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2011 DIGILAW 1756 (PAT)

Ranjeet Kumar Jha v. State Of Bihar

2011-08-19

ASHWINI KUMAR SINHA, NAVANITI PRASAD SINGH

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JUDGEMENT NAVANITI PRASAD SINGH, J. 1. Having heard Shri G.P. Jaiswal, learned Senior Counsel, amicus curiae, at our request in support of the appeal and Shri Ashwani Kumar Sinha, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, we propose to dispose of this appeal at this stage itself. 2. For the reasons in detail recorded in our order dated 04.08.2011 briefly stated when the appeal was listed before us for consideration of the handwritten application sent by the appellant praying for bail stating that though he was literate he was unable to engage any counsel being poor and his earlier bail applications to this Court had already been rejected several times, we found to our shock and dismay that the trial Court in its judgment under appeal had found the appellant to be about 28 years of age which would have made him about 16 years at the time when the alleged occurrence took place for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. We became curious and anxious in this regard. What shocked us more was that the appellant had raised the plea of juvenility in the trial Court itself and even though the trial Court found the appellant to be 16 years 5 months and 27 days old on the date of occurrence, that is, 09.08.1996, it rejected the claim and proceeded to deliver judgment ignoring the evidence on record as if the plea was never raised. The result was that though the appellant was undisputedly a juvenile in conflict with law by the judgment under appeal dated 28.06.2008, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for an offence under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. Noticing this and the fact that the appellant himself had written to this Court that he is not in a position to engage a Lawyer to defend him, on our request Shri G.P. Jaiswal, learned Senior Counsel agreed to assist the Court and after hearing the learned Senior Counsel and the Additional Public Prosecutor and examining the records we reserved the case for order and are now disposing the appeal itself. Saharsa P.S. Case No.360 of 1996 (G.R. Case No.953 of 1996) was registered for offences under Sections-302 & 201 of the Indian Penal Code as against the appellant charging the appellant of committing murder and causing the disappearance of the dead body of the deceased on 09.08.1996. Saharsa P.S. Case No.360 of 1996 (G.R. Case No.953 of 1996) was registered for offences under Sections-302 & 201 of the Indian Penal Code as against the appellant charging the appellant of committing murder and causing the disappearance of the dead body of the deceased on 09.08.1996. After submission of chargesheet and committal of the case to the Court of Sessions, Sessions Trial No. 68 of 1997 was registered in the Court of Additional District Judge, F.T.C.-II, Saharsa. It appears from the records that the appellant was also facing another prosecution arising out of Bangwan P.S. Case No.57 of 1996 (G.R. Case No.647 of 1996) for, allegedly, committing another murder on 05.06.1996, for which Sessions Trial No.210 of 2003 was pending before the Sessions Judge, Saharsa. It appears that in course of the proceedings of this second Sessions Trial No.210 of 2003, as before the Sessions Judge, Saharsa, a plea was raised on behalf of this appellant on the basis of his matriculation certificate as granted by the Bihar School Examination Board noting his date of birth to be 12.02.1980, that the appellant was juvenile. Apparently, the learned Sessions Judge, being prima facie satisfied, referred the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board, Saharsa to enquire into the matter. It constituted a Medical Board and considered its report as well as the matriculation certificate. It noted as a consequence of its enquiry that the date of birth of the appellant was 12.02.1980 and, as such, on the date of occurrence of this second case, that is, on 05.06.1996 he was much less than 18 years of age and, thus, declared him juvenile under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as Juvenile Justice Act of 2000). He, accordingly, sent his report to the Sessions Judge. The order of Juvenile Justice Board, Saharsa is dated 30.05.2006 and it was duly exhibited in the present case before the trial Court and marked as Ext. C. 3. Upon receipt of the report of the Juvenile Justice Board, Saharsa, the learned Sessions Judge, Saharsa in Sessions Trial No.210 of 2003, noting that the appellant was much less than 18 years of age on the date of occurrence, by its order dated 04.08.2006 remitted the matter for final disposal to the Juvenile Justice Board, Saharsa in terms of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000. This order of learned Sessions Judge in Sessions Trial No.210 of 2003 dated 04.08.2006 was exhibited in the present case before the trial Court and marked as Ext. D. 4. On 08.11.2007 the appellant filed a petition in the present case being Sessions Trial No.68 of 1997 as pending before the learned Additional District Judge, F.T.C.-II, Saharsa claiming that he was a juvenile and had been so found by the Juvenile Justice Board, Saharsa and the learned Sessions Judge, Saharsa by virtue of Exts.C & D. From the records, which we have perused the appellants petition, clearly referred to the aforesaid orders as also the amendment to the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Amendment Act, 2006. On behalf of appellant, it was urged that by virtue of Section-7A as newly inserted and Section-20 as amended by addition thereto a proviso and an explanation, he was a juvenile and had to be given the benefit under the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000. From the records, we find that the learned A.P.P. filed a rejoinder to the appellants petition, inter alia, stating that the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000, which had come into force with effect from 01.04.2001, was prospective in application and as on the said date the appellant was above 18 years of age, he could not get the benefit thereof, being above 16 years of age on the date of occurrence, which was 09.08.1996 when the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 1986 was in force, he could not get the benefit of the Act of 1986 as the juvenile defined therein by virtue of Section-2(h) thereof meant a boy not above the 16 years of age. We may note with regret that he mentioned nothing about the amendments to the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 by Amendment Act of 2006 which was in detail referred to and appended to the appellants petition. What we find more distressing is that the learned Additional Sessions Judge by his order dated 19.12.2007 rejected the plea of the appellant even though he recorded the finding apparently basing on Exts. C&D, that on the date of occurrence, that is, on 09.08.1986 the appellant was 16 years 5 months and 27 days old. What we find more distressing is that the learned Additional Sessions Judge by his order dated 19.12.2007 rejected the plea of the appellant even though he recorded the finding apparently basing on Exts. C&D, that on the date of occurrence, that is, on 09.08.1986 the appellant was 16 years 5 months and 27 days old. He held that as he was above 21 years on 01.04.2001 when the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 came in force, he could not get the benefit of the said Act. Learned Additional Sessions Judge before whom the matter was pending like the A.P.P. ignored to consider the amendment to the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 by the Amendment Act of 2006. Learned Additional District Judge then proceeded to hear the final arguments in the Sessions Trial No.68 of 1997 and delivered the judgment on 28.06.2008, holding the appellant guilty under both Section-302 and Section-201 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. What is more distressing is that in the final judgment he has chosen not to refer to the question of juvenility of the appellant at all, rather he has noted Exts. C&D on behalf of defence but shown it to be merely certified copies of orders stating in paragraph-23 of his judgment that they have been filed to show that Krishna Kumar Jha, the uncle of the appellant was in inimical terms with the appellant which was obviously, to his knowledge, incorrect. Upon the conviction and the sentence being awarded appellant was taken into custody to serve out the sentence and, as such, has continued in custody till date, which is now over 3 years. His bail applications before this Court were rejected without the question of juvenility being raised or considered. As in the case under appeal the trial Court by order dated 19.12.2007 found the appellant to be 21 years of age on the date of judgment, that is, 28.06.2008 our curiosity led to the discovery of the aforesaid facts from the available records itself. It is because of this that we decided to finally hear the appeal in detail as in our opinion permitting detention of the appellant in custody any further would be travesty of justice. It is because of this that we decided to finally hear the appeal in detail as in our opinion permitting detention of the appellant in custody any further would be travesty of justice. If the appellant was to succeed on merits in the appeal itself then there was no question of giving him the benefit of his juvenility, but if we found that on facts the conviction had to be sustained then the appellant had to be given the benefit of juvenility in terms of Section 7A read with Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 as amended and as he had spent more than 3 years in prison serving out the sentence, any further detention was totally unwarranted, if not illegal. In view of the insensitivity to the legal issue as shown and apparent from the judgment of the trial Court, which we say with regret is not a stray case, we have thought it advisable to clear the misconception prevailing in the Subordinate Courts of Bihar with regard to two issues of law which arise in the present case as well. 5. The first issue is with regard to determination of age of a person accused of an offence when it appears that a person charged with offence is a juvenile or claims as such. The second issue is the consequences of a finding that on the date of occurrence if a person is found to be juvenile then what is to be done? 6. The first thing we would like to mention is that if the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 and the Central Rules, that is, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 and the Bihar Rules, that is, Bihar Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2003 are read then it would be found that Legislature has left no discretion in respect of both the issues to the Court or the Juvenile Justice Board. The procedure and the consequences are laid down without exception leaving no scope for discretion. Here, I may remind of what the Apex Court said in the case of Shri Mandir Sita Ramji Versus Governor of Delhi & Ors. The procedure and the consequences are laid down without exception leaving no scope for discretion. Here, I may remind of what the Apex Court said in the case of Shri Mandir Sita Ramji Versus Governor of Delhi & Ors. since reported in AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1868, relevant part of which is quoted hereunder:- "When a procedure is prescribed by the Legislature, it is not open for the Court to substitute a different one according to its notion of justice. When the Legislature has spoken, the Judges cannot afford to be wiser." 16. Now, coming to the first issue as to what is to be done by a Court when it finds that the accused appears to be a juvenile or claims to be a juvenile in terms of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 and the Rules framed thereunder. At this stage first we must notice that the first comprehensive legislation dealing with juvenile and juvenile delinquency as applicable in India was the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 1986, Section-2(h) thereof defined a juvenile to mean a boy who had not attained the age of 16 years. This Act of Parliament was later repealed and replaced by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 with effect from 01.04.2001. Under the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 this definition of juvenile has been changed. By virtue of Section-2(k) of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 juvenile is defined as a person who has not completed 18 years of age, thus, in respect of boys the age of juvenility has since been increased from 16 years under the Act of 1986 to 18 years under the Act of 2000. As noticed above, the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 was enforced with effect from 01.04.2001 and thereafter on 22.06.2001 the Central Government framed model rules known as the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2001. As noticed above, the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 was enforced with effect from 01.04.2001 and thereafter on 22.06.2001 the Central Government framed model rules known as the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2001. It may be noted here that these Model Rules as framed by the Central Government was one of the subject matter of consideration by the Constitution Bench in the case of Pratap Singh Versus The State of Jharkhand since reported in (2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 551 wherein the Apex Court held that the Central Government did not have any authority to make those rules and they could not resort to those rule making power under the Clause dealing with power to remove difficulty. The Apex Court in that case was dealing with questions of juvenility and implications of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 and repeal of the Act of 1986. It must be noticed here that soon after the said Constitution Bench judgment in 2005, the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 was substantially amended. Apart from inserting a new provisions, that is, Section-7A and substantially amending Section 20 and Section 68 of the said Act, was also amended by adding a proviso to sub-section(1) thereof, authorizing the Central Government to frame model rules. Thus, the authority of the Central Government, which was found missing, in the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the case of Pratap Singh (supra), was cured. It is under this amended provision, which authorized the Central Government to frame model rules, the Central Government has now framed the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 enforced with effect from 26.10.2007. Section-68 of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 had originally authorized only the State Government to frame Rules to carry out the purposes of the Act, which has now been extended to the Central Government as well, as noticed above. In so far as Bihar is concerned, the State Government has framed the Bihar Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2003. 17. In so far as Bihar is concerned, the State Government has framed the Bihar Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2003. 17. So far as the first issue is concerned, we need not discuss the same in detail because the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000, the model rules as framed by the Central Government in 2007 and the Bihar Rules of 2003 in relation to this issue had already been discussed by this Court in the case of Sachin Kumar Gupta @ Sachin Kumar Versus The State of Bihar & Anr. since reported in 2008(2) PLJR 800 , which we approve. What has been held in substance is that considering the provisions of the aforesaid legislations and the delegated legislation and in particular Rule-12 of the Central Rules 2007 and Rule-22 of the Bihar Rules-2003 that the age would be assessed first on basis of the birth certificate given by the Corporation or the Municipality, the matriculation or equivalent certificate or the birth certificate from the school first attended and only in absence thereof the age would be assessed on the medical opinion of a duly constituted Medical Board subject to margin of 1 year and the documents above mentioned would be conclusive proof of the age. Thus seen, resort to Medical Board in each and every case is not the mandate of law, rather it comes into play only when the documents as mentioned in the Rules aforesaid are not available. It may further be noted that once a finding of juvenility is given in terms of Sections-7A, 14 and 49 of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000, by virtue of Section-49 and in particular sub-section(2) thereof, no subsequent proof is at all admissible to deny the benefit of juvenility and the declaration once made is final. Thus seen, there is no discretion on the Court but in the said circumstances as mentioned above to hold an enquiry and give a finding in the manner prescribed. 18. I may note that the Apex Court in the case of Ram Suresh Singh Versus Prabhat Singh @ Chhotu Singh & Anr. since reported in (2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 681, a case going from this Court, in principle also held the same view, though it noticed the Central Rules of 2001 as the judgment of this Court was delivered prior to the Central Rules of 2007. since reported in (2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 681, a case going from this Court, in principle also held the same view, though it noticed the Central Rules of 2001 as the judgment of this Court was delivered prior to the Central Rules of 2007. Even then it held that resort to Medical Board or other evidence is permissible only when the documents as mentioned in the rules aforesaid are not available and the documents if produced and proved would be conclusive proof of the age leaving no discretion on the Court. 19. Thus, to conclude this first issue we must point out that if the claim about juvenility is made before any Court or any Court feels that the accused before it was a juvenile when the offence was committed then first, that Court, in terms of Sections-7 & 7A of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 would be obliged to refer the matter immediately to the Juvenile Justice Board. The Juvenile Justice Board then would conduct an enquiry, as contemplated under Section-14 of the said Act. While conducting the said enquiry, as noticed above in the case of Sachin Kumar Gupta (supra), the Board would consider the evidence in accordance with Rule- 12 of the Central Rules, 2007 and Rule-22 of the Bihar Rules, 2003 and pass appropriate orders. Once a person is declared to be juvenile, then in terms of Section-49 of the Act that order would be final and in terms of sub-section (2) thereof subsequently no proof can be taken as against it. If the order of the Juvenile Justice Board is against the person claiming to be juvenile or in favour of the juvenile then Section-52 provides for an appeal to the Court of Sessions and Section-53 provides for a revision to the High Court. 20. It is in view of these provisions and the scheme, as noticed above, that we have indicated that there is no discretion left to any Court or the Board in the matter and they have to proceed according to the schemes once it finds someone to be a juvenile or a claim of juvenility is made. This issue is answered accordingly. This issue is answered accordingly. Now, we come to the second and more important issue as to the applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 to proceedings pending when the said Act came into force and the consequence of a person being found to be a juvenile in terms of the said Act on the date of occurrence. In this regard, we may point out that if the date of occurrence is after the enforcement of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000, that is, after 01.04.2001 the provisions are clear. In this situation, if it is found that the person is a juvenile and, hence, a juvenile in conflict with law, then the first thing is that by virtue of Section-12 of the Act his bail plea has to be disposed of. In other words, as provided under the said Act, he may or may not be released on bail, but in either of the case he cannot be remanded to the judicial custody. His case has to be placed before the Juvenile Justice Board which can, instead of releasing him make an order sending him to observation home or a place of safety by virtue of Section- 12(3) of the Act. Then orders that may be passed in terms of Section-17 may be passed keeping in mind orders by virtue of Section-16 of the Act which may not be passed. However, by virtue of Section-18 of the Act it is prohibited to try a juvenile together with a person who is not juvenile but that trial would also be by and before the Juvenile Justice Board and not in any Court of the juvenile in conflict with law. Now, we come to the specific problem of applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 to pending proceedings in cases, that is, offences committed prior to 01.04.2001 in respect of which either enquiry or trial is pending before a competent Criminal Court or appellate or revisional proceedings are pending from order of conviction. It would be our duty to point out that there has been substantial change in the statute law in regard to the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 in this regard since its enactment and enforcement on 01.04.2001. It would be our duty to point out that there has been substantial change in the statute law in regard to the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 in this regard since its enactment and enforcement on 01.04.2001. It would be seen that as originally enacted Section-2(l) of the Act defines juvenile in conflict with law to mean a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offence. Then, we had Section-7 and Section-20 to which the proviso and the explanation, as we now find, were not there. It is in this perspective when such a question arose before the Constitution Bench in the case of Pratap Singh (supra) that the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held thus in paragraphs-36 & 37, which is quoted hereunder:- "36. We, therefore, hold that the provisions of the 2000 Act would be applicable to those cases initiated and pending trial/inquiry for the offences committed under the 1986 Act provided that the persons had not completed 18 years of age as on 1-4-2001. 37. The net result is: (a) The reckoning date for the determination of the age of the juvenile is the date of the offence and not the date when he is produced before the authority or in the court. (b) The 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending proceeding in any court/authority initiated under the 1986 Act and is pending when the 2000 Act came into force and the person had not completed 18 years of age as on 1-4-2001." The effect of this judgment was that if the person who was charged with committing an offence prior to 01.04.2001 and was found to be a juvenile, that is, under 18 years of age and he had not attained majority as on the date of enforcement of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000, Section-20 would apply and he would get the benefit of juvenility but notwithstanding the fact that he was a juvenile within the meaning of Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 on the date when the offence was committed prior to that Act but had attained majority by the time the Act came into being and the proceedings were pending he would not get the benefit of the said Act and would not be treated as a juvenile under the said Act. It appears to us that this is the position that was taken by the learned Additional District Judge in the present case because it found that when the offence was committed, though petitioner was not a juvenile, in terms of the Juvenile Justice Act of 1986, he was a juvenile in terms of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000, but as he had attained majority prior to 01.04.2001, in fact, being almost 21 years of age on that date, he could not be given the benefit of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000. This order unfortunately, as noted above, was passed on 19.12.2007 by when the Act had been substantially amended altering the very basis of the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Pratap Singh (supra) by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Amendment Act, 2006 with effect from 22.08.2006. 21. What was done by the Amendment Act of 2006 was that Section-2(l) of the Act was amended and now it was provided that the juvenile in conflict with law would mean a juvenile alleged to have committed an offence and had not completed 18 years of age on the date of commission of such offence. New Section 7A was introduced which clearly provided that the claim of juvenility on the date of commission of offence could be raised before any Court, at any stage, even after the disposal of the case. Further Section-20 which is a special provision in respect of pending cases was substantially amended adding a proviso and an explanation thereto. The explanation added to Section-20 made it clear that it applied to all pending cases including trial, revision or appeal or other criminal proceedings in respect of juvenile in conflict with law in any Court and it further provided that this Section would apply as if the said provisions were in force for all purposes and at all material times when the alleged offence was committed. Thus, there was a clear departure from the law as laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Pratap Singh (supra) which was rendered on 2nd February, 2005. 22. Thus, there was a clear departure from the law as laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Pratap Singh (supra) which was rendered on 2nd February, 2005. 22. We do not have to go far to see the effect as it was exhaustively considered by the Apex Court in the case of Hari Ram Versus State of Rajasthan and another since reported in (2009) 13 Supreme Court Cases 211. In paragraph-37 of the reports, their Lordships have held thus:- "37. The said decision in Pratap Singh Case, 6 Pratap Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand (2005) 3 SCC 551 ] led to the substitution of Section 2(l) and the introduction of Section 7- A of the Act and the subsequent introduction of Rule 12 in the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, and the amendment of Section 20 of the Act. Read with Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7-A and Rule 12, Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as amended in 2006, is probably the section most relevant in setting at rest the question raised in this appeal, as it deals with cases which were pending on 1-4-2001, when the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, came into force." Then, I may refer to what is noticed by the Court in Paragraphs- 38,39&40 of the reports, the relevant parts are quoted hereunder:- 38. The same is, accordingly, reproduced hereinbelow: "20. Special provision in respect of pending cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that court as if this Act had not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence: Provided that the Board may, for any adequate and special reason to be mentioned in the order, review the case and pass appropriate order in the interest of such juvenile. Explanation.-In all pending cases including trial, revision, appeal or any other criminal proceedings in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law, in any court, the determination of juvenility of such a juvenile shall be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2, even if the juvenile ceases to be so on or before the date of commencement of this Act and the provisions of this Act shall apply as if the said provisions had been in force, for all purposes and at all material times when the alleged offence was committed." 23. The proviso and the Explanation to Section 20 were added by Amendment Act 33 of 2006, to set at rest any doubts that may have arisen with regard to the applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, to cases pending on 1-4.2001, where a juvenile, who was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence, was involved. 39. The Explanation which was added in 2006, makes it very clear that in all pending cases, which would include not only trials but even subsequent proceedings by way of revision or appeal, the determination of juvenility of a juvenile would be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2, even if the juvenile ceased to be a juvenile on or before 1-4-2001, when the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, came into force, and the provisions of the Act would apply as if the said provision had been in force for all purposes and for all material times when the alleged offence was committed. In fact, Section 20 enables the court to consider and determine the juvenility of a person even after conviction by the regular court and also empowers the court, while maintaining the conviction, to set aside the sentence imposed and forward the case to the Juvenile Justice Board concerned for passing sentence in accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000. 40. At this point it may be noted that the decision of the Constitution Bench in Pratap Singh case 6 was rendered at a point of time when the amendments to Sections 2(l) and 20 and the introduction of Section 7-A had not yet been effected, nor was Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules available. 24. 40. At this point it may be noted that the decision of the Constitution Bench in Pratap Singh case 6 was rendered at a point of time when the amendments to Sections 2(l) and 20 and the introduction of Section 7-A had not yet been effected, nor was Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules available. 24. It may be noted that even though drastic amendments were made by the Amendment Act of 2006 new rules were framed being the Central Rules, 2007 still there were several decisions rendered by the Apex Court which would prima facie show the continuance of applying the law as laid down by the Constitution Bench in the case of Pratap Singh (supra). These have been discussed in paragraphs-44 to 49 of the said judgment in Hari Rams case (supra), which are quoted hereunder:- 44. Of the decision rendered after the amendments effected in 2006 to the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, the first decision of 11 note is that of Jameel case rendered on 16-1-2007 wherein the amendments to the Act effected by Amendment Act 33 of 2006, which came into effect on 22-8-2006, were not even noticed. [11 (2007) 11 SCC 420 ] 45. The next decision rendered on 27-5-2008 is in Vimal Chadha case wherein, although the amendment of the Act and the introduction of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, were brought to the notice of the Court, the same were not considered and the decision was rendered in the light of the decision rendered in Pratap Singh case and other cases decided prior to 1-4-2001. [12 (2008) 15 SCC 216 ] 46. The next decision rendered on the same point on 11-9-2008 was the decision in Ranjit Singh case case wherein also the amendments to Section 2(l) and 20 and the introduction of Section 7-A in the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, and the introduction of the 2007 Rules had not been considered and the decision passed sub silentio. [14 (2008) 9 SCC 453 ] 13 47. Similar was the situation in Babloo Pasi case decided on 3-10-2008 which basically dealt with Section 49 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 and Rule 22 of the Jharkhand Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2003, which is pari materia with Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules. [14 (2008) 9 SCC 453 ] 13 47. Similar was the situation in Babloo Pasi case decided on 3-10-2008 which basically dealt with Section 49 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 and Rule 22 of the Jharkhand Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2003, which is pari materia with Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules. While deciding the said case, the Honble Judges did not also have occasion to consider the amendments effected to the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, by the Amendment Act 33 of 2006 which had just come into force on 22-8-2006. [13 (2008) 13 SCC 133 ] 48. None of the aforesaid decisions are of much assistance in deciding the question with regard to the applicability of the definition of "juvenile" in Sections 2(k) and 2(l) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as amended in 2006, whereby the provisions of the said Act were extended to cover juveniles who had not completed 18 years of age on or before the coming into force of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 on 1-4- 2001. (emphasis supplied) 49. The effect of the proviso to Section 7-A introduced by the amending Act makes it clear that the claim of juvenility may be raised before any court which shall be recognized at any stage, even after final disposal of the case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of the provisions contained in the Act and the Rules made thereunder which includes the definition of "juvenile" in Sections 2(k) and 2(l) of the Act even if the juvenile had ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of the Act. (emphasis supplied) The net result is noted in paragraph-50 thereof, which is quoted hereunder:- 50. (emphasis supplied) The net result is noted in paragraph-50 thereof, which is quoted hereunder:- 50. The said intention of the legislature was reinforced by the amendment effected by the said amending Act to Section 20 by introduction of the proviso and the Explanation thereto, wherein also it has been clearly indicated that in any pending case in any court the determination of juvenility of such a juvenile has to be in terms of Section 2(l) even if the juvenile ceases to be so "on or before the date of commencement of this Act" and it was also indicated that the provisions of the Act would apply as if the said provisions had been in force for all purposes and at all material times when the alleged offence was committed. (emphasis supplied) 25. Thus, what we find from the judgment referred in the case of Hari Ram (supra) is that after the amendment to the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 by the Amendment Act of 2006 the situation as emanating in the case of Pratap Singh (supra) underwent a complete change. The effect is that once a person is found to be a juvenile in conflict with law as defined by Section-12(l) of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000, then irrespective of his age at the time when this matter is considered in any pending proceeding when the Act came into force, he would continue to be treated as juvenile in conflict with law and be entitled to the benefits in relation thereto. We regret that even though by a specific petition before the learned Additional District Judge these amendments were brought to his notice he chose to completely ignore them and deny the benefit to the appellant which the law had given to him. We may notice that now the Apex Court has consistently taken note of the amendment and the judgment as rendered in the case of Hari Ram (supra) and extended the benefit to persons who are found to be juvenile in conflict with law for an offence committed prior to the enforcement of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 irrespective of their age when such determination is made after coming into force of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000. We may only refer to some of the cases being Dharambir Versus State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. We may only refer to some of the cases being Dharambir Versus State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. since reported in (2010) 5 SCC 344 , Daya Nand Versus State of Haryana since reported in (2011) 2 SCC 224 and Lakhan Lal Versus State of Bihar with analogous cases since reported in (2011)2 SCC 251 . 26. Thus, the answer to the second issue is that if in any proceeding pending when the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 came to be enforced if it is found that on the day when the offence was said to have been committed by a person who was a juvenile in conflict with law as defined by Section- 2(l) of the Act, he would be so treated irrespective of his present age or age as on 01.04.2001 and he cannot be denied the benefits accruing to a juvenile in conflict with law. It is in this perspective that we have earlier said that there is no discretion left to any Court in the matter in pending proceedings. He the juvenile in conflict with law cannot be sentenced to imprisonment at all and cannot be allowed to continue to be in jail. If we apply the law, as noticed above to the present case, it would be found in its inevitable conclusion that the order of the learned Additional District Judge dated 19.12.2007 was clearly erroneous and the appellant was entitled to the benefits as a juvenile in conflict with law, in view of the 2006 amendments to the Act and, was wrongly deprived thereof, he was convicted but wrongly sentenced. Now, coming to the merits of the appeal. It may be noted that it is on basis of evidence proving the circumstances that the appellant has been convicted for the offence under Sections-302 & 201 of the Indian Penal Code. We have perused the evidence. The circumstances that have been proved clearly and consistently point to the inevitable conclusion of the appellants guilt and inconsistent with his plea of innocence. We are in agreement with the learned trial Judge of the circumstances as noted by him, which are noted hereunder and, which in our opinion, conclusively proves the guilt of the appellant. (i) At 3 pm on the fateful day i.e. on 09.08.1996 the appellant visited the house of the informant, Sanjeet Kumar (P.W.8) and took his younger brother the deceased Manjeet with him. (i) At 3 pm on the fateful day i.e. on 09.08.1996 the appellant visited the house of the informant, Sanjeet Kumar (P.W.8) and took his younger brother the deceased Manjeet with him. (ii) Several prosecution witnesses, namely, P.Ws.-2,3 & 5 have established that at 7 pm of the said day the deceased Manjeet Kumar was last seen with the appellant, Ranjeet Kumar Jha. (iii) Sunil Kumar Raut (P.W.6) establishes that on the same day at about 8 pm appellant came to his house completely nervous, borrowed clothes from him discarding his smelly clothes. The appellant then tried to burn his discarded clothings. (iv) The half burnt discarded clothing of the appellant were recovered by the police which were concealed under heap of garbage. (v) In extra judicial confession the appellant confessed to the facts. (vi) Bottle of ether and syringe which were recovered by the police from the site of the dead body as found was indicated and accepted by the accused in his extra judicial confession. (vii) The dead body of Manjeet was recovered from a drain wrapped in cloth. (viii) The defence of the appellant was the plea of alibi that on the fateful day i.e. on 09.08.1996 at the relevant time he was at Kolkata stood falsified by the written information given by the appellants father (Exts.1/2 & 5/1), which clearly show that the appellant was at Saharsa itself at that time alibi could neither be established rather it was falsified. 27. In view of the aforesaid, we are unable to interfere with the conviction of the appellant, but at the same time in view of the prohibitions as contained in Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 as amended by the Amendment Act of 2006, we are unable to sustain the sentence of life imprisonment on his juvenility, having been established by Exts.C & D. His case should have been referred to the Juvenile Justice Board for sentencing and he could not under any circumstances be remanded to judicial custody for serving out his sentence. We would have in normal course remanded the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board for sentencing but as we have already noted above that the appellant has remained in judicial custody for more than 3 years serving out his life sentence, we have no option but to allow the appeal, while upholding the conviction, but setting aside the sentence, with a direction that the appellant be released from custody forthwith if not required to be detained in any other case. In terms of Section-19 of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 he shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attached to the conviction. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Bihar Judicial Academy for being brought to the notice of Judicial Officers so that in future injustice to juvenile in conflict with law may be avoided in this State and the legislative mandate is carried out in true letters and spirit. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed. 28. Before closing we would like to appreciate the fair and valuable assistance rendered in the case by Shri G.P. Jaiswal, learned Senior Counsel, amicus curiae, and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Shri Ashwani Kumar Sinha. Shri G.P. Jaiswal would be entitled to one hearing fee as a Senior Advocate from the Patna High Court Legal Services Committee. We order accordingly.