By The Court—Both these special appeals arise out of the judgment and order dated 8.10.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby the writ petitions preferred by the appellant have been dismissed. 2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present appeals are as follows: 3. J.L.M. Inter College, Kundarki, district Moradabad, hereinafter referred to as “the Institution” situate in the district Moradabad is a recognised and aided institution by the Government of Uttar Pradesh. It is governed by the provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”. The provisions of U. P. High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act. 1971, is applicable to it. The Institution advertised the post of Principal in the newspapers “Amar Ujala” and “Dainik Aaj” on 22nd May, 2008. The appellant claiming himself to be eligible also applied for the said post of Principal in the Institution. The Selection Committee held interview on 22nd June, 2008 and recommended the name of the appellant for appointment on the post of Principal. The recommendation was accepted by the Committee of Management and the appointment letter was issued to the appellant on 23rd June, 2008. The appointment was approved on 2nd July, 2008 and he joined the Institution on 3rd July, 2008. However, on 23rd July, 2008, the approval granted on 2nd July, 2008 was stayed till further orders. The appellant challenged the order dated 23rd July, 2008 by means of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.38067 of 2008 before this Court and vide order dated 31st July, 2008 an interim order was passed in favour of the writ petitioner-appellant. 4. According to the appellant on 12th January, 2009, the Manager of the Institution called for an explanation from him. Thereafter on 20th April, 2009 and 9th May, 2009 notices were issued to him to which the appellant had submitted his reply on 16th May, 2009. The Committee of Management passed a resolution on 24th May, 2009 dispensing with the services of the appellant which decision was communicated to the appellant by the Manager vide letter dated 26th May, 2009. The decision dated 26th May, 2009 has been challenged by means of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.33040 of 2009. 5. The Committee of Management passed a resolution on 24th May, 2009 dispensing with the services of the appellant which decision was communicated to the appellant by the Manager vide letter dated 26th May, 2009. The decision dated 26th May, 2009 has been challenged by means of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.33040 of 2009. 5. In the counter affidavit filed in the Writ Petition No.33040 of 2009 it has been stated that the appellant is a convict in a murder case on the basis of the judgment and order dated 21st April, 2009 passed in Session Trial No.1002 of 1995 connected with other two Sessions Trials, wherein the appellant has been convicted under Section 147, 148, 149 and 302 I.P.C. In the criminal appeal preferred by him before this Court he has been released on bail and the execution of the sentence has been stayed. It has also been stated that his selection is an outcome of fraud and manipulation. However, it was claimed that the appellant was appointed on probation for a period of one year under Regulation 8 of Chapter III of the Regulations, framed under the Act, and in spite of notice having been given to him there had been no improvement in the functioning of the appellant as such the Committee of Management resolved to discharge him from services. 6. The learned Single Judge after going through the records of the writ petitions, the affidavits, exchanged between the parties, and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties came to the conclusion that the order of discharging the appellant is an order simplicitor and not punitive inasmuch as the appellant was appointed for one year’s probation and he has been discharged from service before the expiry of the period of probation. The learned Single Judge, therefore, declined to interfere in the resolution passed by the Committee of Management and accordingly dismissed both the writ petitions. 7. We have heard Sri Irshad Ali, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri J.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the Committee of Management of the Institution in both the appeals. 8. The learned Single Judge, therefore, declined to interfere in the resolution passed by the Committee of Management and accordingly dismissed both the writ petitions. 7. We have heard Sri Irshad Ali, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri J.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the Committee of Management of the Institution in both the appeals. 8. Sri Irshad Ali, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the order dated 26th May, 2009 though does not contain the exact resolution passed by the Committee of Management yet in the counter affidavit filed in the Writ Petition No.33040 of 2009, a copy of the resolution has been enclosed as Annexure No.CA-7 from the perusal of which it will be seen that the order dispensing with the service of the appellant is punitive as it has been passed on the ground that the appellant has not been able to establish his competence on the post of Principal and his work was found unsatisfactory despite notices. He, thus, submitted that the learned Single Judge was not justified in law in upholding the order of discharge as being simplicitor and not punitive in nature. In support of his aforesaid plea he has relied upon the following decisions: 1. Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satvendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and others, AIR 1999 SC 983 . 2. Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India and others, AIR 2000 SC 1401 . 3. A.P.State Fed. Of Coop. Spinning Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. P.v. Swaminathan, JT 2001(3) SC 530 4. Har Dev Singh v. Committee of Management D.B. Santokh Singh Khalsa Inter College, Partab Pura, Agra and another, 2004(3) AWC 2770 5. Tasneem Fatma (Smt) v. State of U.P. And others, (2009) 1 UPLBEC 321. 6. The Committee of Management Hamidia Girls Inter Colelge, Allahabad and another v. The State of U.P. And others, Special Appeal No.5 of 2009, decided on 9th January, 2009. 9. According to him, on 12th January, 2009, the Management of the Institution had issued a show cause notice calling upon the appellant to submit his explanation on ten points to which he had submitted his reply. 9. According to him, on 12th January, 2009, the Management of the Institution had issued a show cause notice calling upon the appellant to submit his explanation on ten points to which he had submitted his reply. However, by another notice dated 20th April, 2009 he was again asked to submit his reply on sixteen points raised therein and it was specifically mentioned therein that if satisfactory explanation is not furnished along with proof, the Committee of Management would consider the question of extending the period of probation or discharging him from service. The same thing was repeated vide letter dated 9th May, 2009 which shows that the Committee of Management had already made up its mind to discharge the appellant from services. Even the reply dated 16th May, 2009 submitted by the appellant has not been taken into consideration by the Committee of Management. All this shows that the decision of discharging the appellant from services is punitive in nature and it casts stigma upon him and, therefore, is liable to be set aside having been passed without holding a regular enquiry. 10. Sri J.P. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant has been convicted under sections 147, 148, 149 and 302 I.P.C. by the Sessions Court. Even though he has been released on bail and the sentence has been suspended it would not wipe out his conviction as this Court has not stayed the operation of the Sessions Court’s judgment. According to him such a person cannot be permitted to continue on the post of Principal of the Institution and if he is allowed to continue it would adversely affect the academic environment in the Institution. He further submitted that even otherwise the appellant was appointed on probation for a period of one year on 2nd July, 2008 and before the period of probation could expire the Committee of Management resolved to discharge him from service as his work was not found satisfactory. The order of discharge is simplicitor in nature and cannot be termed as punitive. 11. He further submitted that sufficient opportunity was given by the Committee of Management to the appellant to improve his working and he having been failed to avail this opportunity, the Committee of Management had rightly resolved to discharge him from services and the reasons given in the resolution did not cast any stigma upon the appellant. 11. He further submitted that sufficient opportunity was given by the Committee of Management to the appellant to improve his working and he having been failed to avail this opportunity, the Committee of Management had rightly resolved to discharge him from services and the reasons given in the resolution did not cast any stigma upon the appellant. In support of his aforesaid plea he has relied upon the following decisions: 1. P.C.Bagha P.G. College, Hathras v. V.C. Agra University, 1980 UPLBEC 119 2. State of U.P. & another v. Kaushal Kishore, 1991(1) SCC 691 . 3. Kunwar Arun Kumar v. U.P. Hills Electronics Corporation Ltd. and others, (1997) 2 SCC 191 . 4. Rajasthan Adult Education Association and another v. Km. Ashok Bhattacharya and another, 1998(78) FLR 347. 5. Hukum Anand Khundia v. Chandigarh Administration and another, 1998(78) FLR 529 6. Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences and another, (2002) 1 SCC 520 7. Ram Swaroop v. Central Administrative Tribunal and others, 2000 (2) AWC 980 8. State of Punjab and others v. Sukhvindar Singh, 2005(5) SCC 569 . 9. State of U.P. And another v. Ram Bachan Tripathi, 2005(6) SCC 496 10. Municipal Committee Sirsa v. Munshi Ram, AIR 2005 SC 792 . 11. Tasneem Fatma (Smt.) v. State of U.P. and others, 2009(1) UPLBEC 321. 12. Director State Civil Aviation U.P. v. Mohd. Rizwan Khan, 2009 (2) LBESR (All) (LB) 12. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the various plea raised by the learned counsel for the parties. It is not in dispute that the appellant was appointed on the post of Principal of the Institution on 2nd July, 2008 on probation for a period of one year. He joined on 3rd July, 2008. In the meantime he was convicted by the Sessions Court for the offence under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302 I.P. C. Even though he has been released on bail and the sentence has been suspended by the Court yet the operation of the order passed by the Sessions Court convicting him has not been stayed. He is still a convict in the murder case. The Committee of Management had given him opportunity to improve his working. He is still a convict in the murder case. The Committee of Management had given him opportunity to improve his working. The appellant has submitted his reply and considering the same the Committee of Management has passed the resolution that the appellant has failed to improve his working and his services be dispensed with. The resolution passed by the Committee of Management had not been sent to the appellant and only a formal decision dispensing with his services has been communicated by the Manager of the Institution. Prima facie the order discharging the appellant from service is an order simplicitor. However, in order to consider as to whether the said order is punitive or not we have to see as to whether it casts a stigma upon the appellant or not and any proceedings which have been taken prior to the order discharging would amount to cast a stigma or not. We may mention here that the learned Single Judge has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Tasneem Fatma(Smt) (supra), which is a case decided by another learned Single Judge of this Court in which the entire case laws upto the year 2008 have been considered and the following principles have been enunciated in paragraph 57 therein: “57.From the above discussions, the principles discernible to find out whether a simple order of termination/discharge of a temporary employee or probationer is punitive or not, broadly, may be stated as under: (a) The termination of services of a temporary servant or probationer under the rules of his employment or in exercise of contractual right is neither per se dismissal nor removal and does not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. (b) An order of termination simplicitor prima facie is not a punishment and carries no evil consequences. (c) Where termination simplicitor is challenged on the ground of casting stigma or penal in nature, the Court initially would glance the order itself to find out whether it cast any stigma and can be said to be penal or not. If it does not, no further enquiry shall be held unless there is some material to show certain circumstances, preceding or attending, shadowing the simplicitorness of the said order. (d) The Court is not precluded from going beyond the order to find out as to whether circumstances, preceding or attending, makes it punitive or not. If it does not, no further enquiry shall be held unless there is some material to show certain circumstances, preceding or attending, shadowing the simplicitorness of the said order. (d) The Court is not precluded from going beyond the order to find out as to whether circumstances, preceding or attending, makes it punitive or not. If the circumstances, preceding or attending, show only the motive of the employer to terminate, it being immaterial would not vitiate the order unless it is found that order is founded on such act or omission constituting misconduct. (e) If the order visits the public servant with evil consequences or casts aspersions against his character or integrity, it would be an order by way of punishment irrespective of whether the employee was a mere probationer or temporary. (f) “Motive” and “foundation” are distinct, though the distinction is either very thin or overlapping. “Motive” is the moving power, which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently. “Motive” is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. “Foundation”, however, is the basis, i.e., the conduct of the employee, When his acts and omissions treated to be misconduct, proved or founded, it becomes a case of foundation. (g) If an order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal, but if it falls short of it, it would not. (h) Where the employer is satisfied of the misconduct and the consequent desirability of termination, it is dismissal even though the order is worded innocuously. However, where there is mere suspicion of misconduct and the employer does not wish to bother about it, and, instead of going into the correctness of guilt, feel like not to keep the employee and thus terminate him, it is simpliciter termination and not punitive. (i) Where the termination simplicitor is preceded by an enquiry, preliminary or regular, the Court would see the purpose, object of such enquiry as also the stage at which, the order of termination has been passed. (j) Every enquiry preceding the order of termination/discharge, would not make it punitive. Where an enquiry contemplated in the rules before terminating an probationer or temporary employee is held, it would not make the order punitive. (j) Every enquiry preceding the order of termination/discharge, would not make it punitive. Where an enquiry contemplated in the rules before terminating an probationer or temporary employee is held, it would not make the order punitive. (k) If the enquiry is to find out whether the employee is fit to be confirmed or retained in service or to continue, such an enquiry would not render termination punitive. (l) Where the employer hold a formal enquiry to find out the correctness of the alleged misconduct of the employee and proceed on the finding thereof, such an order would be punitive, and, cannot be passed without giving an opportunity to the concerned employee. (m) If some formal departmental enquiry commenced but not pursued to the end. Instead a simple order of termination is passed, the motive operating in the mind of the authority would be immaterial and such an order would be non punitive (n) When an order of termination is assailed on the ground of mala fide or arbitrariness, while defending the plea of mala fide, if the authority has referred certain facts justifying the order of discharge relating to misconduct, negligence or inefficiency of the employee in the appeal or in the affidavit filed before the Court, that would not make the order founded on any misconduct. (o) Sometimes when some reason is mentioned in the order, that by itself would not make the order punitive or stigmatic. The following words mentioned in the order have not been held to be punitive. i. “want of application”, ii. “lack of potential”, iii. “found not dependable”, iv. “under suspension”, v. “work is unsatisfactory”, vi. “unlikely to prove an efficient officer”. (p) Description of background facts also have not been held to be stigmatic. (q) However, the words “undesirable to be retained in Government service”, have been held stigmatic. (r) If there is (i) a full scale formal enquiry, (ii) in the allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct, (iii) which culminated in a finding of guilt; where all these three factors are present, the order of termination would be punitive irrespective of the form. However, if any one of three factors is missing, then it would not be punitive.” 13. However, if any one of three factors is missing, then it would not be punitive.” 13. The aforesaid judgment in the case of Tasneem Fatma (Smt.)(supra) has been affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No.5 of 2009, decided on 9th January, 2009, Committee of Management, Hamidia Girls Inter College, Allahabad and another v. The State of U.P. and others. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of Tasneem Fatma (Smt) (supra) and affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court. Applying the principles laid down in the aforesaid case we find that in the present case no formal departmental enquiry had been commenced against the appellant. The appellant had been given three show cause notices calling upon him to furnish explanation on the various points mentioned therein. In the said show cause notices it was specifically mentioned that on the basis of the explanation furnished, the question of extending the period of probation or retaining him in service would be considered. In our considered opinion, the notice issued to the appellant was only to find out his suitability and opportunity to improve his functioning. It did not cast any stigma. The decision taken by the Committee of Management as contained in the resolution dated 24th May, 2009 was not given to the appellant instead he was discharged from service simplicitor by giving one month’s pay. The order, therefore, cannot be held to be punitive or stigmatic in nature. We, therefore, do not find any legal infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 14. We have not dealt with the case laws cited by the learned counsel for the appellant separately as all of them have been considered by a learned Single Judge in the case of Tasneem Fatma (Smt.) (supra) and we have agreed with the law summed up in paragraph 57 of the reports. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the Committee of Management does not lay down any different proposition than what has been summed up in the aforementioned case and therefore are not being separately dealt with. 15. In view of the foregoing discussions, we do not find any merit in these appeals. Both the appeals fail and are dismissed. However, the parties shall bear their own costs. (Appeals dismissed) _____________