JUDGMENT Mr. Mehinder Singh Sullar, J.: - As an identical matrix of the facts and evidence is involved between the parties with respect to similar subject matter i.e. quarter Nos.317 and 318 therefore, I propose to dispose of above indicated two regular second appeals, by virtue of this common judgment, in order avoid the repetition. 2. However, the conspectus of the facts, culminating in the commencement, relevant for deciding the present appeals and emanating from the record, is that the quarter Nos. 316 to 318, situated in Preet Nagar Colony, Sodal Road, Opposite Park, Jalandhar City, were allotted to one Mangu Ram son of Mehar Chand, by the office of Regional Settlement Commissioner, Jalandhar, by way of allotment letters dated 10.1.1957 (Ex.RI & Ex.R2), in lieu of his claim for immovable property, left by him in West Pakistan, under the provisions of The PON Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. Piara Singh (plaintiff) was already in possession of these quarters. Mangu Ram agreed to sell quarters No. 317 and 318 and executed the agreements dated 29.12.1969 & 28.7.1969 (Ex.P5 and E.x.P1) in his favour for a total consideration of Rs.6300/- + 6100/- respectively. Mango Ram received the entire consideration amount at the time of execution of agreements. He also executed a power of attorney (Lx.P3), appointing the original plaintiff to do all acts in respect of said quarters. Thereafter, the plaintiff claimed to have repeatedly asked Mangu Ram, who promised to register the sale deed its soon as lie received the conveyance deed from the Government, but in vain. Mango Ram died, leaving behind the defendants as his LRs/daughters. According to the plaintiff that alter the death of Mangu Ram, their LRs are trying to obtain the conveyance deed in their name in collusion with the staff without an legal right. 3. Mango Ram died, leaving behind the defendants as his LRs/daughters. According to the plaintiff that alter the death of Mangu Ram, their LRs are trying to obtain the conveyance deed in their name in collusion with the staff without an legal right. 3. Aggrieved by the conduct of LRs of Mangu Ram i.e. Lila Wanti appellant-defendant No.1 and Palo proforma respondent No. 2-defendant No.2 (for brevity “the-defendants), original plaintiff (Piara Singh son of Ishar Singh (since decesed)”p.ow, be­ing represented by his LRs (for short “the original plaintiff’), filed two suits for a decree of declara­tion to the effect that he (original plaintiff) was owner and in possession, with a consequential re­lief of permanent injunction, restraining the defen­dants from dispossessing him and from alienating the quarters in dispute in any manner, He also sought a decree for specific performance of the agreements to sell (Ex.PI and Ex.P5) executed in his favour by Mango Ram, with respect to the quar­ters in question. 4. The case set up by the original plaintiff, in brief in so far as relevant, was that he was in long and adverse possession of the disputed quarters, which were allotted to Mango Ram. He agreed to sell the same to him (original plaintiff), by means of agreements (Ex.PI & Ex.P5) and received the total consideration amount at the time of its execution. Having purchased the quarters, the original plaintiff got 10 HP electric connection and installed a flour mill there. He claimed to have deposited a sum of as fees for issuance of conveyance deed of quarters No. 317 and 318 in the name of original allottee, but defendant No. 1 is trying to get the conveyance deed issued in her favour with intent to alienate the quarters in question to some body else. The original plaintiff asked the defendants not to do so but in vain and defendant No. I obtained the conveyance deed in her favour. It necessitated the original plaintiff to file the present two suits in this respect. 5. Levelling a variety of allegations and narrating the sequence of events in detail, in all, the original “plaintiff claimed that he was a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration and was in long possession of the disputed quarters, but the defendants intend to disturb his ownership and possession, with­out any legal basis and refused to execute the sale deed, in pursuance of the indicated agreements. On the basis of aforesaid allegations, the original plaintiff filed the two suits for a decree of declaration/permanent injunction and for a specific performance of the contract against the defendants, in the manner depicted hereinabove. 6. The defendants contested the suits and filed the written statements, interalia pleading certain preliminary objections of, maintainability of the suits, limitation, cause of action and locus standi of the original plaintiff. Likewise, the factum of execu­tion of agreements (Ex.PI & Ex.P5) and receipt of amount of consideration by Mangu Ram was denied. It was claimed that even if the agreements are proved to have been executed, the same are without consideration and knowledge of the defendants. It was claimed that the original plaintiff had been given the quarters in dispute on rent. It will not be out of place to mention here that the defendants have stoutly denied all other allegations contained in the plaints and prayed for dismissal of the suits. 7. In the wale of pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the essential issues for proper adjudication of the suits. 8. The parties to the lis, produced on record the oral as well as documentary evidence, in order-to sub­stantiate their respective pleaded cases. 9. The trial Court, after taking into consideration the entire evidence on record, decreed both the suits of the original plaintiff for declaration, injunction as well as for specific performance of the agree­ments and directed the defendants to get the sale deed executed within a period of two months by way of impugned judgments and decrees dated 4.6.1985. 10. Dissatisfied with the decisions of the trial Court, the defendants filed two appeals, which were dismissed as well. However, the judgments and decrees of the trial Court to the extent are modi­fied. The decrees of specific performance of the agreements to sell were passed and defendants were further directed to execute the sale deed in fa­vour of original plaintiff within a period of three months, by the 1st Appellate Court through the me­dium of impugned judgment and decree dated 8.11.1986. 11. The appellant-defendant No.1 still did not feel satisfied with the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below and preferred the instant regu­lar second appeals. That is how I am seized of the matter. 12. 11. The appellant-defendant No.1 still did not feel satisfied with the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below and preferred the instant regu­lar second appeals. That is how I am seized of the matter. 12. At the very outset assailing the impugned judg­ments and decrees, the learned counsel for appel­lant defendant has contended with some amount of vehemence that since the conveyance deed vas not issued by the Rehabilitation Department, so, Mangu Ram was not competent to alienate the disputed quarters, vide agreements to sell (Ex.PI and 11 Ex.5). The argument is that the conveyance deed was issued in favour of defendant No.1 on 16.12.1982 and as there was no privity of contract between the original plaintiff and defendant No.1, therefore, the suits of the original plaintiff ere not maintainable and the Courts below committed a mistake and wrongly decreed the suits. The sub-mission further proceeds that assuming for the sake of argument, the agreements (Ex.Pl and 4 Ex.P5) are duly proved, even then, the provisions of Sec­tion 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter to be referred as “the Act”) have been ignored by the Courts below. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in case Vimaleshwar Nagappa Shet v. Noor Ahmed Sheriff & Ors. 2011(3) Civil Court Cases 673 (SC). 13. On the contrary, hailing the impugned judgments and decrees, the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs urged that it stands proved on record that the quarters in question were allotted to Mangu Ram, who sold the same to the original plaintiff and received the total consideration amount, in lieu of the agreements to sell (Ex.Pl and Ex.P5). The possession of original plaintiff is ad­mitted by the defendants. The argument is that since both the Courts below have recorded a find­ing of fact based on the evidence that Mangu Ram had sold the disputed quarters to the original plaintiff and no substantial question of law is involved, so, no interference is warranted by this Court, as en­visaged under Section 100 CPC in the impugned judgments and decrees. In this respect, he has relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh & Anr., [2008(2) Law Herald (P&H) 896 (SC)] : 2008 AIR (SC) 1749. 14. In this respect, he has relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh & Anr., [2008(2) Law Herald (P&H) 896 (SC)] : 2008 AIR (SC) 1749. 14. Having heard the learned counsel for the par­ties having gone through the record With their valuable assistance and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to my mind, there is no merit in the instant regular second appeals in this context. 15. As is evident from the record that the quarter Nos. 316 to 318 were allotted to one Mangu Ram by the office of Regional Settlement Commissioner, Jalandhar, by means of allotment letters dated 10.1.1957 (Ex.RI & Ex.R2), in lieu of his claim for immovable property left by him in West Pakistan, According to the plaintiff that Mangu Ram (original allottee) agreed to sell the quarters m question, executed the agreements (Ex.PI and Ex.P5) respectively in his favour and received the entire consideration amount. The defendants have denied the execution of agreements, but admitted the possession of the original plaintiff over the indicated quarters. 16. Sequelly, the trial Court as well as the 1st Appellate Court after considering the entire material on record in the right perspective, have recorded the finding of fact that the execution of agreements and receipt of entire amount as sale consideration by Mangu Ram, are duly proved on record. The learned counsel for the appellant-defendant did not point out any material, muchless cogent, to contend as to how and in what manner any interference is warranted in these findings of fact in this regard. All other arguments, relatable to the appreciation of evidence containing minor discrepancies now sought to be urged on her behalf, have already been duly considered and decided by the Courts below. 17. Such thus being the position & evidence on record now the short and significant question though important that arises for determination in these appeals is, as to whether the agreements to sell (Ex.P1 and Ex.P5) are enforceable in law or not? 18. Having regard to the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties, to me, the answer must obviously be in the affirmative, as the indicated agreements, which are otherwise proved, already acted upon & implemented, are legally enforceable. 19. 18. Having regard to the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties, to me, the answer must obviously be in the affirmative, as the indicated agreements, which are otherwise proved, already acted upon & implemented, are legally enforceable. 19. What is not disputed here is on record that the quarters in question were assessed to house tax in the name of original plaintiff for the assessment year 1971 (PW1). He installed 10 Horse Power electric motor for running a flour mill in the quarters in dispute since 1970. Not only that, the indicated quarters stand in the name of original plaintiff in the record of Municipal Corporation. If the crux of the entire evidence, with regard to execution of agreements (Ex.PI and. Ex.P5), receipt of the entire consideration amount by Mangu Ram, ownership and possession of original plaintiff recorded in the record of Municipality and payment of house tax by him, as discussed hereinabove, are put together, then, to my mind, the conclusion is inescapable and irresistible that the agreements to sell were duly acted upon/implemented and Mangu Ram had the clear intention to sell the disputed quarters to the original plaintiff and received the total consideration amount mere fact that the conveyance deed as not issued by the department in the name of Mangu Ram, during his life time, in pursuance of allotment letters (Ex.Rl and Ex.R2) ipso facto, is no ground to negate the claim of the original plaintiff, in this relevant behalf had Mangu Ram not died on 1.1.1981, then the conveyance deed would have been executed/issued in his favour. In this manner, to me, Mangu Ram had rightly executed the agreements to sell (Ex.Pl and Ex.P5) in favour of original plaintiff alter allotment of quarters to him and received the entire consideration amount. 20. Faced with the situation, the next celebrated argument and vague pleading of the defendants that the original plaintiff was in possession of the quarters in question as a tenant, is devoid of merit and remained an unfolded mystery. No cogent evidence from the Municipal Corporation or any other source is forthcoming on record to prove the tenancy of the original plaintiff. 21. It is not a matter of dispute that the relationship of landlord and tenant only comes into existence as a result of bilateral agreement. No cogent evidence from the Municipal Corporation or any other source is forthcoming on record to prove the tenancy of the original plaintiff. 21. It is not a matter of dispute that the relationship of landlord and tenant only comes into existence as a result of bilateral agreement. It may be implied from the acts and conduct of the parties, which may indicate that the landlord ever intended to divest himself of the possession of the premises and to give it to the tenant that the tenant intended to assume possession thereof. One of the most important circumstances, from which, the inference of tenancy may be drawn, is the payment of rent. Meaning thereby, the payment of rent is a normal incident of tenancy and on the other end, the fact that no rent was paid would lead one to a contrary conclusion and negative the existence of such relationship of landlord and tenant. When there is an implicit intention of the landlord to create tenancy rights in the property, the tenancy only comes into existence as a result of bilateral agreement and payment of rent etc., which are totally lacking in the instant case. 22. On the contrary, there is a positive evidence on record that the quarters in question were assessed to house tax in the name of original plaintiff for the assessment year 1971 and he has been recorded as owner and in possession of the same in the Municipal record. 23. Again, it is not a matter of dispute that after the death of Mangu Ram, defendant No.1 managed and obtained the conveyance deed dated 16.12.1982 in her favour. Once the conveyance deed was executed in her favour after the death of Mangu Ram, in that eventuality, possibly, she cannot escape her liability, being LR of Mangu Ram, arising out and in lieu of the agreements to sell, as contemplated under Section 19 of the Act. 24. Now adverting to the other argument of learned counsel for appellant- defendant that the Courts be­low have not exercised their discretion, in view of Section 2C of the Act. is neither tenable nor the ob­servations of Hon’ble Apex Court in Vimleshwar Nagappa’s case (supra) are at all applicable to the facts of the present case, wherein, the agreement of sale dated 2.5.1988 does not refer to Defendant No. 3. at all or his share in the property. is neither tenable nor the ob­servations of Hon’ble Apex Court in Vimleshwar Nagappa’s case (supra) are at all applicable to the facts of the present case, wherein, the agreement of sale dated 2.5.1988 does not refer to Defendant No. 3. at all or his share in the property. However, in the plaint, the plaintiff clearly admitted the share of Defendant No.3 who was a minor and the fact that no guardian was appointed for the minor and De­fendant No.2 was not his natural guardian. Without Defendant No.3 joining the other co-sharers, no agreement of sale could be entered with the plain­tiff for the entire property including the minor’s share. So, on the peculiar facts and in the special circumstances of that case, it was observed as under (paras 12 and 13):­- “12. It is also clear that the High Court has re­corded in the impugned judgment dated 03.03.2009 that the counsel agreed with in­structions from the plaintiff and reiterated this fact in its order dated 28.08.2009 in Misc. Civil No: 13474 of 2009 in the above-mentioned RFA while rejecting the plea of the counsel for the appellant herein that he did not his clients. A concession made by a counsel on a question of fact is binding on the client, but if it is on a question of law, it is not binding. [vide: Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sumpati Subha Rao & Anr. 1963(2) SCR 208 B.S. Bajwa & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors. 1998(2) SCC 523 , 525-5261. 13. As stated earlier and the reading of the im­pugned judgment and order of the High Court, more particularly, para 7, which is concluding paragraph, clearly show that it is a consent or­der. As per Section 96(3) of the Civil Proce­dure Code, no appeal lies from a decree passed by the court With the consent of the parties. 25. Possibly no one can dispute with regard to the aforesaid observations but, to me, the same would not come to the rescue of the defendants in the present controversy. Since the statutory conditions are deeply lacking, so, the provisions of Section 20 of the Act are not at all applicable to the facts, particularly when in the instant case. 25. Possibly no one can dispute with regard to the aforesaid observations but, to me, the same would not come to the rescue of the defendants in the present controversy. Since the statutory conditions are deeply lacking, so, the provisions of Section 20 of the Act are not at all applicable to the facts, particularly when in the instant case. The agreements (Ex.PI and Ex.P5) have already been acted upon and implemented in the manner discussed herein­before and when both the Courts concurrently decreed the suits for specific performance of the indicated agreements. Therefore, the contrary submissions of learned counsel for the appellant-defendant “stricto sense” deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances. 26. Meaning thereby, the Courts below have taken into consideration and appreciated the entire relevant evidence brought on record by the parties in the right perspective. Having scanned the admissible evidence in relation to the pleadings of the parties, they have recorded the aforementioned findings of fact. Such findings of fact based on the appraisal of evidence, cannot possibly be interfered with by this Court. While exercising the powers conferred under section 100 CPC, unless and until, the same are illegal and perverse. As no such patent illegality or legal infirmity have been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant, therefore, the impugned judgments and decrees de­serve to be and are hereby maintained, in the ob­taining circumstances of the present case. 27. Likewise, the entire matter revolves around the re-appreciation and re- appraisal of the evidence on record, which is not legally permissible and is beyond the scope of second appeal. Since no question of law, muchless substantial, is involved, so no interference is warranted, in the impugned judgments/decrees, in view of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kashmir Singh’s case (supra). 28. No other meaningful argument/point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned counsel for the parties. 29. In the light of aforementioned reasons, as there is no merit, therefore, the instant appeals are hereby dismissed as such.