.B. Pradhan, the learned Counsel for the Respondent, vehemently supports the impugned judgment and award and urges this Court to dismiss the appeal with costs. 4. The learned CGC lastly contends mat the interest awarded @ 7% per annum is also on the high side and needs to be interfered with. On the other hand, Mr. R.B. Pradhan, the learned Counsel for the Respondent, vehemently supports the impugned judgment and award and urges this Court to dismiss the appeal with costs. 4. After hearing the counsel and on perusing the materials on record, the first question which falls for consideration in this appeal is whether the evidence to establish a nexus between the death of the deceased on 17.11.1998 and the injuries sustained by him in the vehicular accident which took place on 17.11.1998? The pleading and proof required for dealing with a claim petition under Sections 166 and 168, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 have been reiterated by the Apex Court recently in Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) SCC 13 530 in paragraphs 11,14 and 15 of the judgment: 11. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of the claimant's predecessor had taken place by reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the same would be ignored only on the basis of a post-mortem report vis-a-vis the averments made in a claim petition. 14. Some discrepancies in the evidence of the claimant's witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. 14. Some discrepancies in the evidence of the claimant's witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was required to apply the principle underlying the burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 as to whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour, which was required to be proved by Respondents 2 and 3. 15. In a situation of his nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties. 5. At this stage, it may be profitable to refer to and examine the findings of the Tribunal in respect of the causal connection between the vehicular accident which occurred on 17.11.1998 and the date of the deceased on 11.11.2001 i.e. about three years after the vehicular accident in question. These are found at paragraph 21 of the impugned judgment, which read thus: 21. I have carefully gone through the many medical documents produced by the claimant including the cash memos and vouchers related to medicines bought, but there is not a single medical report from any Doctor or Hospital giving the case history of the patient/injured as to why he was admitted into hospital and what was his condition at the time of admission and discharged (discharge?). It is not denied that the deceased father of the claimant was injured in the leg. The only clue as to his condition can be found from non-medical reference of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pynursla (D) Sub-Division M.S.E.B. who vide his letter dated nil Dec. It is not denied that the deceased father of the claimant was injured in the leg. The only clue as to his condition can be found from non-medical reference of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pynursla (D) Sub-Division M.S.E.B. who vide his letter dated nil Dec. 2000 to the Commandant 37 Bn, BSF, Shillong has informed the latter that the deceased Bholi Rai has returned from a long medical treatment in Patna Medical College Hospital on his leg injury and was advised to go for voluntary retirement as his leg fracture could not be cured and he has become permanently disabled. This letter produced as Ext. 4 was not denied or contradicted by the Opposite Party. It can therefore be safely concluded that the injury sustained by the injured Bhola Rai was grievous and permanent in nature. The treatment of the injured Bholi Rai continued till 2000 and in the year 2001, he was referred by Woodland Hospital to International Hospital, Guwahati where he died. Though the Death Certificate shows the cause of death as diabetic CRF with peripheral failure, no doubt the prolonged injury sustained by the deceased Bhola Rai must have resulted in his death and accordingly overall, the cause of death linked to the injury sustained cannot be ruled out. This answers Issue No. 3. 6. In my opinion, the aforesaid findings of the Tribunal so judged on the touchstone of preponderance of probability do not suffer from perversity, CW 1, who is the son of the deceased and the claimant Respondent herein, deposed that his father died due to the accident as it affected his left thigh bone and hip bone resulting in abnormal gait. He also deposed that his father could not resume his duty after the accident and was under continuous treatment from one place to another. The evidence of CW 1 was corroborated by CW 2, who testified that since 1998, after the accident, Shri B. Rai did not join his duty due to his leg fracture which became permanent disablement till date and that after he met with an accident, he could not join his duty as he was under treatment in several places. The evidence of CW 1 was corroborated by CW 2, who testified that since 1998, after the accident, Shri B. Rai did not join his duty due to his leg fracture which became permanent disablement till date and that after he met with an accident, he could not join his duty as he was under treatment in several places. CW 3 and CW 5 also corroborated CW 1 by deposing that the deceased after the accident did not join his duty till his retirement as he was doing his treatment C W 6, who is an Assistant Engineer in the MSEB under whom the deceased was working at the time of the accident, also deposed that after the deceased met the accident, he never joined his duty as he was under prolonged medical treatment He further deposed that after three years, the victim came back to pynursla and wanted to resume duty, but was not allowed as there was no medical fitness1 certificate: he was walking with" the support of a crutch. C W 6 testified that the victim was a diabetic patient and opined that the combined effect of the accident and the blood sugar he had, had shortened his life. Except for his opinion, this witness also corroborated the factual statements given by CW 1. In my opinion, there is sufficient evidence to hold that the vehicular accident was mainly responsible for the death of the deceased. C W 6 is admittedly not an expert opinion to assert that the death of the deceased was due to the combined effect of the accident and blood sugar had by the deceased. Moreover, this was not the pleaded case of the insurer. The principles for determining causal relationship between user of a motor vehicle and the accident which resulted in death or disablement have been explained by the Apex Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patel v. Vatschala Uttam More, (1991) 3 SCC 530 . This is what the Apex Court said at paragraphs 34, 35 and 36 of the judgment: 34. In the context of motor accidents the expression "caused by" and "arising out of are often used in statutes. Although both these expressions imply a causal relationship between the accident resulting in injury and the use of the motor vehicle but they differ in the degree of proximity of such relationship. In the context of motor accidents the expression "caused by" and "arising out of are often used in statutes. Although both these expressions imply a causal relationship between the accident resulting in injury and the use of the motor vehicle but they differ in the degree of proximity of such relationship. This distinction has been lucidly brought out in the decision of the High Court of Australia in Government Insurance Office of N.S. W. v. R.J. Green case, wherein Lord Barwick, C.J. has stated: Bearing in mind the general purpose of 5 the Act I think the expression "arising out of must be taken to require a less proximate relationship of the injury to the relevant use of the vehicle than is required to satisfy the words "caused by". It may be that an association of the injury with the use of the vehicle may yet be enough to satisfy the expression "arise out of as used in the Act and in the policy. 35. In the same case, Windeyer, J. has observed as under: The words 'injury caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle' postulate a causal relationship between the use of the vehicle and the injury. 'Caused by' connotes a 'direct' or 'proximate' relationship of cause and effect. 'Arising out of extends this to a result that is less immediate; but it still carries a sense of consequence. 36. This would show that as compared to the expression "caused by", the expression "arising out of has a wider connotation. The; expression "caused by" was used in Sections 95(1)(b)(i) and 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. In Section 92-A, Parliament, however, chose to use the expression "arising out of" which indicates that for the purpose of awarding compensation under Section 92-A, the. causal relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and the accident resulting in death or permanent disablement is not required to be direct and proximate and it can be less immediate. This would imply that accident should be connected with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection need not be direct and immediate. This construction of the expression "arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" in Section 92-A enlarges the field" of protection made available to the victims of an accident and is in consonance with the beneficial object underlying the enactment. 7. This construction of the expression "arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" in Section 92-A enlarges the field" of protection made available to the victims of an accident and is in consonance with the beneficial object underlying the enactment. 7. Though the causal relationship between the use of the vehicle and the injury considered by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision was in the context of a patrol tanker overturned as a result of collision with track and after a few hours explosion and fire taking place in it causing death, in my judgment, the underlying principles therein will be applicable on the facts of this case. True, the deceased did not immediately die after the accident but died more than three years after the accident. Nevertheless, once the claimant-Respondent is able to create a high a degree of probability on the basis of the evidence of a battery of witnesses that after the deceased met the accident, he was under prolonged medical treatment and had never resumed duty due to his inability to produce medical fitness certificate, the onus of proving that he died due to the combined effect of the injuries sustained by him in the said vehicular accident and his uncontrolled blood sugar shifted to the Appellant. Having not done so, I have no alternative but to hold that there is causal connection, even though not immediate, between the accident and the eventual death of the deceased. On the contention of the learned GGC that the interest awarded is on the high side, I do not think so. Presently, the interest rate prevailing in the commercial banks has gone up to 8 per cent or more. The rate of interest prevailing at the time of filing the claim petition i.e. 2000 was also roundabout 8% per annum. Therefore, this contention has also no leg to stand on. 8. The result of the foregoing discussion is that there is no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed. The Appellant is, therefore, directed to deposit with this Registry the compensation amount together with the interest due for payment to the claimant-Respondent within a period of two months from the date of receipt of this judgment. As the Appellant has raised an important question of law, it need not be saddled with costs. Appeal dismissed