JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. 1. All the aforesaid five writ appeals are arising out of a common judgment passed by a learned Single Judge, dismissing five writ petitions, upholding their compulsory retirement from service. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 25.06.2008, passed in WP (C) Nos. 5914 of 2004, 4750 of 2004, 2610 of 2005, 2616 of 2005, 3027 of 2005 the writ Petitioners are challenging the said judgment in these appeals. 2. We have heard Sri A.C. Borbora, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants as well as Sri S.N. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the Publication Board, Assam, and Sri A.K. Phookan, learned Advocate General for the State. We have also gone through the impugned judgment and the pleadings of both the parties. Learned Counsel for the Board also produced the relevant files and Resolution registers, as per our order, and those have also been perused. 3. Facts necessary for disposal of the writ appeals are that the Publication Board, Assam, had 53 (fifth-three) employees on its roll. It came into existence in the year 1958, inter alia, to extend its services for the purpose of publication of historical manuscripts, publishing literatures in different languages, compiling and publishing Anglo-Assamese dictionary, historical books etc. Due to various factors the Publication Board turned to be a non-profitable and the situation came to such a pass that it could not pay regular salaries of the employees for 20 (twenty) months and it also could not contribute Provident Fund subscriptions and LIC premiums of the employees nearly for 6 (six) years. To overcome the financial crunch it approached the Government of Assam, who agreed to provide necessary fund to introduce Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS in short). On receipt of requisite fund the Board decided to prune the employees strength to 15 (fifteen). As per its Resolution dated 23.2.2004 the Board took a policy decision to introduce VRS Scheme. In the next meeting held on 8.5.2000 the Board approved both the VRS as well as compulsory retirement of its employees and authorized the Executive Committee to take appropriate action and advise the Board in this regard under Resolution Nos. 3.01 and 3.02. 4. As per its Resolution dated 23.2.2004 the Board took a policy decision to introduce VRS Scheme. In the next meeting held on 8.5.2000 the Board approved both the VRS as well as compulsory retirement of its employees and authorized the Executive Committee to take appropriate action and advise the Board in this regard under Resolution Nos. 3.01 and 3.02. 4. Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution s of the Board the Executive Committee took a general decision in its meeting held on 28.5.2000 that the employees may be sent on compulsory retirement, as may be required and deemed necessary. 5. The Resolution registers reveal that both the Board as well as the Executive Committee of the Board sat quite over the matter and the Resolutions, pertaining to VRS and CRS, were not pursued for few years. 6. Suddenly, the Secretary of the Board issued a general notice on 19.03.2004, inviting options from the employees, willing to accept VRS. Soon thereafter the Secretary himself took a decision on 5.4.2004 that five persons (Appellants herein) do not deserve to be retained in service as their service records reveal that these employees are not furthering the interest of the Board and, as such, these employees should be sent on compulsory retirement. Consequent to this decision another notice was published on 29.04.2004, intimating the employees that those who have not offered for VRS may also be considered for compulsory retirement. Finally, 27 (twenty-seven) persons were retired under VRS and the writ Petitioners/Appellant (5 Nos.) were given compulsory retirement. Being aggrieved by their compulsory retirement the writ petitions were filed and having lost in the writ petitions the present set of appeals have been filed. 7. It is the settled position of law that writ appeal is not a statutory appeal. Essentially, it is an in-house method of scrutinizing Single Judge's judgments on the motion of aggrieved parties. However, Single Judge's judgments are interfered with only if the findings are perverse and/or reasoning is not based on record. In other words, the writ Appellants are required to make a strong case of perversity or patent error in the impugned judgments. 8. With regard to the contours of judicial review of an order of compulsory retirement the legal principles have been succinctly laid down in the case of Baldev Raj Chadha v. Union of India, reported in (1980)4 SCC 321 . 8. With regard to the contours of judicial review of an order of compulsory retirement the legal principles have been succinctly laid down in the case of Baldev Raj Chadha v. Union of India, reported in (1980)4 SCC 321 . In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the orders of compulsory retirement are not immune from judicial review and the onus is on the State to furnish materials before court to justify its action in public interest in the following words: 8... When an order is challenged and its validity depends on its being supported by public interest the State must disclose the material so that the court may be satisfied that the order is not bad for want of any material whatever which, to a reasonable man reasonably instructed in the law, is sufficient to sustain the grounds of 'public interest' justifying forced retirement of the public servant. Judges cannot substitute their judgment for that of the Administrator but they are not absolved form the minimal review well settled in administrative law and founded on constitutional obligations. The limitations on judicial power in this area are well known and we are confined to an examination of the material merely to see whether a rational mind may conceivably be satisfied that the compulsory retirement of the officer concerned is necessary in public interest. 9. In a plethora of judgments it has also been held that an order of compulsory retirement does not amount to punishment and hence principles of natural justice is not required to be observed, while asking an Officer to go on compulsory retirement (judgments reported in AIR 1991 SC 534 and AIR 1992 SCC 1020 and (1992)2 SCC 299 may be referred). Similarly, in the case Madhya Pradesh State Co-operative Diary Federation Limited v. Rajnesh Kumar Jamindar and other reported in (2009)15 SCC 221 , the Apex Court has reiterated the principles governing the field of compulsory retirement. Their Lordships have held that this provision has been made in the service jurisprudence to weed out dead wood and an order of compulsory retirement, being not panel in nature, can be subject to judicial review, if it is found that-i) it is based on no material, ii) it is arbitrary, iii) it is without application of mind; iv) there is no evidence in support of the case. 10. 10. In the aforesaid case, the earlier judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das vs. Chief District Medical Officer, reported in (1992)2 SCC 299 : AIR 1992 SCC 1020, Umed Bhai M. Patel vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (2001)3 SCC 314 were followed, wherein their Lordships laid certain guidelines for reviewing an order of compulsory retirement. 11. In the case of Baikuntha Nath Das (supra), the Apex Court culled-out the following principles in respect to compulsory retirement. The guidelines given in the case are as below: 34. The following principles emerge from the above discussion: (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the Government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether, (emphasis is ours) While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide, or (b) that it is based on no evidence, or (c) that it is arbitrary-in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order. (iv) The Government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter-of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. 12. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. 12. In State of Gujarat vs. Umedbhai M. Patel (supra), the Apex Court has reiterated the law of compulsory retirement as below: 11. The law relating too compulsory retirement has now crystallized into definite principles, which could be broadly summarized thus: (i) Whenever the services of a public servant are no longer useful to the general administration, the officer can be compulsorily retired for the sake of public interest. (ii) Ordinarily, the order of compulsory retirement is not to be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the Constitution. (iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off dead wood, but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after having due regard to the entire service record of the officer. (iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record shall be taken note of and be given due weightage in passing such order. (v) Even uncommunicated entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration. (vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more desirable. (vii) If the officer was given a promotion despite adverse entries made in the confidential record that is a fact in favour of the officer. (viii) Compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitive measure. 13. In view of the aforesaid authorities from the Apex Court the High Court would be well within its limit and jurisdiction to scrutinize the justiciability of the compulsory retirement of the Appellants, albeit, keeping in mind that the learned Single Judge has upheld such orders. 14. Sri Borbora, learned senior Counsel for the Appellants advanced his arguments almost verbatim, what was argued before the learned Single Judge, while assailing the impugned judgment. In other words, learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the impugned orders of compulsory retirement were illegal, invalid and non est in law inasmuch as the orders were passed by an authority not empowered under the relevant rules. The learned Counsel also contended, although in feeble voice, that the Appellants could not have been compulsorily retired with the aid of FR 56 (b). The learned Counsel also contended, although in feeble voice, that the Appellants could not have been compulsorily retired with the aid of FR 56 (b). Sri Borbora also submitted that instead of retaining few employees, who had opted for VRS the Respondents picked up the Appellants for compulsory retirement and this amounts to malafide action. 15. We would like to make it clear that our focus would be more to see whether compulsory retirement of the Appellants was in public interest or was it a mere subjective satisfaction of the Secretary of the Publication Board. Be that as it may, we would like to mention here that in the case of Chairman and M.D, Indian Overseas Bank v. Tribhuwan Nath Srivastava (Civil Appeal No. 1186 of 2005-D/O on 4.2.2011). The Supreme Court has held that it is the employers legitimate discretion whether to accept an offer of voluntary retirement and the courts ordinarily should not questions such legitimate exercise of discretion. In this way, the submissions of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that instead of accepting offers of voluntary retirement by few other employees and sending the Appellants to go on compulsory retirement is illegal and unjust cannot be accepted by us. In our considered opinion the Publication Board will be within its jurisdiction to send its employees on voluntary retirement under FR (b) and FR (j) and in larger interest of the Board. 16. During the course of hearing Shri Sarma, learned Counsel for the Board, produced the Rules of the Publication Board. Rule 5 deals with the business of the Board; Rule 7 details the business of the Executive Committee and Rule 9 stipulates duties and powers of the Secretary. Under Rule 5(1), the Publication Board shall sit, at least, twice in a year and, inter alia, to decide all policy matters of the Board. Rule 6 is about the Constitution of the Executive Committee. Under Rule 7, the Executive Committee shall sit, at least, once in every three months. Under Rule 8, the Executive Committee has been delegated certain powers, which shall be subject to the approval of the Board. Under Rule 9, it has been provided that the Secretary shall carry out the decisions of the Board and that of the Executive Committee and perform certain other functions. Under Rule 8, the Executive Committee has been delegated certain powers, which shall be subject to the approval of the Board. Under Rule 9, it has been provided that the Secretary shall carry out the decisions of the Board and that of the Executive Committee and perform certain other functions. The Secretary has to, therefore, carry out the decisions of the Board and of its Executive Committee and cannot act beyond what may have been so decided. For ready reference Rule 9(ii), (v) and (vi) are extracted below: 9. Duties and powers of the Secretary: (i) ***** ***** ***** (ii) To carry out the decisions of the Board and of the Executive Committee. (iii) & (iv) ***** ***** ***** (v) To perform all other functions as may be required for carrying out the purposes of the Board. (vi) To appoint Lower Division Assistants and 4th Grade employees and to recommend action against the employees to the Executive Committee. (Upper Divisions Assistants shall be appointed by the Executive Committee.). (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) and (xi) ***** ***** 17. As noted earlier, the Resolution registers are totally silent to show that any meeting of the Board was held after 8.5.2000 and that of Executive Committee after 28.5.2000 till the Secretary of the Board, on his own, issued general notice of VRS on 19.3.2004 and his decision taken on 5.4.2004 to send the Appellants on compulsory retirement. 18. Apparently, the Secretary was not delegated with the power or authority to finalise the list of employees, who may be allowed to avail VRS nor was the Secretary delegated the power and/or authority to send employees on compulsory retirement. Under Rule 9(vi), the Secretary can, at best, recommend to the Executive Committee, if he wishes any action to be taken against its employees. However, in the present case, the Secretary has sent as many as five persons, including a Circulation officer, Accountant, Library Assistant etc., on compulsory retirement, which is per-se not in conformity to Rule 9(vi) and other provisions of the said Rule. As per Resolution Nos. 3.01 and 3.02, the Executive Committee was also asked to advise the Publication Board as to how to implement the VRS and its decision on compulsory retirement of its employees. To put it differently, even the Executive Committee was not given absolute power to take decisions under VRS and CRS. 19. As per Resolution Nos. 3.01 and 3.02, the Executive Committee was also asked to advise the Publication Board as to how to implement the VRS and its decision on compulsory retirement of its employees. To put it differently, even the Executive Committee was not given absolute power to take decisions under VRS and CRS. 19. Although the Writ Petitioner had specifically raised the question of authority and jurisdiction of the Secretary to issue orders of compulsory retirement, the learned Single Judge has rejected the contention holding that the Secretary had just carried out the decision of the Board and the Executive Committee. However, after going through the relevant files and the Resolution registers, we do not find anything on record that the Secretary had at all apprised the Executive Committee of the names of the persons, who had opted for VRS, far less any decision by the Executive Committee to recommend to the Board about compulsory retirement of the Appellants. 20. In view of the above, we hold that the orders of compulsory retirement of the Appellants are bad in law and consequentially, unsustainable. As a corollary, the impugned orders of compulsory retirement vis-a-vis the judgment of the learned Single Judge are hereby set aside. All the five writ appeals stand allowed. However, instead of passing any order for reinstatement of the Appellants, we direct the Publication Board to reconsider compulsory retirement of the Appellants and pass appropriate orders in accordance with its rules and bye laws, if any. This exercise shall be done within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 21. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we leave both the parties to bear their own expenses of the proceedings. Appeal allowed.