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2011 DIGILAW 1773 (ALL)

PRAMOD KUMAR v. STATE OF U. P.

2011-07-22

SUDHIR AGARWAL

body2011
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 2. Petitioner’s fire-arm licence was placed under suspension by Collector vide order dated 11.12.2008. Petitioner came to this Court in Writ Petition No. 3656 of 2009 and the said order dated 11.12.2008 was quashed by this Court by following order: “Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, this writ petition is being disposed of at this stage without calling for a counter-affidavit. By means of the impugned order dated 11.12.2008, after suspending the arms license of the petitioner, he has been required to show-cause as to why his license should not be cancelled. This Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 58216 of 2005 (Ajay Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. and others) wherein, after considering the Full Bench decision of this Court in the cases of Balaram Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 1988 AWC 1481. Kailash Nath v. State of U.P., 1985 AWC 493 , as well as the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sadri Ram v. District Magistrate, Azamgarh and others, 1998 All CJ 1449, has held that the arms license cannot be placed under suspension pending enquiry. In such view of the matter the suspension of the arms license of the petitioner as directed by the impugned order dated 11.12.2008 is liable to be quashed. Accordingly, this writ petition stands partly allowed. The suspension of the arms license of the petitioner by the impugned order dated 11.12.2008 is quashed. If in pursuance of the suspension order of the licensed weapon of the petitioner has been seized, the same shall be released to the petitioner forthwith. However, the respondents shall proceed to take appropriate action with regard to the cancellation of the arms license of the petitioner in accordance with law. In case if the petitioner has not submitted his reply to the show-cause notice, he may do so within a month from today and thereafter the respondent authorities shall be at liberty to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.” 3. This Court clearly took a view that arms licence cannot be placed under suspension pending inquiry and, therefore, the order is without jurisdiction. This Court clearly took a view that arms licence cannot be placed under suspension pending inquiry and, therefore, the order is without jurisdiction. However, this Court permitted the Collector to make inquiry and pass final order with respect to cancellation of licence, if so required. The Collector in a complete strange manner passed a fresh order on 19.3.2009 suspending fire-arm licence of petitioner again observing that this Court has permitted him to pass a fresh order of suspension after giving opportunity of hearing to petitioner. Either the simple English language in judgment was not appreciated or not read at all by Collector himself or his understanding is extremely poor. The judgement is very categorical and clear. It quashes the order of suspension on the ground that Collector did not possess any such power following decision of Full Bench in Balram Singh (supra) and Division Bench decision in Sadri Ram (supra). Such kind of understanding on the part of an officer holding the office of District Magistrate is really surprising. If this is the level of understanding and appreciation, this Court feels pity on the situation as to how such kind of officers would be able to manage more onerous duties administration of the district. 4. The matter did not rest here. Castigating the approach and manner in which District Magistrate had acted in this case, this Court passed a detailed order on 7.7.2009 clearly observing, “it is very surprising that the District magistrate has not understood the contents of order dated 30.1.2009, as the said order clearly mentioned that the suspension of the fire-arm licence of petitioner by the impugned order dated 11.12.2008 is quashed but the show-cause notice issued alongwith the suspension order was not quashed and the final order was to be passed after considering the reply of the petitioner to the show-cause notice. . . . Surprisingly, the District Magistrate has again placed the fire-arms licence of the petitioner under suspension.” 5. . . . Surprisingly, the District Magistrate has again placed the fire-arms licence of the petitioner under suspension.” 5. Despite this order and direction issued to respondents to file counter-affidavit, in the entire counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 3, which has been sworn by one Radhey Shyam, Senior Administrative Officer, Collectorate, Hamirpur, nothing has been said on this aspect of the matter and an attempt has been made to justify the order of suspension on merits that the petitioner is a person of doubtful activities and, therefore, there was a apprehension of misuse of fire-arm hence his licence was placed under suspension. 6. This Court never considered the question on the merit whether the suspension was warranted or not but has considered the very jurisdiction of District Magistrate and thereafter has passed the aforesaid judgment. It is not the case of respondents that said judgement has been reversed or set aside in appeal. On the contrary it is not disputed between parties that judgement dated 30.1.2009 has attained finality. 7. In the circumstances, I have no manner of doubt that the impugned order cannot sustain. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 19.3.2009 is hereby quashed. 8. Considering the manner in which the respondent No. 3 has acted in this case and has shown his total lack of understanding of a simple matter, in my view, it is a fit case where a heavy cost should be imposed upon respondent No. 3 for causing an avoidable litigation by passing wholly illegal and unwarranted order. The petitioner is thus entitled to costs quantified to Rs. 50,000/- against respondent No. 3. It is made clear that at first instance respondent No. 1 shall pay cost to the petitioner but it shall have the liberty to recover the amount of cost from the officer concerned holding the office of respondent No. 3, after holding such inquiry as permissible in law. —————