ORDER N. Kumar, J. The revenue has preferred, this appeal challenging the order passed by the Tribunal [2010 (251) E.L.T. 459 (Tri.&Bang.)] which dismissed the application filed by the Revenue under the provisions of Section 35C(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 seeking condonation of delay in filing the application for rectification of the mistake on the ground that the Tribunal is not vested with the power to condone the delay. 2. The appeal No. E/161/07 was disposed of by the Tribunal on merits by an order dated 21-8-2007 allowing the appeal of the assessee. The revenue preferred a miscellaneous application for rectification of mistake under the provisions of Section 35C(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (for short hereinafter referred to as "Act") on 10-12-2008 for rectifying the mistake. It is. apparent on the face of the record that the mistake pointed out was the decision relied on by the Tribunal in the case of M/s. Godavari Sugar Mills Limited vs. CCE, Belgaum, 2007 (212) E.L.T. 234 (Tri.&Bang.) wherein the final products were under different chapter and the input was molasses while in Appeal No. E/161/2007, the inputs were chemicals and other products which were used in the manufacture of molasses and molasses was classifiable under Chapter sub-hearing No. 1703 10 00 and it was an intermediate produce and not the final product. This is the mistake which is sought to be brought to the notice of the Tribunal by the Revenue. It was found that the certified copy of the CESTAT Final Order was received by revenue on 17-9-2007 and the revenue filed the application for rectification of mistake on 10-12-2008 beyond the six months period prescribed under law for filing such a rectification application. Therefore, the application for condonation of delay in filing the application for rectification was filed. The said application was opposed contending that there is no provision in the Act for the Tribunal to condone the delay. On the contrary, the revenue contended that the Tribunal has inherent power to condone the delay. After hearing both the parties and also referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sunitadevi Singhania Hospital Trust and Another Vs. Union of India and Another, JT (2008) 13 SC 360. The Tribunal held that the said judgment of the Apex Court has no application to. After hearing both the parties and also referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sunitadevi Singhania Hospital Trust and Another Vs. Union of India and Another, JT (2008) 13 SC 360. The Tribunal held that the said judgment of the Apex Court has no application to. the facts of this case and the provisions of Section 35C(2) of the Act did not empower the Tribunal to condone the delay in filing the application for rectification of the mistake filed belatedly and thus the application for condonation of delay and consequently the application for rectification of mistake were dismissed by the Tribunal. Aggrieved by the same, the revenue has preferred this appeal. 3. Section 35C(2) of the Act reads as under: The Appellate Tribunal may, at any time within (6 months) from the date of order with a view of rectifying any mistake apparent from the record amend any order passed by it under Sub-section (1) and shall make such amendments if the mistake is brought to its notice by the (Commissioner of Central Excise) or the other party to the appeal. 4. A perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that the power is conferred on the Appellate Tribunal to rectify any mistake apparent from the record and amend any order passed by it under Sub-section (1) However, six months' is the time within which such mistake to be rectified The said provision does not expressly provide for condonation of delay in filing an application for rectification. 5. In those circumstances, the question for consideration is: Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act in particular Section 5 has application or whether the Tribunal can exercise its inherent power and condone such delay?. 6. The three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise Vs. Hongo India (P) Ltd. and Another, (2009) 315 ITR 449 SC dealing with the jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter of. condonation of delay beyond the limit prescribed under the Act after referring to the earlier judgments of the Court held as under: Through, an argument was raised based on Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming that Section 29(2) would be attracted what we have to determine is whether the provisions of this Section are expressly excluded in the case of reference to High Court. It was contended before us that the words "expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions, of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law here in this case is Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein, are such that the legislature intended it to be a complete Code by itself which, alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In others words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 support the conclusion that the time limit prescribed under Section 35H(1) to make a reference to High Court is absolute and unextendable by Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well settled law that it is the duty of the Court to respect the legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking, the provisions of Section 5 of the Act. 7. In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, if the Tribunal has respected, the legislative intent whereby legislature did not expressly or impliedly state that either Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable or the delay in passing an order on an application for rectification could be condoned, it is not possible to hold, that the Tribunal committed any irregularity in rejecting the application for rectification on the ground that it is barred by time. In the instant case, after the order of the Tribunal is passed, the revenue has refunded the money to the Assessee. Even at this stage they did not apply their mind. It is only on rejection of the duty paid by the Assessee and nearly after 14 1/2 months the application for rectification is made. The delay itself would be around 8 1/2 months. Therefore, seen from both the angles, we do not see any justification to entertain this appeal. 8. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.